Fontes moralitatis
Scholasticism used this term to describe the criteria (“sources”) for the moral assessment of an action. Traditionally, such criteria were “object” (also “ goal of action”, “ finis operis ”), “intention” (also “goal of the agent”, “ finis operantis ”) and the “circumstances” (“ circumstantiae ”) of the action, Beyond which there are no further criteria.
From the traditional point of view, the qualitative determination of the action, i.e. whether it is good or bad, depends on “object” and “intention”. On the other hand, the “circumstances” depend only quantitatively to what extent they are one or the other.
object
You have to have a reason for every action: you strive for a value or a set of values or you seek to avoid damage or a set of damage. If the action corresponds to the desired value or value group also in a universal view (= without restriction to certain beneficiaries) and in the long run and as a whole, this value or value group constitutes the intended "object" of the action and the action is ethically imitated named this "object". If, on the other hand, the action ultimately does not correspond to its own reason, but undermines it in the long term and as a whole in a universal view and thus has the structure of overexploitation compared to its reason, the damage that is permitted or caused without a “corresponding reason” is ethical consideration of the intended "object" of the action, and the action is named after them. If harm is allowed or caused for no “appropriate reason”, then the action is “inherently bad”. For example, in an act in which a limb of a patient is amputated because it is the only way to save his or her life, the "object" is "life-saving." If, on the other hand, a limb is amputated for reasons other than life-saving and therefore for reasons that do not “correspond”, the act is referred to as “mutilation” and this then constitutes the intended “object” of the act and is “inherently bad”.
intention
The unity of an action comes about when its reason is sufficient for its establishment. However, our actions usually do not stand on their own; in the one action we already prepare further actions. Of course, the additional assignment of one action to another is of ethical importance for the first action. If you go on a trip abroad for relaxation, but also want to use it to secretly accept works of art, then this already influences the moral assessment of the holiday trip. Because then the “object” of the second act (theft) is already present in the first as “intention”. Although the first act, the recreational journey, is not "inherently bad", it becomes "bad" by being assigned to another, "inherently bad" act. In the case of an action, on the other hand, which in itself is not related to a further action, one can only speak of the wanted "object", but there is no point in additionally speaking of an "intention". “Intention” always means the “object” of a further action to which a first action that already has its own desired “object” is assigned.
circumstances
The "circumstances" are only used for quantitative determination. For example, a theft of 100 or 10,000 euros is a theft, but the severity of the theft depends on the amount stolen. Other "circumstances" that are important for the quantitative determination of the goodness or badness of an action are, for example, the intensity with which an action occurs, whether it was already planned or was only carried out accidentally, and the like. Ä .; The responsibility of the agent is also one of the circumstances.
Often the traditional textbooks give as circumstances: Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando (who, what, where, with the help of what, why, in what way, when). However, this seems to be a mistake that one writer copies from another. "Circumstances" of this kind are a structure principle in ancient rhetoric (Quintilian). But for a murder it is irrelevant whether it is carried out with a knife or a revolver and also whether it takes place in Frankfurt or Berlin. The question of “who” is also irrelevant for the ethical assessment of an action. Circumstances such as the amount of money stolen or the extent of physical harm on the other hand - which are not mentioned in these lists - are important if one wants to determine the severity of an ethically bad act.
It is similarly wrong to want to count the foreseen consequences of an action only under the "circumstances". Harmful consequences, for which there is no “appropriate reason” for permitting or causing, determine the “object” of the action.
In their ethical meaning, “subject”, “intention” and “circumstances” are actually the necessary and sufficient criteria for the moral assessment of an act.
To: The good end does not justify the bad means
The traditional sentence that the good end does not justify the bad means, according to these criteria, says that an action which turns out to be "bad in itself" because of its subject matter does not become better because it is used as a means to one to enable further, good action. For example, torture can never be justified by having an urgent interest in information. Because you can blackmail any statement with torture, but you never have the slightest guarantee that a statement blackmailed through torture is true. A legitimate interest in information is therefore not a “corresponding reason” for torture; rather, torture is always “disproportionate” and therefore “inherently bad”.