Talk:Martin Heidegger

First paragraph needs mention of Nazism

The US general public, particularly in recent years, knows Heidegger best for two things: his philosophy and his Nazism. The first is represented in the first paragraph by the mention of one of his literary works. The second is represented by his Nazi party membership, and a reference to the uproar which it continue to cause.

If this were a Wikipedia article ca. 1980 then it might be appropriate to leave the reference to Heidegger's Nazism out of the first paragraph. However, since the Farias, Ettinger and other books a concern about Heidegger's Nazism has moved to the fore. The controversy is so significant that anyone who is unaware of it really knows very little about Heidegger.

Someone has taken an absolutist position and simply rolled back my additions to the first paragraph. It would be better to discuss what sorts of references to Heidegger's Nazism belong in the first paragraph, rather than arbitrarily attempting to ban it from there. That is particularly the case given the prominence that discussions of Heidegger's Nazism has in the body of the Wikipedia article itself.

Jonathansamuel (talk) 04:13, 19 September 2008 (UTC)

Heidegger Quote incorrect

I have tried to find the quote attributed to Martin Heidegger which states: "We pursue that which retreats from us" which no Heidegger scholar can find as of late. I can only assume Heidegger never said this. If anybody has information on this please advise. This quote is probably one of the most tossed around Heidegger quotes among the mainstream than any other. See Wiki article on Tao Of Steve --LAgurl 06:33, 15 October 2007 (UTC)

I'm pretty sure that quote was 1) misattributed to Heidegger or 2) severely butchered if it was Heidegger. if the latter it could be a distillation of the para. on uncanniness in Sein und Zeit, II.3, p. 322- McQuarrie and Robinson trans. Platypusjones (talk) 18:53, 20 November 2007 (UTC)

Archive Created April 5th 2005

• The Discussion archive is available here, and issues raised in the archive may be copied to this page if a editor wishes to reassert or quote a prior comment topic. --Mikerussell 02:38, 9 April 2006 (UTC)/Archive 1

Updated with appended items to end of April 2006. Lucas

Influences

Why is Holderlin not in influences?

Dazine...

This article misses the point and crux of Heidegger work. Which is his concept of dazine "Being there". His phenomenology isn’t really address either? Why? Dazine is in each of us "the mine" Being here in the midst of the universe. To understand it is to understand the universe. He didn’t explore consciousness, subjectivity, ego, or the mind because he realized it was pointless to do so... How far down the animal ladder do they go? There is no way to know so he chooses not to waste time on it. There are many ways of perceiving the world and ours, he said, isn’t particularly the best. He pushed humanity to answer the big ontological questions.

We muddy the water by focusing on the fact that he was beguiled by of Nazi Germany. What is important is his philosophical work and its impact on the existentialism. Why, instead are we wasting our time of the readers… its stupid pettiness born out of ignorance. Its like focusing on the majority of the article of Einstein on his contribution to the development of the nuclear bomb—which would be equally ignorant. H0riz0n 05:03, 1 May 2006 (UTC)

I definitely agree. The article needs to spend more time discussing Da-sein (which I believe is colloquial German for everyday existence), and his hermeneutic phenomenology. While I do think that it is important for the Nazi section to be addressed, and I don't think that it can be properly separated from his philosophy (unfortunately), it seems absurd to spend more time on that than on the bigger philosophical concepts. Drifter 14:43, 1 May 2006 (UTC)

First it is "national socialist" not "Nazi" (which is a slang term). But I agree that one needs to have separate section on Heideggers involvement into that movement or ideology. Besides that one should also identify what Heideggers own political views really are. National Socialism itself was an extremely diverse movement unifiying different ideologies.

—The preceding unsigned comment was added by 41.241.133.124 (talk) 11:24, 13 December 2006 (UTC).

-I think there is a disproportionate amount of attention given to Heidegger's politics as oppossed to his thought in this article. Furthermore, Derrida's thoughts on the topic, expressed in his book Of Spirit, are probably the most noted, yet they are not really adressed in this article. HR

-Additionally, its Dasein, not 'Dazine,' it seems that a lot of people involved in this article don't know what they're talking about. This article just does not have enough on Heidegger's thinking. Where is discussion on 'origin of the work of art,' 'onto-theology', or his destruction of the history of metaphysics, what or historicality? This article is in serious need of detail. HR

Yeah, at least I have no idea what I'm talking about. My knowledge of Heidegger is very limited (unfortunately), and so too is my knowledge of German. But, I don't know about anyone else. Of course, if we grant your comment that a lot of the people involved in this article don't know what they're talking about, it is curious that you should be truly wondering about why there is no discussion on "Origin of the Work of Art," "Onto-theology," the "clearing," metaphysics, and historicity. Of course, the statement is also misused. If someone talks about Da-sein, and all that it means, etc., they may know what they are talking about. All that you can correctly say is that a lot of people involved in this article don't know what you're talking about. How do you know we don't know what Da-sein is (of course we may not)? All that is certain is that, at least I have confused Dazine for Da-sein. And while I may not know what I'm talking about, all that follows from your point is that I don't know what you're talking about, at least until you pointed out my ineptitude in recognizing Heidegger's German. Besides that, however, I still agree that there needs to still be more in-depth analysis of Being-there, mineness, being-towards-death, and the array of Heidegger's later philosophy dealing with onto-theology, the destruction of metaphysics, the clearing, technology, and Gestell, etc. Drifter 01:27, 18 April 2007 (UTC)

The Wikipedia article declares that Dasein is "…the being for whom being is a question, a being who is not man but who is nothing other than man." On looking in The Origin of the Work of Art (Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes), I find in a footnote that Dasein is "Heidegger's name, in Being and Time, for man as well as for man's manner of being." So, the article says that Dasein is not man and the footnote says that Dasein is man. Is this an example of Hegelian logic in which the Law of Contradiction (~(p^~p)) is broken, and a = not–a ? If so, it makes for difficulty in communication.Lestrade 04:03, 5 August 2007 (UTC)Lestrade

Heidegger appropriated the word Dasein for his own use. It had been used for many years to mean to exist or to be present there. He decided to take possession of the word and insist that it designate some concept that he wanted to communicate, or seem to communicate. He did not feel the necessity of creating a totally new word as a sign for his concept, even though Dasein had already had a conventionally accepted meaning. [User:Lestrade|Lestrade]] 12:49, 15 August 2007 (UTC)Lestrade

opening paragraph

i restructured the opening paragraph without making major content changes for oine major reason: 1) the most recent version stated the Heidegger's name and birth and went right to influences. Covention suggests that when one is coming to an encyclopedia, one wants to know first who this person is rather than who they influenced. a brief description of who and and what heidgger did should come before anything else, so i changed it. no other substantial change.Platypusjones 18:32, 25 May 2006 (UTC)

concrete or abstract?

In the section titled "Influences", in the context of a paragraph describing Heidegger and Husserl, a sentence reads The bulk of Being and Time is an abstract description of Dasein. It is unclear of whether this statement refers to a Husserlian criticism of Being and Time or is a general claim about Being and Time. If the former, it should be noted. If the latter, a discussion on whether Being and Time is abstract or "concrete" might be in order. i would argue that Heidegger may use an abstruse language, but is offering a radically concrete description of the average everydayness of dasein viz. phenomenology, which favors the things themselves instead of concepts (e.g. mathematical representations). any thoughts? Platypusjones 14:50, 1 June 2006 (UTC)

I agree. Insofar as Heidegger was reorienting his phenomenology from the realm of transcendental egos and epistemological noemas, and towards that of the ontological question of "being", it would seem that his theories would be, at least compartively, more concrete. Drifter 16:33, 1 June 2006 (UTC)

Thanks Drifter. I'll wait briefly to see if anyone else offers an opinion. If not i will make a change and point to this discussion if there is concern. Platypusjones 17:13, 1 June 2006 (UTC)

I agree. "abstract" undoubtedly referred to the writing style. — goethean ॐ 19:13, 1 June 2006 (UTC)

Upon review, i determined that the statement really had no bearing on the paragraph at hand, and rather than trying to rephrase it, removed it. I added a brief quote from Husserl's "Phenomenology and Anthropolgy" to support the claims made prior, which included reference to the concrete-wordliness of dasein. no other change in this section. Thanks all. Platypusjones 20:09, 1 June 2006 (UTC)

Heidegger one of most influential, not "considered by some"

I removed the words "considered by some to be" from phrases about Heidegger being "one of the most influential philosophers of the 20th century." I challenge anyone to mount a case that he was anything but. Perhaps this unjustified qualifier was a bit of wishful thinking on the part of somebody who would have preferred it not to be the case. paulreeve 12:10, 8 June 2006 (UTC)

it's typically the case that those vague qualifiers are added because the subsequent claims are subjective claims that cannot be measured in any standardized way. it's like saying the rolling stones are one of the best rock bands of the 20th century. according to whom? by what criteria? rather than challenging someone to say that he's not, the most appropriate avenue as an alternative to the qualifier is to cite a source, or at least an opinion (ex. John Smith, etc. considered Heidegger to be one of the most...). if you can't, let it stand. anyone else?Platypusjones 19:14, 8 June 2006 (UTC)

There is no question that Heidegger was one of the most influential philosophers of the 20th century. I write this as someone with very little / no sympathy to Heidegger. The right analogy to the Stones is that they were one of the most *popular* bands of the 20th century, also an indisputable statement. Just as the second statement is consistent with the POV that the Stones were a bad rock band, the first is consistent with the POV that Heidegger's philosophy was wrong or meaningless. Crust 15:20, 9 June 2006 (UTC)

Popularity does not equal influence. Influence here mean "influencing philosophers (and writers, and artists)". With the Stones, it means "influencing musicians". I agree with Mr. Jones that what is needed here is a reference: in x, y says that H is the greatest philosopher ever, etc. — goethean ॐ 17:14, 9 June 2006 (UTC)

I'll side with Crust first -- Heidegger is probably the single most influential philosopher of the 20th century, for better or worse. Going by the truckloads of secondary literature about him, his imitators in linguistics, in psychology and in postmodernism generally -- this must be added to his profound influence upon Jean-Paul Sartre's, famous Being and Nothingness, (1950) and the global Existentialist movement. I'll side with Goethean next -- the popularity of Heidegger helps to explain why 20th century philosophy degenerated into postmodern Literary production. His lack of grounding in the science of Philosophy (shown by his neologisms) also helps to explain why Heidegger sought to revive Nietzsche. They shared a lack of logical method, of systematic grounding, of any reference to the dialectics of their contemporary field -- and it's that laziness that made them so wildly popular. "If they can evade the current philosophical issues, broadcast their opinions, substitute irony for dialectics and make up words as they go along, then so can we." There's the postmodern folly. Petrejo 04:42, 13 June 2006 (UTC)

I'll side with Goethean next

Huh? Please refrain from drafting me into your anti-Heidegger crusade...thx. — goethean ॐ 14:33, 26 June 2006 (UTC)

Re PHILOSOPHIA. You are all off track. Never mind the "influential". Was Heidegger a PHILOSOPHER? As long as no proof can be found for this, all we can say is that he is considered by some to have been a philosopher. Which brings us to the question: Who, exactly, are these SOME? And why should we accept their word sight unseen?--BZ(Bruno Zollinger) 09:19, 27 June 2006 (UTC)

Re PHILOSOPHER? To elaborate on Bruno's somewhat cryptic question, I believe that he means to say that Heidegger would not consider himself a philosopher. Indeed, one of Heidegger's crucial works is "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking", in Zeit und Sein. Heidegger considered philosophy, or metaphysics, to be at an end, as (I am very sketchy on this article, given the fact that I am combining hazy memory with abstruse writing) the question of being, the fundamental question of philosophy (according to Heidegger [?]), has been resolved (?). However, I think it would only be correct (if we want to get into the pedantics of it) to say that in Heidegger's 'later' work, he is not doing the work of philosophy. As far as I understood it, Heidegger's immanent criticism of Sein und Zeit was that it was framed through a metaphysical, and thus philosophical, framework. If we consider that a great deal of Heidegger's early works were concerned with decidedly ontological matters, and were framed through a philosophical/metaphysical discourse, I think that it would not be totally incorrect to say that Heidegger was, at least at times, and at some of the most significant times (if we are to believe, as many purport, that Sein und Zeit is Heidegger's masterpeice á la magnum opus) a philosopher, or at least that those works are philosophical. I think Heidegger would (or did), to his chagrin, admit this. Please, if I am incorrect in any of my factual statements, namely regarding the content of "The End of Philosophy", please forgive me by correcting me. Thanks, Drifter 17:41, 27 June 2006 (UTC)

