Fallacy

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A theory of error is a philosophical theory that both characterizes competing positions as wrong and explains the prevalence and persistence of these errors. An error theory therefore contains three elements : the arguments for one's own position, the refutation of other approaches and the explanation of the errors. An error theory therefore not only answers the question of validity (is the statement true?), But also the question of the genesis of errors.

A simple example

Santa Claus is a simple example: All statements made about Santa Claus (e.g. that he brings gifts to good children at Christmas, that he has a certain appearance, that he flies over the clouds in his sleigh, etc.) apply to enlightened contemporaries as myths: Obviously, not a single statement that we make about Santa Claus as a living being that actually exists in this world is actually true; that is, they are all to be classified as wrong .

But there are certain explanations for the fact that these claims, symbols and rituals are still adhered to: one is in a certain Christian tradition, one does not want to distance oneself from one's surroundings, one wants to bring joy to one's children, etc.

Error theory in epistemology

In his book "The Last Word", the American philosopher Thomas Nagel deals with contemporary approaches to what he believes is a widespread doubt about the objectivity or the general validity of reason. He explains this subjectivism by the fact that the application of ratio is an individual, a "local activity", through which we nevertheless deal with general truths about infinite sets of things - this contradiction or this riddle leads to doubts about the authority of thought and the attractiveness of subjectivist explanations of knowledge and norms. Nagel takes a position of realism and rationalism, which is fundamentally opposed to the subjectivism of John Leslie Mackie , which is important as a starting point in the following example - the explanations of the respective error intersect in these two examples.

Error theory in ethics

The Australian philosopher John Leslie Mackie (1917–1981) developed his theory of error of morals in his book "Ethics. Inventing Right and Wrong" (German: Ethics. The invention of right and wrong ) : In his opinion, we do moral things in everyday life Judge statements about actions that attribute a certain moral value to them: e.g. B. "This action is good / bad". However, according to Mackie, we make a mistake if we assume that the moral properties of this action, being good or bad, belong to the action per se as quasi objective characteristics, i.e. are objective . For Mackie, there are no objective moral values ​​independent of circumstances, societies and times. For him, moral values ​​are instead the result of a biological and social development process, the main content of which is the limitation of egoism or the expansion of sympathy in order to resolve unavoidable social conflicts.

To distinguish it from the thesis of the existence of objective values, he describes his position as moral subjectivism or ethical skepticism . In doing so, he distinguishes himself from Kant's deontological ethics , from the utilitarianism of John Stewart Mills and from the position of John Rawls ( justice as fairness ). Instead, he develops a practical system of morality that tests actions with a three-stage universalization for their moral value. Mackie is therefore far from any amoralism or nihilism .

He explains the attractiveness of the thesis of the existence of objective values, among other things, with the external projection of moral values ​​internalized in childhood, with the "lending of authority" to apparently objective values ​​in discussions, with self-deception about the connection between desires and moral values, etc. .

Possible points of criticism

In ethics, there is also the approach of interpreting value statements not as statements about objective properties of reality, but as an expression of our feelings ( emotivism as a variant of noncognitivism ; important representatives of the latter are, for example, Alfred Jules Ayer and Richard Mervyn Hare , an ancestor an emotivist theory is also David Hume ). Statements like "This act is cruel!" are only interpreted prescriptively as "Refrain from this action!", so they say nothing about the action itself, but about our attitude towards it.

An opponent of the error theory could also object that our moral ascriptions by no means invent material properties , but rather recognize moral characteristics independent of time and circumstances: There are "valuable facts" for this view such as (per se) "cruel" actions, "brave" behavior, "Generous" donations etc. From this point of view it seems strange that our value statements should really not denote anything in the world: How can one speak of "beautiful" pictures, "good" people etc., if not real facts in this regard World? Contemporary representatives of such a theory, which rejects moral relativism and is called moral realism , include Jonathan Dancy , John McDowell and David Wiggins ; Plato , Aristotle and Kant , for example , are considered to be older representatives, also regarded by Mackie himself .

A fallacy theorist could object that language analyzes do not make statements about existence, that people must have a special capacity for cognition in addition to their normal paths of knowledge, or that anthropology and ethnology have shown that the evaluations of the same actions vary over time and from culture to culture . So the discussion is far from over.

The objection to the error theory is that it is based on several fallacies:

  • The criticism of the talk of objective values ​​as ontologically untenable presupposed an unrestricted validity of positivism for ethics, which Mackie presupposes but does not prove (" petitio principii ").
  • Mackie does not distinguish between strong and weak ethical realism. The rejection of a strong ethical realism does not therefore result in a rejection of a weak realism.
  • Objectivity can initially only be understood as the "claim to validity and justification" of ethical judgments, without having to commit to a specific "ontologization". In particular, the objectivity of ethical judgments does not mean having to start from values ​​in the sense of Platonic ideas.
  • The error theory is based on a "genetic fallacy": it confuses genesis (emergence) with validity. The mere fact that values ​​have grown historically does not mean that they are only historical.
Example: The fact that women have only had the right to vote in Germany since 1919 does not mean that women’s right to vote was previously not an objective human right.

See also

literature

  • Burgess, JA (1998): Error Theories and Values . in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 76 (4), pp. 534-552.
  • Lillehammer, H. (2004): Moral Error Theory . in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 104 (2), pp. 93-104.
  • Mackie, JL (1977): Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong . Harmondsworth: Penguin. - German at Reclam, 2000.
  • Miller, A. (2002): Wright's Argument Against Error-Theories . in: Analysis, 62 (2), 98-103.
  • Wiggins, D. (2005): Objectivity in Ethics: Two Difficulties, Two Responses . in: Ratio, 18 (1), pp. 1-26.
  • Wright, C. (1996): Truth in Ethics . in: B. Hooker (ed.): Truth in Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 1-18.
  • Michael Quante: Introduction to General Ethics. 4th edition. Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2011, ISBN 978-3-534-24595-6 , pp. 100-103 (presentation and criticism of Mackie's theory of error).
  • Friedo Ricken : General ethics. 5th edition. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 2013, ISBN 978-3-17-022583-1 , pp. 28-30.

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Thomas Nagel, The Last Word, Stuttgart: Reclam 1999, p. 103 ff. (The Last Word, New York / Oxford)
  2. ↑ Michael Quante: Introduction to General Ethics. 4th edition. Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2011, ISBN 978-3-534-24595-6 , p. 101
  3. ^ Friedo Ricken : General ethics. 5th edition. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 2013, ISBN 978-3-17-022583-1 , p. 29
  4. ↑ Michael Quante: Introduction to General Ethics. 4th edition. Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2011, ISBN 978-3-534-24595-6 , p. 100
  5. ^ Friedo Ricken : General ethics. 5th edition. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 2013, ISBN 978-3-17-022583-1 , p. 30
  6. ^ Friedo Ricken : General ethics. 5th edition. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 2013, ISBN 978-3-17-022583-1 , p. 29 f.