Non-identity problem

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The non-identity problem , also known as the paradox of future individuals (English non-identity problem or paradox of future individuals ), raises the question of the extent to which there can be obligations towards future people to do or refrain from certain actions if these exist Human depends on the actions themselves. The usual procedure for answering such questions would be to assess the morally relevant consequences of an action by comparing the state of the person concerned with or without action, which is referred to as person-affecting intuition . The prerequisite for this procedure, however, is the existence of the person concerned, which is why it is discussed which standards are to be applied if the form of a person's identity that will arise in the future is predetermined by current discussion results. With regard to responsibility towards individuals, the problem arises, for example, in reproductive medicine .

In further formulations, the non-identity problem also calls into question obligations towards future groups or entire generations. Its extension to groups or generations was for a time considered to be of decisive importance for issues of intergenerational justice , environmental ethics and sustainable development . The apology paradox , which arises when one apologizes for the deeds of one's ancestors, without which one would not exist, can also be seen as a form of the non-identity problem.

Question

The precariousness of the genetic makeup

According to Gregory Kavka , in the 1970s several philosophers independently formulated the argument that we were not committed to the well-being of future generations: Robert M. Adams (1979), Derek Parfit (1976), and Thomas Schwartz (1978). The non-identity problem gained greater prominence in the early 1980s through the work of Derek Parfit, James Woodward, and Gregory Kavka. Especially Parfit's elaboration in Reasons and Persons (1987) was later taken up and dealt with.

The non-identity problem is based on a number of assumptions:

  • Precarious origin of a life : Kavka describes the existence of a person at the time of its origin as precarious: If it had come to conception only a little earlier or later or under different circumstances, then other germ cells would have merged and another person would have emerged from it. Which people will come later depends very much on the circumstances we create.
The identity of a person is thus determined among other things by its genetic makeup. An action that has an influence on which sperm and which egg cell fuse, determines which individual will exist in the future ("Claiming dependence on genetic makeup", English Genetic Dependence Claim ). An alternative, less precise assumption assumes that the time of conception determines the identity of a person ("time dependence claim" ).
  • Life worth living: The life concerned or life in general must also be accepted as worth living.
  • An action can only be morally relevant to a life - avoidably damaging or even promoting it - if it makes the person in question worse or better than he would be without action. If, on the other hand, the person would not exist at all without the act, he cannot have been harmed or favored by the act. Then, so the conclusion of the non-identity problem, the person concerned cannot make any moral demands on the agents.

The non-identity problem can be extended from individual individuals to groups or entire generations. For example, we are looking at policies that change the actions of a large number of people. Within a few decades, they lead to completely different generations of individuals than they would exist without such a policy. There is no obligation towards these generations to make the political measures sustainable.

Examples

Preimplantation Diagnostics (Wrongful Life)

The preimplantation genetic diagnosis is an example in which the non-identity problem is the responsibility towards individuals in question. In this scenario, a medical mistake leads to the fact that, contrary to the parents' wishes, an embryo with a genetic defect is selected and implanted in the mother, and a child with a serious hereditary disease is born. Can one reproach the doctor for injuring the child's well-being? US courts have answered this question in the negative in wrongful life lawsuits, citing the non-identity problem. The doctor did not harm the child.

The slave child

In this thought experiment , a couple enters into a binding, enforceable contract with a third party to father a child and then sell it to them as a slave for a certain sum. The child will experience a lot of suffering as a slave, but despite all the limitations, overall it will find it better to live this way than not to live. The couple had a choice not to enter into the contract. It would also have had the option of not fathering a child, or a child that it should not have sold into slavery. In all probability this would have been another child. Did the couple act reprehensible towards the child who was conceived and sold into slavery, although otherwise he would not be alive?

Environmentally damaging behavior of individuals

Someone races to work every day in a car that uses a lot of gas. This harms the environment. In this thought experiment, however, he also comes home earlier than if he had chosen more environmentally friendly means of transport, and during this time he fathered a child. The child later reproaches him for his environmentally harmful behavior. Can it rightly do so even though without this behavior it would not exist?

Climate protection and state policy

Climate protection is an example of the application of the non-identity problem to the existence of a completely different generation worldwide. Effective emission-reducing political measures will change the behavior of most people worldwide in many areas of life and thus lead to the existence of a completely different generation of people within a short time. This raises the question of whether intergenerational justice is even necessary.

In its fifth assessment report , the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ( IPCC) names - in addition to references to authors who consider the non-identity problem to be solved - values ​​that go beyond obligations towards individuals as possible ethical reasons for climate protection measures.

Objections and suggested solutions

There are a number of proposed solutions to the non-identity problem. While the non-identity problem was still seen as a serious argument against intergenerational justice in the 1970s and 1980s, many philosophers have since seen it as overrated or solved in most areas of application.