Re PRIORITIES. First things first, Drifter. Your opinion on whether Heidegger was a philosopher or not is very interesting, and even more so is the reasoning behind it. But first we want to know the names of the scholars whose point of view is or, if this is not identical, ought to be reflected in the article according to you.--BZ(Bruno Zollinger) 13:41, 2 July 2006 (UTC)

Out of curiosity, what exactly constitutes "proof" that someone is a philosopher? ^iggy_talk 15:53, 2 July 2006 (UTC)

Re PROOF. You mean that as long as we cannot clearly define this, we have to assume that Heidegger was a philosopher?--BZ(Bruno Zollinger) 08:59, 3 July 2006 (UTC)

Not necessarily. However, since you raise the question of whether Heidegger can be considered a philosopher, I was wondering what, exactly, would constitute proof that Heidegger was a philosopher? As far as I am aware, it is virtually unknown for anyone to offer any sort of evidence that some person is a philosopher. What makes Heidegger's status as a philosopher particularly questionable? ^iggy_talk 04:02, 4 July 2006 (UTC)

Re QUESTION. Where on earth did I "raise the question of whether Heidegger can be considered a philosopher"?? Of course he can be. And he is, too. By SOME! The question is whether he was. And in order to answer this question we'd first have to know who these SOME are whose opinion we are to accept.--BZ(Bruno Zollinger) 08:47, 4 July 2006 (UTC)

Universities of Marburg, Freiburg and Berlin, where he held - or in the last case, was offered and declimed - the chair in Philosophy. Also, all librarians everywhere who shelve his works under the classmark for philosophy. A non-issue.

I don't understand why you critics don't analyze the word philosopher to find out what it means to be one, ofcourse though you would also have to understand how itr's used in everyday despite it's actual meaning. More to the point though, philo means truth, sophy would mean i think wisdom, or knowledge of that truth. Therefore a philosopher is someone who seeks, or sheds light on this truth, or states what truth is or not alltogether. If one believes that heidegger fits this category, then he is a philosopher, if you believe he doesn't than he is not, This is obviously all based on subjective grounds, kind of like securing objectivity with a secured subjectivity. -currie

Actually Currie, the word is from the Greek

Philo = The love of

sophy = Wisdom

So not far off. PS. Someone has been vandalising pages from your I.P. address, i dont know what it has to do with you, but you should probably create a Wikipedia account for all further legitimate contributions. Orgone 20:08, 23 February 2007 (UTC)

thanks for that orgone I have created an account, also thank you for correcting my definition of philosphy, but I also am going to say that it is objective that Heidegger was influential, it doesn't matter wether or not one find that his influence was good or bad, that is subjective. Obviously though Heidegger did influence philosophy, considering that he influenced hermeneutics, all of Existentialism and changed ontology I'd say that is a an influence. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by Currie1234 (talk • contribs) 03:11, 25 February 2007 (UTC).

Criticism section

I erased the reference to Rorty's apologia in the section on criticism because it isn't criticism but an apologia. A defense of Heidegger should have it's own section. Petrejo 04:28, 13 June 2006 (UTC)

The criticism section of the article mentions Farias' work, but then fails to properly discuss it, even though Farias' book was what caused a huge fuss in France and in North America. Why? Because Farias' book wasn't just a political critique. His argument is that the concept of Dasein can only be authentically expressed via a people grounded in a unique heimat, which is to say, the German people; which means that, in Farias' view, there are truly deep connections between the ideology of National Socialism and Heidegger's thought. The two are a natural fit, so to speak. This needs much more than the superficial mention it is given in this section, and if Farias is mentioned, his book needs to be placed in the booklist under "Criticism." I would also consider adding the book, "Heidegger and Silence" to the critics list.Theonemacduff 15:07, 12 April 2007 (UTC)

away from metaphysics?

Heidegger was arguably the most important metaphysician (certainly as an academic philosopher) of the twentieth century. Are the authors of this page unaware that ontology is the central subject matter of metaphysics?

Didn't Heidegger attempt to move away from metaphysics? — goethean ॐ 14:30, 26 June 2006 (UTC)

Yep — it posses a bit of a problem unless one has actually read any of Heidegger's various notions of metaphysics to see what he is distancing himself from (the determination of the being of beings, as opposed to the letting-be-seen of beings as they reveal themselves, for example). Heideggerian ontology, on Heidegger's account then, is something that he has "freed" from the grasp of metaphysics. Hence, according to Heidegger, what passes for ontology (i.e. "metaphysics") and what ontology really is (the revelation of the being of beings) are two very different things. ^iggy_talk 22:16, 27 June 2006 (UTC)

I think you're getting confused by the fact that Heidegger seems to refute himself by using the same term differently in varying contexts. What Heidegger is moving away from is the 'Western Metaphysic' that was established by Plato/Aristotle and was then 'completed' by Nietszche's Zarathrustra. His philosophy, rooted in ontology, is metaphysical, but Heidegger is attempting to signal a break in his philosphy from what has gone before, (and a reversion to a more fundamental ontology/understanding), by his use of 'metaphsyics' as a pejorative when applied to the Western tradion, with the implicit understanding that, yes, his philosophy is metaphysics. The confusion only arises when we use 'our' generic terms to properly describe his philosophy, while his use of descriptive labels, (compare with his notion of correctness versus truthful), is often for rhetorical effect, or to be more kind, philosophical distinctions. Tsop 09:37, 30 June 2006 (UTC)

The Heideggerian move away from traditional metaphysics lies, most clearly, in the abandonment of the subject-object distinction. The theme here is that the essence of Da-sein is not characterized by substantiality, and the subsequent primacy of theoria over praxis. Hence we see in Sein und Zeit that we are engaging in an existential analytic of Da-sein that finds its ground in ecstatic Temporality, expressed as being-in-the-world. The average everydayness that Da-sein in which finds itself deals with beings, and from its association with them articulates itself according to them. The term 'metaphysics' or the things that come after the study of physics, necessarily finds itself investigating beings that it finds in nature. The difference between ontology and metahysics then is the universality of ontology, the study of the being of being.

Editing "Being and Time"

Changed "Being and Time (German title: Sein und Zeit), published in 1927, is considered by many to be Heidegger's most influental work" to most important work. This should be obvious - 'influence' is not something that can be directly measured, quantatively or qualitatively.

Changed "In later philosophical works, Heidegger changed his views on several points made in Being and Time." to

While Heidegger's philosophy is traditionally divided into 'earlier' and 'later' thought, the former consisting most prominently of Being and Time and lectures such as 'What is Metaphysics?', while his later thought is said to begin around 1935, circa 'The Origin of the Work of Art'. Scholarly interpretation differs as to what degree of continuity exists between Heidegger's later philosophy and the earlier. While there is a clear change, Heidegger himself talking of the 'Kehre', or 'turn', there exist certain similarities, and thus some interpretations see the 'earlier' philosophy as a 'mistaken path', taken by Heidegger, through which he saw his error; or, one can interpret Being and Time as a nascent version of Heidegger's philosophy, which then develops appropriately into a more wide-ranging survey of 'the question of Being'. It is worth mentioning that it is also possible to hold the opinion that it is only Heidegger's Being and Time that has any real value, and that his subsequent output represents a lapse into mysticism and obscurantism.

Please feel free to edit/discuss with regards to accuracy and the general continuity of the page

Tsop 10:24, 30 June 2006 (UTC)

It might be a good idea to add reference of H's work on that of Jacques Lacan. (though I read this very quickly, and it may be in here already).

Good Article

The article failed GA nomination due to the fact that his no references. Don't even try debating it. --GoOdCoNtEnT 07:17, 10 August 2006 (UTC)

Oh yeah? Well, well...you know what?....er...um...oh forget it I give up.

Subjectivity

Can someone take a look at the "Philosophy" section? The beginning says that Heidegger refused to acknowledge concepts such as "subjectivity" but then later on it says that he considered ethics "purely subjective." How can he describe something using a word/concept he does not recognize?

Loopytune 00:24, 24 October 2006 (UTC)Loopytune

This whole paragraph ought to be rewritten since its oversimplification misrepresents. Nowhere does Heidegger refuse to acknowledge the concepts listed - he examines them at length, how they formed and transformed in the history of philosophy. An example of where he addresses "I" as subject, as well as ethics is in section 63, 311-316 of Being and Time. He never says, at least not directly, that ethics is purely subjective. The problem for Heidegger is with securing a starting point in philosophy - a nearly impossible task at any period. To paraphrase SZ 316, starting philosophy from the point of a 'worldless I' (such as the subjectivity of Descartes) is as short-sighted as is starting philosophy from a position of immersion in practical matters. That is where he places ethics, the position of already being immersed so closely in things that there is no stepping back to look at the larger picture. But there is more to it - largely drawing upon Kant as the object of his critique, he sees philosophers as artificially tacking an ethics onto a "theoretische Subjekt". It could be argues that the problem of ethics for him is that it is not integrated with ontology. In fact I would argue this since several works he points out as a part of the "forgetting of Being" the post-Platonic split in philosophy into separate disciplines of logic, ethics, and physics. He does say ethics is existentiell, but that is not the same thing for him as 'subjective' it is just secondary in investigation of existential structures of Dasein rather than a primary starting point. Of course, the strongest critique of all of this was by Levinas, but even he has to play down some points to make Heidegger a Hegelian with the appearance of being devoid of Other. Zeusnoos 01:29, 24 October 2006 (UTC)

The whole paragraph is largely meaningless, and where it is not meaningless it is inaccurate. Not one claim in it is true, right down to the very last error which suggests that dasein rather than in-der-welt-Sein means Being-in-the-world. The comments by Zeusnoos are correct, but you need just a basic, plausible summary of Heidegger's thought before getting into that kind of detail. And this is the only paragraph about his philosophy in the section (the other two are vague stuff about influences). Scrap it and start again - KD

I think the section "Philosophy" is not too bad, no worse than any other encyclopedic entry on this matter. The paragraph you (KD) refer to, I quote here:

Heidegger's philosophy refused to recognize concepts such as consciousness, subjectivity, ego, the mind or other fact-value distinctions, because he saw them as fundamentally immeasurable, indefinable and easily subject to multiple interpretations. For example: consciousness vs. "what?" Ego as opposed to "what?" He criticises our reliance on modern science and our subjugation to technology, and he did not see the point to include an "ethical" dimension to his theory; he suggested that "ethical" dimensions are purely "subjective" and only result in a fundamental misunderstanding of his holistic unified experience of "being in the world" which he called dasein.

This seems like a fair summary for an overview. Might I reply that your empty ejections such as: "not one claim is true" and that it is "meaningless" are more applicable to your own comment (and grammar) than they are to the article! --Lucas

RESPONSE: Well, I don't know what's wrong with my grammar, but then I don't know what an 'empty ejection' is either. The summary is immeasurably inferior to Wikipedia entries on other philosophers - Wittgenstein, for example. The paragraph in question is hopeless, and I am happy to offer details:

"Heidegger's philosophy refused to recognize concepts such as consciousness, subjectivity, ego, the mind or other fact-value distinctions..."

The fact-value distinction signifies, if anything, the logical disconnect between factual observations and value judgments; the old problem about how to derive an "ought" from an "is". None of the concepts which precede it in the sentence have anything to do with it. I can't imagine what "refused to recognize" means in this context - Heidegger spends hundreds of pages discussing consciousness and subjectivity in his books and published lectures; is the sentence supposed to claim that Heidegger denied the existence of minds?

"...because he saw them as fundamentally immeasurable, indefinable and easily subject to multiple interpretations."

