Air Canada Douglas DC-8 accident near Ottawa

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Air Canada Douglas DC-8 accident near Ottawa
CF-TJO DC-8-54 Air Canada PIK 27AUG65 (5578166484) .jpg

An identical Air Canada machine
Accident summary
Accident type Loss of control
place at Ottawa Airport , Ontario , CanadaCanadaCanada 
date May 19, 1967
Fatalities 3
Survivors 0
Aircraft
Aircraft type United StatesUnited States Douglas DC-8F-54 "Jet Trader"
operator CanadaCanada Air Canada
Mark CanadaCanada CF-TJM
Departure airport Montreal-Dorval Airport , Quebec , CanadaCanadaCanada 
Destination airport Ottawa Airport , Ontario , CanadaCanadaCanada 
Passengers 0
crew 3
Lists of aviation accidents

The accident involving a Douglas DC-8 of Air Canada near Ottawa occurred on May 19, 1967. On this day, a Douglas DC-8F-54 "Jet Trader" of Air Canada (CF-TJM) was on a training flight from Montreal Airport -Dorval to Ottawa Airport to a loss of control, causing the plane to crash while lying on its back. All three crew members on board were killed in the accident.

machine

The aircraft involved in the accident was a combined passenger and cargo aircraft of the Douglas DC-8F-54 "Jet Trader" type, which was assembled at the Douglas plant in Long Beach , California and was rolled out on December 14, 1962 . The aircraft had the factory number 45653 , it was the 178th Douglas DC-8 from ongoing production. The DC-8 has been approved with the test number N9612Z . The machine was ordered by Trans-Canada Air Lines . The machine with the aircraft registration number CF-TJM was delivered on January 30, 1963. The machine was given the fleet number 813 . On November 6, 1963, the plane was involved in a serious aircraft accident at London Heathrow Airport . On Trans Canada Air Lines flight 861, the machine with 97 occupants overshot the end of the runway after an aborted take-off, with the machine being severely damaged in the front and lower fuselage area and several engines being torn off. A repair that took several months followed and the machine was put back into operation in 1964. When the airline was renamed Air Canada, the machine was transferred to the fleet of this airline on June 1, 1964. The four-engine long-range - narrow-body aircraft was equipped with four engines of the type Pratt & Whitney Jt3d-3B equipped. By the time of the accident, the machine had run 9,670 hours.

Inmates

On board the machine with which a training flight was carried out that day, there was only a three-person crew, consisting of a test captain and two pilots in training:

  • The flight captain was also certified as a test captain and, sitting in the right pilot's seat, was in the role of pilot flying at the time of the accident . He had 19,400 hours of flight experience, 3,700 hours of which in the cockpit of the Douglas DC-8.
  • In the left pilot's seat sat a pilot who already had 20,478 hours of flight experience, but had only completed eight hours with the Douglas DC-8. He had also spent 28 hours in the DC-8's flight simulator.
  • The third pilot was also very experienced with 18,795 flight hours, but like his colleague only had eight hours of flight experience with the DC-8 and 28 hours in the flight simulator. He was sitting in the second officer's seat, which was behind the right pilot's seat.

the accident

A retraining flight was flown with the machine that day, with the DC-8 being flown from Montréal to Ottawa. The machine took off at 6:02 p.m. on an instrument flight , which was continued as a visual flight when it reached the Ottawa area . After a simulated hydraulic failure, a touch-and-go maneuver was carried out on runway 32 at 18:25 . From the flight data recorder recordings evaluated later it emerged that the maneuver with the ailerons was flown in manual mode. The buoyancy aids were set to 25 degrees before the machine was pulled up. After the machine took off again and a curve was flown on a course of 260 degrees, the ailerons were set back to the hydraulically assisted mode. After about two minutes in the headwind approach, engine no. 4 was idled and left in that position for about two minutes and 15 seconds. A left roll angle averaging about 3 degrees was maintained during this period, except at about midpoint when the aircraft slowly leaned 18 degrees to the left, followed by an abrupt right roll roll to 10 degrees. The length of the headwind section coincided with a planned asymmetrical landing with two engines. Engine no. 4 was ramped up again shortly before a left turn for the transverse approach was initiated. During this curve, engine no. 4 was again shut down and then brought back up to normal output. Engine # 1 was then ramped down for about 20 seconds and then ramped back up to normal output. The landing flaps stayed at the 25 degree setting. As he turned towards the final approach, the pilot in command informed the tower that he had not yet decided whether to make a landing.

When the machine passed the UP beacon about 8.5 miles from the runway threshold and about 200 seconds before impact , the rudder was placed in manual mode and the power of all four engines was reduced. Engine # 4 was then placed in the idle position and the other three engines in the approach thrust position. About 171 seconds before impact, the pilot in command informed the control tower that he was going to land the aircraft. The landing gear was extended 155 seconds before the impact and engine No. 3 was idled 120 seconds before the impact, while the output of engines No. 1 and 2 was increased at the same time. At this point the aircraft was 1,150 feet above the ground and the displayed airspeed was relatively constant at 165 knots (about 306 km / h). Between 109 and 92 seconds before impact, a 34-degree right turn was flown onto a course of 337 degrees. The engine power was reduced again, a roll angle was assumed and the machine returned approximately to the approach baseline. About 69 seconds before the impact, the buoyancy aids were extended to 35 degrees, 54 seconds before the impact the rudder was switched to hydraulic mode for less than 6 seconds and then switched back to manual mode. During the 69-25 second period prior to impact, the rate of descent was relatively constant at around 700 feet per minute, at which rate the machine tended to hit the ground in front of the runway and the airspeed decreased from 163 to 152 kt. The power of engines No. 1 and 2 was gradually increased from 25 seconds before the impact, until eight seconds before the impact, the almost maximum power was reached, whereupon the engines were brought back to idle. 19 seconds before the impact the machine began to yaw to the right, seven seconds later thrust was given to engines 3 and 4. Nine seconds before the impact and at an altitude of about 200 feet above the ground, the flight attitude with the roll angle to the left could no longer be maintained. The machine rolled to the right. Roll and yaw angles increased significantly. The machine continued to roll to the right until it hit the ground 1,995 feet in front of runway 32 and 575 feet northeast of the approach baseline in the supine position with the nose pointing downwards. The accident occurred at 18:37. The machine was destroyed and all three crew members were killed.

causes

The Canadian Aircraft Accident Investigation Branch investigated the incident. The investigators came to the conclusion that the accident was due to the failure of the captain responsible to break off a training maneuver under given conditions which made it impossible to regain control of the engine. In addition, the following findings were noted:

  • The decision to make an asymmetrical approach with the rudder in manual mode was inappropriate.
  • The information available to the crew in the operations manual on the operating procedures when flying a Douglas DC-8 with only two engines was inadequate.
  • Under the given conditions, the machine was inclined to touch down in front of the runway.
  • Control was lost when the power of the left engines was increased late in the approach and at a flight speed that was too low for effective control of the rudder.
  • The faulty check valve was closed during the flight at least 54 seconds before the impact.

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