Peace offer of the Central Powers

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The peace offer of the Central Powers of December 12, 1916 was a peace note in the course of the First World War , which was published at the urging of Austria-Hungary after the conquest of Romania , but remained without consequences.

Wording of the note

The wording of the peace offer of the Central Powers was:

“The most terrible war history has ever seen has been raging in a large part of the world for almost two and a half years. This catastrophe, which the bond of a common millennial civilization has not been able to stop, hits humanity in its most precious achievements. It threatens to shatter the spiritual and material progress that formed the pride of Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century.

Germany and its allies, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, have shown their insurmountable strength in this struggle. They achieved tremendous successes over their opponents, who were superior in number and in war material. Their lines steadfastly withstand the repeated attacks of the armies of their enemies. The recent onslaught in the Balkans has been swiftly and victoriously put down. The last events show that even a further continuation of the war will not be able to undermine its power of resistance, that rather the whole situation justifies the expectation of further successes. In order to defend their existence and their national freedom of development, the four allied powers were forced to take up arms. The acts of glory of their armies have not changed that. They have always held fast to the conviction that their own rights and justified claims do not conflict with the rights of other nations. They do not aim to crush or destroy their opponents. Supported by the awareness of their military and economic strength, and ready to continue the struggle forced upon them to the utmost if necessary, but at the same time inspired by the desire to prevent further bloodshed and to put an end to the atrocities of war, propose the four allied powers to enter into peace negotiations as soon as possible. The proposals that they will bring with them to these negotiations, which are aimed at securing the existence, honor and freedom of development of their peoples, are, in their opinion, a suitable basis for the establishment of a lasting peace.

If, despite this offer of peace and reconciliation, the struggle should continue, the four Allied Powers are determined to lead it to a victorious end. But you solemnly reject any responsibility for it before humanity and history. "

background

The diplomatic preparation of the peace proposal was characterized by the "efforts of German government circles to conceal their own high-pitched war aims and to moderate the demands of their allies". They also tried to evade any mutual surety or guarantee. Ultimately, the joint Foreign Minister of Austria-Hungary, Stephan Burián , was unable to prevail with his demand that specific war objectives be included in the peace note. Therefore, the musical text of the peace offer lacked specific conditions.

The German government under Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg promised by the peace offer three things: First, it should as a disintegrating agent within the war-weary countries of the Entente act, second (ie to the position in relation to the neutral states United States ) strengthen and third, a significant turnaround bring about in the depressed mood of their own people. If the offer was rejected, the odium for the continuation of the war would fall on the opponents, according to German opinion. Germany saw the best justification for intensifying warfare in the failure of the peace campaign, which represented one of the last chances for the Danube monarchy to save its existence .

Answer from the Entente

The less binding tone of the peace note and “its content lacking anything concrete”, but especially the fact that Germany showed no inclination to evacuate the occupied territories, made the note unacceptable to the Entente.

The reply of the Allies of December 30, 1916 therefore spoke of a "suggestion without conditions", which was not an offer of peace. The “proposal appears less as a peace offer than as a war maneuver”. A peace is impossible “as long as there is no guarantee for the restoration of the violated rights and freedoms, for the recognition of the nationality principle and the free existence of the small states”.

Response to the answer

A few days later, Kaiser Wilhelm II announced by decree :

“In association with the rulers allied to me, I had suggested to our enemies that they immediately enter into peace negotiations. The enemies have rejected my proposal. Your hunger for power wants Germany's destruction. The war continues! Before God and humanity, the enemy governments alone bear the heavy responsibility for all further terrible sacrifices, which my will wanted to spare you. In righteous indignation at the pretentious iniquities of the enemy, in the will to defend our most sacred goods and to ensure a happy future for the fatherland, you will become steel. Our enemies did not want the understanding offered by me. With God's help, our weapons will force them to do so! "

- Large Headquarters , January 5, 1917. signed Wilhelm, IR

See also

literature

  • Robert Piloty : The Peace Offer of the Central Powers. Mohr, Tübingen 1917 ( digitized version ).
  • Wolfgang Steglich : Securing alliances or peace of understanding. Investigations into the peace offer of the Central Powers of December 12, 1916. Musterschmidt, Göttingen / Berlin / Frankfurt am Main 1958.

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ^ André Scherer, Jacques Grunewald: L'Allemagne et les problemèmes de la paix pendant la première guerre mondiale. Documents extraits des archives de l'Office allemand des Affaires étrangères . (German original documents) Volume 1, Paris 1962, ISBN 2-85944-010-0 , p. 613ff. (No. 420); and Herbert Michaelis, Ernst Schraepler (ed.): Causes and consequences. From the German collapse in 1918 and 1945 to the state reorganization of Germany in the present. A collection of certificates and documents on contemporary history. Volume 2: The Military Collapse and the End of the Empire. Berlin 1958/59, pp. 68f. (No. 40).
  2. ↑ a b Imre Gonda: Decline of the empires in Central Europe. The dual alliance in the last years of the war (1916–1918). Budapest 1977, ISBN 963-05-1084-7 , p. 232.
  3. ↑ Hellmut Andics : The fall of the Danube Monarchy. Austria-Hungary from the turn of the century to November 1918. (= Austria 1804–1975 , Volume 2) Molden-Taschenbuch-Verlag, Vienna 1976, ISBN 3-217-05022-3 , p. 225.
  4. ^ André Scherer, Jacques Grunewald: L'Allemagne et les problemèmes de la paix pendant la première guerre mondiale. Documents extraits des archives de l'Office allemand des Affaires étrangères. (German original documents) Volume 1, Paris 1962, ISBN 2-85944-010-0 , pp. 609f. (No. 416)
    Imre Gonda: Decline of the empires in Central Europe. The dual alliance in the last years of the war (1916–1918). Budapest 1977, ISBN 963-05-1084-7 , p. 347.
  5. ^ Zbyněk A. Zeman: The collapse of the Habsburg Empire 1914–1918. Vienna 1963, p. 123.
  6. ^ The missed peace , article from December 23, 1966 by Karl-Heinz Janßen on Zeit Online
  7. ↑ Ulrich Cartarius (Ed.): Germany in the First World War. Texts and documents 1914-1918. Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, Munich 1982, ISBN 3-423-02931-5 , p. 208.
  8. ↑ Wladimir Petrowitsch Potjomkin (Ed.): History of Diplomacy, Volume Two (Die Diplomatie der Neuzeit, 1872-1919) , Berlin / Leipzig 1948, p. 349f.
  9. ↑ Herbert Michaelis, Ernst Schraepler (Ed.): Causes and consequences. From the German collapse in 1918 and 1945 to the state reorganization of Germany in the present. A collection of certificates and documents on contemporary history. Volume 2: The Military Collapse and the End of the Empire. Berlin 1958/59, p. 85.