Arrest and assassination of Ngô Đình Diệm

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This is an old revision of this page, as edited by Kirkoconnell (talk | contribs) at 20:57, 14 August 2007 (→‎US reaction: quotations). The present address (URL) is a permanent link to this revision, which may differ significantly from the current revision.

For the coup itself, see 1963 South Vietnamese coup.
Ngo Dinh Diem

On November 2, 1963, President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam and his adviser and younger brother Ngo Dinh Nhu were arrested after a successful coup by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. Despite being promised safe exile, they were executed in the back of an APC by ARVN officers.

Surrender and debate

In the early morning of November 2, Diem agreed to surrender. The officers of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam had intended to exile Diem and Nhu. They had promised the brothers safe passage out of the country into exile if they surrendered. Early on the morning of November 2, the officers held a meeting at Joint General Staff Headquarters at Tan Son Nhut airport, where the coup was being orchestrated. According to Conein, most of the officers, including Minh, wanted Diem to have an “honorable retirement” from office followed by exile. At around 6 am just before dawn, they discussed the fate of the Ngo brothers. Not all the senior officers attended the meeting. General Tran Van Don had already left to make arrangements for the arrival of Diem and Nhu at JGS. There was no formal vote taken at the meeting. General Nguyen Ngoc Le, a former police chief under Diem in the mid 1950s, strongly lobbied for Diem’s execution. Le attracted only minority support. One general was reported to have said “To kill weeds, you must pull them up at the roots.”[1] Conein reported that the generals never indicated that assassination was in their minds, since an orderly transition of power was high in their priority of their ultimate aim of gaining international recognition.[2]

Minh and Don asked Conein to secure a US aircraft that would take the brothers out of the country. Two days earlier, the US ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. had alerted Washington that such a request was likely and recommended Saigon as the departure point. It put the Kennedy administration in a difficult position; provision of an airplane publicly tied it to the coup. When Conein rang David Smith, the acting chief of the Saigon CIA station, there was a ten minute wait. The US government would not allow the aircraft to land in any country unless that state was willing to grant asylum to Diem. The United States did not want Diem and Nhu to form a government in exile and wanted them far away from Vietnam. Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hilsman had written in August that “Under no circumstances should the Nhus be permitted to remain in Southeast Asia in close proximity to Vietnam because of the plots they will mount to try to regain power. If the generals decide to exile Diem, he should also be sent outside Southeast Asia.”[3] He further went on to anticipate what he termed a “Gotterdammerung in the palace”

We should encourage the coup group to fight the battle to the end and destroy the palace if necessary to gain victory. Unconditional surrender should be the terms for the Ngo family since it will otherwise seek to outmaneuver [sic] both the coups forces and the US. If they family is taken alive, the Nhus should be banished to France or any other country willing to receive them. Diem should be treated as the generals wish.[4]

The nearest plane that was capable of a long range was Guam and it would take twenty-four hours to make the necessary arrangements. Minh was astounded and stated that the junta could not hold Diem for that period. Conein did not suspect any deliberate delay by the American embassy. In contrast, a US Senate investigative commission in the early 1970s raised a provocative thought:“One wonders what became of the US military aircraft that had been dispatched to stand by for Lodge’s departure, scheduled for the previous day.” [5]

Intended arrest at Gia Long Palace

In the meantime, Minh left the JGS headquarters for Gia Long palace in a sedan with his aide and bodyguard Captain Nguyen Van Nhung. He had also dispatched a M-113 armored personnel carrier and four jeeps to Gia Long to transport Diem and Nhu to the JGS.[6] While Minh was on the way to supervise the takeover of the palace, Generals Don, Tran Van Khiem and Le Van Kim prepared the army headquarters for Diem’s arrival and the cermonial handover of power to the junta. Diem’s pictures were taken down and his statue was covered up. A large table covered with green felt was brought in with the intention of seating Diem for the handover to Minh and Vice Presdient Nguyen Ngoc Tho, who was to become the civilian Prime Minister during a nationally televised event with international media. Diem and Nhu were to be held in a secure place in the base while awaiting deportation.[7] Minh arrived at Gia Long palace at 8 am in full military ceremonial uniform to supervise the capture of Diem and Nhu for the surrender ceremony. Minh had expected to hold a televised press conference where Diem would hand over power to Tho and “ask” for asylum, which the generals would agree pending their remaining in custody until the transport arrangements were put in place.[8]

Diem's escape

Ngo Dinh Nhu (r), Diem's brother.

