Naval Scare from 1909
The Naval Scare of 1909 (German "Marine-Schrecken von 1909") was a political event in the United Kingdom in the run-up to the First World War . In practice, the naval scare was a state of public hysteria and panic, stemming from fears stoked by parts of the British naval command, parts of the right-wing press and parts of the political class that the superiority of the British fleet over the fleets of other European ones Powers, especially since the deep sea fleet of the German Empire , which was being built up at that time , was in the process of dwindling and the security and prosperity of the island kingdom would be threatened with the greatest danger. Sometimes these fears went so far that there was talk of complete helplessness in the face of a German invasion ( Invasion Scare ).
Formation and course of the scare
The history of the scares
After numerous European countries - Italy , Austria-Hungary , France and in particular the German Reich - had launched ambitious naval armament programs in the course of the general trend in favor of an imperialist and colonialist foreign policy in the first decade of the 20th century , Great Britain grew, As the traditionally strongest sea power in Europe, fears are gradually increasing that as these new sea powers become increasingly stronger, their own supremacy at sea and thus British trade and security interests could be endangered in the future.
When the government of the German Reich decided in an amendment to its naval law of 1899 in 1908 to lay four so-called dreadnoughts - the largest and most modern capital ships at the time - on keel over the next two years , this alarmed parliamentarians and admiralty in Great Britain feared that the superiority of the British navy over the Germans could "melt down" within a short time. In order to be able to maintain the armament advantage of the British over the German navy, one saw in Great Britain - as was also required by the so-called Two Force Standard of 1884 - to retrofit.
On March 16, 1908, the Minister of the Navy in the Asquith government, Reginald McKenna , presented a revised naval budget: This provided for an expansion of the navy that was to be so large that it would be suitable to ensure the British lead over the German navy . McKenna brought them to the formula "increase with incease".
The process of the scare
Concern that the Asquith administration's retrofitting efforts would be too short-term, the Naval Scare of 1909 finally evolved in the weeks and months that followed, which eventually became the first arms race of the 20th century.
Attempts by the British government to "talk" the Reich leadership out of their rearmament intentions through diplomatic channels, so to speak, were unsuccessful: On January 4, 1909 , the British Foreign Minister Sir Edward Gray informed the British Ambassador in Berlin, Edward Goschen , of a conversation with the German Ambassador in London, Count Wolff-Metternich zur Gracht , saying that he had told him that the German Reich had the right to build as many ships as it wanted, but that it could not be offended when Great Britain had so many ships rebuilt what I consider necessary for his self-protection. His appeal to Metternich that "... there was a risk of invasion should there be any unfavorable turn in the relations between this country and Germany" (German: ... the risk of invasion would exist should an unpleasant turn in relations between England and Germany occur) Germany surrendered), met with just as little response from the Reich government as the proposals to, if not to stop, the expansion of the fleet in both countries, at least to slow down or at least to have the respective new ships inspected by naval attachments from the other side. Conversely, Metternich's assurance to Gray that Germany “guaranteed” would not have more than thirteen dreadnoughts by 1912 was not suitable to reassure him. Various other meetings between Grey's and Metternich in February and March were equally unsuccessful.
Meanwhile, large parts of British industry saw an expansion of the fleet as serving their interests: In particular, the coal and steel industries as well as the shipping companies could prepare themselves for financially extremely lucrative large-scale orders for the construction of further dreadnoughts if the British armaments efforts were stepped up. Some politicians also saw an armaments surge as a way of reducing the unemployment rate. Indeed, the percentage of unemployed among the members of the British Engineering, Metals and Shipbuilding Union later fell from 13% in 1909 to 6.8% in 1910. With that in mind, an article in the Fortnight Review on January 1, 1909 argued that an upgrade of the Marine would be "beneficial" because it would create new jobs and so strengthen the UK economy. Another article from February 1 added that upgrading would also be the best guarantee of further peacekeeping: "The equilibrium of great armaments gives stability to peace and prevents a plunge into the dread unknown of conflict."
McKenna's appearance in the House of Commons on March 16 finally caused a general shock in Great Britain and Germany. In his speech before Parliament, the Minister of the Navy claimed on the one hand a naval budget that was higher than any budget for the naval forces in previous British history and on the other hand postulated the departure from the two-force standard and now hardly concealed the German Reich as the sole armaments adversary of Great Britain identified: "... I select that Power [Germany] as the standard by which to measure our own requirements" (German: "I choose this power (Germany) as the standard by which we measure our own needs"). In particular, the conservative opposition and the right wing of its own, the liberal, party met with the appeal: “… the safety of the Empire stands above all other considerations. No matter what the cost, the safety of the country must be assured (… the security of the Empire takes precedence over all other considerations. No matter what it costs, the security of the country must be ensured) ”to lively approval. In fact, his armaments schedule provided for four dreadnoughts to be built in 1909 and, if necessary, the option of four more. This hysteria was intensified by the announcement of the completion of a new type of airship by the Zeppelin Works on April 14th.
