Caroline von Monaco judgment II

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Logo on the decisions of the Constitutional Court

In German jurisprudence, the Caroline von Monaco Judgment II is a judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) of December 15, 1999, in which the scope and content of general personal rights and freedom of the press with regard to reporting on the private life of prominent people is determined has been.

facts

In the proceedings before the Federal Court of Justice (BGH), Caroline von Hannover had taken action against the publication of photos in the Illustrierte Bunte . In the photos, she was seen partly with her children, partly alone, for example, shopping at a market or on a bike on a dirt road. She asked Hubert Burda Media to cease publication because of violation of her general personal rights and her right to her own image .

In the opinion of the civil courts, the publication of these photos was permitted without consent, because Caroline von Hannover, as an absolute person in contemporary history, consciously moved in the public domain, so that according to § 22 , § 23 KUG no consent was required.

Represented by the Hamburg lawyer Matthias Prinz , Caroline von Hannover (at that time still from Monaco) sued the judgment of the BGH before the Federal Constitutional Court.

Summary of the judgment

The court first deals with the scope of general personal rights and the resulting protection of privacy. It shares the opinion of the BGH that the protection relates to a thematic and a spatial area in which even celebrities must remain undisturbed. This spatial area does not necessarily have to be synonymous with “the person's own four walls”. However, the court generally denies a private area if the person is in a publicly accessible place among many other people. In addition, the protection is limited if the person also markets what is part of his privacy and even concludes exclusive contracts for reporting. This, in a sense, reduces one's own claim to privacy. This means that the photos that show Caroline riding, shopping or in a café do not interfere with her personal rights.

On the other hand, the court judges the photos that also show the children differently. They are not absolute figures in contemporary history and deserve greater protection.

The court therefore decided that in the case of the pictures that also showed the princess's children, “the general right of personality ( Art. 2 Para. 1 in conjunction with Art. 1 Para. 1 GG) reinforcing the influence of Art. 6 GG (Protection of the family, parental rights) ”and referred the action back to the BGH on this point. However, the court dismissed the constitutional complaint regarding the five other photos .

Principles of the judgment

"1. The private sphere protected by the general right of personality under Article 2, Paragraph 1 in conjunction with Article 1, Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law is not limited to the domestic sphere. As a matter of principle, the individual must also have the opportunity to move around other, recognizably secluded locations from picture reporting. "
"2. The general right of personality is not guaranteed in the interest of commercializing one's own person. The protection of the private sphere against images is withdrawn, as far as someone shows himself to be in agreement that certain, usually regarded as private matters are made public. "
"3. The protective content of the general personal right of parents or parents is reinforced by Article 6, Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Basic Law, as far as the publication of images is concerned, which has the specific parental turn to the children as its subject. "
"4. The guarantee of freedom of the press contained in Article 5, Paragraph 1, Sentence 2 of the Basic Law also includes entertaining publications and contributions as well as their illustration. In principle, this also applies to the publication of images that show people in public life in everyday or private contexts. "