Instead Minh arrived to find that the brothers were not in the palace. They had escaped via one of three tunnels that they had constructed in anticipation of a coup leading from Gia Long to remote areas outside the palace. Around 8 pm on the night of the coup with only the Presidential Guard to defend them against mutinous forces and armor, Diem and Nhu hurriedly packed a briefly case with American banknotes. They escaped through one of the tunnels with two loyalists. They were the Cao Xuan Vy, the head of Nhu’s Republican Youth, and Air Force Lieutenant Do Tho, Diem’s aide de camp. Tho was the nephew of Colonel Do Mau, the director of military security and a member of the military plot.[9] In the aftermath of the coup, General Paul Harkins, the head of the US presence in Vietnam noted from his inspection that the tunnel “was so far down that I didn’t want to go down to walk up the thing”. The brothers emerged in a wooded area in a park near the Cercle Sportif, the city’s upper class sporting club, where they were picked up by a waiting Land Rover. The loyalists travelled through narrow back streets in order to evade rebel checkpoints and changed to a black Citroen sedan.[10] Ellen Hammer disputes the tunnel escape, asserting simply that the Ngo brothers simply walked out of the building, which was not yet under siege. Hammer asserts that they walked past the tennis courts and left the palace grounds through a small gate at Le Thanh Ton Street and entered the car. After leaving the palace, Nhu was reported to have suggested to Diem that the brothers split up, arguing that their chances of survival would be enhanced. Nhu proposed that one set off to the Mekong Delta to join the IV Corps of the ARVN under loyalist General Huynh Van Cao, while another would travel to the II Corps of General Nguyen Khanh in the Central Highlands. Nhu felt that the rebel generals would not dare to kill one of them while the other was free, in case the surviving brother were to regain power. According to one account, Diem was reported to have turned down Nhu on the reasoning “You cannot leave alone. They hate you too much; they will kill you. Stay with me and I will protect you.” Another story holds that Diem said “We have always been together during these last years. How could we separate during these last years. How could we separate in this critical hour?”. Nhu agreed to stay together until the end.[11]

They loyalists reached the home of Ma Tuyen in the Chinese business district of Cholon. Ma Tuyen was a Chinese merchant and friend who was reported to be Nhu’s main contact with Chinese syndicates involved in the opium trade. The brothers sought asylum from the embassy of the Republic of China, but were turned down and stayed in Ma Tuyen’s house as they appealed to ARVN loyalists and attempted to continue negotiating with the coup generals.[12] Nhu’s secret agents had fitted the home with a direct phone line to the palace so the insurgent generals believed that the brothers were still in the palace. They had no idea that at 9 pm they were to launch an attack on an empty building, nor did the loyalist Presidential Guard, leading to futile deaths.[13] Minh was reported to be mortified that Diem and Nhu had escaped in the middle of the night.[14]

Arrest in Cholon

After Minh had ordered the rebels to search the areas known to have been frequented by the Ngo family, Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao was informed from a captured Presidential Guard officer that the brothers had escaped through the tunnels into Cholon. Thao was told by his superior, General Tran Thien Khiem to find and protect Diem from being killed.[15] When Thao arrived at Ma Tuyen’s house, he phoned his superiors. Diem and Nhu overheard him and fled to the nearly Catholic church of St. Francis Xavier. Tho drove them to the church, which they had frequented over the years. Tho died a few months later in a plane crash, but his diary was uncovered in 1970. Tho recorded Diem’s words as they left the house of MA tuyen. “I don’t know whether I will live or die and I don’t care, but tell Nguyen Khanh that I have great affection for him and he should avenge me.”[16] Soon after the early morning mass celebrating All Souls’ Day (the Day of the Dead), the congregation emptied from the building. The Ngo brothers walked through the shady courtyard wearing dark gray suits and into the building. It was speculated that they were recognised by an informant while they walked through the yard. Inside the church, the brothers prayed and received Communion.[17]