I have no idea where Heidegger sets out to "measure" subjectivity, for example, let alone where he fails. To the extent Heidegger objects to Descartes' or Husserl's understanding of subjectivity, the objection is based on their taking an everyday concept of subjectivity for granted rather than examining it in it's being - as Heidegger would say. He has no complaints about these terms being "indefinable" or "subject to multiple interpretations". Maybe that's someone else's issue - it's not Heidegger's.

"For example: consciousness vs. "what?" Ego as opposed to "what?" [sic]

I have no idea what that means, and I have taught this subject at university level.

"He criticises our reliance on modern science and our subjugation to technology,..."

No he doesn't. He explains that the sway of technology in the modern world is something which has been sent - transmitted - across history by an ancient misunderstanding of the meaning of being. The technological understanding of the world is a fateful outcome of Dasein's forgetfulness of being. If anything, one might speak of the world's "subjugation" to modern Dasein - which cannot be discussed as if it is something separate and apart from modern technology.

"...and he did not see the point to include an "ethical" dimension to his theory; he suggested that "ethical" dimensions are purely "subjective" and only result in a fundamental misunderstanding of his holistic unified experience of "being in the world" which he called dasein."

Nowhere...nowhere...does Heidegger say anything resembling this. Heidegger's views on ethics are to be found in the "Brief uber den Humanismus". The idea that Heidegger would regard ethics as "subjective" is ludicrous - he was not a logical positivist.

Listen, I am sorry if anyone has pride of authorship, but it's lousy. Get rid of it. KD november 13.

Fact-value distinctions are refused by Heidegger in that presumed facts such as consciousness, subject-object, etc. are not distinct from values, they come from an over valuation of presence. In B&T he refuses to use these terms in an attempt to get beyond this presumption of them as facts. They are not facts but biases that have occurred in a misguided metaphysics, by avoiding them he is not precisely trying to contradict them.

Consciousness is not measurable, rather being-in-the-world is not measurable, it is not something that can be put before a microscope, or subjected to a science of measure. They are indefinable in the sense that they are what do or think the defining. They are multiply interpreted by the various sciences. Only under the concept of Being can one get at a philosophy that goes beyond these already misformed concepts.

"Consciousness Vs what", is the question that points out that consciousness Vs world is the failed division that traditionally defines consciousness. One must go beyond this division to being-in-the-world.

You say he does not criticism technology yet in the next sentence you say it came from a misunderstanding of being, surely a criticism. In his work on Descartes he pointedly criticises his failure to answer the main questions of Descartes' time. I don't believe he considered it as deterministic and unavoidable, but due to mistakes made by certain thinkers.

The point about an ethical theory refers to Being and Time. His ethics in Humanism are very far from what is normally considered ethics. His avoidance of the topic is easily seen in his overall ethic regarding the truth of being, how can one address ethics when one sees such a gigantic mistake in the very understanding of the world. As to them being subjective, well perhaps this was a misreading also attributable to Sartre.

By the way, I had no problem with your grammar, I was referring to the previous comment.

I didnt write these paragraphs and don't disagree that they could be improved. It was from your extreme comments that I assumed you might want to re-write it in a very personal way that would not give such an overview, since I think it important to mention his re-orientation of concepts such as consciousness, his view of technology and how ethics is covered (as I read it ethics for him is also a kind of dead word like consciousness or God, that only serves to put an end to thinking about them).

--Lucas

RESPONSE:

My own suggested rewrite is in the rewrite section above. Far from being extremely personal, I think it's much what you'd expect to see in an encyclopaedia entry about Heidegger. I don't want to be rude about your take on Heidegger, but I think it would be unrecognizable to most Heidegger scholars. I think you have kind of got some of his points, but you state them in such a way that it's hard to tell. Heidegger certainly took the position, for example, that there is no world qua world in the absence of Dasein, and similarly no Dasein which is not at the same time in-der-Welt-sein (being-in-the-world) - but no-one could guess that that is what's meant by "Consciousness Vs what". I don't want to repeat all my criticisms - suffice to say that neither "ethics" nor "God" are in any sense "dead" words for Heidegger, and the fact-value distinction is a specific term in moral philosophy which still has nothing whatsoever to do with the issues raised in the draft. KD

Heidegger didn't create continental philosophy

Lucaas, I noticed you were trying to clean the criticism section, but skirted around this statement: "Continental philosophy is a subject he is even said by some to have created,"

I don't know who would say Heidegger created continental philosophy - you can't understand contemporary continental without studying his works, but the "by some" should be sourced. Even if it can be sourced, I think it should be removed since continental claims Hegel, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, even Kant, hermeneuticians such as Dilthey and Schleiermacher, personalists such as Scheler, religious existentialists such as Berdjaev, etc, etc, etc. We're talking about philosophers over a great span of time, not Heideggerian and post-Heideggerean thought alone. Zeusnoos 19:21, 17 November 2006 (UTC)

Don't think I put this in, was it not there already. I know all these other 19th C thinkers are valued in the continental tradition but prior to Heidegger one might say that they belonged to both "traditions" (nascent, lets say) or were ignored by both, eg, by Frege and by Husserl. Heidegger, in a way, though he was hugely critical and wanted to destruct the tradition, also leads to the inclusion of these 19C figures, and to a certain realisation of their unavoidability in the warped history of metaphysics. A historical point that the Analytic tradition does not grant. Also there was not much English opposition to Husserl but with, Being and Time, and all its neologisms, the opposition became (and remains) quite prominent. So let me say that prior to Heidegger, one (English or otherwise) might have read Hegel, Kierkegaard or Nietzsche etc. as a philosopher in their own right, whereas after Heidegger, they become philosophers taken up academically in a broad and historical way, and not just in their own right, and this happens only within the continental tradition. --Lucas

I am not sure if I fully understand the above exchange, but the suggestion that a distinction between analytical and contintental philosophy dates from the publication of Being and Time, overlooks the importance of Russell and Moore's earlier break with Hegelianism. --KD

This is not really overlooked, since you also have at the time of Moore and Russell Husserl and Frege in Germany reading Bretano and the formation of phenomenology which is also a break from Hegel. But I think that all of the just mentioned names were still doing philosophy without being self-consciously Analytic or Continental. For a fuller account of this division refer to the page itself Analytic and Continental Philosophy, I think it is reasonable enough to make this statement here on the page about Heidegger, since it helps to indicate the importance of his work in really pushing the division, I suppose on Russell's page one might see a similar comment about his creating of Analytic philosophy.

--Lucas

Without wishing to be too disrespectful, the article to which you linked is itself absolutely awful.  ::--KD

Yes I know, but it is the only one, fix it! --Lucas

Largely the notion of a 'continental' philosophy is to some degree an inadequate appelation; while it can be thought of as a geographical grouping this is obviously false -generally it is thought of as the philosophy that followed Kant that was not Frege. Thus, idealism, Hegelianism, Kirkegaard, Schopenhauer etc. There is also a definite emphasis on the problems of the geistwissenschaften {"humanities'). However the idea that Heidegger 'created' continential philosophy is not so strange when one knows the underlying story, which was a lecture 'argument' he had with the neo-Kantian Ernst Cassirer in 1929.It was also at this time that Heidegger entered into an 'acrimonious' debate with Rudolph Carnap, in which Carnap rubbished his What is Metaphysics? as being without meaning etc (the basic analytical criticism of H. that continues to this day). And as the public loves a good argument, it displayed for all to see the gulf between continental and 'analytical' philosophy. So in many ways this was the birth of contintal philosophy - and it was since then that the gulf widened -according to some commentators-, i.e. the practice of separating the two 'philosophies' into different departments at universities etc. So the issue is one that has a fair ammount of truth in it, but one must remember first and foremost that the 'continental tradition' is only a label, and one that has been applied ex post facto to those we consider 'continental' philosophers. This was not a notion that existed in the 19th century.

As a further note, one can say (Rorty does) that Heidegger was responsible for 'discovering' Nietzsche as a philosopher; that prior to Heidegger's reading of him he was thought of mostly as a literary creature, and was read for this reason. Again, this 'truth' becomes truer due to the language used: Nietzsche might have been read as a literary author by those that read books in that time (i.e. 1880-1930}, but then many of them would have also read Schopenhauer and other 'philosophers' -it is only a distinction we make in this modern era and assume it applies directly to previous ones. Read Foucault! Tsop 12:37, 19 January 2007 (UTC)

This article needs a re-write

I'm afraid this article is just too filled with factual errors regard Heidegger's philosophy to justify its existence. A reader new to Heidegger looking at this will walk away with serious misconceptions about his philosophical project. For example, even in the first paragraph there are major errors. Heidegger did not try to direct philosophy away from metaphysics towards ontology. He believed that true philosophy is metaphysics, and that true metaphysics is ontology, or the study of "Being" as such. Phenomenology is the method by which you do proper ontology. Additionally, there is too much about his politics (and Heidegger was in no way a political thinker), and too little about his views on art, poetry, language, and the empirical sciences. Where is a discussion of Eriegnis, or Clearing and Presence, what of 'What calls for thinking?" and his re-reading of Aristotelian temporality? Someone more familiar with Heidegger's philosophy should consider re-writing this article.

-Bloom

As a Heidegger scholar, I agree, although this discussion page is hilarious. The entry as it stands wouldn't pass muster as an undergraduate essay. I am not convinced that a specialist subject like Heidegger's philosophy can be addressed by an unqualified committee. As for whether he was a philosopher, I might point out that he was, of course, professor of philosophy at Freiburg University. I apologize if that's just my POV. - KD

Well go for it then, make the changes! --Lucas

I think the point was that he was waiting for someone more familiar with Heidegger's work to re-write the article. I myself have only read selections of Heidegger (I think it is best for me to wait to read the whole of Sein und Zeit for when I can do so with a professor). However, I think I do have a good idea of what Heidegger is trying to do, at least in Sein und Zeit. I will try and add some stuff. But I am busy and may not get around to it. I invite anyone who actually has read a great deal of Heidegger to re-write this article. It also focuses over-proportionally on his politics. Now, I am not saying that his philosophy does not flow from his politics. In fact, any philosophy for anyone does. And for Heidegger, Bourdieu tries to show that concepts such as authenticity flow from his Nazism and anti-liberalism (?). But still, not only does the article not provide this connection, treating his politics and his philosophy separately, or at least not making appropriate connections to how they are connected and in what way this connection is manifest, but it is over-proportionally involved with his politics. Heidegger is among, perhaps the most, influential philosopher/thinker of the 20th century. This warrants that one do due justice to Heidegger's philosophy. Drifter 05:19, 21 September 2006 (UTC)

• • • i've been reading Heidegger for a good while, and would be willing to work with others on re-writing this entry, or at least restructuring it. there is some great info, but i also agree with many of the criticisms presented (e.g. focusing too much on politics - though nonetheless significant- and not enough on the thought). so, if anyone wants to collaborate on a structure and organizational flow, please let me know here.Platypusjones 15:08, 16 October 2006 (UTC)

IMO, the structure of this article is broken because of its lack of unity. Its a committee product with a weakness for political correctness. That is, in an attempt to transcend a POV, it merely glues together multiple POVs. The trouble may be that Heidegger is not only a political controversy but also a famous person, and fame can distort even scholarly writing.

IMO, the critics of Heidegger can see beyond the fame toward an objective appraisal of his academic content. Advocates of Heidegger tend to emphasize how influential he was, although that influence is compromised when advocates say, for example, that "X" was greatly influenced by Heidegger but didn't really understand Heidegger, or that anybody who criticized Heidegger never really understood him. See how fame gets in the way?

IMO, to preserve the objectivity of the article and help it regain some unity, the critics of Heidegger -- who are the growing minority in this literature -- should provide the structure. Don't make the reader guess about the content of Being and Time; portray Heidegger's actual thought in all its simplistic glory. Quote Professor Tom Rockmore more. Display Heidegger's terminology briefly in something like this:

(1) A human being is a (Dasein) who interacts in-the-world with four basic moods: fear, boredom, joy and anxiety.

(2) Dasein finds an outside world and interacts in the mode of Care (much or little). Dasein is Here and the world is Yonder. The world consists of Things and Other human beings, or simply, the Other. Dasein interacts with the Other in three modes of Solicitude: catching-up with the Other, suppressing the Other, and authenticity.

