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As for Chinese assistance requested by Hồ Chí Minh, Liu Shaoqi, with authorization given by Mao while the latter was visiting Moscow, selected Luo Guibo as the liaison representative of the CCP Central Committee. Chosen because his experience as a guerrilla leader gave him the grounding to manage a Chinese advisory mission in Vietnam. Luo's mission as PRC liaison representative to DRV included establishing contact with the Vietnamese Communists, investigating the general situation in Vietnam and reporting his findings to Beijing so that Chinese leaders could make decisions on assisting the Vietnamese Communists.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Vo|first=Alex-Thai Dinh|date=2016|title=Preliminary Comments on Mobilizing the Masses, 1953|journal=Sojourn (Singapore)|volume=vol. 31/no. 3|pages=986}}</ref> Luo and his team were dispatched on a secret mission to Vietnam on 16 January 1950 and arrived in Vietnam on 26 February 1950.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Jian|first=Chen|title=Mao's China and the Cold War|publisher=Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press|year=2001|pages=120}}</ref> Accompanying Lup on the trip to Vietnam was a staff of eight, including a telegraph operator, secretaries and guards. The initial plan for Luo was to stay in Vietnam for three months, but he stayed for seven years, until 1957. His first assignment was as the head of the Chinese Political Advisory Group (CPAG) in the DRV from 1951 to 1954, and the following three years until 1957 he served as China’s ambassador to the DRV.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Xiaobing|first=Li|title=The Dragon in the Jungle: The Chinese Army in the Vietnam War|publisher=New York, NY, Oxford University Press|year=2020|pages=18}}</ref>
As for Chinese assistance requested by Hồ Chí Minh, Liu Shaoqi, with authorization given by Mao while the latter was visiting Moscow, selected Luo Guibo as the liaison representative of the CCP Central Committee. Chosen because his experience as a guerrilla leader gave him the grounding to manage a Chinese advisory mission in Vietnam. Luo's mission as PRC liaison representative to DRV included establishing contact with the Vietnamese Communists, investigating the general situation in Vietnam and reporting his findings to Beijing so that Chinese leaders could make decisions on assisting the Vietnamese Communists.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Vo|first=Alex-Thai Dinh|date=2016|title=Preliminary Comments on Mobilizing the Masses, 1953|journal=Sojourn (Singapore)|volume=vol. 31/no. 3|pages=986}}</ref> Luo and his team were dispatched on a secret mission to Vietnam on 16 January 1950 and arrived in Vietnam on 26 February 1950.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Jian|first=Chen|title=Mao's China and the Cold War|publisher=Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press|year=2001|pages=120}}</ref> Accompanying Lup on the trip to Vietnam was a staff of eight, including a telegraph operator, secretaries and guards. The initial plan for Luo was to stay in Vietnam for three months, but he stayed for seven years, until 1957. His first assignment was as the head of the Chinese Political Advisory Group (CPAG) in the DRV from 1951 to 1954, and the following three years until 1957 he served as China’s ambassador to the DRV.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Xiaobing|first=Li|title=The Dragon in the Jungle: The Chinese Army in the Vietnam War|publisher=New York, NY, Oxford University Press|year=2020|pages=18}}</ref>


