Zeuthen-Harsanyi model

The Zeuthen-Harsanyi model (also called Zeuthen-Harsanyi game or Zeuthen model or Zeuthen solution ) is a non-cooperative negotiation approach that was originally developed by Frederik Ludvig Bang von Zeuthen (1930) and later developed by John Harsanyi (1977) for the game theory was rediscovered. This model can be viewed as a non-cooperative implementation of the cooperative Nash solution (to which it also converges).

situation

Two players each propose a Pareto-efficient payout. The suggestion made by player 1 is labeled with and that made by player 2 with . This means that each player suggests a payout for himself as well as for his fellow player. If the proposal, the player makes one for himself, and that portion of the player 2 proposes for itself, within the possible transaction amount, the game is over: . If not, players can receive their Threat Point payout ( disagreement ) or enter into negotiation. ${\ displaystyle x = (x_ {1}, x_ {2})}$ ${\ displaystyle y = (y_ {1}, y_ {2})}$ ${\ displaystyle (x_ {1}, y_ {2}) \ in S}$ ${\ displaystyle d_ {i}}$

The next question is which player has to make a concession (concession) and in what amount. This problem can be solved using conflict probabilities or conflict measures.

literature

JC Harsanyi: Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations. Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge 1977, ISBN 0-521-20886-6 .
F. Zeuthen: Problems of Monopoly and Economic Warfare. Routledge, London 1930.
SK Berninghaus, KM Erhart, W. Güth: Strategic games: An introduction to game theory. 2., revised. and exp. Edition. Berlin et al. 2010, chapter 4.2.1.2.

Individual evidence

^ SK Berninghaus, KM Erhart, W. Güth: Strategic games: An introduction to game theory. 2., revised. and exp. Edition. Berlin et al. 2010, pp. 203ff.

[1] SK Berninghaus, KM Erhart, W. Güth: Strategic games: An introduction to game theory. 2., revised. and exp. Edition. Berlin et al. 2010, pp. 203ff.