Pathocentrism

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The term pathocentrism is made up of the words pathos ( Greek πάθος [páthos]: suffering) and center (κέντρον [kéntron]: the center). A synonymous term is sentientism (from the Latin sentire = to feel, feel). It is an ethical approach that ascribes moral intrinsic value to all sentient beings because they can feel, and denies such other beings for the same reason. Pathocentric approaches often start from a utilitarian basic position. Pathocentrism represents a normative starting position from which a moral necessity of animal protection law can be derived. The view that the need for special protection results from a living being's ability to suffer is expressed today in many legal systems (e.g. Animal Welfare Act ) and voluntary commitments (company principles, research guidelines).

Pathocentrists see the disadvantage of sentient beings because of their species affiliation as speciesism , a form of arbitrary discrimination. Hence, coherent pathocentrism implies taking into account the interests of all sentient animals.

history

Historically, the term pathocentrism emerged as an antithesis to anthropocentrism , which regards animals and non-human nature as ethically relevant only because of their use for humans. Physiocentric , i.e. non-anthropocentric, approaches came increasingly to the center of ethical debates with the rise of the environmental ethical discussion in the 1970s. One of the first representatives of pathocentric ethics in the 18th century is the founder of classical utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham . Bentham's formulation “The question is not, Can they reason ?, nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer? ”is especially quoted today by the animal rights movement .

In Buddhist ethics and Hinduism , compassion for "all sentient beings" (see, for example, the Bodhisattva vow ) and the principle of non-violence (" Ahimsa "), especially towards animals, are anchored.

Reason

The most famous representatives of modern pathocentric positions include the philosophers Peter Singer and Tom Regan . Singer justifies pathocentrism as follows:

“The ability to suffer and feel joy is a prerequisite for having interests at all, a condition that must be met before we can meaningfully speak of interests. It would be nonsense to say that it is not in the best interest of a stone to be kicked along a path by a child. A stone has no interests because it cannot stand. Nothing we can do to him could make any difference to his welfare. A mouse, on the other hand, has an interest in not being tortured, because mice suffer when treated in this way.

When a being suffers, there can be no moral justification for not considering that suffering. Regardless of the nature of the being, the principle of equality requires that suffering be equated with the same suffering - insofar as comparable - of every other being. If a being is unable to suffer, or feel joy or happiness, there is nothing to consider. Therefore the limit of the ability to feel (....) is the only justifiable limit of the moral consideration of the interests of others. "

- Peter Singer : Practical Ethics (2011), Third Edition, Cambridge University Press (en), p. 50

criticism

The modern criticism of a pathocentric ethics argues with the subjectivity of the concept of suffering (as well as the opposite), which makes an objective determination of the benefit or damage of an action or omission impossible. From positions of contract theory it is argued that one cannot reasonably want the decision about what is to be considered painful or happy to be borne by the social institutions of justice.

Like all normative concepts, pathocentrism is not a scientific theory because the way it is made does not correspond to the scientific principles of freedom of judgment and falsifiability . At the beginning of the argument there is a normative statement (“The ability to suffer gives moral intrinsic value”), which can neither be empirically proven nor refuted. Pathocentric ethics must therefore be differentiated from axiology , which as a scientific discipline examines moral values ​​and moral action.

See also

Web links

  • Sentience Politics was launched at the end of 2013 as a project by the Foundation for Effective Altruism (EAS) .

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ For example in K. Ott, R. Döring: Theory and Practice of Strong Sustainability . Metropolis-Verl., 2004.
  2. ↑ See Angelika Krebs. An overview of natural ethics. In: Angelika Krebs (Ed.): Naturethik. Basic texts of the current animal and eco-ethical discussion. Frankfurt am Main 1997. Pages 337-379. P. 337 f.
  3. ↑ http://www.treffpunkt-umweltethik.de/umweltethische-modelle/pathozentrisch.htm
  4. ↑ The question is not, Jeremy Bentham: An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789)
  5. ↑ Peter Singer: A Utilitarian Defense of Animal Liberation . S. 73-82 .
  6. ↑ Tom Regan: The Radical Egalitarian Case for Animal Rights . 2001, p. 82-90 .
  7. ^ Critique of Pathocentrism ( Memento of August 13, 2007 in the Internet Archive ), Martin Balluch 2007.
  8. ↑ Martha Nussbaum : Frontiers of Justice (2006)