League of neutrals
The League of Neutrals was a group of European states that assured each other of neutrality in the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 in order to prevent the conflict from spreading to all of Europe. Formally, however, it was not a multilateral treaty, but only intergovernmental agreements.
origin
The driving force behind the league was the Italian Foreign Minister Emilio Visconti-Venosta . He was worried that French pressure could induce Austria to enter the war. In the event of rapid French victories, the diplomatic consequences would be incalculable. In Italy itself, the majority of the cabinet was in favor of neutrality, but King Victor Emmanuel II wanted the French to enter the war. The king dreamed of realizing the goals of the failed Franco-Austrian-Italian triple alliance of 1869.
On July 21, 1870, a few days after the French declaration of war on Prussia, Visconti-Venosta published an article on the subject. In the Opinione from Florence he described a league of neutrals that was supposed to prevent the war from spreading. Especially if the war were to last only briefly, there would be a chance that it would remain limited to France and northern Germany.
British diplomats expressed great sympathy for Visconti-Venosta's proposal; but the means should not be a multilateral treaty that would have restricted Britain's freedom too much. But Secretary of State Granville could envision signing a separate agreement with each of the non-belligerent nations. On August 17th, after Prussia had already won several important battles, the British Foreign Minister wrote to the Italian ambassador: None of the countries involved would abandon their neutrality without first informing the other. The Italian cabinet agreed and followed suit on August 22 with its own statement. The corresponding exchange of notes with Great Britain, Italy, the Ottoman Empire, Spain and Denmark followed from August 31 to September 1.
Consequences for the North German Confederation
The North German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck initially had no reason to change his policy: the League's intentions were clear, and he had foreseen something like that. However, he feared that the league would interfere as the war progressed. At the beginning of September France had lost the battle of Sedan and Napoleon III. was taken prisoner of war. Bismarck heard of British fears that France's power might decline too much. Diplomatic activity between Vienna and St. Petersburg worried him whether the Russian partner might reorient.
Bismarck treated Russia with the greatest courtesy, but conveyed through the ambassador the fear that an unfavorable peace imposed on Germany would have negative effects on public opinion. This allegedly prepares the ground for a socialist republic in Germany. In doing so, Bismarck took advantage of the Russian tsar's fear of revolution. National unrest in Central Europe could spread to Russian-occupied Poland. The Chancellor finally secured Russian neutrality during the course of the war by giving Russia diplomatic assistance in removing the Straits clause (which kept Russian warships away from the Dardanelles) of 1856.
supporting documents
- ^ David Wetzel: A Duel of Nations. Germany, France and the Diplomacy of the War 1870–1871. The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison / London 2012, p. 45.
- ^ David Wetzel: A Duel of Nations. Germany, France and the Diplomacy of the War 1870–1871. The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison / London 2012, pp. 50–52.
- ^ David Wetzel: A Duel of Nations. Germany, France and the Diplomacy of the War 1870–1871. The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison / London 2012, pp. 61–63.
- ^ David Wetzel: A Duel of Nations. Germany, France and the Diplomacy of the War 1870–1871. The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison / London 2012, pp. 63/64.
- ^ Geoffrey Wawro: The Franco-Prussian War. The German Conquest of France in 1870–1871. Oxford University Press, Oxford et al. 2003, p. 239.