(3) As for Things, Heidegger interchanges four terms to describe them: Things, Gear, Ready-at-Hand, and Pragmata. Dasein interacts with Things in the mode of Concern and Directionality. Dasein regards broken Things as Conspicuousness.

(4) Dasein Cares for the abstract Other (Them or They) in the modes of Falling, Inauthenticity, Alienation, Scattering. Simply put, 'They' influence Dasein to be inauthentic.

(5) These, then, are the facts of life, or Facticity of Dasein. We are thrown into this world, and this is our Thrownness. The aim of the life of Dasein is to resist the forces of 'They' and strive to be Authentic.

The superficiality of Heidegger's thought should be intuitively obvious to the objective reader. This suggests, on its own weight, that such an amateur effort in Philosophy could not have gained global fame without the Nazi period. If this article is structured around an objective criticism of Heidegger, it will regain its unity. Petrejo 12:22, 31 January 2007 (UTC)

• • • • • • • I am sufficiently distressed by the Philosophy section that I have prepared a re-write designed to give a basic, uncontroversial summary of the work. This is intended to replace the entire section under Philosophy, the first two paras of which are unacceptable. If people want to keep the third para, which is relatively unimportant in my view, feel free. Understand: this is basic. There is much more to be said - the complete works are some 80 volumes - but you need a start. I am an accredited Heidegger scholar (KD November 2006):

"Heidegger was one of the most influential philosophers of the 20th century, and his ideas have penetrated into many areas. Because his discussion of ontology (the study of the meaning of being) is rooted in an analysis of the mode of existence of individual human beings (Dasein, or being-there), his work has often been associated with existentialism - an association he found uncongenial because his conception of Dasein is not reducible to the free subjective interiority of the human being described, for example, in the early works of Sartre. Nevertheless, among the major philosophical works inspired by Heidegger's thought was Sartre's Being and Nothingness, although Heidegger insisted that Sartre misunderstood him. His philosophical work was also taken up throughout Germany, France, Japan and elsewhere, and has gained, since the 1970s, a following in North America as well. Heidegger's thought was attacked or dismissed, however, by many of his contemporaries, including Theodor Adorno, and Anglo-American philosophers such as Bertrand Russell and A. J. Ayer.

Heidegger's philosophical approach owed much in its origins to the work of the phenomenologist Edmund Husserl, who he served as an assistant and to whom he dedicated his 1927 masterpiece, Being and Time. Husserl sought to find philosophical certainty about the world in what he believed was the unquestionable truth of certain data presented, not to the individual subject, but to an abstract subject he called the 'transcendental ego'. Reviving the question of the meaning of Being, which had long since ceased to be an important topic in mainstream philosophy, Heidegger critically examined the "being" of both subject (or ego) and world, arguing that Husserl had taken the sense of these terms largely for granted. In Being and Time, and his lecture courses from the same period, Heidegger brilliantly shows that the manner of being of the subject (Dasein) is inextricably linked with the being of the world, understood as the surrounding, understood environment which is the field of Dasein's concern. To be human IS to be in a world, and - perhaps controversially - to be a world is to be an environment occupied and manipulated by human beings (or by beings relevantly like human beings - Heidegger was never a species-ist). The analyses did much to undermine the subject/object dichotomy in philosophy.

Some have argued that Heidegger's thought after Being and Time exhibits a 'turn' in his thinking (der Kehre). He denied this in a letter published by W.J. Richardson in his Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought (1963), stating that, if there had been a turn a turn at all, it simply went deeper into the same matters. In his later work, Heidegger largely abandons the account of Dasein as a pragmatic, engaged worldly agent, and instead discusses the other elements necessary to an understanding of being, notably language, the earth (as the almost ineffable foundation of world) and the presence of the gods. Nevertheless, Dasein (or 'mortals' as he later says) remains a crucial part of the coming-about or event (Ereignis) of being. In his work on technology, Heidegger sought to show that our understanding and use of the world as a kind of standing warehouse of stock equipment is based in a forgetting of the original sense of being - that of Dasein and world as inextricably interlinked in a relationship of care: on this basis, Heidegger has been adopted by many as an apostle of environmentalism. His essays on language, poetry, and technology, and his discussions of ancient Greek philosophy, are couched in an increasingly hermetic and almost mystical style, in comparison to the unusual and ungainly, but relatively unambiguous, style of Being and Time. Heidegger wrote little on ethics, the most important text being the "Letter on Humanism" (1946)."

KD, How does one become an 'accredited' Heidegger scholar? Nevermind. I'm very glad, and would, too, like to see the letter to Richardson in this article. The whole Kehre thing is completely out of hand, and recently, at a conference with Caputo in the audience, Caputo noted that he still endorses one or two turns. Ugh. If Heidegger had completely abandoned Dasein he wouldn't have still been talking about it (albeit in the transformed hyphenated form) in Beitraege and late works such as On Time and Being. Zeusnoos 19:13, 8 November 2006 (UTC) (not exactly a Heidegger novice, but not having read the whole Gesamtausgabe)

Doctorate on Heidegger's philosophy and a publication, is all. And no, I haven't read the eighty (is it?) volumes, but a fair few. The debates on detail are fascinating, but Wikipedia really should get the abc right, as it has for other philosophers. Mine may not be perfect, but the existing entry is hopeless - KD.

The draft above is an improvement, but still needs more clarity. There are too many poorly understood buzzwords -- "free subjective interiority" etc. -- and POV endorsements like "brilliantly shows". The existing introductory paragraphs are my free time attempt at the direction this article should go. I'd also trim or spin-off the extraneous stuff about French Heideggerianism. Above all it must be an encyclopedia entry intelligible to readers outside the Continentalist cloisters. Also, KD, you might consider getting a User name. 271828182 22:05, 8 November 2006 (UTC)

No, KD's re-write is quite good. Certainly a great start for what should be at least an accurate article, regardless of whether or not wikipedia users will understand it. If they interested enough to read the article, perhaps it will persuade them to go beyond. -Bloom.

If it can't be understood, why will anyone be interested to read more about it? And how will anyone know if it's accurate? As I said, KD's rewrite is an improvement but even so it is still rife with semi-relevant verbiage. (I notice Bloom didn't respond to either of the specific criticisms I raised.) A more extended example: half the second paragraph dithers inconclusively about the relationship between Heidegger's and Husserl's ideas, before belatedly getting around to the subject, where we finally get this: "In Being and Time, and his lecture courses from the same period, Heidegger brilliantly shows that the manner of being of the subject (Dasein) is inextricably linked with the being of the world, understood as the surrounding, understood environment which is the field of Dasein's concern." The first 16 words of this sentence are padding. The rest of the sentence is packed with technical terms that are unclear. The crucial verb -- "linked" -- tells the reader nothing specific (though the polysyllabic adverb pretends otherwise). A Thomist, a Marxist, a Spinozist, or an eliminative materialist could all agree with the commonplace that human existence is always linked to its environment. The concept of Heidegger's In-der-Welt-Sein is vaguely alluded to in the last clause, and the following two sentences are on the right track, but a novice reader will completely miss the point. Time permitting, I'll rewrite this article over the holiday. 271828182 19:17, 5 December 2006 (UTC)

To respond specifically to your complaints, I agree that "brilliantly" should be removed since it violates POV. However, the French Heideggerianism can stay. Anyone who knows anything about 20th century continental philosophy knows that Heidegger influenced a great bulk of the French. On a more important point though, I find it often the case that Wiki values concision and clarity over rigour and accuracy when dealing with philosophy or more abstruse topics. This policy should change if it interferes with the value of preserving the integrity of the thinkers' work. -Bloom

No one would dispute that Heidegger has strongly influenced French philosophy. But then, no one disputed that. I argue that the section on French Heideggerianism, while not entirely unimportant, is irrelevant to an article on Heidegger. Most of the events therein occurred late in Heidegger's life and in any case had little or no effect on Heidegger's philosophy. Yet this section commands a disproportionate amount of space, especially compared to the article's scanty and only intermittently accurate coverage of Heidegger's own works. A separate article on the reception of Heidegger's thought in France would be more appropriate.

As for your "more important" point, the current article is neither concise nor clear nor rigorous nor accurate -- as I pointed out in detail w.r.t. a representative sentence above. Perhaps if it ever attains any of these virtues, we can debate their relative proportions. 271828182 04:14, 7 December 2006 (UTC)

Perhaps you misunderstood. With a philosopher as difficult to understand as Heidegger, we simply need to forfeit clarity for the sake of accuracy and rigour. Perhaps you can be of service, but I remain skeptical.-Bloom

We must forfeit clarity? I disagree. Is there anything in the 'Introduction' (which I wrote) that is inaccurate? Further, the problem I raised -- which none of your comments have gainsaid -- is that the revision on 'Philosophy' still has all the rigor of a boiled noodle, as I have shown above. 271828182 10:26, 8 December 2006 (UTC)

I don't have too many problems with the intro, though it would be better if you had cited some sources. Also, I would replace "bombastic" with "obscure." I think the larger problem with the intro is that it fails to mention Heidegger's attempt to re-orient western philosophy back towards the question 'what is the meaning of being?' This is clearly delimited in the opening of Being and Time. Just think it should be in the intro. As to the philosophy re-write, I think it just needs touching up, and some references, but it is far better than the rest of the article.-Bloom

Citing sources would be impractical for so general a summary -- what would the footnote say, "see Sein und Zeit, passim"? And I chose "bombastic", in part, because it is citable -- Peter Singer uses that adjective on his blurb for Edwards's Heidegger's Confusions.

The problem with talking about the "meaning of being" is that it is, like too much Continental philosophy, a vague buzzword. It sounds profound, but what the hell is it saying? What's the difference between asking the question of the Sinn von Sein and NOT asking that question (or not being "oriented" toward the question)? If you cannot answer that, then you don't know what you're saying. And to a novice reader making a first approach to H. through a Wikipedia article, it is simply a baffling incantation.

Much of the current rewrite by KD suffers from the same affliction -- ritual phrases that Continental writers use as if they had meanings (e.g., "free subjective interiority", "to be a world"), but which are thoroughly obscure and never clearly explained. Now, they may indeed be meaningful technical terms. But they communicate nothing if they are not explained. Such explanations call for more than "touching up", they indicate that the present article fails to be a good encyclopedia article. 271828182 02:24, 9 December 2006 (UTC)

-The need to restate the question of 'the meaning of Being' is not a vague Continental philosophy "buzzword." Heidegger clearly dilineates the need in the first section of Being and Time (Section I, The Necessity, Structure, and Priority of the Question of Being), this stretches back to the question raised in Plato's Sophist, which Heidegger knew well, and wrote about at great lenght. The term is meaningful and pertinent for the article, though it cannot be explained. Heidegger himself admitted that he was unable to fully explain it even after after the 400 plus pages composed in Being and Time and numerous other texts. I'm not so sure you are really familiar enough with Heidegger to continue working on this article.-Bloom.

So "the term [...] cannot be explained" but it's not a vague buzzword. If you can't explain it, how do you know it's not vague? And if you can't explain it, how do you know how accurate and rigorous this article is?

And how do you know how familiar I am with Heidegger? I've supported my edits with references to the original text, and specific arguments. You've evaded almost every concrete criticism I've raised. 271828182 02:26, 10 December 2006 (UTC)

As I have written in the section below, this discussion is becoming personal and the users engaged in the argument should make it a point to stop editing here for a day or so. Take a break, and when returning, try to make sure that any posts here, or edit summaries are devoid of pointed, accusatory remarks. The content on a talk page should be devoted to the content of the article, not statements about other editor's intentions or knowledge-bases. Again, like I offered below, perhaps after taking a break we can work to come up with a version that merges the editing efforts of everyone, instead of editing and reverting an article-change in its entirety. - Sam 03:22, 10 December 2006 (UTC)

Well, the Philosophy section is much improved - thank you. A specific disagreement with the following:

"Rather, Husserl argued that all that philosophy could and should be was a description of experience (hence the phenomenological slogan, “to the things themselves”). For Heidegger, this meant understanding that experience is always already situated in a world and in ways of being."

