Reason (action theory)

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Reasons to play in the philosophical discipline of theory of action an important role in the explanation of actions . For example, we can explain the fact that Peter is running fast by saying that he wants to catch another train. In this case, the fact that Peter wants to catch a train is what makes it run so fast. One speaks here of a teleological explanation or of an understanding of the action. In psychology , a similar phenomenon is called the term motivation .

In many cases, one can analyze the reason for an action in terms of a belief and a volition component:

  • Peter wants to catch the train.
  • Peter thinks he can catch the train if it runs fast.
  • It follows from this: Peter runs fast.

Such an analysis is also called a practical syllogism .

The teleological explanation, that is, the explanation through reasons, is opposed to the causal explanation, that is, the explanation through causes. For example, a lightning strike can cause a haystack to burn down. According to the strict usage of the theory of action, the lightning strike would not be called a “reason” here (although this could be said colloquially). If someone hits Peter on his knee with a hammer so that the leg twitches reflexively , the blow is also the cause of the twitching, not a reason. In this case, Peter's twitching is not an act, but a mere "body movement", since it happens involuntarily and thus the element of intentionality or voluntariness is missing. Reasons for events can only be given to the extent that these events are understood as intentional (“intentional”) actions.

Are reasons causes?

Despite the differences between reasons and causes just mentioned, the question of whether reasons can be traced back to causes, i.e. whether a reason is a special type of cause, has been discussed in analytical philosophy in recent decades. Donald Davidson is considered to be a main proponent of the reductionist position according to which such a return is possible . The opposite position is u. a. formulated by Elizabeth Anscombe and Georg Henrik von Wright .

The main argument of the anti-reductionist current is that there is a conceptual- logical connection between reasons and actions and that therefore the former cannot be the cause of the latter. Knowledge about cause-effect relationships is empirical knowledge (" a posteriori "), i. H. it is based on experience or, ideally, on scientific verification through experiments . However, the connection between a reason such as the intention to perform a certain action and the action itself cannot be tested experimentally. According to Von Wright, this is the case in particular because the intention is not an event that can be separated from the action: “Intentionality is not a mental act, nor is it an accompanying characteristic experience. A behavior gets its intentional character from the fact that it is seen by the agent himself or by an observer in a wider perspective, by the fact that it is placed in a context of goals and cognitive elements. ”(Explanation and Understanding III, 8).

Davidson's theory is based on the fact that the same event can be described in different ways. Peter's actions can be described either as an intentional act (“he walks”) or as a body movement (“his legs move in a certain rhythm”). Similarly, according to Davidson Peters Grund (“He wants to reach the train”), a certain neurophysiological event (“The and the brain areas are activated”) can be identified. The neurophysiological event causes the body movement, so reasons are causes. Nevertheless, according to Davidson, teleological explanations, i.e. explanations with reasons, cannot be replaced by causal explanations, explanations with causes. From Davidson's position of anomalous monism, it follows that reasons are only identical as individual causes with individual causes, that the intentional concept as a whole cannot be defined by a neurophysiological concept and that the corresponding explanations cannot therefore be traced back to one another.

literature

  • Donald Davidson , Actions, Reasons and Causes , in D. Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events , Oxford, 1980; German "Actions, Reasons, Causes" in D. Davidson, Action and Event , Frankfurt a. M., 1985.
  • William H. Dray , Laws and Explanation in History , Oxford, 1957
  • Abraham I. Report , Free Action , New York, 1961
  • Georg Henrik von Wright , Explanation and Understanding , New York 1971; German: "Explain and Understand", Frankfurt a. M., 1974.

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