A few minutes later, just after 10 am, an armoured personnel carrier and two jeeps entered the narrow alcove housing the church building.[18] Tho had urged Diem to surrender, saying that he was sure that Generals Ton That Dinh and Khiem, and his uncle Mau would guarantee their safety. Tho wrote “I consider myself responsible for having led them to their death.”[19]

Convoy to JGS headquarters

The convoy consisted of Colonels Nguyen Van Quan and Duong Ngoc Lam, the deputy of Minh and the Commander of Diem’s Civil Guard respectively. Lam had joined the coup after it began and was heading for a rebel victory. Two further officers made up the convoy: Major Duong Huu Nghia and Captain Nguyen Van Nhung. Nhung was Minh’s bodyguard.[20]

Diem requested to have a stop at the palace to gather personal items before being exiled. Xuan turned him down, clinically stating that his orders were to deliver Diem and Nhu to headquarters. Nhu expressed disgust that they were to be transported in an APC, asking “You use such a vehicle to drive the president?” Colonel Duong Ngoc Lam assured them that the armor was for their own protection. Xuan said that it was selected to protect the brothers against “extremists”. Xuan ordered the brothers’ hands be tied behind their backs and shoved the brothers into the carrier. One officer asked to shoot Nhu but Xuan turned him down.[21]

Assassination

The body of Diệm in the back of the APC, having been executed on the way to military headquarters.

After the arrest, Nhung and Nghia sat with the brothers in the APC, and the convoy returned to Saigon. Before the convoy departed for the church, Minh was reported to have gestured to Nhung with two fingers. This was taken to be an order to kill the brothers. The convoy stopped at a railroad crossing, where by all accounts the brothers were assassinated. An investigation by Don determined that Nghia had shot the brothers point-blank range with a semi-automatic firearm and that Nhung sprayed their bodies with bullets and then repeatedly stabbed the bodies with a knife.[22]

Nghia gave his account of what occurred during the journey back to the military headquarters. “As we rode back to the Joint General Staff headquarters, Diem sat silently, but Nhu and the captain [Nhung] began to insult each other. I don’t know who started it. The name-calling grew passionate. The captain had hated Nhung before. Now he was charged emotion.” When the convoy reached a train crossing, Nghia said that Nhung “lunged at Nhu with a bayonet and stabbed him again and again, maybe fifteen or twenty times. Still in a rage, he turned to Diem, took out his revolver and shot him in the head. Then he looked back at Nhu, who was lying on the floor, twitching. He put a bullet into his head too. Neither Diem nor Nhu ever defended themselves. Their hands were tied.”[23]

Attempted cover-up

When the corpses arrived at JGS headquarters, the generals were shocked. Although they despised and had no sympathy for Nhu, they still respected Diem. One general broke down and wept while Minh’s assistant, Colonel Nguyen Van Quan collapsed on a table. General Ton That Dinh, the military commander of the III Corps which controlled Saigon and double-crossed Diem, later declared “I couldn’t sleep that night.” Don maintained that the generals were “truly grievous” over the deaths, maintaining that they were sincere in their intentions to give Diem a safe exile. Don charged Nhu with convincing Diem to rejecting the offer. Lodge later concluded “Once again, brother Nhu proves to be the evil genius in Diem’s life.”[24]

ARVN reaction

Don ordered another general to tell reporters that the brothers had died in an accident. He went to confront Minh in his office.

  • DON:Why are they dead?
  • MINH:And what does it matter that they are dead?

At this time, Xuan walked into Minh's office through the open door, unaware of Don's presence. Xuan snapped to attention and stated "Mission accomplie".[25]

Shortly after the midnight of November 2 in Washington, the CIA sent word to the White House that Diem and Nhu were dead, allegedly due to suicide. Vietnam radio had announced their deaths by poison, and that they had committed suicide while prisoners in an APC transporting them to Tan Son Nhut. Unclear and contradictory stories abounded. General Paul Harkins reported that the suicides had occurred either by gunshot or by a grenade wrestled from the belt of an ARVN officer who was standing guard. Minh tried to explain the discrepancy by saying “Due to an inadvertence, there was a gun inside the vehicle. It was with this gun that they committed suicide.”[26]

US reaction

Lucien Conein, the CIA's contact with the ARVN generals.

