Anti-corruption officer

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To combat corruption in the German federal administration , the Federal Ministry of the Interior issued an administrative regulation in 1998 according to which “contact persons for corruption prevention” are to be appointed, depending on the task and size of the department. These are internally referred to as anti-corruption officers. They are also appointed at the state or municipal level under this name or one with a comparable function.

The reasons for the establishment were the increasing number of known and sometimes sensational cases of corruption in the public administration, which had already increased twenty years ago, as well as the growing importance of corruption in the media and thus in public. As early as 1996, the German Association of Cities proposed to improve preventive measures in public administration and in public companies to set up a “central anti-corruption office” with the authorities. The Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA 1997) and the BMI (1998) followed with the “contact person for corruption” and the “contact person for corruption prevention”.

Definition - designations - AKB in authorities

There is no definition for the anti-corruption officer in the regulations, but the term AKB can be derived from the description of the tasks: An AKB is a contact person for the employees and the management of a public administration (in various federal states also for citizens) on actual or suspected corruption, even without compliance with official channels. The AKB should be formally appointed; the appointment should be made known in his area of ​​responsibility.

Anti-corruption officers (for example in the ministries of Brandenburg, Hamburg, Saarland, Thuringia and in the municipalities, e.g. Cologne, Magdeburg, Potsdam, Bad Salzuflen, Wiesbaden, etc.) appear under different names, e.g. B. as "contact person for prevention of corruption" (federal government, Bavaria), "contact point for combating corruption" (Lower Saxony), "contact person for anti-corruption" (in the ministries of Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt), "anti-corruption coordinator" (e.g. in Leipzig, Chemnitz, Zwickau) a. Ä. For the sake of simplicity, they should be referred to here as AKB in the male form.

An external, e.g. For example, a so-called solicitor or ombudsman (e.g. in Berlin-Spandau) can be appointed to whom public employees and citizens can turn (e.g. in Baden-Württemberg, Berlin, Rhineland-Palatinate). There is a specialty in Schleswig-Holstein: The ombudsman responsible for this federal state is the honorary former police chief who, like a lawyer of trust, can guarantee whistleblowers secrecy.

According to a study by the auditing company PricewaterhouseCoopers in cooperation with the University of Halle-Wittenberg on "crime (means: white-collar crime, d. V.) in the public sector" in 2010, 56% of the public administration have an AKB. Specifically, it is 97% of the federal ministries / authorities and 72% of the state ministries / authorities, 48% of the local authorities and 37% of the universities and university hospitals.

Tasks - competencies - duties

Since many federal states and municipalities have based their description of the tasks of an AKB on the RL Bund KorrPräv, their specifications are used here:

  • Contact person for employees and agency management, even without following official channels, as well as for citizens
  • Advice to the agency management
  • Education of employees
  • Participation in the training
  • Observation and assessment of signs of corruption;
  • Participation in informing the public about official and criminal sanctions, taking into account the personal rights of those affected.

Advice to the agency management can consist of:

  • Suggestions for internal investigations
  • Measures against obfuscation
  • Notification to law enforcement agencies
  • Discussions on public relations.

The RL Bund KorrPräv describes the area of ​​competence of the AKB in No. 5 Paragraph 2 ff .:

  • Right to information, especially if corruption is suspected
  • No right to disciplinary powers
  • No right to act as a preliminary investigator or investigator in disciplinary proceedings for corruption
  • Independence from instructions when performing tasks
  • Immediate right of presentation to the agency management
  • Confidentiality about known personal circumstances of employees.

This regulation also states that the AKB must not be disadvantaged because of the performance of its tasks. It is unclear whether the AKB has an obligation to report suspected corruption; An obligation to notify cannot be derived from criminal law (cf. § 138 StGB). However, he must inform the agency management if he becomes aware of facts that justify suspicion of a corruption offense.

See also

literature

  • Bartsch, J., Paltzow, K., Trautner, WE, The Anti-Corruption Officer . Manual for public administration , basic work from 2001 ff., Neuwied, Kriftel
  • Federal Ministry of the Interior, texts on the prevention of corruption , Berlin 2006 (to be ordered from www.publikationen@bundesregierung.de, ArtNr. BMI 05311)
  • Nagel, Hans-Georg, anti-corruption officer in public administration. Performance of tasks by internal auditing / audit offices , In: Zeitschrift Internal Revision, Volume 45, No. 4, August 2010, pp. 178–184

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Federal Ministry of the Interior, Guideline of the Federal Government on the Prevention of Corruption in the Federal Administration , new version of July 30, 2004 (hereinafter referred to as RL Bund KorrPräv); s. http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/ThemenOED_VerwaltungKorruption_SponsoringRichtlinie_zur_Korruptionspraevention_in_der_Bundesverwaltung.pdf?__blob=publicationFile  ( page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.@1@ 2Template: Toter Link / www.bmi.bund.de  
  2. ↑ cf. Hans-Georg Nagel, the anti-corruption officer in public administration . In: Neues Verwaltungsmanagement, Grundwerk 2007, ed. by Christina Schaefer and Jens Fischer, ISSN  1432-3141 , Berlin 2009, F 2.7, p. 3. Quoted in the following: H.-G. Nagel, NVM, F 2.7
  3. ↑ cf. H.-G. Nagel, NVM , F2.7, p. 4
  4. ↑ Recommendations on the prevention of corruption in the federal administration re No. 5 RL Bund KorrPräv, p. 7; s. Archive link ( Memento of the original from July 25, 2014 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.bmi.bund.de
  5. ↑ For details, see archive link ( Memento of the original from January 22, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / transparency.de
  6. ↑ Archive link ( Memento of the original from February 1, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.  @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.schleswig-holstein.de
  7. ↑ So the "representative study for the individual areas of public administration in Germany" - 500 interviewed authorities - by PricewaterhouseCoopers in cooperation with the University of Halle-Wittenberg, criminality (means: economic crime, d. V.) in the public sector 2010 , Oct . 2010, p. 57, p. 41 and Fig. 21, p. 43
  8. ↑ RL Bund KorrPräv, No. 5.1
  9. ↑ See H.-G. Nagel, NVM, F 2 7, p. 14
  10. ↑ No. 5 para. 2 sentence 1 RL Bund KorrPräv