== The Contributions of Luo Guibo in Vietnam ==
== The Involvement of Luo Guibo in Vietnamese Affairs ==
During his first few years in Vietnam, Luo Guibo helped establish the Chinese Military Advisory Group (CMAG) and the Chinese Political Advisory Group (CPAG)). As head of CPAG, Luo led more than one hundred advisors with expertise in finance, banking and grain supply work to advise the DRV on military affairs, finance and the economy, public security, culture and education, united front activities, party consolidation and legal reform.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Olsen|first=Mari|title=Soviet–Vietnam Relations and the Role of China 1949–64: Changing Alliances|publisher=London: Routledge|year=2006|pages=23}}</ref> Their work entailed introducing Chinese experiences to the Vietnamese; developing macro-level strategies and policymaking procedures; making recommendations on issues pertaining to rules, regulations, and directives; and helping the Vietnamese carry out orders and implement programmes.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Dương Danh Dy|title=Hồi Ký Cố Vấn Trung Quốc ở Việt Nam [Memoirs of Chinese advisors in Vietnam]|publisher=Bourg-la-Reine: Diễn Dàn|year=2006|pages=16}}</ref> By 1952 these advisors had become instrumental in helping Hồ Chí Minh and his government introduce the legal apparatuses and policies to consolidate military and socio-political power.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Qiang|first=Zhai|title=China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975|publisher=Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press|year=2000|pages=35}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last=Jian|first=Chen|title=Mao's China and the Cold War|publisher=Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press|year=2001|pages=129, 331}}</ref>
During his first few years in Vietnam, Luo Guibo helped establish the Chinese Military Advisory Group (CMAG) and the Chinese Political Advisory Group (CPAG)). As head of CPAG, Luo led more than one hundred advisors with expertise in finance, banking and grain supply work to advise the DRV on military affairs, finance and the economy, public security, culture and education, united front activities, party consolidation and legal reform.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Olsen|first=Mari|title=Soviet–Vietnam Relations and the Role of China 1949–64: Changing Alliances|publisher=London: Routledge|year=2006|pages=23}}</ref> Their work entailed introducing Chinese experiences to the Vietnamese; developing macro-level strategies and policymaking procedures; making recommendations on issues pertaining to rules, regulations, and directives; and helping the Vietnamese carry out orders and implement programmes.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Dương Danh Dy|title=Hồi Ký Cố Vấn Trung Quốc ở Việt Nam [Memoirs of Chinese advisors in Vietnam]|publisher=Bourg-la-Reine: Diễn Dàn|year=2006|pages=16}}</ref> By 1952 these advisors had become instrumental in helping Hồ Chí Minh and his government introduce the legal apparatuses and policies to consolidate military and socio-political power.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Qiang|first=Zhai|title=China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975|publisher=Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press|year=2000|pages=35}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last=Jian|first=Chen|title=Mao's China and the Cold War|publisher=Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press|year=2001|pages=129, 331}}</ref>


=== Warfare ===
=== Warfare ===
China’s actual involvement in Vietnam began with the Border Campaign in the fall of 1950. The idea of the campaign first emerged during Hồ’s early 1950 visit to Beijing. Both Chinese and Vietnamese communist leaders believe that a victory in such a campaign would enable the Viet Mihn’s base areas to directly backed by the PRC. In order to prepare the campaign, form April to September 1950, Beijing delivered to the Viet Minh more than 14000 guns, 1700 machine guns, about 150 pieced of different types of cannon, 2800 tons of grain and large quantity of ammunition, medicine, uniforms and communication equipment. The Border Campaign began on 16 September and ended with a huge Viet Minh victory. (Chen, 155)
China's actual involvement in Vietnam began with the Border Campaign in the fall of 1950. The idea of the campaign first emerged during Hồ's early 1950 visit to Beijing. Both Chinese and Vietnamese communist leaders believe that a victory in such a campaign would enable the Viet Mihn's base areas to directly backed by the PRC. In order to prepare the campaign, form April to September 1950, Beijing delivered to the Viet Minh more than 14000 guns, 1700 machine guns, about 150 pieced of different types of cannon, 2800 tons of grain and large quantity of ammunition, medicine, uniforms and communication equipment. The Border Campaign began on 16 September and ended with a huge Viet Minh victory.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Jian|first=Chen|title=Mao's China and the Cold War|publisher=Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press|year=2001|pages=155}}</ref>


Encouraged by the victory in the Border Campaign, the Viet Minh’s military commanders (General Giap in particular), as well as the Chinese advisers, believed that it was the time to lead the war to the Tonkin delta area. From late December to June 1951, the Viet Minh put their emphasis on the delta area, hopping that by conducting a series of victorious offensive campaigns against the French defensive system there, they would create conditions for a total Viet Mihn victory on the Indo-China battlefield. However, the Viet Minh’s troops suffered heavily from three offensive campaigns in the delta area and finally decided to give up head-on attacks against fortified French positions by mid-1951. (Chen, 156)
Encouraged by the victory in the Border Campaign, the Viet Minh's military commanders (General Giap in particular), as well as the Chinese advisers, believed that it was the time to lead the war to the Tonkin delta area. From late December to June 1951, the Viet Minh put their emphasis on the delta area, hopping that by conducting a series of victorious offensive campaigns against the French defensive system there, they would create conditions for a total Viet Mihn victory on the Indo-China battlefield. However, the Viet Minh's troops suffered heavily from three offensive campaigns in the delta area and finally decided to give up head-on attacks against fortified French positions by mid-1951.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Jian|first=Chen|title=Mao's China and the Cold War|publisher=Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press|year=2001|pages=156}}</ref>