The Americans were soon to become aware of the deaths of Diem and Nhu. Conein had left the rebel headquarters as the general were preparing to bring in the Ngo brothers. On returning to his residence, Conein received a phone call from the CIA station telling him to report to the embassy. Kennedy had instructed Conein to find Diem. Conein returned to Tan Son Nhut at around 10:30 am. The following conversation was reported.

  • CONEIN:Where were Diem and Nhu?
  • MINH:They committed suicide. They were in the Catholic church at Cholon, and they committed suicide.
  • CONEIN:Look, you’re a Buddhist, I’m a Catholic. If they committed suicide at that church and the priest holds mass tonight, that story won’t hold water. Where are they?
  • MINH:Their bodies are behind General Staff Headquarters. Do you want to see them?
  • CONEIN:No.
  • MINH:Why not?
  • CONEIN:Well, if by chance one of a million of the people believe you that they committed suicide in Church and I see that they have not committed suicide and I know differently, then if it ever leaks out, I am in trouble.”

Conein knew that if he saw the execution wounds, he would not be able to deny that they had been killed. Conein refused to see the proof, realising that having such knowledge would endanger him. He returned to the embassy and submitted his report to Washington.[27]

The CIA in Saigon managed to secure a set of photos of the brothers which left no doubt that they had been executed. The photos were taken at around 10 am of the November 2 and showed the two dead brothers covered in blood on the floor of an armoured vehicle. The brothers were dressed in the robes of Roman Catholic priests with their hand tied between their backs. Their faces were bloodied and bruised and they had been repeatedly stabbed. The images appeared to be genuine, discrediting the generals’ claims that the brothers had committed suicide. The pictures were distributed around the world, having been sold to media outlets in Saigon. The caption below the picture of ‘’Time read ‘Suicide’ with no hands.”[28]

Kennedy learned of the deaths on the following morning when National Security Advisor Michael Forrestal rushed into the cabinet room with a telegram reporting the Ngo brothers’ suicide. According to General Maxwell Taylor, “Kennedy leaped to his feet and rushed from the room with a look of shock and dismay on his face which I had never seen before.” Kennedy had planned that Diem would be safely exiled. Arthur Schlesinger recalled that Kennedy was “sombre and shaken”. Kennedy penned in a memo that the assassination was “particularly abhorrent” and blamed himself for approving the Cable 243 which authorised Lodge to explore coup options in the wake of Nhu’s attacks on the Buddhist pagodas.[29] Kennedy’s reaction did not draw sympathy from his entire administration, some of whom believed he should have not supported the coup and that coups were uncontrollable, leaving assassinations a possibility. Kennedy was sceptical of the story and suspected that a double assassination had taken place. He reasoned that the Catholic Ngos would not take their own lives but Roger Hilsman asserted that Diem and Nhu would have interpreted the coup as Armageddon.[30]

Media reaction

The military junta asserted for days afterward that the Ngo brother had committed suicide. As late as November 6, Minister of Information Tran Tu Oai declared at a news conference that Diem and Nhu had died through “accidental suicide” after the firearm discharged when Nhu had tried to seize the gun from the arresting officer. David Halberstam, the ‘’New York Times’’ who won a Pulitzer Prize for his Vietnam reporting, was immediately sceptical. He wrote to the US Department of State that “extremely reliable private military sources” had confirmed that the brothers were ordered to be assassinated upon their return to military headquarters. Neil Sheehan reported a similar account based on what he described as “highly reliable sources.” Father Leger of the St. Francis Xavier Catholic church asserted that the Ngo brothers were kneeling in the building when soldiers burst in a took them outside and into the APC. Lodge had been informed by “an unimpeachable source” that both brothers were shot in the nape of the neck at the Diem’s body bore the signs of a beating.[31]

Impact and aftermath

Once the news of the cause of death of the Ngo brothers began to become public, the US began to become concerned at their association with the new junta and their actions during the coup. U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk directed Lodge to inquire to Minh about the killings. Rusk worried about the public relations implications that would be generated by the bloody photographs of the brothers. Lodge showed no alarm in public, congratulating Don on the “masterful performance” of the coup and promising diplomatic recognition. Don’s assertion that the assassinations were unplanned was sufficient for Lodge, who told the state department that “I am sure assassination was not at their direction.” Minh and Don reiterated their position in a meeting with Conein and Lodge on the following day.

