Analytical ethics

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Analytical ethics refers to moral philosophy in the context of analytical philosophy . Large parts of analytical philosophy at the beginning of the 20th century were naturalistic , empirical and rationalistic ; accordingly, utilitarian or even anti-realist moral theories were often developed here. This has changed completely today, the various analytical moral theorists are working out and defending a wide variety of approaches, whereby all classical positions of ethics are still being discussed. Since the international debate on moral-philosophical issues has been largely contested for several decades by analytically trained theorists, but otherwise there is no consensus on how to distinguish it from continental philosophy , moral philosophy and "analytical ethics" now largely coincide.

The classics of analytical ethics include:

  • all classic utilitarians
  • Alfred Jules Ayer , who defended a metaethical emotivism: moral propositions are not verifiable, so no factual assertions; they only express feelings; "You should not kill!" only expresses an emotional displeasure
  • John Leslie Mackie , who argued against the objectivity of ethics and in favor of an error theory of morals

For an overview of current moral-philosophical concepts cf. the main articles morality and ethics .

Remarks

  1. See Graham MacDonald:  Alfred Jules Ayer: Ethics. In: Edward N. Zalta (Ed.): Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy .

See also

Introductory literature