As my derided rewrite pointed out, Heidegger's strategy of locating experience - or Dasein - as always already thrown into a world was a stark overturning of and departure from Husserl's position (to be fair, Husserl in his later work attempted to take account of some of the problems Heidegger pointed out). Husserl's ego is above all transcendental, and he struggles tirelessly to try to build a bridge back from the ego to the actual world. Heidegger's approach is the opposite. The current rewrite suggests Heidegger adopted his approach from Husserl.

Less specifically, the section on time is a good try, but since it doesn't explain what Heidegger meant by 'authentic' time, I don't believe a reader will be able to understand it. It's an immensely difficult subject to tackle in a short article which everyone insists must be easily intelligible, but the starting point has to be Heidegger's claim that "care" is the essential structure of Dasein. Sorry if that's not much help. KD

The re-write above is weak, IMO, because of its one-sidedness. The Nazi uprising, which also explains Sartre's participation in Heidegger, and his surpassing of Heidegger through the French Resistance, is central to the upsurge of Heidegger, the decline of Husserl, the long trek of Heidegger through Nietzsche, the conquest of French Philosophy, and the Existentialist revolt. The entire aspect of the NEGATIVE of Heidegger is downplayed in this re-write, and so the re-write continues to sound 50 years old. Petrejo 12:30, 31 January 2007 (UTC)

Sorry, but I don't think it is correct to say that Heidegger's philosophy is essentially a marriage between two insights. I still think the philosophy section has major problems.

-Bloom —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.13.81.121 (talk) 20:33, 22 December 2007 (UTC)

Intro should have Heidegger as Existentialist or Continental

I removed the stuff about existentialism from the intro. I hope this is ok since I thought existentialism was a strange thing to mention so early in the article since it is not clear if he was or not an existentialist. I also removed mention of existential commonplaces. The term sounds odd, who is an existentialist today? Instead I said he provided some of the basics for Continental Philosophy. Lucas

Though Heidegger disavowed the term, I see this as a distinction without much difference. Sartrean existentialism is inconceivable without H.'s work. And just read S&Z! "Existentialia" appear from the start of the book onward. Regardless of today's fashions, H. is an existentialist. Talking of "Continental Philosophy" only makes the article more vague (and thus less informative): "CP" includes Hegel, Benjamin, Schelling, etc., all of whom are quite different from Heidegger. Likewise, your edit introduced a bunch of obscure jargon -- "modulated", "re-orientate". May I recommend Orwell's "Politics and the English Language"? Or merely Strunk and White? 271828182 02:24, 9 December 2006 (UTC)

Continental does not make it more vague. Existentialism is not really practiced heard of at the moment but Heideggerean practice is still if a context iongoing in general in Continental philosophy.

I think you are making an assumption about Heidegger being an Existentialist, just as Sartre did, it is not justified.

Heideggers influence is quite direct on some Continentals, vague on others. However, the influence of Existentialism is really just associated with Sartre and some kind of pop phenomenon.

Heidegger's refusal of the term Existentialism is pretty convincing, in his Letter on Humanism he says:

existentialism says: Existence precedes essence. In this statement he is taking existentia and essentia according to their metaphysical meaning, which from Plato’s time on has said that essentia precedes existentia. Sartre reverses this statement. But the reversal of a metaphysical statement remains a metaphysical statement. With it he stays with metaphysics in oblivion of the truth of Being.

Nor do I think that because Heidegger mentions existentiale and existeniel a number of times in B&T that it makes him an "existentialist" (since Sartre defined it and, though was influenced by Heidegger, he got him quite wrong). Sartre never understood how extensive Heidegger's criticism was, it even included a rejection of humanism.

--Lucas

Lucas, how does replacing "existentialism" with "continental philosophy" not increase vagueness, given that existentialism is one type of continental philosophy?

And just because Heidegger refuses the term, does that make it "pretty convincing"? The Letter on 'Humanism', you will notice, is strenously interpreting sentences Heidegger himself wrote, such as "Das 'Wesen' des Daseins liegt in seiner Existenz" and "der Vorrang der 'existentia' vor der essentia". Could you explain how section 9 of S&Z is not existentialist? In particular, aside from the preceding sentences, the passage that starts: "Alle Explikate, die der Analytik des Daseins entspringen, sind gewonnen im Hinblick auf seine Existenzstruktur." (You may also wish to consult Gesamtausgabe v. 20, p. 152, which makes it clear that Heidegger's existentialism is crucial to his break with Husserl.)

And after that, I still await your explanation of what jargon such as "modulated" and "re-orientate" add to your edits. 271828182 09:52, 9 December 2006 (UTC)

Using Continental instead of Existentialism does not increase vagueness but does increase accuracy. Which existentialist did he influence? Sartre. Which Continental philosophers did he influence? Almost all (if even more Marxist oriented philosophers were negatively influenced, they didnt ignore him).

I agree it not enough that he just refuses the term. What I find convincing is the Letter from him I quoted above. There it is clear that Heidegger considers "Existentialism" as still within the kind of philosophy he repudiated.

I am not going to try interpret a section from Being and Time to verify if it is existentialist or not. Existentialism is an invention of Sartre, he came upon it after reading Heidegger and mixing it with Descartes' cogito and Hegel's dialectic. Remember Sartre was a Marxist. So since existentialism is just a misreading of B&T I don't think it can be folded into it as you, with Sartre, are attempting. It might be appropriate on pages for Sartre or Existentialism but since one of Heidegger's biggest influences was Derrida and other non-Existentialists (or do you also call Derrida existentialist?) it is too narrow to litter the intro with Heidegger and Existentialism.

As a compromise the best thing to do is make a section "Heidegger and Existentialism", there we can include quotes from Sartre, from Heidegger's rejection of Existentialism and some of the material yoiu presumably are considering in this argument.

By the way, "modulated" and "re-orientate" are not jargon they are just ordinary words, check a dictionary . Jargon is stuff that belongs to a particular technology or subject (like philosophy).

--Lucas

So why exactly (since you find it so convincing) does Heidegger repudiate existentialism? How is it a distortion of S&Z? You are convinced, so how do you know that section 9 of S&Z is not existentialist?

If reading S&Z is too hard, I still recommend Orwell's "Politics and the English Language". 271828182 20:22, 9 December 2006 (UTC)

The both of you should take a break from editing this page, or at least the introduction, for some time. It seems to be getting personal and less about collaborating for the benefit of the article and the community. If you both do not find it objectionable, I could read over and edit the best-case scenario versions of the introduction in each of your points of view, and then post a merged version here. Take me up on the offer, find another way to resolve the issue, or take a breather - in any case, please be more civil and good natured. - Sam 20:30, 9 December 2006 (UTC)

Thanks Sam, it sounds like a bit of a risk since we still are discussing this and I don't really find 2718... or whatever the name is, too personal. What in any case is your opinion? I don't really have a problem with someone wanting to claim him as existentialist, I just think that existentialism is something Sartre invented and doesnt take into account the wider effect of Heidegger especially on that anti-existentialist, Derrida.

To return to 2718... It is clear he repudiates existentialism (almost as long as your name!) since he says in the quote above I gave you that Sartre merely inverts the two metaphysical words, essence and existence. Sartre wants to preference existence over essence. Heidegger does not only want to do this, he wants to question not only the syntax or ordering but also the history and meaning of these terms. This is what is called destruktion, and like deconstruction it does not simply mean inverting or reversing the existing order, like putting body before mind, woman before man, matter before idea, etc.

I know section 9 of S&Z was not existentialist when it was written, because I know that Sartre read B&T (maybe only section 9), interpreted it in his own way (adding Descartes cogito, lots of stuff about consciousness, and Hegel on nothingness). Sartre then wrote about and invented the idea of "Existentialist" philosophy, saying that Heidegger was also a part of this new philosophical movement. Some people even believed him!

--Lucas

My edits are intended to make the article clear and accurate. I have opposed Lucaas's edits since they routinely add needless verbiage and buzzwords. When asked to explain or justify his claims with reference to the primary sources, Lucaas fails to do so (e.g., in the comment immediately above he discusses Sartre but continues to avoid discussing Heidegger's own words). He identifies existentialism exclusively with Sartrean existentialism, which goes against well-established usage. He has provoked several edit wars (see philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of science, ontotheology), particularly with his arbitrarily rigid distinction between "analytic" and "Continental" philosophy, which is never sourced and appeals only to his private and often false conceptions of that divide (cf. KD's comments above, or Talk:Philosophy of science). If I oppose his edits, it is for the benefit of this article and Wikipedia's philosophy articles in general. 271828182 22:51, 9 December 2006 (UTC)

This is very general comment (and why call me "he"), let us try and stay focused on this issue of Heidegger's existentialism. As to the issue of Continental and Analytic, it is not a minor issue and in the additions I have made in trying to come to terms with it and what it means for an encyclopedia has been largely based on Analytic philosophy. I have made ample references, to some if not all of the 13 majors scholars including the U.S. philosopher, Richard Rorty who finds this "schism" of interest to contemporary philosophy (I suppose, since it is a new thing in the history of philosophy that two sides do not talk)

Anyhow, as I said let us remain focused on Heidegger. Note, I was the one who provided the quote above from Letters on Humanism, as to your referencing, well, enough said. I identify Existentialism with Sartre of course, who do you think came up with the idea and name of "Existentialism"? I have also, in deference to you, left the word prominent in the article since Existentialism took on its own meaning in certain schools and in pop culture. And we added the quote I gave on Heidegger's rejection of Existentialism. So I really don't know why you write this blustering comment now after there seemed to be some compromise with the new edit of the intro which we both re-wrote together.

--Lucas

It's not bluster, it's a matter of objective record: your edits regularly provoke multiple reverts and acrimonious discussion, and those discussions typically end with your views being thoroughly discredited. Your record of contributions speaks for itself. 271828182 17:28, 10 December 2006 (UTC)

This is untrue, the recored speaks for itself. Yes it provoked some responses when I tried to establish that all these departmentalised philosophies were not separated out disciplines in Continental or Eastern philosophy. A number of these issues have been resolved amicably.

Unlike you, I do not go stalking you to pass remarks about your edit history, but if most philosophy editors on here are Analytic and I say something about Eastern or Continental or even Greek philosophy, they often dont see it immediately, since they are, understandably, immersed in an Analytic way of philosophy.

--Lucas

Sure. And I suppose you see how parochial and narrow-minded the "analytics" are because you are not immersed in any particular way of thinking. In more than one sense.

Feel free to "stalk" my record on Wikipedia. For example, compare the article on Gilles Deleuze in Nov 2005 with what it is today. Anyone reading this should feel free to compare Lucas's edit history and see what his record says about his contributions to WikiKnowledge. 271828182 19:34, 11 December 2006 (UTC)

Well, I certainly do not deny my own prejudices, I'm not a 'plant without roots', I was merely pointing out some of those that I had come across I think it not unusual that some pages become quite one-sided, especially something like phil of language which is of course mainly done by Analytic.

Yes I compared the article you did on Deleuze, and well done, it is immeasurably better (except I prefer the big photo of the old page and do not like the infobox). It is probably one of the more difficult pages on here to get right.

It is a different thing to edit a philosopher's page than to change a more general mistake on older pages that are resisted.

--Lucas

Perhaps we might agree as to some references to provide an adequate range of perspectives on the subject tied to verifiability and clear use of credible sources? I wonder as well whether one can talk about Heidegger being characterised as an existentialist without discussing the broader issues of his French reception and translations of his work into the French language. (To be direct about it, I think that is somewhat consistent with Lucas's view by implication.) Might I suggest off the top of my head Ethan Kleinberg's Generation Existential as one such source and Dominique Janicaud's Heidegger en France as another?