Several members of the Kennedy administration were also appalled by the killings. Averell Harriman declared that “it was a great shock to everybody that they were killed.” He postulated that it was an accident and speculated that Nhu may have caused it by insulting the officers who were supervising him. Embassy official Rufus Phillips said “I wanted to sit down and cry”, and cited the killings as a key factor in the future troubles.[32]

According to Howard Jones, the fact ”that the killings failed to make the brothers into martyrs constituted a vivid testimonial to the depth of popular hatred they had aroused.” The assassinations opened a split within the leadership of the junta and repulsed US and world opinion. The killings damaged the public belief that the new regime would be an improvement over the military junta. It drove the initial harmony among the generals into discord. The criticism of the killings caused the officers to battle each other for positions in the new government. Don expressed abhorrence at the assassinations, caustically remarking that he had organised the armoured car in an effort to protect Diem and Nhu. General Nguyen Khanh claimed that the only condition he had put on joining the conspiracy was that Diem was not to be killed. According to Jones, “when decisions regarding postcoup affairs took priority, resentment over the killings meshed with the visceral competition over government posts to disassemble the new regime before it fully took form.”[33]

Culpability debate

Minh and Thieu (pictured) blamed one another for the assassinations.

The responsibility for the assassinations were generally put on the shoulders of Diem. Lucien Conien, the CIA agent who was the US liaison officer with the generals in planning the coup, asserted “I have it on very good authority of very many people, that Big Minh gave the order” as did William Colby. Don was equally emphatic, stating “I can state without equivocation that this was done by General Duong Minh and by him alone.” [34] Lodge thought that Xuan was also partly culpable asserting that “Diem and Nhu had been assassinated, if not by Xuan personally, at least at his direction.”[35]

When Colonel Nguyen Van Thieu, the 5th Division commander who lead the assault on the palace rose to become President in 1971, Minh attributed the assassinations to him. Minh claimed that Thieu had caused the deaths by hesistating and delaying the attack on Gia Long Palace. Don was reported to have pressured Thieu during the night, telling him on the phone ”Why are you so slow in doing it? Do you need more troops? If you do, ask Dinh to send more troops – and do it quickly because after taking the palace you will be made a general.”[36] Thieu stridently denied responsibility and issued a satement that Minh did not dispute:”Duong Van Minh has to assume entire responsibility for the death of Ngo Dinh Diem.”[37]

During the Presidency of Richard Nixon, a US government investigation was initiated into American involvement in the assassination of Diem. Nixon was a political foe of Kennedy, who defeated him in the 1960 Presidential election. Nixon ordered an investigation under E. Howard Hunt into the murders, convinced that Kennedy must have sent out a secret order. Nixon’s inquiry was unable to find any such secret telegram.[38]

Motivation

Conein asserted that Minh’s humiliation by Diem and Nhu was a major reason for Minh ordering their executions. Conein reasoned that Diem and Nhu were doomed to death once they escaped from the palace instead of surrendering in the palace and accepting the offer of safe passage out of the country. Having stormed the palace successfully, Minh had presumed that the brothers would be in the place, and arrived at the palace in full ceremonial military uniform “with a sedan and everything else.” Conein described Minh as a “very proud man” who had lost face at turning up in a palace for a moment of glory only to find an empty building. Conein declared more than a decade after the coup that he believed that Diem and Nhu would not have been killed if they were in the palace because there were too many people present.[39]

One Vietnamese Diem loyalist asked friends in the CIA why an assassination had taken place, reasoning that if he was deemed to be inefficient, a removal from power would be sufficient. The CIA responded that “They had to kill him. Otherwise his supporters would gradually rally and organise and there would be civil war.”[40]

Minh was reported to have privately told an American some months after the event that “We had no alternative. They had to be killed. Diem could not be allowed to live because he was too much respected among simple, gullible people in the countryside, especially the Catholics and the refugees. We had to kill Nhu because he was so widely feared – and he had created organizations that were arms of his personal power.”[41]

