exception
An exception ( loan translation from Latin ex-ceptio ) is used as a technical term in addition to everyday language, primarily in philosophy and jurisprudence . It denotes a case that is not covered by a rule or is in conflict with a current rule. In particular, the concept of exception was coined by the theologian Søren Kierkegaard , whose conceptual work was introduced by Schmitt into the philosophy of law and by Jaspers into existential philosophy . Furthermore, in Heidegger's later work, From the event, there is a further development of the term that shows strong parallels to mysticism.
The concept of exception at Søren Kierkegaard
Kierkegaard's thoughts on the exception are largely determined by his endeavor to understand and justify himself as a legitimate exception to the general. The actual concept of the exception finds its elaboration in his work mainly in the double script Feart und Zittern and Die repetition , which is then taken up by Carl Schmitt.
“The exception explains the general and itself; and if one wants to study the general right, one need only look around for a justified exception. It reveals everything much more clearly than the general itself. The justified exception is reconciled in general. The general is fundamentally polemical against the exception; for it does not want to let any of its preference be noticed until the exception forces it, as it were, to admit it. If the exception does not have this power, it is not justified; and that is why it is very wise of the general not to be noticed too soon. At first glance, the sinner himself does not know that heaven loves one sinner more than ninety-nine righteous people. On the contrary, he only feels the anger of heaven until he finally forces heaven to come out with language. In the long run, you get tired of the eternal, almost boring talk about the general. There are exceptions. If one cannot explain them, then one cannot explain the general either. If, as usual, one does not think about the general with passion, but only with a comfortable superficiality, one does not notice the difficulty, of course. The exception thinks the general with an energetic passion. "
Biographically, Kierkegaard saw himself as an exception - a central motif in his life that found new applications: his relationship with his father, his short-lived engagement to Regine Olsen, his permanent criticism of the general public, especially: the Danish state church. For him, the exception is the existential and necessary decision between the universal and the eternal, i.e. between the ethical and the divine. Following Hegel , Kierkegaard equates the general with the ethical, from which no path leads to the religious and thus to redemption. Only through the exclusion of the individual from the general is a leap into the religious and thus into salvation possible. As a special example of such a forced decision, Kierkegaard cites the biblical story of Abraham, who, summoned by God to sacrifice Isaac , was faced with fear and trembling before the decision:
“The act of Abraham is, ethically speaking, he wanted to murder Isaac; in religious terms, he wanted to sacrifice Isaac. But in this contradiction lies the fear that can probably rob a person of sleep; and yet Abraham is not who he is without this fear. "
Kierkegaard still considers Abraham's actions to be legitimate and raises the question of the conditions under which a (teleological) suspension of the ethical is possible. Here, at the same time, the polarity to the general becomes clear: as a general, the ethical has to τέλος ( telos ) the good human togetherness and is thus the τέλος of history. In return, Abraham's decision serves his personal salvation before God, and this is where he differs from similar figures such as B. the sacrifice of Iphigenia by Agamemnon , which had the common good of the Greeks as its purpose. Abraham's sacrifice only served him as evidence of his trust in God and is thus a legitimate exception to the general.
The concept of the exception at Carl Schmitt
Schmitt uses the concept of the exception as the central starting point for his justification of sovereignty and law and thus as the core of his decisionism :
"Whoever decides on a state of emergency is sovereign ."
Such an exceptional case cannot be determined exactly from a legal point of view, it "can at most be described as a case of extreme need, endangerment of the existence of the state or the like, but cannot be circumscribed as factual." Schmitt's decisionism gains its argumentative strength with the determination of sovereignty from the exception he links the legal justification and legal implementation centrally to the sovereign who appears in the exception . The sovereign is thought of - based on Kierkegaard's legitimate individual - as an acting subject and not as a legal figure. The dialectic of exception necessarily emphasizes the decision:
"Just as in the normal case the independent moment of decision can be pushed back to a minimum, in exceptional cases the norm is destroyed."
“In its absolute form, the exceptional case has occurred when the situation must first be created in which legal principles can apply. Every general norm demands a normal structuring of the living conditions to which it is to be applied as a matter of fact and which it subjects to its normative regulation. The standard needs a homogeneous medium. A normal situation must be created, and sovereign is the one who definitely decides whether this normal state really prevails. Here the decision is separated from the legal norm, and (to put it paradoxically) the authority proves that it need not be right in order to create law. "
More can be found under Carl Schmitt - Constitution, Sovereignty and State of Emergency .
See also
Individual evidence
- ↑ M. Theunissen: exception . In: Historical Dictionary of Philosophy . Berlin 2004.
- ^ Søren Kierkegaard : Fear and Trembling / The Repetition . In: Collected Works . Jena 1923, p. 203 .
- ^ Søren Kierkegaard: Fear and Trembling / The Repetition . In: Collected Works . Jena 1923, p. 26 .
- ^ A b c Carl Schmitt: Political Theology . Berlin 2004, ISBN 978-3-428-08805-8 , pp. 19 .
- ↑ Carl Schmitt: Political Theology . Berlin 2004, ISBN 978-3-428-08805-8 , pp. 21 .