Leipziger Volkszeitung decision

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In German jurisprudence, the Leipziger Volkszeitung decision refers to a decision of the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) of October 3, 1969, in which the Federal Constitutional Court deals with the importance of the freedom of recipients as an independent fundamental right .

facts

The complainant had a friend send him daily newspapers from the GDR. The customs authorities kept a copy of the Leipziger Volkszeitung dated May 8, 1964, because the Lüneburg district court had confiscated this edition because of state security offenses. The regional court justified its decision with the fact that with this issue the SED wanted to promote the banned KPD in order to finally establish a tyranny and arbitrary rule in the Federal Republic like in the GDR . The complainant lodged a constitutional complaint against the decision of the regional court. The Federal Constitutional Court overturned the confiscation order.

Summary of the decision

In this ruling, the Federal Constitutional Court determined that the freedom of recipients or information is an independent basic right alongside freedom of opinion and freedom of the press . This basic right was only introduced in Germany after 1945 based on experience with state control of information and conformity in the Nazi state.

Freedom of information has two components: the principle of democracy according to Article 20, Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law and the right of personality from Article 2, Paragraph 1 in conjunction with Article 1, Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law, because information is an elementary need to develop as a personality.

The freedom to obtain information from generally accessible sources (so-called freedom of recipients ) contributes significantly to the formation of will in the democratic process; it must not be subject to any state influence. It is also irrelevant whether it is unsolicited information sent or requested information; access to the information is also protected.

For the reasons

“Until 1945, German constitutional history did not have an independent basic right to unhindered education from generally accessible sources. [...] The reason for the independent constitutional guarantee of freedom of information in the Basic Law was the experience with the information restrictions that belonged to National Socialist government practice, the state control of opinion, the state bans on listening to foreign radio stations and the bans on literature and art. [...]

In the constitutional order, freedom of information is on an equal footing with freedom of opinion and freedom of the press. It is not a mere part of the right to freedom of expression and expression. [...]

According to this, two components are essential for the freedom of information guaranteed in Art. 5, Paragraph 1, Clause 1 of the Basic Law. On the one hand there is the reference to the democratic principle of Article 20.1 of the Basic Law: A democratic state cannot exist without free and as well-informed public opinion as possible. In addition, freedom of information has an individual legal component derived from Art. 1, Art. 2, Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law. One of the basic human needs is to learn from as many sources as possible, to expand one's own knowledge and thus to develop as a personality. In addition, in modern industrial society, the possession of information is of essential importance for the social position of the individual. The fundamental right to freedom of information, like the fundamental right to freedom of expression, is one of the most important prerequisites for free democracy (cf. BVerfGE 7, 198 [208]). It is only with his help that the citizen is put in a position to create the necessary prerequisites for the exercise of his personal and political tasks in order to be able to act responsibly in the democratic sense. With increasing knowledge, the citizen recognizes interactions in politics and their significance for his existence and can draw conclusions from them; his freedom to share responsibility and to criticize grows. Last but not least, the information can enable the individual to get to know the opinions of others, to weigh them up against one another in order to eliminate prejudices and to awaken understanding for those who think differently. […]

The individual is already 'informed' of this kind when the information is brought to him by post. If the access is interrupted in this way, a later invocation of freedom of information cannot be countered that he did not order the publication and that there is therefore no interference with the freedom of 'information'. It is in the nature of this right that the will to be informed may only be updated after receipt of the mail. [...]

Newspapers and other means of mass communication are therefore by their very nature generally accessible sources of information. They do not lose their status as a generally accessible source even if state measures such as confiscations, import bans or restrictions impair the possibility of general access. [...]

The individual should be able to form his or her opinion on the basis of widely scattered information material. He should not be subject to any influence by the state when selecting the material. Since the freedom of information, due to its connection with the democratic principle, is also intended to prepare a judgment on the policy of one's own state organs, the fundamental right must largely be preserved from restrictions by these state organs. [...]

Freedom of information was constitutionally guaranteed as a reaction to the National Socialist information bans and restrictions in order to guarantee unhindered information also from sources that exist outside the control of the state authority of the Federal Republic. If the source of information is generally accessible at any location, regardless of whether it is outside of the Federal Republic of Germany, then a legally binding confiscation order cannot lead to this information source being deprived of its general accessibility. "

See also

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. Reference: BVerfGE 27, 71-88; Ref .: 1 BvR 46/65