Aitia

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Aitia , Greek αἰτία , can be translated with cause . Aristotle uses this term in a broader sense. The meaning of this central Aristotelian term can often be given as a reason or also an explanation : A necessary condition for having knowledge of something is to be able to state one's aitiai . For Aristotle there are four of these:

  1. the material cause (in medieval tradition: causa materialis ): for example, causes that lie in which materials are used to build a house;
  2. the effective cause ( causa efficiens ): the causality in the narrower sense; here the work of those who carry out the building process;
  3. the formal cause ( causa formalis ): ideas, intentions, etc .; here the design of the architect (also: the architecture )
  4. the final - or ultimate cause ( causa finalis ): here the fact that a house offers protection.

Justification of the division into four ( aitiai ) causes

If one wants to justify the division into just four aitiai , one must consider what is supposed to be explained by their specification. These are things and changes. According to Hennig, one can differentiate: on the one hand between the natural thing that changes and the natural change that the natural thing is subject to; on the other hand between what a natural thing / natural change becomes, what it is, and what the natural thing / natural change becomes. Combining these two distinctions results in the following cross-classification:

natural thing that changes the natural change to which the thing undergoes
what the thing or the change becomes what it is The substance cause concerns natural things, not change, and is what they become what they are. The effective cause concerns natural change and is what the change becomes what it is.
what the thing or the change becomes The cause of form only affects natural things and is what the thing becomes when it develops naturally. The ultimate cause also affects only natural changes and is what they become when they occur.

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Boris Hennig: The Four Causes . In: The Journal of Philosophy, 106 (3), 2009, pp. 137-160.
  2. ↑ Ibid., P. 143ff.

Web links