Non-transferable individual votes
The non-single transferable vote ( english single non-transferable vote , abbreviated SNTV , , Simple non-transferable vote ' ) is an electoral system that in constituencies is used, in which more are selected as a proposal is (multi-person or multi-mandate constituencies).
Voting method
Each voter has only one vote that he can give to candidates who are available for election for several posts. In a constituency with n positions to be awarded, the n candidates with the most votes are then elected.
example
In the election in 2013 to the Parliament of Japanese Tokyo competed in the five-mandate constituency Edogawa seven candidates from five parties. The election result was as follows
| candidate | Political party | be right | proportion of | Result | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kazuhiko Ueno | Justice Party ( Kōmei ) | 45,490 | 20.9% | Elected | |
| Satoshi Udagawa | Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) | 44,956 | 20.7% | Elected | |
| Kazuaki Tajima | Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) | 36,249 | 16.7% | Elected | |
| Reiko Ueda | Everyman's Party ( Minna ) | 31,139 | 14.3% | Elected | |
| Yuriko Kono | Communist Party of Japan (CPJ) | 25,783 | 11.8% | Elected | |
| Ikuko Tanoue | Democratic Party (DP) | 23,947 | 11.0% | ||
| Hisashi Sasamoto | Democratic Party (DP) | 10,053 | 4.6% | ||
| total | 217.617 | 100.0% | |||
With this result, the Democratic Party received no mandate, although it was in third place in the addition of the votes for its candidates:
| Political party | be right | proportion of | Seats | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LDP | 81.205 | 37.3% | 2 | |
| Kōmei | 45,490 | 20.9% | 1 | |
| DP | 34,000 | 15.6% | 0 | |
| Minna | 31,139 | 14.3% | 1 | |
| KPJ | 25,783 | 11.8% | 1 | |
| total | 217.617 | 100.0% | 5 | |
Tactical choice and nomination
The incentive for tactical voting is very high with the simple non-transferable voice. Since the voter only has one vote, the voter should vote for a candidate who on the one hand has a chance to win, but on the other hand does not already have a large lead in votes. Before the election, the parties also have to assess exactly how large their voter potential is and tactically nominate their candidates accordingly.
In the example above, the LDP might even have passed three candidates if the party's voters had optimally distributed their votes among these candidates: If the overall result for the party had the same (81.205 votes), three LDP candidates would have denied 27,000, 27,005 and 27,200 CPY candidate pushed to sixth place.
| candidate | Political party | be right | proportion of | Result | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kazuhiko Ueno | Kōmei | 45,490 | 20.9% | Elected | |
| Reiko Ueda | Minna | 31,139 | 14.3% | Elected | |
| Hypothetical LDP candidate 1 | LDP | 27,200 | 12.5% | Elected | |
| Hypothetical LDP candidate 2 | LDP | 27.005 | 12.4% | Elected | |
| Hypothetical LDP candidate 3 | LDP | 27,000 | 12.4% | Elected | |
| Yuriko Kono | KPJ | 25,783 | 11.8% | ||
| Ikuko Tanoue | DP | 23,947 | 11.0% | ||
| Hisashi Sasamoto | DP | 10,053 | 4.6% | ||
| total | 217.617 | 100.0% | |||
Under the assumption (depending on the personalization of the political system and the local conditions, which does not apply or applies only to a limited extent) that voters base their voting decision only on the basis of party affiliation and not on the basis of other, personal characteristics of the candidates, the Democratic Party in the above example would have one Can win a seat if they had only put up one candidate and this would have unified all party votes.
| candidate | Political party | be right | proportion of | Result | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kazuhiko Ueno | Kōmei | 45,490 | 20.9% | Elected | |
| Satoshi Udagawa | LDP | 44,956 | 20.7% | Elected | |
| Kazuaki Tajima | LDP | 36,249 | 16.7% | Elected | |
| Hypothetical DP candidate | DP | 34,000 | 15.6% | Elected | |
| Reiko Ueda | Minna | 31,139 | 14.3% | Elected | |
| Yuriko Kono | KPJ | 25,783 | 11.8% | ||
| total | 217.617 | 100.0% | |||
This kind of tactical voting behavior could be achieved by a change of the electoral process to the single transferable vote avoid (single transferable vote), because there unneeded voices and the voices of the weakest candidates voter preferences are transmitted according to.
The case that - like the Democratic Party in the example - one party nominates too many candidates, ie it could have won more mandates with fewer candidates based on its share of the vote, is called overnomination in English . As under nomination is referred to it when a party has nominated too few candidates and votes "wasted", that is, they would have more seats by additional nominations can win. The process of the conscious tactical distribution of votes to different candidates is called [vote] allocation .
application
Puerto Rico
In Puerto Rico , where SNTV is known as the representación por acumulación , the procedure is used in the election of the Senate and House of Representatives.
Taiwan
In Taiwan , SNTV was used in the election of the Legislative Yuan until 2004 . There some parties developed a simple and effective system of vote allocation , according to which the voters of a party should decide between different candidates of this party based on their date of birth in order to achieve an even distribution of votes.
Japan
In Japan , the majority of the upper house mandates are awarded via SNTV. Up until the electoral reform of 1994, the lower house was also elected using this method, with an average of four MPs being elected in each constituency. Often applicants from the same party ran against each other, especially from the competing factions of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Seats in prefecture and local parliaments are also allocated by SNTV. In Japan, multiple and single-seat constituencies are used at the same time; if n = 1, SNTV is identical to a simple majority vote .
Poland
In Poland , SNTV was used in the elections to the Senate in 1989-2011, initially with 47 two-mandate constituencies (one constituency per voivodeship ) and two three-mandate constituencies ( Warsaw and Katowice voivodeships ), then from 2001 onwards, following the new layout of voivodeships with two- , Three- and four-mandate constituencies. This rule was abandoned in favor of majority voting.
Jordan
In 1993, King Hussein pushed through the introduction of SNTV. Previously, in each constituency, voters had as many votes as there were seats available, from which the Muslim Brotherhood hostile to the king benefited.
Afghanistan
The parliamentary elections in Afghanistan since 2005 have also taken place according to the SNTV electoral system.
See also
Individual evidence
-
↑ Ustawa z dnia 7 kwietnia 1989 r. Ordynacja wyborcza do Senatu Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej. In: Dziennik Ustaw, ISAP, sejm.gov.pl. Retrieved June 7, 2015 (Polish). Ustawa z dnia 10 maja 1991 r. Ordynacja wyborcza do Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. In: Dziennik Ustaw, ISAP, sejm.gov.pl. Retrieved June 7, 2015 (Polish).
- ↑ Ustawa z dnia 12 kwietnia 2001 r. Ordynacja wyborcza do Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i do Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. In: Dziennik Ustaw, ISAP, sejm.gov.pl. Retrieved June 7, 2015 (Polish).
- ↑ Monkey Cage: Deja vu for Jordanian election reforms , Washington Post, September 2, 2015
literature
- Bernard Norman Grofman, Sung-Chull Lee, Edwin Winckler, Brian Woodall (Eds.): Elections in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan under the Single Non-Transferable Vote: The Comparative Study of an Embedded Institution. University of Michigan Press 1999.