Rational reconstruction

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The rational reconstruction (also: reconstruction) is a method of the empirical-analytical philosophy of science . This metatheoretical investigation approach aims to make a theory transparent through a logical analysis and axiomatized description.

Postulates of Reconstruction

From the point of view of the empirical-analytical understanding of science, four postulates must be observed when developing theories:

  1. Rationality : Theories and theorization must follow the laws of logic.
  2. General validity : Theories must make general statements about a realm of reality.
  3. Freedom of values : Scientific theories may only contain value-free statements or systems of statements that do not contain any normative statements.
  4. Verifiability : Every scientific theory must be verifiable against reality (intersubjectively).

Nevertheless - and this is emphasized by Wolfgang Stegmüller in his examination of the concept and the procedure of rational reconstruction - the descriptive component of the rational reconstruction must be supplemented with a normative component: The aim of the reconstruction is not to describe the actual structure of the theory, but the representation of how this structure should be if it conformed to the a priori principles of rationality.

The goal of the reconstruction

The aim of the reconstruction is - following the structuralist theory concept - primarily to create a general and descriptive formula for the representation of the empirical statements and their logical relationships given in the publications of the scientists, i.e. to work out their logical-formal structure.

Joseph D. Sneed defines the rational reconstruction as follows: “with this intuitions about the empirical claims of the theory and the logical relations among them as our starting point, we would like to produce some comprehensive and perspicuous form for exhibiting the claims of this theory and their logical relations. Let us call this a logical reconstruction of the theory, and the activity of attempting to produce it logical reconstruction. "

This objective implies that the rational reconstruction is not aimed at reproducing a historically accurate representation of what the authors concerned have thought. Rather, the method is used to improve the theories and arguments examined with regard to current standards of rationality and the knowledge acquired in the meantime. Due to this fact, the rational reconstruction as a type of text interpretation is particularly characterized by the fact that its results can differ from the content of the interpreted text or even supplement it.

Traditionally, in the rational reconstruction of an object of investigation, the following is exactly determined:

  • central terminology,
  • Structure and logical structure,
  • Core statements and central relationships,
  • linguistic precision as well
  • empirical basis.

An exact determination makes it possible to make evaluations with regard to the epistemological status of an object of investigation.

Example: Defects in the reasoning are compensated for by premises not listed by the author, terms and conceptual distinctions that the author was not familiar with are used and theories may be presented more consistently than they were originally.

Principles of rational reconstruction

The rational reconstruction is essentially based on three principles:

  1. Similarity,
  2. Precision and
  3. Consistency.

Similarity

The principle of similarity is based on the relation of logical equality and thus relates to the indistinguishability of statements from a well-defined range of statements. For the epistemological process of rational reconstruction, this principle has the consequence that the theory extracted from a text must be reproduced or presented in such a way that harmony with the author's basic ideas is preserved. Based on Stegmüller , it is essential to combine constructive activity and historical method: Against this background, the principle of similarity requires that one investigates the author's conceptual and problem developments and, if necessary, the corresponding (scientific) historical backgrounds in Considering. On the basis of these requirements, the basic idea of ​​the author must become recognizable from the rational reconstruction, in that the text is reconstructed from his point of view.

precision

A fundamental requirement of scientific language in general - and thus also of rational reconstruction - is the precision of the terms used to represent a reconstructed theory. In this context, “precision” is understood to mean the need for the stringency and comprehensibility of the terms used: they must not be pre-loaded in colloquial language, but must have an intersubjectively comprehensible system and be conclusive and valid (taking into account the truth of premises) in the context of the reproduced theory be. If the reconstructed theory could be represented using precise terms, the terms occurring in the texts that had different meanings in other historical, social and scientific contexts must then be "translated" into modern scientific language without shifting the meaning of the content.

consistency

In the context of rational reconstruction, consistency is understood to mean this between the reconstruction of a model and the scientific statements. It must therefore be possible to integrate a reconstructed model into the theory without contradiction.

With regard to the interpretation of texts, if contradicting, rationally reconstructed interpretations of a text are possible, the degree of adequacy is decisive. In the case of two equal interpretations of a text, the more consistent, more intellectually coherent interpretation is to be preferred. In order to achieve consistency, similarity and precision requirements must be met.

This means that a text must be presented as a model in order to use it to check the relevance of historical ideas.

Rational reconstruction versus direct interpretation

Bühler shows that the methods of rational reconstruction can be contrasted with the methods of direct interpretation. The rational reconstruction and direct interpretation of a theory is equally confronted with passages in the text of the examined author. The direct interpretation describes the attempt to systematically present what the author really meant. In contrast, rational reconstruction describes what the author would have wanted to say if he had known what we know and if he had been more rational than he actually was.