Difficulties exist, however, in reconciling proposed solutions with proposed solutions to other ethical problems. Some argue, for example, on the issue of asymmetry , that you can not put in the world a non-life worth living because it is for this particular would be bad kid, but that you're not a life worth living witness must , because here by failing no one in particular is harmed. However, this proposal for solving the asymmetry does not allow the non-identity problem to be solved easily by developing a concept of impersonal harm, that is, by giving up the view of people. It is considered an unsolved problem to develop a so-called “theory X” that gives up intuition concerning the person and thus solves the non-identity problem, while maintaining the consequences of actions as the basis of ethical judgments but avoiding a traditional utilitarian position, for example because the maximization of aggregate well-being the "repulsive conclusion" (English repugnant conclusion ) implies that one should produce much, hardly worthwhile life as possible.

The "the-children-of-your-neighbors-argument"

If an act affects not only the people who helped create it, but also other people, then there may be a moral obligation to these other people. In the example of the environmentally harmful behavior of an individual, children other than their own would very likely also exist without the action; in any case, there would be a moral obligation towards them.

The butterfly effect argument

The butterfly effect argument aims at the alleged causality of a damaging action for the existence of humans. Indeed, precarious existence depends on a vast variety of circumstances and actions. Any deviation, however small, in the course of time and in circumstances up to the conception of a child produces a different individual. The connection between these circumstances and actions and the existence of a certain person is so weak that it seems completely arbitrary and inappropriate to single out an action and view it as the cause. For the moral assessment of an action, what is decisive is what the parents might have done under the assumption that they would have followed exactly the same course of time afterwards, i.e. the same person would have been born.

In the example of the environmentally harmful behavior of an individual, it could be argued that the child just as easily owes its life to some other circumstance on the day of its conception. For example, if the father saw a ten-minute summary of a football game after he came home but before he fathered the child, he came home five minutes later than before due to a new law on working hours and stepped out of the car when he was out of the car got into dog excrement, so that he had to clean his shoes for another five minutes, one would also have to say that the child owes its existence to the football game, the Working Hours Act and the careless behavior of the dog owner. Virtually no past policy that has in any way influenced his parents or their ancestors may be viewed as objectionable to him by the child.

The butterfly effect argument works, if it is recognized, both in the case of individual justice and in the case of intergenerational justice. However, it cannot be applied to the cases in which an action affects a person's existence in a purposeful manner rather than by chance. I.e. the preimplantation diagnosis is not covered by the butterfly effect objection.

Others

A number of other objections have been raised against the non-identity problem. If one assumes, for example, that a rebirth of the soul cannot be ruled out, this calls into question the identity of the body and its genetic makeup.

Deontological demands on the behavior of the agents circumvent the non-identity problem.

literature

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Neil Levy, The Apology Paradox and the Non-Identity Problem . In: The Philosophical Quarterly . tape 52 , no. 208 , July 2002, doi : 10.1111 / 1467-9213.00273 .
  2. ^ A b Gregory S. Kavka: The Paradox of Future Individuals . In: Philosophy & Public Affairs . tape 11 , no. 2 , 1982.
  3. ^ Robert M. Adams: Existence, Self-Interest, and the Problem of Evil . In: Noûs . tape 13 , no. March 1 , 1979.
  4. ^ Derek Parfit: On Doing the Best for Our Children . In: Michael Bayles (Ed.): Ethics and Population . Cambridge, MA 1976.
  5. ↑ Thomas Schwartz: Obligations to Posterity . In: Richard Sikora and Brian Barry (Eds.): Obligations to Future Generations . Philadelphia 1978.
  6. ↑ MA Roberts: The nonidentity problem . 2013.
  7. ^ Derek Parfit: Reasons and Persons . Oxford University Press, 1987.
  8. ^ Tremmel: The non-identity problem . 2013, p. 186.
  9. ^ Tremmel: The non-identity problem . 2013, p. 186.
  10. ^ Tremmel: The non-identity problem . 2013, p. 185.
  11. ↑ MA Roberts: The nonidentity problem . 2013.
  12. ^ Tremmel: The non-identity problem . 2013, pp. 197-198.
  13. ↑ a b Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Working Group III (Ed.): Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change . 2015, Chapters 3.3.2 and 3.4 ( ipcc.ch [PDF; 1.3 MB ]).
  14. ^ Tremmel: The non-identity problem . 2013, p. 206.
  15. ↑ MA Roberts: The nonidentity problem . 2013.
  16. ^ Tremmel: The non-identity problem . 2013, pp. 186–187.
  17. ^ Tremmel: The non-identity problem . 2013, pp. 199-202.
  18. ^ Tremmel: The non-identity problem . 2013, pp. 194–197.