Logical space

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Logical space is a technical term introduced by Ludwig Wittgenstein in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus for the structural whole of all facts . In Wittgenstein's terminology, every elementary sentence describes a state of affairs, an existing state of affairs is considered a fact . The definition of logical space as the epitome of facts includes not only facts, but also non-existing (merely possible ) facts.

Formal reconstructions

Various formal reconstructions of the logic or ontology of the Tractatus have been proposed. An attempt was made to understand the “logical space” as a pair of a set of objects and a set of non-complementary n-place predicates, or as a Boolean algebra of situations. In addition, under the designation “logical space”, a formally defined term is introduced in various logic systems, without claiming to be an operationalization of Wittgenstein's term.

Sellars

Wilfrid Sellars , referring to passages in the Tractatus, spoke of a “logical space of reasons”, but the closeness to the text of this reading is controversial. This is structured by relationships such as relationships of justification, in contrast to the totality of empirical descriptions; if a mental state is labeled as “knowledge”, it is classified in this “space of reasons”.

Robert Brandom and John McDowell tie in with this idiom ; here this term becomes a central concept for the experimental determination of theoretical concepts of the philosophy of mind such as that of intentionality or that of knowledge.

Quotes from the Tractatus

1.13 The facts in logical space are the world.
3.4 The proposition determines a place in logical space. The existence of this logical place is guaranteed by the existence of the components alone, by the existence of the meaningful sentence.

3.41 The punctuation mark and the logical coordinates: this is the logical place.
3.42 Although the proposition may only determine one place of the logical space, the whole logical space must be given by it. (Otherwise, the negation, the logical sum, the logical product, etc. would always introduce new elements - in coordinates.) (The logical framework around the picture determines the logical space. The sentence extends through the entire logical space.)

4.463 The truth conditions determine the leeway that the sentence leaves for facts. (The sentence, the image, the model are, in the negative sense, like a solid body that restricts the freedom of movement of others; in the positive sense, like the space delimited by solid substance in which a body has space.) Tautology allows reality the whole - infinite - logical space; the contradiction fills the whole logical space and leaves no point to reality. Neither of the two can therefore determine reality in any way.

literature

  • Albert Newen : Interpretation and reconstruction of the ontology in Wittgenstein's Tractatus , in: Grazer Philosophische Studien 41 (1991), pp. 33–65.

Individual evidence

  1. Cf. Raum, logischer In: Historical Dictionary of Philosophy , Vol. 8, p. 121.
  2. See e.g. BN Cocchiarella: Logical Atomism, Nominalism, and Modal Logic , in: Synthesis 31 (1975), 23-62.
  3. Cf. Gert-Jan C. Lokhorst: Ontology, Semantics, and Philosophy of Mind in Wittgenstein's Tractatus ( Memento of the original dated February 16, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / homepages.ipact.nl archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF; 378 kB) . A formal reconstruction, in: Knowledge 29 (1988), 35-75.
  4. See e.g. B. Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind , in: H. Feigl / M. Scriven (eds.): The Foundations of Science and the Concepts of Psychoanalysis, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1956, various complete and partial reprints, etc. a. ed. Robert Brandom, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1997, § 36.
  5. ^ John McDowell: Mind and World , Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1994; Robert Brandom: Making it Explicit , Harvard University Press, 1994, p. 5
  6. Ludwig Wittgenstein: Logical-philosophical treatise, Tractatus logico-philosophicus. Critical Edition. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1998.