Moral relativism

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As Moral relativism (also: ethical relativism ) in the be metaethics positions of practical philosophy called, attributed what moral principles, judgments and beliefs on social, cultural, historical or personal circumstances. According to this position, values and judgments , especially moral judgments, are not objective and in principle not universally valid. Rather, values ​​are dependent u. a. of cultural, historical, especially material conditions and individual preferences. A philosophical historicism goes hand in hand with a corresponding relativism. Transferring today's values ​​to historical events would constitute an impermissible presentationalism.

Western philosophy

Moral relativism is in contrast to all forms of moral universalism (including all forms of moral realism and moral naturalism), which advocates a general validity and objectivity of moral principles that are in principle understandable for every person.

Moral relativism thus rejects an objective or universal morality. Its proponents, however, represent different theories on the nature of morality and on the motives and grounds for justifying moral behavior. Some moral relativists see this as explainable only through subjective moral perception ( emotivism ). This notion is also compatible with universalistic ethics . Conventionalist, materialist, or prescriptivist theories are also compatible with moral relativism. Combined with a pragmatic theory of truth , even descriptivistic variants are conceivable.

Antiquity

Already around 450 BC In ancient Greece, the sophist Protagoras and the historian Herodotus represented moral relativistic views. Protagoras' statement “Man is the measure of all things” could already be an early forerunner of moral relativism, but it is not entirely clear whether Protagoras had this in mind. Herodotus of Halicarnassus (484–420 BC) observed that different cultures view their own belief systems and the way they do something better than others'. Specifically, Herodotus was talking about the Persian King Darius , who called Greeks to his court and asked how much they would be willing to eat their dead instead of burying them. They replied that no money in the world could make them do it. Then Darius sent for Kallatiern, members of an Indian tribe, who devour their dead (see endocannibalism ), and asked them how much money they would be willing to burn their fathers in death for - whereupon they shouted loudly about this terrible act. Furthermore, some ancient philosophers doubted the existence of an objective morality that is free from subjective influences.

Plato defended the idea of ​​an objective moral code, while Aristotle argued that man should strive to have an outstanding being in order to be happy and comfortable, and that there are logical and natural reasons for people to act righteously. A few centuries later, Sextus Empiricus (2nd century AD) stated in his work “Fundamentals of Pyrrhonic Skepticism” that huge differences in clothing, food, death cult etc. can be found between individual cultures that “a skeptic himself with the statement whether natural properties are good or bad ”.

middle Ages

With the rise of Christianity , moral relativism only played a subordinate role, since God's will was thought of as objectively valid morality. The ten commandments were seen as absolute and universal moral truths. Relativistic approaches therefore only reappeared at the beginning of modern times.

Modern times

Relativistic approaches can be found in the 16th century in Montaigne's work Essais (II) , in which he is skeptical of ethical universalism . In his view, moral laws and rules are the result of chance alone.

In the 17th century, Thomas Hobbes propagated that moral rules can be seen as a social contract that people agree on in order to be able to live with one another at all. One implication of this suggestion is that good or bad arises from pragmatic considerations, not from universal rules.

David Hume (1711–1776) is described as the father of moral relativism and modern emotivism , although he himself did not support relativism. In his works, Hume differentiated between facts and values ​​and suggested that moral judgments should be understood as dependent on the values ​​represented, since they do not depend on verifiable facts, but on our feelings and passions. He denied the existence of an objective standard of morality, claiming that the universe was indifferent to our preferences and problems.

Modern

Although controversial, it can be said that Karl Marx (1818–1883) implied in his critique of political economy that there was no objective moral code, but only interests that use morality.

Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), in contrast to Marx, wrote something about morality. His famous statement “God is dead”, for example, implies that objective morality is no longer tenable. In his work Beyond Good and Evil , he argued that there are no moral appearances, only moral interpretations of them.

These philosophical views paved the way for moral relativism mainly by raising doubts as to whether the existence of objective moral truths could be proven.

Classical anthropology

Also anthropological research in the 19th and 20th centuries support the relativism.

William Sumner (1840–1910) argued in his Folkways work , published in 1906 , that right and wrong are always related to the prevailing social mores and customs and are shaped by practices and institutions. For people living in a society, the concept of correct morality can only mean conformity with local customs. (see also ethnocentrism )

The anthropologist Franz Boas saw cultural / moral relativism as a necessary, anthropological tool to understand foreign cultures and societies. He said that, from a scientific point of view, one shouldn't project one's own moral judgments onto the beliefs and values ​​of other cultures, but that one can evaluate them objectively. Many of his students propagated these views and some, like Melville Herskovits or Ruth Benedict , argued that a relativistic view can help fight prejudice and strengthen tolerance.

