Animal Microencephalic Lumps

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Animal Microencephalic Lumps (literally from English about animal lumps with a tiny brain ; also AML ) are a hypotheticum in modern animal ethics .

background

In the original proposal by Gary Comstock in 1992, AML are transgenic "farm animals" whose brains have been made so small by genetic manipulation that they are unable to feel pain. Comstock and other scientists later used the term in a figurative sense to denote general transgenic organisms that on the one hand resemble a variety of "farm animals" in their function, but on the other hand do not have the useless or undesirable properties and capabilities of this species . Similar examples and considerations can be found in the books by Bernard Rollin ( The Frankenstein Syndrome ), Julian Baggini ( The Pig that wants to be eaten ) or Kirsten Schmidt ( Blind chickens as a test case of animal ethics theories ). Although the technical realities do not currently permit the construction of AML, authors of the volume Animal Enhancement rate the possibility of AML as “not absolutely improbable or purely fantastic. It at least draws on motifs that are now within the framework of what is scientifically aimed at ”.

For animal ethics, AML are not only interesting because they raise new questions, but also because of the predominantly pathocentric paradigm within them. Criticism beyond this paradigm attacks corresponding projects in the construction of AML often with reference to a “ dignity ” concept or an intrinsic “character” of animals, which is marginalized by reducing their properties to the useful. Ferrari has argued that the acceptance of the possibility of "switching off" a sensation of pain independently of a holistic well-being of the organism simplifies the phenomenon of sensation of pain in an inadmissible way. Others explain that it is practically impossible to construct such "animals" without carrying out experiments on animals capable of suffering, which in turn cause pain. Somewhat detached from questions of ethics, Karafyllis poses and negates the question of whether AML are animals at all. Instead, she suggests the term biofact . In defense of AML projects, it was argued that assuming the legitimacy and persistence of human usage claims about non-human animals, the use of AML causes a minimum of suffering, which is in the interest of the animals concerned.

Individual evidence

  1. ^ A b G. Comstock: What obligations have scientists to transgenic animals? . In: Center for Biotechnology Policy and Ethics, Texas AandM University Discussion papers . 1992.
  2. ^ A. Ferrari, C. Coenen, A, Grunwald, A. Sauter: Animal Enhancement New technical possibilities and ethical questions  (= contributions to ethics and biotechnology). Federal Office for Buildings and Logistics , 2010, pp. 135–139.
  3. ^ A. Holland: Artificial lives: philosophical dimensions of farm animal biotechnology . In: Ethical Issues in Biotechnology . 2002, pp. 309-323.
  4. ↑ A. Ferrari: Genmaus & Co . Harald Fischer, Erlangen 2008, ISBN 3891314183 .
  5. ↑ NC Karafyllis: Biofacts: attempt on humans between artifacts and living beings . Mentis, 2003.
  6. ↑ D. Macer: Ucncertainties about 'painless' animals . In: Bioethics . 3, No. 3, 1989, pp. 226-235.