Philosophical Investigations
The Philosophical Investigations (PU) are Ludwig Wittgenstein's late, second major work. The book formulates the basic ideas of the philosophy of normal language . The Philosophical Investigations exerted an extraordinary influence on the philosophy of the second half of the 20th century; Among other things, speech act theory by John Langshaw Austin and John Rogers Searle as well as Erlangen constructivism ( Paul Lorenzen , Kuno Lorenz ) build on the ideas developed here. The transcendental pragmatics of Karl-Otto Apel and the universal pragmatics of Jürgen Habermas are also significantly influenced by it. The book is directed against the philosophy of ideal language , which, in addition to Bertrand Russell and Rudolf Carnap , especially Wittgenstein himself represented in his first major work, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus .
The book was written between 1936 and 1946, but was not published until 1953, two years after the author's death. In contrast to the strictly systematic structure of the Tractatus, the Philosophical Investigations are a more or less loose collection of aphorisms and notes. According to Wittgenstein's statement, he tried several times to “weld his results together into such a whole” until he realized that he “would never succeed” (foreword). Nonetheless, a whole series of theses can be identified on different subject complexes, which are briefly presented below.
The use theory of meaning
Wittgenstein is directed against the so-called “realistic” theory of meaning , according to which: “ Every word has a meaning. [...] It is the object for which the word stands. “(PU 1). According to this theory, the meaning of the word “red” would be an abstract object, the color red. For Wittgenstein, on the other hand, the meaning of a word is in most cases determined by its use: “ One can use the word for a large class of cases "Meaning" - if not for all cases of its use - explain this word as follows: The meaning of a word is its use in language ”(PU 43).
The use of a word is determined by rules, similar to the correct use of a chess piece: “ The question 'What is a word actually?' is analogous to 'What is a chess piece?' "(PU 108). Knowing the meaning of the word “red” means having a rule to distinguish red from non-red things. For example, a merchant who is asked for red apples could hold the apples next to a color sample to determine whether they are red (PU 1). The close connection that Wittgenstein sees between the meaning of a word and the rules for its use is also expressed in the following quote: “ How do I know that this color is red? One answer would be 'I learned German.' "(PU 381).
Language game and way of life
The rules of the use of a word are determined by the fact that linguistic utterances assume a certain function in everyday life. “ See the sentence as an instrument and its sense as its use. "(PU 421). However, this function may be different in different situations. Wittgenstein uses the word " language game " for the occurrence of language in concrete contexts : Wittgenstein gives a number of examples of language games " commands and act according to commands - describing an object after looking at it - producing an object according to a description - reporting an event [... ] - Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying ”(PU 23).
Wittgenstein uses the word “way of life ” for the entirety of the patterns of action in a culture . The individual language games are ultimately always embedded in a way of life: " The word 'language game' is intended to emphasize that speaking the language is part of an activity or a way of life " (PU 23). In this sense Wittgenstein can say: " And to imagine a language means to imagine a way of life " (PU 19).
Follow a rule
According to Wittgenstein, the rules of using a word can be conveyed by demonstrating and imitating: “ I'll show him, he'll imitate me; and I influence it by expressions of agreement, disagreement [...] etc. Think you were a witness of such a teaching. No word would be explained in it by itself, no logical circle made. "(PU 208). Wittgenstein, however, encounters the following difficulty: A rule is only ever learned from a finite number of examples, but should ultimately be applicable to an infinite number of cases. It follows that the rule does not specify the pattern of action to be learned, there is always a multitude of patterns that are compatible with it: “ Our paradox was this: a rule could not determine a course of action, since every course of action is in accordance with the rule be brought ”(PU 201).
Wittgenstein's solution to this problem is this: The fact that there are a multitude of ways to continue the rule does not mean that we consciously choose one of those ways. Rather, it imposes itself directly on us: “ If I follow the rule , I will not vote. I follow the rule blindly. "(PU 219). A theoretically possible doubt has practically no place in this situation. “ It was possible, under certain circumstances, a doubt. But that doesn't mean that I doubted or even could doubt ”(PU 213).
The therapeutic function of philosophy
This passage exemplifies a figure of argument that is typical of Philosophical Investigations: According to Wittgenstein, many philosophical problems arise from the fact that concepts are alienated from their ancestral context, their language game, and are unjustifiably applied to another context. The solution to a philosophical problem often consists in uncovering such an unjustified transference: “ We lead words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use ” (PU 116).
For example, doubt is a language game that follows its own conditions and rules and does not have a place in every situation. Through this consideration, a philosophical doubt like skepticism , which doubts everything, is exposed as nonsensical. " But that does not mean that we doubt because we can imagine a doubt " (PU 84).
With a comparable argument, Wittgenstein criticizes the basic question of logical atomism about the basic components of the world: “ To the philosophical question: 'Is the facial image of this tree composed and what are its components?' Is the correct answer, 'That depends on what you mean by' put together 'understand' (And of course that is not an answer, but a rejection of the question.) ”(PU 47). The question of a composition is a language game that cannot be transferred to such an abstract context.