Tran Van Huong, a civilian opposition politician who was jailed in 1960 for signing the Caravelle Manifesto which criticised Diem and later became Prime Minster for a brief period was scathing in his analysis of the generals’ action. He stated “The top generals who decided to murder Diem and his brother were scared to death. The generals knew very well that having no talent, no moral virtues, no political support whatsoever, they could not prevent a spectacular comeback of the president and Mr. Nhu if they were alive.[42]

Burial of Diem and Nhu

At around 4 pm, the bodies of Diem and Nhu were claimed by the wife of former Cabinet minister Tran Trung Dung, a relative who had long broken withg Diem.[43] The corpses were taken to the Catholic St. Paul’s Hospital, where a French doctor simply made a formal statement of death without conducting an autopsy. The original death certificate did not describe Diem as the Head of State but as “Chief of Province”, a post he once held four decades earlier under the French colonial administration. Nhu was described as “Chief of Library Service”, a post which he had held in the 1940s. This was reported as a Vietnamese way of expressing contempt for the two despised leaders. Their place of burial was never been disclosed by the junta and rumours persist to the current day. Some say that they were interred in a military prison, a local cemetery, the grounds of the JGS headquarters at Tan Son Nhut and some reports of cremation.[44][45] Nobody was ever prosecuted for the killings.[46]

See also

Notes

  1. ^ Hammer, p. 297.
  2. ^ Jones, pp. 416–417.
  3. ^ Hammer, p. 294.
  4. ^ Hammer, p. 295.
  5. ^ Jones, p. 416–417.
  6. ^ Jones, p. 416.
  7. ^ Jones, p. 417.
  8. ^ Jones, p. 418.
  9. ^ Hammer, p. 293.
  10. ^ Karnow, p. 323.
  11. ^ Hammer, p. 293.
  12. ^ Jones, p. 418.
  13. ^ Karnow, p. 323.
  14. ^ Jones, p. 418.
  15. ^ Hammer, p. 292.
  16. ^ Hammer, p. 294.
  17. ^ Jones, p. 428.
  18. ^ Jones, p. 429.
  19. ^ Hammer, p. 294.
  20. ^ Hammer, pp. 297–298.
  21. ^ Jones, p. 429.
  22. ^ Karnow, p. 326.
  23. ^ Jones, p. 429.
  24. ^ Jones, p. 429.
  25. ^ Jones, p. 429.
  26. ^ Jones, p. 425.
  27. ^ Jones, p. 430.
  28. ^ Jones, pp. 430–431.
  29. ^ Jones, p. 425.
  30. ^ Jones, p. 427.
  31. ^ Jones, p. 430.
  32. ^ Jones, p. 436.
  33. ^ Jones, p. 436.
  34. ^ Jones, p. 435.
  35. ^ Jones, p. 436.
  36. ^ Hammer, p. 299.
  37. ^ Jones, p. 435.
  38. ^ Hammer, p. 296.
  39. ^ Jones, p. 435.
  40. ^ Jones, p. 435.
  41. ^ Jones, p. 435.
  42. ^ Jones, pp. 435–436.
  43. ^ Buttinger, p. 1008.
  44. ^ Shaplen, p. 210.
  45. ^ Jacobs, p. 189.
  46. ^ Jones, p. 180.

References

  • Buttinger, Joseph (1967). Vietnam:A Dragon Embattled. Praeger publishers.
  • Hammer, Ellen J. (1987). A Death in November. E. P. Dutton. ISBN 0-525-24210-4.
  • Jacobs, Seth (2006). Cold War Mandarin : Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America's War in Vietnam, 1950-1963. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. ISBN 0742544478.
  • Jones, Howard (2003). Death of a Generation. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-505286-2.
  • Karnow, Stanley (1997). Vietnam:A history. Penguin Books. ISBN 0-670-84218-4.
  • Shaplen, Robert (1965). The lost revolution : Vietnam 1945–1965. Andre Deutsch.
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Arrest_and_assassination_of_Ngô_Đình_Diệm&oldid=151248714"