Structural phenomenology (Witzenmann)

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Structural phenomenology describes the method developed and practiced by Herbert Witzenmann (1905–1988) phenomenological observation of consciousness . His "epistemological concept" from 1983 bears the same title.

Links

Witzenmann's structural phenomenology is methodologically and partly also terminologically linked to Rudolf Steiner's theory of knowledge and indirectly ( Goetheanism ) and directly to Goethe's natural research. In contrast to Heinrich Rombach 's approach of the same name, it is not primarily in the tradition of philosophical phenomenology according to Husserl , but can be related to this in various aspects.

The following methodological elements from Goethe's natural research have found their way into structural phenomenology:

  • the awareness and systematic cultivation of the forms of mental activity exercised in the scientific knowledge process ("separating and connecting")
  • the principle, originally going back to Empedocles , of grasping like by like ("participation in production")
  • the concretion of universal regularity (“ primordial phenomenon ”) in what is currently observed in contrast to the abstract formation of theories and subjective formation of ideas

With regard to Rudolf Steiner's theory of knowledge, the structural phenomenology is based in particular on the following aspects:

  • the principle of an open-minded, referential or deictic use of language and terms ("gaze control")
  • the subject area of ​​human cognitive processuality (consciousness as "scene")
  • in the self-referential phenomenological consciousness observation ("spiritual observation")
  • the handling of pre-predictive forms of activity (holding back, producing) as well as showing corresponding (pre-subjective, pre-objective) structural components ("pure perception", "pure concept")
  • on the doctrine of ideas (presentation as an "individualized concept")

Main motives

method

The starting point of structural phenomenology is the question of whether and how preconscious, genuinely mental activity is involved in the creation of naive-realistic everyday consciousness, especially the object-subject relation. The subject-object split is not understood as a prerequisite for the act of cognition, but as its result, which has to be examined with regard to its actual genesis. By systematically training the observation intention , the aim is to expand the first-person perspective in the direction of transpersonal , yet non-extinguishing process awareness that does not extinguish the observing individual consciousness. First of all, it is a matter of differentiating receptive and productive parts of activity in the regular execution of consciousness and their access to complementary structural elements (perception, concept).

The central finding of structural phenomenology is that

“Complete reality in the variety of its manifestations does not appear as the content of our consciousness without our help in shaping it. Rather, we build everything that is real to us through the union of perceptible and conceptual elements. At first we do this union activity subconsciously. But it can be done consciously. It always takes place when we grasp something that is initially not understood. It cannot therefore be explained or replaced by anything else. Because it occurs anew with every attempt to explain. "
Basic structure

Witzenmann describes the dynamic synthesis of perception and concept as the basic structure . With it, a uniform and general principle of form is shown, which is decisive for all subject and object-side structures - provided we are aware of them. The basic structure according to Witzenmann differs from that according to Rombach in that the latter is based on a plural conception characterized by certain contents. The former, on the other hand, is characterized by four general stages of form, which show themselves in the transition from every conceptual content to the perceptible.

Memory layer

From the perspective of basic structural processuality, ordinary consciousness shows itself as its objective (the object ) or personal result (the subject ). Since it relates as such to something that precedes it (the formation of the basic structure), it has a memory-like characteristic; Witzenmann also speaks of it as a layer of memory superimposed on the primary structure . The resulting object therefore does not guarantee the other person a presence in the sense of a procedural awareness, but rather hides this from them. In this respect, our naive-realistic everyday consciousness is not directly realistic in relation to its original emergence, but can be clarified immanently with regard to its emergence through structural phenomenological observation of consciousness .

covers

Herbert Witzenmann applied the concept of structural phenomenology in his research and works to various issues from anthroposophy , the humanities and social sciences . Although some authors explicitly refer to structural phenomenology and its consequences in their work, this research direction is still at the beginning of a more comprehensive reception and continuation. The following authors are to be named here as examples: Jost Schieren shows in a structural phenomenological analysis of Goethe's research method its distinctive scientific ethos. In an "Anthropology of Encounter", Michael Ross applies the concept of the basic structure to the formation of social reality and draws corresponding social and economic conclusions. By systematising typical attempts at solving the problem of the brain-consciousness problem, Johannes Wagemann arrives at its reformulation and develops how Witzenmann's structural phenomenology opens up an integrative solution perspective for this problem.

literature

  • Klaus Hartmann: Novalis' liberal language conception . Bouvier, Bonn 1987, ISBN 3-416-02014-6 (especially pp. 180-194)
  • Michael Ross: Social Realization. Epistemological, methodological and anthropological foundations with Max Weber and Rudolf Steiner . Tectum, Marburg 1996, ISBN 3-89608-628-6 (= Diss. Phil., Dortmund 1996)
  • Jost Schieren: Intuitive judgment. Methodological and philosophical foundations of Goethe's scientific knowledge . Parerga, Düsseldorf 1998, ISBN 3-930450-27-5 (= Diss. Phil., Essen 1997)
  • Rudolf Steiner: The Philosophy of Freedom. Basics of a modern worldview. Observation results using a scientific method . Felber, Berlin 1894; Steiner, Dornach 2011, ISBN 978-3-7274-6271-9 ( online version of the 1918 edition )
  • Rudy Vandercruysse: Herbert Witzenmann - thinking in the struggle with intellectualism . In: Development of the ego . Menon, Heidelberg 1991, ISBN 3-921132-01-0 , pp. 39-54.
  • Johannes Wagemann: Brain and Human Consciousness. Neuromythos and structural phenomenology . Shaker, Aachen 2010, ISBN 978-3-8322-9772-5 (= Diss. Phil., Witten-Herdecke 2010)
  • Sabine Wettig: Imagination in the cognitive process. Opportunities and challenges in the age of the visual media . Transcript, Bielefeld 2009, ISBN 978-3-8376-1080-2
  • Herbert Witzenmann: structural phenomenology. Preconscious shaping in the cognitive revelation of reality. A new epistemological concept following on from Rudolf Steiner's epistemology . Spicker, Dornach 1983, ISBN 3-85704-172-2
  • Herbert Witzenmann: structural phenomenology. Basic ideas for an epistemology that grasps reality . In: Die Drei , Vol. 54, Issue 5 (1984), ISSN  0012-6063

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Wagemann, Brain and Human Consciousness , pp. 235f
  2. ↑ Witzenmann, structural phenomenology , p. 101
  3. ↑ Wagemann, Brain and Human Consciousness , pp. 244f
  4. ↑ Schieren, Intuitive Judgment , p. 107
  5. ↑ Ross: Social Reality Formation , p. 182
  6. ↑ Wagemann, Brain and Human Consciousness , p. 230