Winograd Commission

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The Winograd Commission is a commission of inquiry set up by the Israeli government , which is to analyze the military and political mistakes of Israel regarding the war and make recommendations for future conflicts as part of an investigation report on the Lebanon war 2006 . The commission's namesake and chairman was Eliahu Winograd , a former judge of the Israeli Supreme Court .

history

After the 2006 armistice of the Lebanon war on August 14, 2006, criticism of the warfare of the Israeli armed forces arose in Israel . In particular, reservists had criticized the army's inadequate preparation for a conflict in the north following the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon in 2000 and the sudden start of the war on July 12, and called for an investigation. On September 17, 2006, the establishment of the commission, which, in addition to Eliahu Winograd, includes the law professor Ruth Gavison , the political scientist Jehezkel Dror and the former generals Menachem Einan and Chaim Nadel , was decided by the Israeli cabinet. The five members of the commission, which was only appointed by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert as a result of great domestic political pressure, held their first meeting on September 18, 2006; on December 2, 2006 the first witnesses were heard. On February 6, 2007, Knesset MP Zehava Galon ( Meretz ) failed in the Israeli Supreme Court with her application that the commission should hold its hearings and meetings in public. On March 13, 2007, the Commission announced that it would publish a preliminary report in the second half of April that would make recommendations on Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Defense Minister Amir Peretz , and Dan Chalutz , Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces during the war. This preliminary report was published on April 30, 2007 and the final version was published on January 30, 2008.

Authorization and Powers

The commission looked at the war events of the conflict between Israel and Lebanon from July 12, 2006, on the basis of Article 8a of the 2001 Government Law, in order to draw conclusions from these events and make recommendations for the future. The Commission's mandate was as follows:

The political system:
The Commission will examine the approach of the political leadership regarding the campaign in the north from a political, military and civil point of view and adopt results and conclusions.

The Commission will also examine the level of readiness and preparation of the political leadership in relation to the fighting with Hezbollah and the threats posed by the deployment of Hezbollah along the northern border, if the Commission deems it necessary.

The Security Apparatus:
The Commission will examine the readiness and management of the security apparatus in relation to the campaign in the north in the following areas and adopt results and conclusions:

- The readiness and preparation of the security apparatus in the face of the threat posed by Lebanon, including the readiness of the intelligence services, the build-up of forces and preparing for various threat scenarios.

- Handling the fighting, commanding the troops, including civil defense, as well as the supply and logistics system during the fighting, including the decision-making process from the kidnapping of the soldiers on July 12th to the start of the ceasefire on August 14th, 2006.

Results

Preliminary report

The Winograd Commission came to the conclusion that the war had started in the summer of 2006 without a clear plan and that there was a “weakness in strategic thinking” in the decisions. The members of the Israeli cabinet had been presented with a blurred picture of the situation in order to obtain approval for the start of the war. It had not been considered that the chances of success were slim, and insufficient importance was attached to the war-related rocket fire on Israel.

Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has been blamed for grave errors and has been accused of “ grave failure ”. The preliminary report stated that Olmert's decision to start the war was wrong and hasty. He did not set the target himself, but rather was led to it by the army command. He had not asked about alternative plans on the part of the army and was not in a position to express targeted criticism of the plans presented.

Dan Chalutz has been accused of not paying sufficient attention to the importance of the Katyusha rockets launched by Hezbollah on Israeli territory . He had forced the cabinet to accept his decisions without presenting sufficient alternatives to the plans he had presented. In addition, he had prevented critical voices from the army from publishing alternative opinions regarding the military plans.

Amir Peretz was accused of neither having enough experience and understanding in his department nor the influence appropriate to his position. The criticism is centered on his assuming the office of defense minister without a background in security-related areas. Even after accepting the post he did not try to compensate for this lack of experience by learning that he did not consult the right experts for advice during the war.

Winograd emphasized that there were "many others who are responsible for the mistakes". Despite the seriousness of the allegations, the preliminary report did not contain any recommendations regarding the political future of the government members mentioned, but rather aimed to provoke a public discussion.

Reactions to the publication of the report

Amid the impressions of the report, the undisclosed minister Eitan Kabel , who was responsible for the Israel Broadcasting Authority , resigned on May 1, 2007 and called on Olmert to resign as well. On May 3, there was a demonstration in Tel Aviv with around 150,000 participants, at which the resignation of Olmert and Peretz was demanded. Another three days later, on May 6, Defense Minister Amir Peretz announced that he would step down from his post at the end of the month.

Final report

On January 30, 2008, the Commission then submitted the final version of its investigation.

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. United Press International : Analysis: Reservists demand war probe , August 21, 2006 (English)
  2. BBC News : Israel army chief admits failures , August 24, 2006 (English)
  3. Website of the Israeli government: Establishment of the Winograd Committee September 14, 2006 (English)
  4. Reuters : Lebanon investigators have scathing criticism of Olmert  ( page no longer available , search in web archivesInfo: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , April 30, 2007@1@ 2Template: Toter Link / de.today.reuters.com  
  5. ^ Website of the Supreme Court of Israel: HCJ 258/07 MK Zehava Galon v. The Governmental Commission of Inquiry for the Examination of the Events of the War in Lebanon 2006 , accessed May 8, 2007 (Hebrew)
  6. ^ Israel Embassy Berlin: Government declaration of September 17, 2006 ( Memento of September 28, 2007 in the Internet Archive ) September 18, 2006
  7. ^ A b Süddeutsche Zeitung : Violent allegations against Olmert "Serious failure" April 30, 2007
  8. a b c Haaretz : Winograd committee: We won't call for resignations, let the public decide April 29, 2007
  9. ^ Süddeutsche Zeitung : Pressure on Prime Minister Olmert grows May 1, 2007
  10. Reuters : Israel's Defense Minister Perez plans to withdraw from the end of May  ( page no longer available , search in web archivesInfo: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. May 6, 2007@1@ 2Template: Toter Link / de.today.reuters.com  
  11. ^ New York Times : English Summary of the Winograd Commission Report , Jan. 30, 2008
  12. see also Jerusalem Post Main points presented by the Winograd Committee  ( page no longer available , search in web archivesInfo: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , Jan. 30, 2008@1@ 2Template: Dead Link / fr.jpost.com