Let's remember that, despite the fact that Derrida had so few kind words for Sartre's work for much of his career (and there were much later extended references, including if memory serves a treatment of Antisemite and Jew in "Abraham, l'autre"), he was willing to credit accounts of his work that indicated some filiation with Sartre (sorry, I don't have any cites on hand for that one on hand, let alone any particular mastery of the details). Sartre may have been taken down a few notches in the French canon, but just about everyone continued to read him, to the point that influence may be quite understated and even a bit subliminal outside of the brighter lines drawn around the "Letter". Buffyg 22:10, 11 December 2006 (UTC)

I remember a time when it was hard to communicate Husserl's thought accurately because it was so often viewed through a distorting Heideggerian or Sartrean lens. Now -- fashions have changed, and new generations have forgotten the history and context they claim is so determining -- it seems impossible to discuss Heidegger without saddling him with a Derridean cart. Lebensphilosophie, Neue Ontologie, and Existenzphilosophie were all German philosophical movements before Sartre became famous. Klages is virtually unknown, though his exaltation of the body and championing of the anti-rational associations of language directly presage postmodernism (and Klages, despite his overtly reactionary politics, at least had the good sense to never support the Nazis). Is it too much to ask that an article about Heidegger should be about Heidegger and his historical context, rather than about his Francophone acolytes and imitators? 271828182 09:42, 12 December 2006 (UTC)

I can only buy rather less than half of what you're selling. For one, it's weak to claim that earlier receptions of Heidegger's work should be privileged simply because they came first -- that would serve to put us right back at a level of fashion you deride. It is in any case impossible to divorce Heidegger from his French context because Heidegger sought out that context as a matter of calculation. You might as well insist on excising treatment of the rectorate, which was another moment of Heidegger calculating his influence against a massive historical moment. Which is also to say: I agree that there needs to be some extended accounting for Heidegger's work per se, but, frankly, there are quite a few carts Heidegger saddled himself with that you have to look to other commentators to explicate, as Heidegger's own reflections on these matters are at times unsatisfactory, to say the least. You can look to Derrida as one of several eminent commentators required to give us insight where Heidegger does not.

That being said, Derrida was always quite clear that he had a lot to say about Heidegger, and we can't load down this entry with all of that, any more than we should elevate Derrida as though he were the only or only preeminent commentator or somehow undisputed in his views. Does this boil down to putting out Satre because of the "Letter" and taking on Derrida because Heidegger was said to commend his work? No, this isn't even a great way to judge fidelity or infidelity. But where there are gaps in Heidegger's own account (which is, I think, beyond dispute), you have to look to the commentaries with the most powerful explications of these gaps, and my view is that deconstruction happens to produce loads of such explications by what we might call independent Heideggerians, all of whom seem clearer than you're prepared to acknowledge on matters of history and context in excess of the French reception. On the flip side, the Heidegger that appears here should not be dominated by this or that reception, and the reception of his work should be clearly tagged against difficulties in reading Heidegger that should be generally informative. Buffyg 13:02, 12 December 2006 (UTC)

As to Lebensphilosophie, Neue Ontologie, and Existenzphilosophie movements, a few of the hundreds of movements the Germans like to extrue why not put some comment in the article on them.

The cart problem you discuss well above, but the origin of this dispute here on the talk page came from my attempt to remove Existentialism from all over the intro. I did not attempt to replace that with Derrida or Deconstruction but with the fairly neutral cart of Continental philosophy since he has influenced most Continentals but had little cited acknowledgment from Analytic (though someone suggested to me that Wittgenstein II came out of Husserl/Heidegger and Deleuze's idea of Affect may also have been from Heideggerean mood)

--Lucas

I don't love the Continental tag, but I think it's the best option on the table. Amply illustrated in the course of this exchange is that there was extensive circulation of influences between French and German philosphers (phenomenology, existentialism, deconstruction, hermeneutics all being transnational traditions with determinate institutional roots in languages and institutions largely nationally configured), where Heidegger was, as you have suggested, a major element of this circulation (incidentally I would add that there is a closely related phenomenon that also involves Heidegger, which is the circulation of literary interests, of which Celan would be a privileged example). As I've said previously, it would be difficult to argue other than that Heidegger's consciously staked his work on these circulations (one could cite other instances than the "Letter" and France: earlier at Davos and later at Athens, for example). A central stake of all of this seems to me to be translation (both within and across languages, as Derrida so often insisted), but that would be, at least in part, another way of confessing myself a Derridean.

In any case, I take the view that the circulation is the most massive and imposing phenomenon before us and that to describe Heidegger in terms of any particular circulating movement would be to understate his influence and its stakes. I think one can say that without violating NPOV or OR. Buffyg 15:37, 12 December 2006 (UTC)

I am not claiming that "earlier receptions of Heidegger's work should be privileged simply because they came first". As frère Jacques would say, I challenge anyone to cite where I wrote or implied any such thing. I would merely point out that while a philosopher can be strongly influenced by his contemporaries, it is somewhat more challenging to be influenced by the future.

And I severely doubt that the "independent Heideggerians" of deconstruction provide "the most powerful explications" of the "gaps" in Heidegger. Derrida, Lacoue-Labarthe, Nancy, et al. pay precious little attention to Dilthey, Rickert, Lask, or Jaspers, all of whom are key players in the debates that Heidegger was wrestling with while he was writing S&Z. (To say nothing of more distant background such as Klages and the George-Kreis.) You will learn a lot more about Heidegger by reading Ott's or Kisiel's painstaking empirical, documentary research, or just by reading the primary sources themselves, than you will by reading reams of quasi-Derridean periphrasis. Unfortunately, most of the primary sources are in German and, for all their much-ballyhooed emphasis on "textuality", today's lit critters are often ignorant of foreign languages.

At any rate, my foregrounding of existentialism in my initial rewrite of the introduction was intended to allude to this broader context in which Being and Time was written and made its first impact. As befits an introduction, this is pretty important and basic stuff. (For example, it's impossible to understand Heidegger's Nazism without understanding Division II of S&Z -- that is, the existentialist Heidegger.) However, as an introduction, I could do little more than gesture in the appropriate directions -- which seems to have produced more heat than light. The, ah, "massive and imposing" "circulation" of later developments gets its due later in the introduction.

As for "continental philosophy", I repeat that (at the very least) this term is unhelpfully vague. Imagine:

A: Heidegger? What's he about?

B: He's a big-time continental philosopher.

A: What's a continental philosopher?

B: You know, Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger, those guys.

A: Oh.

"Existentialism", despite its own ambiguities, is more specific. (Note that I removed, in a second draft, the immediate reference to existentialism, which may have been too jarring for some.)

In sum, I can now see that it will likely be quite challenging to completely overhaul this article's philosophy section, at least without protracted wrangling. I'll see what I can do, briefly, sticking to cited passages of H., and leaving aside contentious issues of context and reception. 271828182 18:05, 12 December 2006 (UTC)

As I said before, I don't love the Continental tag, but when someone uses it, I have some idea what they're talking about. It may well be that I go through the dialogue you've rehearsed every time. One gets from it a sense of breadth as the expense of referring to something that has little coherence outside of a generally shared set of references. I can live with that. As for "earlier receptions of Heidegger's work should be privileged", I go on to read that your motive was to allude to where Heidegger's work "made its first impact" (a claim that is itself debatable). I don't think this point needs to be further belaboured.

As for your remark that, "I would merely point out that while a philosopher can be strongly influenced by his contemporaries, it is somewhat more challenging to be influenced by the future." I believe Heidegger's quotation of Kleist at the conclusion of the Wisser interview speaks to this in speaking of the "coming mind": "I step back before one who is not yet here, and bow, a millennium before him, to his spirit." Apart from all the calculation as to his contemporary influence and however difficult, Heidegger evidently anticipated his future reception to take on just such a challenge.

To be frank, everything else seems to be arguing the toss. I don't concede any of your further argument, and I see no need to specify my objections. Further argument seems to me to serve no other purpose than to distract from editing, as I don't see it having any clear consequence for the entry. A number of the issues you've raised definitely need to make it to the article (is it just me, or does Dilthey make no further appearance than on list of influences?), so I'd prefer to encourage your contributions there rather than to drag out our exchange here. Buffyg 21:13, 12 December 2006 (UTC)

'Question re Heidegger qua existentialist': I should think (borrowing this idea from elsewhere on this page) that it is erroneous to judge the question of Heidegger and existentialism based on the actions of his French successors/imitators; rather Heidegger must have essential existialist aspects in his work, or be following a tradition. I am not sure that there is a definition of existentialism (my personal one is "issues arising out of existence") and 'existence precedes essence' is Satre, not a tradition. So to turn to the second question, Heidegger's place in a tradition, are we right to say that Kirkegaard was the first existentialist? Kirkegaard's influence on S & Z is obvious, both in the concept of Angst, but one can also see the birth of das Man, which Kirkegaard tends to express more poetically and less 'objectively' than Heidegger does. So, thus: was Heidegger influenced by the existentialist flavour of Kirkegaard? - Indubitably. I think the article should concentrate on the basic precepts/concepts of existentialism as applicable to Heidegger, stating influences if possible, but perhaps largely ignoring the question of French influences. 'Letter on Humanism', while a response to the French situation (Satre), need not be seen as a engagement with Satre's thinking. Does anyone know if Heidegger ever read Being and Nothingness? ````

Book burnings?

The article says that there have been book burnings on his campus during nazi-time - the German article says that he stopped book burnings which is also what my fairly dim memory suggests. I can't find any source right now but is there anybody here who is sure there have been burnings or maybe even has a source? --Kricket 14:40, 11 December 2006 (UTC)

btw. @ Mtevfrog: great work!

In Rudolf Otto's Heidegger: A Political Life, it states that the national day of book burning (May or June 10?) was "celebrated" at Freiburg too, and that there was nothing Heidegger could have done to stop it. KD

The Kehre

This doesn't seem to have much treatment at all. First we're told that it happened, then we're told that Heidegger never went along with it. It's not really clear what's at stake in arguing either way. I'm going to hunt for some sources and would be grateful if someone else could provide more of the same and/or have a stab at revisions. Buffyg 20:35, 19 December 2006 (UTC)

This article needs a better picture.

The actual picture of Heidegger is all pixeled and without strength. If the problem is that other pictures have copyrights, I would recommend this one, wich at least has better quality: http://i49.photobucket.com/albums/f258/tito-/Heidegger.jpg (I didn't change it myself cause I don't know how).

German Atheist?

Heidegger wasn't exactly an atheist, it seems a bit misleading to label him as such. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 74.12.131.148 (talk) 19:13, 13 April 2007 (UTC).

Opening paragraph

The introduction does not need to come before the early life and right after the table of contents. Its info should be condensed and put in the beginning introductory paragraph at the top and the article should begin with his life right after the contents. Afghan Historian 19:20, 30 April 2007 (UTC)

Additionally, does the sentence "Philosophers are divided in their opinion . . ." belong in the article at all? Although the statement is cited, it contributes nothing to the article and isn't really a statement of fact since we haven't polled philosophers. Also, just one or two agreeing with the quote would satisfy its terms. Furthermore, the paragraph is understandable and informative without the sentence.166.165.207.67 (talk) 16:58, 11 January 2008 (UTC)

I have deleted this sentence, because I think there is no philosopher that is not controversial. -- Tischbeinahe (talk) φιλο 19:11, 11 January 2008 (UTC)

Heidegger at Freiburg

(Cut n paste from the Reference Desk, in case it might prove useful Wetman 04:21, 21 May 2007 (UTC))

You might want to begin with The Rectorate 1933-34: Facts and Thoughts, Heidegger's post-War memoir on the period, though I should caution you that this is a work of self-justification, which disguises as much as it reveals. In essence, his rectorship at Freiburg collapsed for of a variety of reasons, including good old-fashioned departmental politics, vicious and treacherous as always, no matter what regime they operate under! Beyond that, one has to take into consideration Heidegger's own political naïvete and his gross over-estimation of his importance, both in the Nazi academic world and the broader scheme of things. One also has to take into account the nature of the Nazi system itself, and its underlying theory and practice. No matter what stress was placed upon the sublime, Nazism was shaped by mediocrity, not excellence. It was the world not of the Superman, but the Supermouse.

In his memoir, Heidegger maintains that his position at Freiburg was undermined by a conspiracy, involving his academic rivals and the district student leader, Dr Gustav Scheel, who later became Reich leader of students and university lecturers, and Gauleiter of Salzburg. Heidegger certainly had opponents at Freiburg, especially in the Law Faculty, though not all were doctrinaire Nazis. The matter, though, went far beyond the confines of the University. In November 1933 the Nazis created their own structure of leadership within the whole university system, elevating Party mediocrities and time-servers to important positions in the Reich Association of German Universities. It was a clear declaration that Heidegger's bid for leadership of the German university system had falied, and that the Nazis had no real use for him, no matter his international stature. Abandoned by many of his more important colleagues at Freiburg, and snubbed by the government, Heidegger was in a personal, professional and political limbo.