Current positions

Descriptive relativism

Descriptive relativism describes a variety of normative ideas from different cultures, times and social groups. Depending on the initial situation, one can speak of cultural or historical relativism. Descriptive relativism does not require adherence to certain tolerance principles. Only empirical theses are put forward, but no normative theses follow. Since the demand for tolerance is tied to normative theses, it is not described by descriptive relativism, but neither is it rejected, it is neutral to the question of an obligation to tolerance.

So-called descriptive relativists (e.g. Ralph Barton Perry , 1876–1957) accept the existence of basic disagreements about the correct course of action, even when the same facts are present and the same consequences are to be expected. However, descriptive relativists do not necessarily deny the existence of a single correct moral judgment given the same circumstances.

Metaethical relativism

Metaethical relativists claim that all moral judgments have their origin either in social or in individual standards and that no absolute standard exists by which one can judge the truth of a moral statement. The British philosopher Bernard Williams (1929–2003) also came to this conclusion .

Metaethical relativists generally hold the view that the descriptive properties of terms such as “good”, “bad”, “right” and “wrong” are not to be seen as universal truth conditions, but rather correspond to social conventions and personal preferences. With the same set of verifiable facts, some societies or individuals will have fundamental differences in understanding what societal norms are and what one does based on one's preferences.

Relativists, such as Gilbert Harman , claim that there is a certain motivation behind every action. Whether a person feels this motivation depends very much on the norms and values ​​of the society in which they find themselves. The feeling of morally "right" action brings a kind of justification for one's own actions.

The final standard of assessment will always correspond to social or personal norms and not to a universal standard. The scientific standards for temperature measurement and for checking mathematical theses serve as examples.

Some philosophers claim that moral relativism leads to emotivism or some other type of non-cognitivism. This thesis was put forward in the first half of the 20th century. Leading representatives of this thesis, also known as logical positivism , are Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970) and Alfred Jules Ayer (1910–1989).

Positivists only see a sentence as meaningful if it can be checked or proven by logical, empirical or experimental investigation. Sentences that cannot be checked in this way, like many metaphysical statements, are not regarded as false, but as empty of content, meaning or meaning. Moral judgments are mostly explained as an expression of perceived preferences, conditions or personal attitudes. So, as far as moral concepts are concerned, they are free of cognitive content and consequently also not a possible subject of a truth assessment. Such a metaethical position has z. B. Charles L. Stevenson (1908-1979). However, not all metaethical relativists judge moral statements or beliefs as meaningless.

RM Hare

Some philosophers, such as RM Hare (1919–2002), argue that moral theses submit to the rules of human logic regardless of the absence of facts. They therefore claim that humans are not able to make contradicting ethical judgments themselves if they want to remain credible. They neither endorse nor refute the existence of moral facts, they just say that human logic influences moral theses. Accordingly, they conclude that a preferred, objective moral standard exists, albeit with limited validity.

Walter Terence Stace

Ethical relativism is the subject of The Concept of Morals by Walter Terence Stace , in which he wrote:

“I shall reject ethical absolutism. But I shall also reject ethical relativity. Morality, I shall try to show, is relative in the sense that it is relative to the universal needs of human nature. But it is not relative to the particular needs of particular nations, ages, or social groups. Consequently it does not vary from place to place or from time to time. Morality is universal, but it is not absolute. "

Fallacy

John Leslie Mackie describes his moral arguments for relativity as the theory of error: a theory which says that although in Kantian objective values ​​are part of the meaning of moral language and thought, those objective values ​​are false.

In the first part, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong , he uses several arguments to support his claim that objective values ​​are wrong. He argues that some aspects of moral thinking are relative and that this requires an intrinsic function. Above all, he thinks that it is very unclear how one could supervise objective values ​​on features of the natural world (see Queerness' argument ). Furthermore, he believes that it would be difficult to justify and justify our knowledge of “entity values” or all of the consequences. In conclusion, he thinks that it is possible to prove that people would still believe in objective values ​​even if they are not proven or there is no reason to believe in them. Hence, he claims that it is possible to deceive people or make them believe that objective values ​​exist.