For the reasons

“In contrast to the right to one's own image, the protection of privacy, which is also rooted in general personal rights, does not relate specifically to images, but is thematically and spatially determined. It includes, on the one hand, matters that are typically classified as 'private' because of their information content, because their public discussion or display is considered improper, becoming known is perceived as embarrassing or triggers adverse reactions from the outside world, such as in disputes with oneself in Diaries ( BVerfGE 80, 367 ), in the case of confidential communication between spouses ( BVerfGE 27, 344 ), in the area of ​​sexuality ( BVerfGE 47, 46 ; BVerfGE 49, 286 ), in the case of socially deviant behavior ( BVerfGE 44, 353 ) or in the case of illness ( BVerfGE 32, 373 ) is the case. If there was no protection against the knowledge of others, the confrontation with oneself, impartial communication among loved ones, sexual development or the use of medical help would be impaired or impossible, even though the behavior is protected by constitutional law. "(Rz. 75 )
“On the other hand, the protection extends to a spatial area in which the individual can come to himself, relax or even let go (see BVerfGE 27, 1   <6>). This area also offers the opportunity to behave in a manner that is not intended for the public and whose observation or representation by outsiders would be embarrassing or disadvantageous for the person concerned. In essence, however, it is about a space in which he has the opportunity to be free from public observation and thus from the self-control that is forced by it, even without having to behave there necessarily differently than in public. If such areas of retreat no longer exist, the individual could be mentally overwhelmed because he would have to pay constant attention to how he affects others and whether he is behaving correctly. He lacked the phases of being alone and balancing out that are necessary for the development of personality and without which it would be permanently impaired. "(Rz. 76)
“Such a need for protection also applies to people who receive special public attention because of their rank or reputation, their position or influence, their skills or actions. Anyone who has become a person of public life, whether intentionally or unintentionally, does not lose their right to a private sphere that is hidden from the public eye. This also applies to democratically elected officials who are publicly accountable for their performance of office and have to accept public attention to this extent, but not for their private life, provided this does not affect the performance of office. "(Rz. 77)
“Where the boundaries of the protected private sphere run outside the house cannot be determined in a general and abstract way. Rather, they can only be determined on the basis of the particular nature of the place that the person concerned visits. The decisive factor is whether the individual finds or creates a situation in which he can reasonably and thus also for third parties assume that he is not exposed to the public eye. "(Rz. 79)
“Places where the individual is among many people lack the prerequisites for the protection of privacy in the sense of Article 2, Paragraph 1 in conjunction with Article 1, Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law. They cannot fulfill the need to withdraw and therefore do not justify the basic rights protection that this need deserves for reasons of personal development. Neither can individuals redefine such places in their private sphere through behavior that would typically not be displayed in public. It is not his behavior, whether alone or with others, that constitutes the private sphere, but the objective reality of the location at the time in question. He therefore behaves in places that do not have the characteristics of seclusion as if he were not under observation, he himself removes the need for protection for behaviors that are not of any concern to the public. "(Rz. 81)
“The protection of privacy from public knowledge also does not apply if someone agrees that certain matters that are usually considered private are made public, for example by concluding exclusive contracts on reporting on their privacy. The constitutional protection of privacy under Article 2, Paragraph 1 in conjunction with Article 1, Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law is not guaranteed in the interests of commercializing one's own person. Nobody is prevented from opening up private areas in this way. In that case, however, he cannot at the same time invoke the protection of privacy that is turned away from the public. [...] "(margin no. 82)
[…] It is recognized, however, that children require special protection because they first have to develop into people who are responsible for themselves (see BVerfGE 24, 119  <144>; BVerfGE 57, 361  <383>). This need for protection also exists with regard to the dangers emanating from the interest of the media and their users in images of children. Their personal development can be more sensitively disturbed than that of adults. The area in which children feel free from public observation and are allowed to develop must therefore be protected more comprehensively than that of adults. (Margin no. 83)
How the strengthening of the protection of personality through Art. 6 GG works in detail cannot be determined in a general and abstract way. It is true that there will usually be no need for protection if parents with their children consciously turn to the public, for example taking part in public events together or even being the focus of them. To that extent, they submit to the conditions of public appearances. In addition, the protection of the general right of personality in favor of specific parent-child relationships can, in principle, also intervene where the prerequisites of local seclusion are lacking. (Rz. 85)

Meaning of the judgment

This judgment was considered to be trend-setting until 2004, when Germany was convicted by the European Court of Human Rights for violating the European Convention on Human Rights. On February 7, 2012, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights specified the 2004 judgment.

For the judgments of the BGH and the ECHR, see also the Caroline judgment and right to own picture .

literature

  • Thomas Haug: Photo coverage of celebrities. With special consideration of the admissibility of the judicial assessment of the informational value of media reports. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2011, ISBN 978-3-8329-6528-0 .
  • Thomas Haug: Groundbreaking judgments of the ECHR on press law. Final defeat for Princess Caroline. In: Kommunikation & Recht , No. 3/2012, p. 1 (online) .

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. BVerfGE 101, 361 , Az. 1 BvR 653/96.
  2. ECHR, Grand Chamber, judgment of February 7, 2012, Az. 40660/08 and 60641/08 ( Von Hannover II ), Kommunikation und Recht 2012, 179.