Principle of double action

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The principle of double action (PDW) is a principle accepted by some ethical theories. It states that an action with both (morally) bad and (morally) good or (morally) neutral consequences is morally permissible if the bad consequences are only unintended side effects. It is morally forbidden when (also) the bad consequences are intended. This is especially the case when the bad consequences are used as a means of achieving the good consequence. According to this principle, the bad consequence is morally relevant only insofar as it is intended by the actor and thus made the object of his will, but not insofar as he only foresees it.

The principle of double action is occasionally used to justify the normative differentiation between active and indirect euthanasia that exists in many legal systems .

Concept history

Within an ethical theory that absolutely forbids some actions, the dilemma can arise that this prohibition does not allow an action that would have very good and desirable consequences in a certain situation. In contrast to consequentialism , which only considers the consequences of the action when assessing an action as morally right or wrong, certain values apply absolutely in deontological theories of ethics. A common example is the absolute prohibition of killing within Christian ethics, which, however, has been relativized by the PDW.

Taking the example of killing an aggressor in the act of self-defense, the question was first discussed by Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century . It can happen, says Thomas, that you kill an aggressor in self-defense. This can be allowed because the (morally good) intention associated with this action is to save one's own life. Killing the attacker is just as much an effect of the action as saving one's life. If the killing was not a disproportionate use of force in relation to the severity of the attack, then the death of the attacker was accepted by the self-defender, but despite the absolute prohibition of killing, this is no reason to make self-defense appear morally wrong.

In its present form, the PDW is a collection of conditions under which it is allowed to do something bad. According to Friedo Ricken's statements from 2013, it reads :

The following four conditions must be met in order for an evil to be morally permissible:

(1) The act itself, apart from the foreseen evil, must be morally good or morally indifferent.
(2) The acting person intends the good effect of the action; the bad effect is only foreseen.
(3) "The bad effect must not be a means to produce the good effect." That is, either
(3a) that the bad effect is only a consequence of the good effect; or
(3b) the bad effect "must be as immediate as the good result"
(4) The foreseen evil must be outweighed by a "correspondingly grave reason."

Condition (2) means that only the good effect may be intended. The condition (3) demands that "the bad effect may not be intended as a means to a good cause."

According to Helga Kuhse and the New Catholic Encyclopedia , the PDW is formulated as follows:

(1) The act itself must be good or at least morally neutral.
(2) The agent may not want the bad effect to be positive, but may allow it. If he can do the good without the bad effect, then he should. Sometimes people say that the bad effect is indirectly wanted.
(3) The good effect must come from the action at least as immediately as the bad (in the causal sequence, not necessarily in the temporal sequence). In other words, the good effect must be directly caused by the action, not the bad effect. Otherwise, the doer would be using a bad means to a good cause, which is never allowed.
(4) The good effect must be sufficiently desirable so that it offsets allowing the bad effect. There are many factors that must be weighed and compared in making this decision, with care and caution appropriate to the importance of the case.

In this definition, the second sentence of Clause 2 (“If he can get the good effect without the bad effect, then he should do so”) is important. This formulation prevents the impression that bad side effects, which might have been avoidable, could easily be accepted as long as they were not directly intended.

Well-known examples

All examples are constructed in such a way that the action in case A is morally prohibited in an ethical theory with an absolute prohibition of killing, while case B in such a theory can be morally permissible according to the PDW, provided that the conditions (1) - (4 ) are fulfilled.

mother and child

Case A: There are complications in the birth of a child. The mother's life can only be saved if the child is killed by the skull shattered. Otherwise, the mother and child die. In this case the good effect would only be the side effect of the direct - bad - action, which is prohibited.

Case B: A pregnant woman is diagnosed with uterine cancer. The only way to save their lives is to have the uterus removed, which kills the fetus. So it is not a directly intended killing of the fetus.

Bombs on innocent civilians?

Case A: In a just war , the one-time bombing of the civilian population can end the war (faster).

Case B: In a just war, bombing a military target can end the war (faster). Civilians will die in the bombing.

In the literature, a distinction is made between the strategic bombing and the terror bombing :

  • Strategic Bombardment : A pilot bombs an enemy military target "in a just war". He foresees that innocent civilians in the vicinity of the target will be killed.
  • Terror bombing : A pilot bombs innocent civilians "in a just war" to weaken the enemy.

According to the PDW, strategic bombing can be ethically permitted under conditions (1) - (4). In the case of strategic bombing, however, condition (4) is problematic: "under what circumstances is it ... morally justified in [these] cases ... to accept the death of innocents"?

A terror bombardment violates (2) and (3), so it would be murder.

For the solution of the cases, a counterfactual auxiliary consideration is suggested: would the pilot, if he could, avoid killing the civilians? This is only the case with strategic bombing.

Discussion and criticism

Critics of the principle claim that it makes little difference to the moral judgment of an action whether a bad consequence is only expected or also intended.

The PDW is countered by the fact that in the legal and everyday area, what is consciously accepted is also counted as guilt (cf. also: dolus eventualis ).

Furthermore, the differentiation between the intended and the only accepted is hardly feasible intersubjectively.