Criticism of moral relativism

Relativism and world community

Moral relativism is not only an issue for philosophers, but it also has implications for the social sciences and international relations. In 1947 the American Anthropological Association sent a comment to the UN Commission on Human Rights:

“Standards and values ​​are relative to the culture from which they derive so that any attempt to formulate postulates that grow out of the beliefs or moral codes of one culture must to that extent detract from the applicability of any Declaration of Human Rights to mankind as a whole. "

In this she criticized the fact that the western world tries to impose its values ​​on other societies.

Moral universalists believe that humanity derives moral knowledge from external sources, such as a deity or doctrine, and still others believe that moral facts result from nature or reality. In either case, however, moral facts remain invariant when the circumstances to which they may relate differ. Furthermore, each of these schools of thought sees moral facts as objective and determinable.

Even today, moral relativism is an important issue in society, for example in societies with many immigrants. The issue here is, for example, up to which point practices by minorities should be tolerated if they conflict with the moral principles of the majority.

Roman Catholic

The claims of moral relativism conflict with the tenets of most world religions . Catholics and secular intellectuals attribute the suppression of absolute values ​​by moral relativism to post-war Europe. Pope Benedict XVI , Marcello Pera and others argued that after 1960 Europe abandoned many traditional Christian norms and values ​​and replaced them with ever-changing moral rules. They also describe that during this time the sexual act developed from a mere means of reproduction, which led to a decline in the population. The resulting population vacuum in Europe is being filled by immigrants, mostly from Islamic countries, who are trying to reintroduce absolute moral values. An official answer of the Roman Catholic Church to moral relativism can be found in the Veritatis Splendor , the tenth encyclical of Pope John Paul II.

Many of the Catholic Church's main criticisms of moral relativism relate to modern phenomena, such as selective abortion. Many advocates of selective abortion support moral relativism with quotes like "That's just your point of view!" To counter the arguments of anti-abortionists.

Contradictions of Moral Relativism?

Opponents of moral relativism describe it as incompatible with itself. Because on the one hand he rejects absolute moral values, on the other hand he presents his own ideas about the view of morality as absolute. For example, the German professor Peter Zöller-Greer:

“Moral relativism is also judgmental, exclusive and partisan, although the proponents of moral relativism think they are liberal, inclusive and neutral. Moral relativism is judgmental because it claims that people who believe in absolute moral values ​​are wrong. Moral relativism is exclusive because it excludes belief in absolute moral values ​​and it is partisan because the representatives of absolute moral values ​​do not belong to the party of 'right thinkers'. "

Argument of intolerance

This theory relates to the likelihood of intolerant behavior. Moral relativists maintain that a morally absolute attitude increases the likelihood of intolerant behavior towards other people and increases condemnation of other ways of doing things. For example, in the course of the second millennium, a great many people were killed because of their religion, because it did not match that of the currently ruling monarch. Today everyone would probably agree that this behavior is immoral. It follows that the consequences of morally relativistic action are less immoral than those of morally absolute action.

Moral innovation

In the past, slavery was seen as perfectly acceptable in many parts of the world, while elsewhere it was called the great evil. Many authors and thinkers of that time already stated that there must be a uniform moral standard in order to prevent such things. Moral relativists would respond that this standard could only be valid if the person himself had already viewed a certain fact (in this example slavery) as immoral by himself.

Many relativists now also speak of the fact that certain ways of doing business are morally wrong. But instead of saying, "Slavery is wrong", the statement is viewed from a more cultural perspective, such as "Slavery is rejected by our society". However, even in times of slavery there were moral relativists with this attitude. In this case the statement would of course be wrong, since slavery was recognized as correct by society. Accordingly, it is rather difficult to speak of a development or even an improvement in moral relativism.

Intervention and inaction

One point of criticism of moral relativism is that relativists cannot justify interfering with the customs of other cultures, since doing so would impose one's own moral ideas on them. In reality, however, not all relativists can be accused of this objection, since not all understand “non-imposing” as an essential principle. However, those who advocate “non-enforcement” as a principle must accept the criticism that they would not be willing to prevent calamity or evil, even if they themselves saw it as an evil in their own society.

Is Relativism a Nihilism?

Nihilism is the negation of any order of knowledge, value and society, colloquially also the negation of all positive approaches. The criticism of relativism is that it does not describe a positive moral theory, since it does not, for example, meet the following criterion of a positive moral theory:

  • A moral theory should be normative, moral relativism is at best an error theory .