Rational reconstructions also differ from direct interpretations "in that they consciously change their object, that is, in contrast to interpretations, they remove the distance between production and reception by [...] taking the place of the reconstructed object." Characteristic of direct interpretation is also that standards lead to certain rationality assumptions for the individual case and these assumptions are used as revisable prerequisites. They act as rebuttable presumptions and are used as long as there is no evidence. Rationality principles, however, play a different role for rational reconstruction. They do not serve to generate descriptive refutable assumptions, but have a normative effect.

application areas

The method of rational reconstruction is mainly used in the history of political theory and ideas as well as in political philosophy . The often normative texts are empirically checked and, if necessary, translated into models. The key messages of the historical texts should be understandable and comprehensible for the reader despite the time lag. Representatives for this are u. a.

Web links

  • uni-bielefeld.de , "History of Science, Rational Reconstruction and the Justification of Methodologies" by Martin Carrier.
  • pos.sagepub.com , "Habermas' Method: Rational Reconstruction" by Jørgen Pedersen.

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Marin Arnold Gallee: Building blocks of an abductive science and technology philosophy. The problem of the two “cultures” from a methodological perspective. LIT Verlag, Münster 2003, p. 228.
  2. ↑ Brockhaus: Philosophy. Mannheim / Leipzig 2004, Lemma construction.
  3. ↑ Herbert Tschamler: Theory of Science. An introduction for educators. 3rd edition, Klinkhardt, Bad Heilbrunn 1996, p. 48f.
  4. ↑ Wolfgang Stegmüller: New ways of the philosophy of science. Springer, Berlin 1980, p. 171.
  5. ^ Joseph D. Sneed: The Logical Structure of Mathematical Physics. 2nd edition, Springer, Berlin 1979, p. 3f.
  6. ↑ Axel Bühler: Use and methodological peculiarities of rational reconstructions in the context of investigations into the history of ideas. In: International Journal of Philosophy, Issue 1/2002, p. 118.
  7. ↑ Dirk Koob: Social capital brought up for discussion. A meaning-theoretical perspective on a social-scientific concept and theory problem. Universitätsverlag Göttingen, Göttingen 2007, p. 80.
  8. ↑ Gert Albert: Hermeneutic Positivism and Dialectical Essentialism Vilfredo Paretos. VS Verlag, Wiesbaden 2005, p. 21.
  9. ↑ Walter Gebhard: Nietzsche's Totalism: Philosophy of Nature between Transfiguration and Doom. De Gruyter, Berlin / New York 1983, p. 158.
  10. ↑ Wolfgang Stegmüller: Essays on Kant and Wittgenstein. WBG, Darmstadt 1970, p. 1.
  11. ^ Stegmüller, Wolfgang (1970): Essays on Kant and Wittgenstein, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, p. 1.
  12. ↑ Ulrich Krohs (2004): Theory of biological theories, Springer Verlag, Berlin, p. 31.
  13. ↑ Stegmüller, Wolfgang (1970): Articles on Kant and Wittgenstein, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, p. 4.
  14. ↑ Schweizer, Stefan (2008): Sociopolitical Control: The Micro-Macro Connection, Diplomica Verlag, Hamburg, p. 20.
  15. ↑ Bühler, Axel (2002): Use and methodological peculiarities of rational reconstructions in the context of research on the history of ideas, in: International Journal of Philosophy, Issue 1/2002, p. 121.
  16. ↑ Spoerhase, Carlos (2007): Authorship and Interpretation - Methodical Foundations of a Philological Hermeneutics, de Gruyter Verlag, Berlin, p. 312.
  17. ↑ Mittelstraß, Jürgen (1995): Encyclopedia Philosophy and Philosophy of Science, Metzler Verlag, Stuttgart, p. 551.
  18. ↑ Bühler, Axel (2002): Use and methodological peculiarities of rational reconstructions in the context of research on the history of ideas, in: International Journal of Philosophy, Issue 1/2002, p. 126.
  19. ↑ See for more in depth: Scholz, Oliver (1999): Understanding and Rationality - Investigations into the Basics of Hermeneutics and Philosophy of Language, Klostermann Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, pp. 151f.
  20. ↑ Jürgen Habermas, (1973): Knowledge and Interest. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1973
  21. ^ Iring Fetscher: Rousseau's political philosophy. On the history of the democratic concept of freedom. Luchterhand, Neuwied 1960
  22. ↑ Ingeborg Maus: To clear up the democratic theories. Legal and democratic theoretical considerations following Kant. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1992
  23. ↑ Glen Newey: Hobbes and Leviathan. Routledge, London 2008.

literature

  • Jürgen Mittelstraß : Reconstruction , in: Jürgen Mittelstraß (Ed.): Encyclopedia Philosophy and Philosophy of Science. 2nd Edition. Volume 7: Re - Te. Stuttgart, Metzler 2018, ISBN 978-3-476-02106-9 , pp. 62-64 with additional information
  • Wolfgang Stegmüller : Rational reconstruction of science and its change: With an autobiographical introduction. Reclam, Stuttgart 1979, ISBN 3150099382 .
  • Herbert Tschamler: Theory of Science. An introduction for educators. 3rd edition, Klinkhardt, Bad Heilbrunn 1996.