Power principle
The power principle is a principle developed by the Federal Labor Court , according to which a workers' association is only " eligible for collective bargaining " if it has enough assertiveness to force its social opponent ( employer / employer association ) to engage in serious negotiations on union demands. The interaction of pressure and counter-pressure is necessary to enable collective bargaining and to guarantee the collective bargaining sovereignty of the trade unions and employers' associations.
Indicators of social power can be, for example, the number and operational status of the members as well as collective agreements that have already been concluded. However, it must also be taken into account whether any collective agreements that may already have been concluded are so-called “convenience collective agreements”. If this is the case, they are not a sufficient indicator to establish social power.
Critics of the principle of power see a contradiction between the principle of power and Article 9 (3) of the Basic Law and claim that this unilaterally favors the established large unions and prevents the formation and work of alternative unions . Also, the concept of power can neither be defined in terms of content nor space, and the narrowing of tariff policy to pressure and counter pressure leads to an intellectual exhaustion of the same. In Article 9 (3) of the Basic Law there are, in the opinion of the critics, no evidence for the interpretation of the Federal Labor Court.
In the opinion of the proponents, the requirement of social power ensures the functionality of the collective bargaining system by preventing weak unions from being granted collective bargaining capacity, which would lead to a collective bargaining agreement by the stronger collective bargaining party .
The development here is in flux with regard to the collective agreements of the Christian trade unions and also with regard to the recently questioned principle of collective bargaining unity (only one collective agreement per company).
Individual evidence
- ↑ Federal Labor Court, decision of March 28, 2006, Az. 1 ABR 58/04, AP No. 4 to § 2 TVG tariff capability.
- ↑ BAG, decision of March 14, 1978, Az. 1 ABR 2/76, AP No. 30 on § 2 TVG.
- ↑ Wank / Schmidt, “News on the social power and organizational efficiency of an employee association. The development lines of the BAG jurisprudence and concrete conclusions ", RdA 2008, 257, 270 ff.
- ↑ Federal Labor Court, decision of March 28, 2006, Az. 1 ABR 58/04, AP No. 4 to § 2 TVG tariff capability.
- ↑ Richardi, “The CGM decision of the ArbG Stuttgart: Tariff ability and tariff censorship”, NZA 2004, 1025 f.
- ↑ Wank / Schmidt, “News on the social power and organizational efficiency of an employee association. The lines of development of the BAG case law and concrete conclusions ”, RdA 2008, 257, 267.