Criticism claims that moral relativism is actually moral nihilism, or a theory of error , and is mistakenly interpreted as positive moral theory.

See also

literature

  • James Dreier: Moral Relativism and Moral Nihilism. In: David Copp (Ed.): The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005, pp. 240-264.
  • Gerhard Ernst (Hrsg.): Moralischer Relativismus (= Ethica. Volume 17). mentis, Paderborn 2009, ISBN 978-3-89785-314-0 .
  • Gerhard Ernst: Tolerance and / or Relativism. In: Lifeworld and Science. Section contributions. XXI. German Congress for Philosophy, University of Duisburg-Essen, Campus Essen September 15-19 , 2008. University of Duisburg-Essen, Essen 2008, ISBN 978-3-00-025531-1 , dgphil2008.de (PDF; 43.6 kB)
  • Christopher Gowans: Moral Disagreements: Classic and Contemporary Readings . Routledge, London 2000.
  • Richard M. Hare : Sorting out Ethics. Clarendon Press, Oxford 1997, ISBN 0-19-823727-8 .
  • Gilbert Harman , Judith Jarvis Thomson : Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity. Blackwell Publishing, Oxford 1996, ISBN 0-631-19203-4 .
  • Paul K. Moser, Thomas L. Carson: Moral Relativism: A Reader . Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001.
  • Michael Quante: Introduction to General Ethics. 4th edition. Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2011, ISBN 978-3-534-24595-6 , pp. 151–155.

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. Hermann Diels, Walther Kranz (ed.): Fragments of the pre-Socratics 80B1 = Plato, Theaitetos 152a
  2. Reinhold Bichler, Robert Rollinger: Herodot . Hildesheim u. a. 2000, p. 11.
  3. Herodotus of Halicarnassus (a Greek polis in Asia Minor), excerpts from The Histories (approx. 430 BC) ( Memento of the original from September 10, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. . On: Loyola University Chicago . Retrieved April 8, 2014. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.luc.edu
  4. Herodotus, Book 3, 38
  5. James Fieser: Moral Philosophy Through the Ages. 2000, ISBN 0-7674-1298-2 .
  6. ^ Plato - Themes, Arguments and Ideas
  7. ^ Philip Grgic: Sextus Empiricus on the Goal of Skepticism. ( Memento of the original from January 11, 2014 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF) In: Ancient Philosophy. 26, 2006, pp. 141ff. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.ifzg.hr
  8. ^ Dieter Sturma: Jean-Jacques Rousseau. 2001, ISBN 3-406-41949-6 , p. 77.
  9. Sharon A. LLoyd et al. a .: Hobbes's Moral and Political Philosophy. 2008.
  10. ^ David Hume: Treatise. P. 295.
  11. ^ Richard Wright: Understanding religious ethics. 2009.
  12. ^ Karl Marx: A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Published 2009 in Standard Publications, Incorporated, ISBN 1-4385-0873-5 .
  13. Friedrich Nietzsche: Beyond Good and Evil. 1886.
  14. ^ William Sumner: Folkways: A Study of Mores, Manners, Customs and Morals . Cosimo, New York 2007, ISBN 978-1-60206-758-5 .
  15. ^ Franz Boas: Museums of Ethnology and their classification. 1887.
  16. Gerhard Ernst: Tolerance and / or Relativism. (PDF)
  17. Harmen Gilbert: The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics. New York . Oxford University Press, 1977.
  18. ^ Richard Mervyn Hare: Sorting out Ethics. In: Oxford scholarship online. Oxford University Press, 2000, ISBN 0-19-825032-0 .
  19. ^ Walter T. Stace: The Concept of Morals . The MacMillan Company, New York 1937, ISBN 0-8446-2990-1 , pp. 67 (Reprinted 1975 by permission of MacMillan Publishing).
  20. American Anthropologist. Vol. 49, no. 4, p. 542.
  21. ^ Josef Cardinal Ratzinger, Marcello Pera: Without Roots: The West, Relativism, Christianity, Islam. Basic Books, 2006, ISBN 0-465-00634-5 .
  22. ^ John Paul II (1993): Veritatis Splendor.
  23. Peter Zöller-Greer: Everything is relative - Really? In: Professorenform-Journal. 2005, p. 51.
  24. ^ Richard Joyce: Mackie's arguments for the moral error theory. 2007.