There were also those in the Nazi movement, led by Erich Jaensch, his former colleague at the University of Marburg, who made every attempt to ensure that Heidegger would not be offered a leading position in Prussia or the Reich, because they did not wish him to be seen as 'the philosopher of National Socialism.' Jaensch complied a memorandum arguing against a proposal that Heidegger be appointed head of the Prussian Academy of University Lecturers. It would be against all reason, he wrote, " ...if what is possibly the most important post in the intellectual life of the nation in the weeks and months ahead were to be filled by one of the biggest scatterbrains and most eccentric cranks we have in our university system: a man about whom men who are perfectly rational, intelligent and loyal to the new state argue among themselves as to which side of the dividing line between sanity and mental illness he is on." And this on one of the best philosophical minds Germany produced in the whole of the twentieth century! Against this background it is no great surprise that his rectorship failed. He finally resigned in April 1934, not February, as he says in Facts and Thoughts. You will find much more detail on this whole affair in Part Three of Martin Heidegger: A Political Life by Hugo Ott. Clio the Muse 00:26, 19 May 2007 (UTC)

English Translations

The very fact that Holzwege is translated as Off the Beaten Track instead of Paths Through the Woods indicates that translations of Heidegger's works into English must be regarded as doubtful and useless.Lestrade 14:17, 12 July 2007 (UTC)Lestrade

In fact, holzwege implies ways which deviate from the main path and lead nowhere, rather than paths through the woods. The English expression is therefore quite apt.KD Tries Again 18:36, 12 July 2007 (UTC)KD

Holzwege in German implies exactly that, a deviation from the main path or being on the wrong path! KMJagger 08:48, 2 August 2007 (UTC)

Is that KD Tries Again's subjective implication or is it common knowledge that "…holzwege implies ways which deviate from the main path and lead nowhere?" After all, holz means wood, woods, or forest. Wege means ways or passages. There is no explicit mention of destinations. Literally, holzwege means forest paths. I've always experienced paths leading somewhere. Their whole purpose is to provide a passage from one place to another. I don't share your implication.Lestrade 22:01, 12 July 2007 (UTC)Lestrade

I was wrong. Looking into my old German dictionary, I found that the definition of holzweg is "way in a wood that leads only to a place where trees are felled and does not go any further; glade; dilemma." (Sehr or stark) auf dem holzwege sein means "to be quite on the wrong track." Maybe that could mean "off the beaten track."Lestrade 23:39, 12 July 2007 (UTC)Lestrade

On the other hand, since the holzwege are paths that lead to a sunlit clearing or glade, instead of merely nowhere, they might be interpreted as being attempts at understanding or enlightenment. This is because the dark forest might represent obscurity, nescience, and ignorance.Lestrade 15:25, 13 July 2007 (UTC)Lestrade

Of course. See "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" or the Heraclitus seminar - truth (or aletheia) as clearing.KD Tries Again 15:00, 16 July 2007 (UTC)KD

Obscurantism

I think Heidegger is considered to be obscurantist by many readers.--Markisgreen 12:11, 22 July 2007 (UTC)

note that "obscurantism" is a polemical rather than descriptive term, often used against opponents on personal or ideological grounds, and accusations of incomprehensibility don't equal actual incomprehensibility.Ehmhel 22:04, 22 July 2007 (UTC)Ehmhel

It is clearly inappropriate to link to an article on "obscurantism." Ask: would Britannica have such a link? Answer: no. Reason: because they take the idea of neutrality seriously. Regardless of whether "many readers" consider Heidegger to be obscure, such a link is clearly a way of introducing non-neutrality. MHJDBS 23:53, 22 July 2007 (UTC)

There are millions of people out there who consider philosophy of any kind to be obscurantist. The link is certainly inappropriate.KD Tries Again 15:14, 23 July 2007 (UTC)KD

I disagree. Surely we must not say "He IS an obscurantist" in encyclopedia. BUT we must not hide a well-known controversy neither.

"A democrat criticized a republican for blah blah" is a completely neutral news and doesn't mean the republican IS so.

And I cannot figure out how MHJDBS so easily concluded that Britannica would exclude such a link.Cosfly 05:26, 26 July 2007 (UTC)

The proper term is not "obscurantist" (since it may be confused with meaning 1 from the Merriam Webster, namely "opposition to the spread of knowledge"), but "a cryptic writer" or "uses a purposefully obscure language" would be more appropriate. "Nature loves to hide" and so does Heidegger. He confessed in the Spiegel interview that his purpose was not to allow his readers to write many books based upon his theories. He did that by writing an extremely difficult text, comparable to Pierre Bourdieu's obscurantist writing style. Contemporary philosophers could be classified in two categories: those who understand Being and Time by reading it and those who cannot understand it without reading somebody else's commentary to it. Tgeorgescu (talk) 01:26, 8 August 2008 (UTC)

Criticism

The criticism section needs revision to be more accurate and fair, such as citing its many claims, naming Heidegger's critics, and have a more neutral appoach.

Responding to the above, I have been putting off reading this section but finally did so. First, while the criticism section - if we must have one (not all philosopher articles on Wikipedia do) - is bound to be critical. But it should just focus on the main, authoritative criticisms, not gather up anything which can be found. I'd suggest:

1. Something from his contemporaries, maybe Cassirer. 2. Something representative from the Frankfurt School - Adorno. 3. The well-known article by Carnap. 4. Something else from the analytics - either Russell or Ayer, preferably the former. 5. I can also add some criticisms of his classical scholarship.

Is anything else essential to an encyclopaedia article? I may have forgotten something.

Second, the existing section should be ruthlessly trimmed where no appropriate cites are given. Examples:

This [1]is a link to an Amazon page, which doesn't even make the point it's supposed to be supporting.

This [2] is a link to an unsigned article on an internet Quotes cite. Not up to Wiki standards.

I'm guessing the Tom Rockmore cites should be to Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy - but it doesn't say. And then we have a silly summary of Sein und Zeit with the comment 'citations needed'. I am of the view that citations should come first, and that this - and the other unsupported material - should go. If there is agreement, I'll prune the section to the important and supportable points.KD Tries Again 18:58, 1 August 2007 (UTC)KD

The summary of Sein und Zeit doesn't look silly to me. Why do you call it silly? Something is silly if it is senseless, foolish, stupid, absurd, or laughable. Can you give a clear, unambiguous, direct, specific answer?Lestrade 19:07, 1 August 2007 (UTC)Lestrade

It does lack sources and is a hodge-podge of comments, many of which seem vague or inaccurate. Ehmhel 14:34, 2 August 2007 (UTC)

Lestrade, I enjoy entertaining you but time is short today. I know from your contributions that your German is perfectly good enough to recognize that Dasein is not to be translated as "Self". Dasein does not "find" a world, it is always already in-der-Welt-sein. And I could go on. I might mention that [Sein und Zeit] does additionally have a little bit to say about time. Anyway, if there was an appropriate reference for the summary, maybe there's be justification for it. But I don't see one.KD Tries Again 14:40, 2 August 2007 (UTC)KD

It may or may not be true that Dasein is not a Self or that it does not find a world. However, in the Wikipedia article Dasein, it appears that Dasein is "engaged in the world." Also, Dasein makes a choice whether to dismiss a tradition or else dismiss an experience that requires a choice. We also find, in the article, that Dasein is capable of contemplation. Misunderstandings of this obscure concept are not silly. What is silly, or foolish, is for Heidegger to think that he could communicate an ambiguous, confused concept such as Dasein through the use of imprecise, obscure, peculiar language. Also, translation of his idiosyncratic language from German to English does not facilitate communication of the concept without error.Lestrade 15:47, 3 August 2007 (UTC)Lestrade

Whether silly or not, the criticisms should be presented as clearly and accurately as possible regardless of what one considers to be the faults or merits of Heidegger. What's wrong with revising the section so that criticisms have sources, are clearer, and thus potentially more convincing? Ehmhel 17:18, 3 August 2007 (UTC)

I assume in the above that Heidegger had a desire to communicate his concept through the use of words. However, there is a possibility that he was not interested in communicating his thought. Instead, as an academic in a German university, he may have been interested in appearing profound and disguising the banality of his thought, thus assuring professional advancement and the accompanying remuneration.Lestrade 18:21, 3 August 2007 (UTC)Lestrade

One can accuse anyone of politics and personal ambitions, whole television networks are based on this. I find it more rewarding to examine the arguments without presupposing a universal skepticism or hermeneutics of suspicion. Approximate if not always good sense and critical debate has been established on many points and arguments in Heidegger, there is even a whole "respectable analytic" literature on Heidegger (as well as Hegel) today (with pragmatic, transcendental, and Wittgensteinian arguments for and against). Ehmhel 18:43, 3 August 2007 (UTC)

One sure effect of obscure, neologistic writing (Heidegger and Hegel come to mind) is that it generates a wealth of respectable literature, for and against, and thereby ensures academic job security. Throughout history there has been a need for a priestly caste that can translate the hieratic into the demotic.Lestrade 19:51, 3 August 2007 (UTC)Lestrade

Since Lestrade's views, even if correct, have no relevance to how we write the article, does anyone disagree with my positive suggestion above or have any additions?KD Tries Again 19:58, 3 August 2007 (UTC)KD

I already began to make changes in this direction, including changing the summary and adding a contemporary European reception section, but it needs much more work. Ehmhel 20:07, 3 August 2007 (UTC)

I did what I could to make it more precise and historically accurate. The analytic criticism section is more wordy than the others. Should this be a brief portrayal of different kinds of criticisms or should each be as developed? Ehmhel 21:27, 5 August 2007 (UTC)

Being-towards-death

Being-towards-death is fairly simple in it's proposition the the human Dasein is the only ontology aware of its "demise". It is from this proposition that Heideggers notions of Throwness/Angst/Anxiety are formulated. It is also the interstice where Phenomenology becomes misused and mistaken as Existentialism; as the latter formulated anxiety as a key concept to found its philosophy (especially Sartrean existentialism which championed choice and authenticity as products of anxiety.)–124.179.62.108 12:11, 4 August 2007 (UTC)

New photos at Commons

There are now some new Photos at http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Martin_Heidegger I have added an english description to the images. You'll find there:

• Heidegger birthplace (choose the one you like best)
• Heideggers grave
• Heideggers "Feldweg" - Heidegger often walked the Feldweg (field path), when some philosophical problems troubled him. There is also a small text Heidegger dedicated to this field path ("Der Feldweg").

I have no user account at the english Wikipedia so far, you can find me as user "Tischbeinahe" in the german Wikipedia. Greetings from Berlin, Tischbeinahe

Kuki Shūzō

Mtevfrog -- In deciding who should or should not be included in the info box, please reconsider your entirely understandable opinion, but this time taking into account these further factors:

• 1. There are no other non-Europeans in this list.
• 2. In 1927, Heidegger was introduced to Kuki in Edmund Husserl's home in Freiburg before Kuki began attending lectures at the University of Marburg.
• 3. In 1933, Kuki published the first book length study of Heidegger to appear in Japanese, The Philosophy of Heidegger (Haideggā no tetsugaku).

Source: Nara, Hiroshi. (2004). The Structure of Detachment: the Aesthetic Vision of Kuki Shūzō with a translation of "Iki no kōzō." Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. ISBN 0-8248-2735-X (cloth) ISBN 0-8248-2805-4 (paper)

• 4. Heidegger referenced a conversation "between a Japanese and an inquirer" in On the Way to Language (Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache).

Source: Heiddeger, Martin. (1971). On the Way to Language. San Francisco: Harper & Row.

Note Gesamtausgabe (Heidegger)

I. Abteilung: Veröffentlichte Schriften 1910–1976

• Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache. (1953/54) Zwischen einem Japaner und einem Fragenden

• 5. In 1957, Heidegger himself expressed a desire to have written the preface to the German translation of Kuki's 1930 book, The Structure of "Iki"「chic」 (「いき」の構造,, "Iki" no kōzō).