A heated debate ensued, in which supporters and opponents of McKenna's course fought passionately for their positions. While opponents of rearmament such as the liberal Lupton ("... I am sure Germany is perfectly friendly to us ..." in German: "... I am sure, Germany is absolutely friendly to us ...") pointed out that "We never had a war with Germany" (German: “We never had a war with Germany”) and that the money would be better invested in the expansion of the social system anyway, conservatives and members of the imperialist wing of the liberals spoke up about the indispensable security policy of a strong fleet. Samuel Roberts argued: “The first and foremost reason why we should have a supreme Navy is our island home.” (German: “First and foremost, the reason we need a superior fleet is our island home.”) To the food supply Ensuring the UK, for example, would require 33 million units of wheat annually, of which only 7.5 million would grow in the country itself, while the remaining 25.5 million units would have to be imported from abroad. In order to ensure the supply of the island even in the event of war, a strong navy is essential. Meanwhile, MP John Ward asked why a continental power like Germany would need a fleet as strong as that of a pure island kingdom. Since Germany would only need a strong army for its security and not a strong navy, this could only serve offensive purposes. In the same vein, Prime Minister Asquith and opposition leader Arthur Balfour praised McKenna's plans. The latter even claimed that Germany would have not only 13, as the Liberals assumed, but 17 dreadnoughts by July 1911, whereupon the Liberal Trade Minister Winston Churchill cut him off.
Churchill, Minister of the Interior Herbert Gladstone and David Lloyd George , the finance minister of the Asquith government, who had already voiced his suspicion in a letter to Churchill on January 3, "I believe the Admirals are procuring false information to frighten us." believe the admirals provide false information to frighten us. ”) (Griggs, p. 176), subsequently appeared consistently as those (predominantly liberal) parliamentarians who most stubbornly demanded that the fleet expenditure be kept small (Little Navy Party).
The Navy League countered these demands with the slogan: “We want eight and we won't wait” (German: “We want eight and we won't wait”) and in 1909 demanded the construction of all eight ships.
The debate of March 16 did not go unnoticed in Germany. Goschen described the reactions in Germany in a report on March 22nd: "The debate ... is being followed with the deepest interest here and is the subject of discussion not only in the Press but also in the Budget Committee of the Reichstag ..." (German : "The debate ... is being followed with great interest and not only discussed in the press, but also in the finance committee of the Reichstag ...".
On March 29, the Navy asked in the House of Commons for six ships, while the majority of MPs (only 135 out of several hundred MPs voted for the construction of eight ships) only wanted to approve the funds for four ships. McKenna found a compromise by asking for funds to build four ships immediately and the funds to build four more later in the year if deemed necessary. The funds that had not been budgeted were to be used instead for Lloyd George's and Churchill's plans to further expand the British welfare state.
On July 26, McKenna spoke again in front of the House of Commons and announced his intention to have the four additional ships that had been promised to him built in the event that the four ships that were already under construction were not enough. Another heated debate ensued. When Prime Minister Asquith finally sided with his Naval Minister again, the debate was de facto decided and the construction of the additional four - a total of eight - ships sealed. After their rearmament goals were met, the conservative politicians and press ceased their aggressive rhetoric in favor of further armament of the Navy, so that with the end of the panic rhetoric of spring and early summer, so did the naval panic as a state or mental climate in the middle of summer It was completed in 1909.
Results of the scare
The direct result of the Naval Scare, the increase in the number of dreadnoughts laid down in 1909 to eight, was a severe blow to the Liberal government, which had taken up after the elections of 1906 with the promise of a significant reduction in military spending . The use of considerable additional financial resources for the benefit of the navy as well as a tax increase made necessary by the further armament angered many supporters of the Liberals against “their representatives” and “their government”.
Historically, the Naval Scare of 1909 marked the de facto end of the policy of the two-force standard.
In retrospect, Winston Churchill summarized the armament debate that Parliament fought in the wake of the Naval Scares, laconically and ironically in his World War II memories:
“In the end a curious and characteristic solution was reached. The Admiralty had demanded six ships: the economists offered four: and we finally compromised on eight. However, five out of the eight were not ready before 'the danger year' of 1912 had passed peacefully away. "
“Ultimately, a curious and characteristic solution was achieved. The Admiralty had asked for six ships, the economists offered four, and we finally agreed on eight. However, five of the eight weren't finished until the 'dangerous year' of 1912 was peacefully over. "
literature
- Arthur Marder: History of the Royal Navy. From Dreadnought to Scapa Flow. 5 vols. London [u. a.]: Oxford Univ. Press, 1961-1970