See also

literature

  • Philippa Foot : The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect , in: Philippa Foot: Virtues and Vices ans Other Essays in Moral Philosophy , Oxford 1978, pp. 19–32 (English)
  • Raymond Gillespie Frey: The Doctrine of Double Effect , in: Ders. / Christopher Heath Wellman (ed.): A companion to applied ethics , Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford 2003, ISBN 1557865949 , pp. 464–474 ( Google Books )
  • Martin Klein: Euthanasia and the principle of double action , in: Wiener Klinische Wochenschrift (2002) 114 / 10–11, pp. 415–421 ( PDF )
  • the same: active euthanasia and the principle of dual action. Würzburg medical history reports 23, 2005, pp. 51–62
  • Peter Knauer : Action Networks - About the Basic Principle of Ethics , Frankfurt am Main 2002, ISBN 3-8311-0513-8 . ( PDF )
  • Friedo Ricken : General ethics. 5th edition. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 2013, ISBN 978-3-17-022583-1 , pp. 303-308.

Web links

Remarks

  1. ↑ Suzanne Uniacke: Principle of Double Effect . In: Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy . 1998, doi : 10.4324 / 9780415249126-L017-1 .
  2. ↑ Thomas Aquinas: Summa theologica 2-2, q. 64 a.7: “Respondeo dicendum quod nihil prohibet unius actus esse duos effectus, quorum alter solum sit in intentione, alius vero sit praeter intentionem. Morales autem actus recipiunt speciem secundum id quod intenditur, non autem ab eo quod est praeter intentionem, cum sit per accidens, ut ex supradictis patet. Ex actu igitur alicuius seipsum defendentis duplex effectus sequi potest, unus quidem conservatio propriae vitae; alius autem occisio invadentis. Actus igitur huiusmodi ex hoc quod intenditur conservatio propriae vitae, non habet rationem illiciti, cum hoc sit cuilibet naturale quod se conservet in esse quantum potest. Potest tamen aliquis actus ex bona intentione proveniens illicitus reddi si non sit proportionatus fini. Et ideo si aliquis ad defendendum propriam vitam utatur maiori violentia quam oporteat, erit illicitum. Si vero moderate violentiam repellat, erit licita defensio, nam secundum iura, vim vi repellere licet cum moderamine inculpatae tutelae. Nec est necessarium ad salutem ut homo actum moderatae tutelae praetermittat ad evitandum occisionem alterius, quia plus tenetur homo vitae suae providere quam vitae alienae. Sed quia occidere hominem non licet nisi publica auctoritate propter bonum commune, ut ex supradictis patet; illicitum est quod homo intendat occidere hominem ut seipsum defendat, nisi ei qui habet publicam auctoritatem, qui, intendens hominem occidere ad sui defensionem, refert hoc ad publicum bonum, ut patet in milite pugnante contra hostes, et in ministro iudicis contrais pugnes. Quamvis et isti etiam peccent si privata libidine moveantur. "(Free translation: I answer that an action with a double effect is not forbidden, in which only one effect is intended ( in intention ), but the other is outside the intention ( praeter intentionem ) The type of morality of an action is determined by what is intended, not by what is outside the intention, since this is immaterial ( per accidens ), as is clear from what has been predicted. A defensive act can have a double effect One is to save one's life, the other to kill the attacker. Such an act would be permissible because it is natural to keep oneself alive as much as possible, but an act of good intention may be illegal because of them Disproportionality. ...) [1]
  3. ↑ See: Friedo Ricken : Allgemeine Ethik. 5th edition. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 2013, ISBN 978-3-17-022583-1 , p. 304
  4. ^ Friedo Ricken : General ethics. 5th edition. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 2013, ISBN 978-3-17-022583-1 , p. 305
  5. ↑ Helga Kuhse, The "holiness of life" in medicine. A philosophical criticism, Erlangen 1994, p. 118
  6. ^ New Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. 4, New York, pp. 1020-22. Principle of Double Effect
  7. ^ Friedo Ricken : General ethics. 5th edition. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 2013, ISBN 978-3-17-022583-1 , p. 306
  8. ^ Friedo Ricken : General ethics. 5th edition. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 2013, ISBN 978-3-17-022583-1 , p. 308
  9. ^ Reticent Friedo Ricken : General Ethics. 5th edition. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 2013, ISBN 978-3-17-022583-1 , p. 306, which abstains from a judgment and only emphasizes the intuition of a greater reprehensibility of the terror bombardment - even if neither were morally permitted.
  10. ^ Friedo Ricken : General ethics. 5th edition. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 2013, ISBN 978-3-17-022583-1 , p. 307 f.
  11. ↑ Cf. Dieter Birnbacher : Analytical Introduction to Ethics , Berlin 2nd ed. 2007, pp. 180f.
  12. ↑ Michael Quante: Introduction to General Ethics. 4th edition. Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2011, ISBN 978-3-534-24595-6 , p. 133
  13. ↑ Michael Quante: Introduction to General Ethics. 4th edition. Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2011, ISBN 978-3-534-24595-6 , p. 133