Source: Light, Stephen. (1987). Kuki Shūzō and Jean-Paul Sartre: Influence and Counter-Influence in the Early History of Existential Phenomenology. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. ISBN 0-8093-1271-9

Since Heidegger himself acknowledged a significant, years-long relationship with Kuki Shūzō and his work, this name does belong amongst the small group of students in Wikipedia's Martin Heidegger info box. --Ooperhoofd (talk) 19:35, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

Weblinks

After initial approval, (link was up for a week), why did you remove my article link from the WORKS ON HEIDEGGER section? Here's the link to article entitled IN DEFENSE OF MARTIN HEIDEGGER http://www.artsandopinion.com/2007_v6_n6/lewis-32.htm Artsandopinion (talk) 16:49, 15 January 2008 (UTC)Robert Lewis

Your contributions to Wikipedia are entirely links to your own essays. These are non-notable opinion pieces (original research by Wikipedia's standards) which add no valuable information to these articles, and just waste readers' time. This has been discussed extensively on your Talk page, and also on the Discussion pages of other articles in which you have either spammed or otherwise lobbied to include links to your website. Does this conversation really need to be repeated on every article you spam? Please do not re-submit this link. Thanks. / edg ☺ ☭ 17:01, 19 March 2008 (UTC)

Notes

I did the article on Heidegger in the german Wikipedia and would just like to point out a few things. Sorry for my awkward english – I hope you'll get the point anyways.

• Heidegger’s philosophy is essentially an attempt to marry two insights. → Like Hannah Arendt said: There is no such thing as Heidegger's philosophy. If you like, you could point out that it's more a way of asking. There is no canon of conclusions or statements. This is also important because the article takes into account his later works, where Heidegger changes his point of view in regard to Sein und Zeit.
• ...that experience is always already situated in a world and in ways of being. → Heidegger does not use the term "experience" in Sein und Zeit. This is because he is not concerned about how we experience things, but what things are. His question of being is not just towards what something is like for us, but what something is.

Well, this amounts to realism. A phenomenologist cannot become a realist without ceasing to be a phenomenologist in that very moment. Heidegger's answer to the dillema "let's speak of how things are in their own being, without being or becoming realists" is to explain in Being and Time the root of the word "phenomenon" as apophainestai, i.e. how an object shows itself to the Dasein. Herein appearance does not mean superficial (i.e. fake, deceiving) phenomenality, but simply the way objects are presenting themselves to us. So, Heidegger does not assume that objects could have a reality outside of (bereft of) human awareness. As in that classic example: if a tree falls and there is no one to hear it, there is no sound, but there are just mere air vibrations. This means that sounds are specific to the Dasein's awareness, and outside of Dasein's awareness there are no sounds, just air vibrations. Animals display unaware responses to air vibrations (since animals are not beings-in-a-world, they lack awareness; all they display are reactions to stimuli, called vigility). So basically, Heidegger equates being-in-a-world (i.e. the fact that Dasein bears its own world with him/her as the snail bears its house with it) with Dasein's awareness, and outside of being-in-a-world there is no reality, there are just inanimate objects which could never constitute a reality, except when a Dasein comes around them and gets their impressions (appearances, i.e. how they show themselves to him/her). This is not to be confused with Berkeley's theory, because Berkeley did not admit an inter-subjective reality, if I am correct about his solipsistic empirical idealism. Heidegger's viewpoint definitely rejects the conclusion of realism, namely impersonalism as decidedly as it rejects the conclusion of idealism, namely solipsism. Tgeorgescu (talk) 01:06, 8 August 2008 (UTC)

I agree to your explanation, but I still don't like the term "experience" in connection with Heidegger. This is because Heidegger would not say, that we "experience" a hammer as a tool, or a sea as water-supply. You can not experience things in such a way, because they are what they are only in a world and you can not experience the world, because the world is the transcendental background of understanding. I think Heidegger did not use the term "experience" in Being and Time, because he did not want to be associated with a cognitivistic point of view. (Maybe Heidegger would use the term "experience" only in connection with heat, pressure and so on. So far I never found this term in one of his writings.) Heidegger askes the "question of the meaning [Sinn] of being". But you can not "experience" a meaning of something. (In German it's not "meaning" but "Sinn" which also means "direction". "Clockwise" for example in German is "Uhrzeiger-sinn", where "sinn" means the direction the watch hand goes. This direction is later in Being and Time revealed as the time itself, so meaning is interconnected with time: To understand the meaning of a hammer you got to have a future plan, like building a house or so. But you can not "experience" neither this future nor the plan). -- Tischbeinahe (talk) φιλο 20:36, 8 August 2008 (UTC)

• all experience is grounded in "care." → Not experience is grounded in care, but Dasein is in fact care. This again is an answere to what (Dasein) is and not to what it is like. But maybe you could keep this paragraph and the explanation using "experience" as kind of introduction and than later make it clear, that it's more than just a phenomenological question, but an ontological question.
• that would have made of the existential analytic only a kind of “limit case” (in the sense in which special relativity is a limit case of general relativity). → Just delete that one. It's way to metaphoric. It's enough to explain that existential analytic is only the first step of the deconstruction of the history of philosophy.
• Die Kehre → Essential for the Kehre is Heideggers understanding of truth as aletheia. While in Being and Time truth was the openness of Dasein (Erschlossenheit) it now changes to the openness of being itself. The first paragraph of "Later Works" should be moved to "Die Kehre". In any way it should be mentioned that the Kehre is connected to his understanding of truth. („Indem es das Wort Sinn von Sein zugunsten von Wahrheit des Seins aufgibt, betont das aus Sein und Zeit hervorgegangene Denken künftig mehr die Offenheit des Seins selbst als die Offenheit des Daseins (…) Das bedeutet die ‚Kehre‘, in der das Denken sich immer entschiedener dem Sein als Sein zuwendet.“ – Heidegger: GA 15, S. 345)
• Against the revealing power of poetry, Heidegger sets the force of technology. → Not "force" because technology is also a way of revealing. But what is characteristic for the technological way to reveal the world, is that every object that is revealed, is revealed for a subject. Technology so enhanced the subject-object-structure and centers the world around the human subject. By technology all meaning is directed towards human wishes, while in contrast poetry (like Hölderlin's) reveales meaningfull references that do not center around the human subject. (By the way: the article "Gestell" uses a misleading translation. Sure Gestell=enframing, if you look it up at a dictionary, but this translation does not get the philosophical point. Ge-stell derivates from stellen (to stand someone on something). This would also make it clear for the reader, why the universe is transformed into a "standing reserve", as the article says: By technology the human subject stands the world as an object.) A very important point is not mentioned conerning Heideggers critic on technology: Heidegger links modern technology and western metaphysical thinking. The advancement of the modern subject (Descartes, Kant) is an important condition for the development of modern technology. But it wasn't Descartes nor Kant who "invented" the subject, but being itself showed for them as an object for an subject. This makes up Seinsgeschichte (history of being) which leads to our age of technology.
• The article does not say anything about Grundstimmungen (en: mood, sentiment, humor?) which are very important througout Heideggers whole work. While in Being and Time anxiety reveales the whole of Being-in-the-world, it later becomes boredom (as in Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik) and concerning the Ereignis (enowning) it is awe (or dread / timidity). While the modern subject is bearish and crude towards the world (because everything is explainable to him, even the new) Heidegger is concerned about a mood that overcomes this attitude and keeps an openness for the new, for the enownding.

-- Tischbeinahe (talk) φιλο 19:53, 2 March 2008 (UTC)

Hydrogen Bombs in 1949?

In the section "Heidegger and Nazism/Post-war period" there is a quote dated 1949 in which Heidegger supposedly mentions hydrogen bombs. This is strange since the first such device did not come along until 1952.RandomTool2 (talk) 16:45, 4 April 2008 (UTC)

Well, the idea was around since 1942. 'The H-bomb was suggested by Teller in 1942. Active work on it was pursued in the summer of 1942 by Oppenheimer, Teller, myself, and others. The idea did not develop from Teller's "quiet work" at Los Alamos during the war. When Los Alamos was started in Spring 1943, several groups of scientists were included who did work on this problem specifically. However, it was realized that this was a long-range project and that the main efforts of Los Alamos must be concentrated on making A-bombs.' Quoted from http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/history/cold-war/hydrogen-bomb/comments-bethe.htm Tgeorgescu (talk) 14:38, 27 July 2008 (UTC)

All quite true, but would Heidegger have known all this? - and, if he did, would he have assumed that his audience shared this knowledge? RandomTool2 (talk) 15:24, 27 July 2008 (UTC)

Educational Philosophy of Martin Heidegger

Above article is basically one person's essay. It has been languishing in the articles in need of wikification since June 2007 and I am trying to help clear the backlog. Is there anything that you would like to rescue from it? I'm hoping you will know whether it is best improved, merged or just deleted. Thanks. Itsmejudith (talk) 22:52, 7 July 2008 (UTC)

Zygmunt Bauman's thesis and the disputed quote from Heidegger's works

I made on the article the following contribution:

From Zygmunt Bauman's perspective, Heidegger's remark is understood as proper.

So, my question is: could this be considered interpolation. If it is no interpolation, but I was simply stating the facts, I would like to see it added back to the main article. Tgeorgescu (talk) 12:27, 16 July 2008 (UTC)

In 1819, Schopenhauer clearly explained how reason could be used for good or evil. Reason is amoral. We can use reason to plan a church bake sale or a massacre. Machiavelli demonstrated the amorality of reason.Lestrade (talk) 01:02, 17 July 2008 (UTC)Lestrade

I suppose the above is an answer to my argument. Heidegger and Bauman did not unmask reason as amoral, because this would have been unoriginal ("Reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions." Hume -- and we know that genocidal hatred is one of the possible passions, just as brotherly love is, too.) What Heidegger said in that specific quote is that the technological organization specific to the modern times, defined through an incomplete enumeration of specific modern technologies, is one of the causes (factors) which is essential to modern mass murder. Bauman masterly developed such insight into a comprehensive account of the intimate link between modernity and the Holocaust (which is as far as it can be from Holocaust denial). Therefore, from Bauman's viewpoint (print-published), Heidegger's quote is perfectly reasonable, and it is far from being suspicious at all. So, Bauman's thesis is a systematized rendering of the gist of Heidegger's quote. As such, Heidegger's affirmation may no longer be constructed as denial of the Holocaust. Is this interpolation, or simply explaining what Bauman wrote? Tgeorgescu (talk) 14:21, 27 July 2008 (UTC)

If the answer supra is not convincing enough, then certainly Bauman's thesis is simply a particularization of Heidegger's thesis about the Gestell (the ghost in the technical-economic system, arising from thinking errors which began in the Antique Greece and went along Middle Ages and the modern time) and of Heidegger's thesis about the nefarious role of the metaphysics of subjectivity (which leads to a nihilistic-autarchic state policy wherein the fight between races is simply the offspring of Cartesian-Kantian philosophy which dominates the political lives of the nations, wherein the subject, i.e. the national, becomes the measure of all things and of all other people). Tgeorgescu (talk) 19:17, 4 August 2008 (UTC)

Merge Dasein with Being & Time

The sections "Being and Time" and Dasein could perhaps benefit from merging, and might also perhaps, by getting to the point more quickly and then only then to background. I'm not going to touch this article myself, however.

Dasein is defined okay...A slight stab at time seems to pass adequately... There is little or nothing defining care, thrownness, falling, authenticity...Stuff I came here to read about.

Slogging through background about the relationship of Heidegger's mentors and antecedants to B&T is important stuff, I suppose, but save it for lower down and start with a highly concise description of the book. I wonder how the separate, B&T Wikipedia article is (in a non Heiddeggerian sense). Calamitybrook (talk) 02:52, 5 August 2008 (UTC)

Request for Help on the deconstruction article concerning Heideggers influence on the development of deconstruction

I would like to bring to your attention to the fact that the article on deconstruction currently lacks a passage on Heideggers influence on the development of deconstruction. This would greatly improve the current article and the expertise of the one of the Heidegger editors familiar with this aspect of deconstructions development is therefore kindly requested.Seferin (talk) 19:19, 9 August 2008 (UTC)