In a similar way Wittgenstein solves the induction problem , in which the practice of learning from experience is called into question: “ The certainty that fire will burn me is based on induction. [...] Is the confidence justified? What people accept as justification shows how they think and live ”(PU 325). Ultimately, the conviction that we can learn from experience is based in our living environment. Philosophy can neither deliver nor demand a stronger justification. In this sense, Wittgenstein says: “ Our mistake is to look for an explanation there where we should see the facts as 'primordial phenomena'. That means where we should say: this language game is being played ”(PU 654).
Private language
According to Wittgenstein, a private language is a language or language game in which in principle only the speaker himself can know the meaning of the words in that language. The case of a Robinson Crusoe does not count as a private language because it is in principle able to convey the meaning of its language elements to others. Wittgenstein's example is a language of sensation: “ The words of this language should refer to what only the speaker can know about; on his immediate, private feelings. "(PU 243). In the private language argument, he shows that using private language words is pointless. When Wittgenstein turns against the possibility of such a language (PU 258), he also turns against the thesis that in our own language terms for psychic things, such as For example, the word "pain" refers to such private episodes. According to Wittgenstein's theory of meaning, we learn such words in intersubjective language games. A purely private experience cannot be conveyed intersubjectively, but dealing with it can. This thesis is expressed in the famous beetle parable: “ Assuming everyone had a box, there would be something in it that we call 'beetles'. Nobody can ever look into the other's box, and everyone says that he only knows what a beetle is from the sight of his beetle. [...] The thing in the box does not belong to the language game at all, not even as a something, because the box could also be empty ”(PU 293).
Speaking about psychological processes is to be analyzed as speaking about external behavior: “ An› inner process ‹requires external criteria ” (PU 580).
Family resemblance
The core of Wittgenstein's criticism of the philosophy of ideal language is that, with its demand for exactness, it presents the fuzziness of natural language terms as a shortcoming. Wittgenstein coined the term “ family resemblances ” for this fuzziness . He explains them in PU 66 using the word “game” as an example. According to Wittgenstein, there is no common feature that is common to all games. Another moment of uncertainty (language) lies in the fact that our concepts do not function reliably in every, but only in ordinary situations: “ Only in normal cases is the use of words clearly mapped out to us; we know, have no doubt, what to say in this or that case ”(PU 142, see also PU 80).
However, this inaccuracy does not make our terms unusable. “ But it is superfluous to say: 'Stop around here' ” (PU 71). On the contrary, exaggerated precision would be inexpedient: " If I now say to someone: 'You should come to dinner more punctually [...] ', this is actually not speaking of precision, because you can say, 'Think about the timing in the laboratory [...] , there you see what 'accuracy' means' ”(PU 88). However, this is precisely what the philosophy of ideal language fails to recognize: “ The more closely we look at the actual language, the stronger the conflict between it and our demands ” (PU 107). Wittgenstein draws the conclusion from these observations: " Philosophy must not interfere with the actual use of language in any way, it can only describe it in the end " (PU 124).
Quotes
- “ Our language can be seen as an old city: a corner of alleys and squares, old and new houses, and houses with additions from different times; and this surrounded by a multitude of new suburbs with straight and regular streets and with monotonous houses. "(PU 18)
- “ And in this situation, for example, you find yourself looking for definitions in aesthetics or ethics that correspond to our terms. In this difficulty, always ask yourself: How did we learn the meaning of this word ('good' for example)? "(PU 77)
- “ Philosophy is a struggle against the bewitching of our minds by the means of our language. "(PU 109)
- " It is a major source of our lack of understanding that we do not overlook the use of our words " (PI 122)
- " The most important aspects of things for us are hidden by their simplicity and everydayness " (PU 129)
- “ Following a rule, making a message, giving an order, playing a game of chess are customs (customs, institutions). Understanding a sentence means understanding a language. Understanding a language means mastering a technology. "(PU 199)
- “ The philosopher deals with a question; like a disease. "(PU 255)
- “ What is your goal in philosophy? Show the fly the way out of the fly glass. "(PU 309)
literature
Issues of the PU
- Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigations . Critical Genetic Edition. Edited by Joachim Schulte. Scientific book society. Frankfurt 2001, ISBN 3-518-58312-3 .
Secondary literature
General
- Ernst Michael Lange: Ludwig Wittgenstein: "Philosophical Investigations": a commentary introduction. Paderborn 1998, ISBN 3-506-99499-9 .
- Meredith Williams (Ed.): Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. Critical essays. Lanham 2007, ISBN 978-0-7425-4191-7 .
Language / meaning
- Wulf Kellerwessel: Wittgenstein's philosophy of language in the "Philosophical Investigations": a commentary first introduction. Frankfurt 2009, ISBN 978-3-11-032850-9 .
Rules and rule compliance
- Edward H. Minar: Philosophical Investigations §§185-202. Wittgenstein's Treatment of Following a Rule. New York / London 1990, ISBN 0-8240-5090-8 .
- Saul A. Kripke: Wittgenstein on rules and private language. An elementary representation. Frankfurt / Main 1987, ISBN 3-518-57832-4 .
Web links
- Philosophical research , full text on mickindex.sakura.ne.jp.