Samaritan Dilemma
The Samaritan Dilemma is a mathematical game from game theory . It models the situation of two actors, one of whom is in need of help and the other can provide help. The Samaritan dilemma often serves as an argument against the welfare state or against transfer payments.
The needy can try to improve his situation with the support of the Samaritan, or he can rely on the continuous help of the Samaritan without making any effort. The dilemma is that the benefit for the needy is identical in both cases, that is, there is no incentive for him to free himself from the need for help and the dependence on the Samaritan.
The name Samaritan Dilemma was coined by the article of the same name by economist James M. Buchanan from 1975. The name refers to the biblical example of the Good Samaritan .
The way out of this dilemma, with repeated play, is strategic behavior. According to Buchanan, the Samaritan must credibly convey to those in need that he is ready to stop providing support. He should encourage those in need to free themselves from their need for help through commitment and with the temporary support of the Samaritan.
Description of the situation
To illustrate this, Buchanan presented this dilemma in game theory as a social dilemma :
| Player 2 | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| engagement | No engagement | ||
| Player 1 | Not helping | 2/2 | 1/2 |
| Help | 4/3 | 3/4 | |
Historical root
Thomas Robert Malthus formulated an early structure of the Samaritan dilemma in order to weaken poor welfare in England from 1795 : If the poor are supported financially, they would only indulge in idleness and produce too many children ( population pressure ), and then less and less would be motivated to work. Malthus argued that it would be better to let the poor starve to death ( redundant population according to Malthus 1798, p. 19), since the exponential increase in the poor consumes too many resources and would then have to starve to death all the more. The Poor Law Commissioners (see also Poor Law 1834 ) adopted Malthus' argumentation to legitimize tightening against the " Paupern ".
Individual evidence
- ↑ See for example Jürgen Ehrke: On the stabilization of fragmented states. Decentralization, development cooperation and the specter of separatism. Potsdam 2011, p. 118.
- ↑ Anheier, Förster, Mangold, Striebing: Foundations in Germany 1. A location. Wiesbaden 2017, p. 23.
- ↑ Buchanan, JM (1975): The Samaritan's dilemma. In: Altruism, morality and economic theory. In: ES Phelps (ed.), New York: Russel Sage foundation. Pp. 71-85.
- ↑ Cf. Stockmann, Menzel, Nuscheler: Development Policy. Theories - Problems - Strategies. Berlin and Boston 2016, p. 55.
- ↑ See Michael Bretschneider-Hagemes: Scientific Management reloaded? For the subjectification of gainful employment through post-Fordic management. Wiesbaden 2017, p. 200.