Acceleration requirement in detention matters

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The need for speed in custody matters required by the on the prosecution involved State organs , the criminal conduct with maximum acceleration as long as the accused in custody is.

Validity

The speed-up requirement in detention matters follows from the fundamental right to freedom of the person , which Article 2, Paragraph 2, Clause 2 and Article 104 of the Basic Law guarantee “in an indissoluble context”. The aforementioned basic right protects physical freedom of movement. The complete deprivation of physical freedom of movement is associated with pre-trial detention. The rule of law can only inflict this “evil” on a person who has been convicted of a criminal offense . If, on the other hand, a person is merely suspected of a criminal act - as is always the case with pre- trial detention - complete deprivation of liberty is only justified if the state authorities carry out the criminal proceedings with the "greatest possible" speed. They must do “everything in their power” to complete the investigation “as soon as possible” and obtain a judicial decision.

content

The state organs must avoid significant procedural delays that fall within their sphere of influence, provided that this is reasonable. Whether the authorities, the delay in debt or accused causes have is not relevant.

The relevance of a delay depends on the appropriateness of the duration of the proceedings in the individual case, determined according to objective criteria, i.e. on the complexity of the case, the large number of people involved or - within limits - the behavior of the defense. The Federal Constitutional Court has already criticized procedural delays of a few weeks or months as unconstitutional.

The reasonableness of an acceleration also depends on the circumstances of the individual case. In the event of significant delays , the Federal Constitutional Court has asked the specialized courts to use the judges' bench beyond the obligation, for example through additional hearing appointments "in the evenings" or, if necessary, "also on weekends (Saturdays)". As a rule, two negotiation days per week should be sufficient.

The required degree of acceleration increases with the length of the pre-trial detention. Section 121 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure takes this requirement into account. Thereafter, pre-trial detention for the same offense is generally limited to six months, longer execution is an exception that is only possible within narrow limits. It is constitutionally required that the delay could not be prevented with organizational measures.

Legal consequence

If the public prosecutor's office or criminal courts have not taken all possible and reasonable measures to conclude the investigation with the necessary speed and to pronounce a judgment , further execution of pre-trial detention violates the basic right of personal freedom. Release from custody is the “imperative” legal consequence , without the weight of the charge being relevant: remand detention must not anticipate the protection of legal interests in the manner of a penalty , which the substantive criminal law should serve.

literature

Individual evidence

  1. BVerfGE 10, 302 , 322; BVerfGE 58, 208 , 220; BVerfGE 105, 239 , 247.
  2. Bodo Pieroth / Bernhard Schlink: Grundrechte , 23rd ed. 2007, Rn. 413.
  3. BVerfGE 61, 28 , 34; Pieroth / Schlink: Grundrechte , 23rd ed. 2007, Rn. 426.
  4. BVerfGE 21, 220 , 222; BVerfGE 36, 264 , 273; BVerfG, StV 2007, p. 369 (370); BVerfG, decision of June 6, 2007 - 2 BvR 971/07, juris, Rn. 23.
  5. BVerfG, NJW 2006, p. 672 (673 f.); StV 2006, p. 703 (704, 705).
  6. BVerfG, StV 2007, p. 369 (370); BVerfG, decision of June 6, 2007 - 2 BvR 971/07, juris, Rn. 25, 36.
  7. BVerfG, StV 2006, p. 87 (89).
  8. BVerfG, decision of September 19, 2007 - 2 BvR 1847/07, www.bverfg.de, para. 4 .; a. A. for extensive proceedings Bodo Pieroth and Bernd J. Hartmann: The constitutional acceleration requirement in detention matters , criminal defense lawyer (StV) 2008, p. 276 (279): three meetings of five hours per week.
  9. BVerfG, NStZ 2005, p. 456 (457 Rn. 12); StV 2007, p. 369 (370).
  10. BVerfGE 53, 152 , 159.
  11. BVerfGE 20, 45 , 50; BVerfGE 36, 264 , 271.
  12. BVerfGE 36, 264 , 272.
  13. BVerfGE 20, 45 , 50; BVerfGE 36, 264 , 273.
  14. ^ Rainer Wiedemann, in: Dieter C. Umbach / Thomas Clemens (ed.): Basic Law. Employee commentary , 2002, Art. 2 Para. 2 Rn. 397.
  15. BVerfGE 19, 342 , 348.