The Viet Minh’s strategy experienced an important change in 1952 because during 1952-53 the French turned to a more defensive strategy in the war against the Viet Minh due to their military effectiveness. The French attitude opened up new possibilities to the Vietnamese. (Olsen 2006, p. 24) On 16 February 1952, Luo Guibo summarized in a report to the Chinese Central Military Commision that it was necessary for the Viet Minh to focus on liberating Sơn La, Lai Châu, and Nghĩa Lộ, all in north-western Vietnam, in 1952, and prepared for seizing north-western Vietnam and upper Laos in 1953, marking the emphasis of Viet Mihn shifted from the delta area to upper Laos and north-western Vietnam. (Chen, 156) There are two reasons for targeting this region in particular: First, the French defenses there were considered to be rather weak and the odds for a Viet Mihn victory were good. Second, if the Viet Mihn could secure this area under its control, the chanced of an attack from its rear would be very unlikely. The whole plan for the northwest campaign was followed closely in Beijing, and Luo Guibo’s strategies were approved by CCP Central Military Commission before the Vietnamese went into action. (Olsen 2006, p. 24)
The Viet Minh's strategy experienced an important change in 1952 because during 1952-53 the French turned to a more defensive strategy in the war against the Viet Minh due to their military effectiveness. The French attitude opened up new possibilities to the Vietnamese.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Olsen|first=Mari|title=Soviet–Vietnam Relations and the Role of China 1949–64: Changing Alliances|publisher=London: Routledge|year=2006|pages=24}}</ref> On 16 February 1952, Luo Guibo summarized in a report to the Chinese Central Military Commision that it was necessary for the Viet Minh to focus on liberating Sơn La, Lai Châu, and Nghĩa Lộ, all in north-western Vietnam, in 1952, and prepared for seizing north-western Vietnam and upper Laos in 1953, marking the emphasis of Viet Mihn shifted from the delta area to upper Laos and north-western Vietnam.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Jian|first=Chen|title=Mao's China and the Cold War|publisher=Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press|year=2001|pages=156}}</ref> There are two reasons for targeting this region in particular: First, the French defenses there were considered to be rather weak and the odds for a Viet Mihn victory were good. Second, if the Viet Mihn could secure this area under its control, the chanced of an attack from its rear would be very unlikely. The whole plan for the northwest campaign was followed closely in Beijing, and Luo Guibo's strategies were approved by CCP Central Military Commission before the Vietnamese went into action.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Olsen|first=Mari|title=Soviet–Vietnam Relations and the Role of China 1949–64: Changing Alliances|publisher=London: Routledge|year=2006|pages=24}}</ref>


From October to December 1952, the Viet Minh’s troops successfully conducted the north-west campaign, which resulted in their occupation of Sơn La, Lai Châu, Nghĩa Lộ, and western Yên Bái. From late March to May 1953, the Viet Mihn’s troops further conducted the Sầm Nưa Campaign in Upper Laos, leading to their control of Sầm Nưa and part of Siang Khoary and Phôngsali. In the fall of 1953, the Vietnamese Workers Party (VWP) leadership realized the potential turning point of the war, and asked the Chinese to provide advice in a cable to the CCP Central Commission on 13 August 1953. On 27 and 29 August, the CCP Central Committee sent two telegrams to Luo Guibo and VWP Central Committee, proposing that the Vietnamese should continue to carry out the ‘north-western strategy’ and should not shift to the delta area. In late October and early November 1953, Chinese military adviser Wei Guoqing together with Viet Mihn commanders worked out the operation plans for 1954 along these lines, which were approved by the VWP Politburo on 3 November, and all of the above formed an important background element for the Diên Biên Phu Campaign. (Chen, 157)
From October to December 1952, the Viet Minh's troops successfully conducted the north-west campaign, which resulted in their occupation of Sơn La, Lai Châu, Nghĩa Lộ, and western Yên Bái. From late March to May 1953, the Viet Mihn's troops further conducted the Sầm Nưa Campaign in Upper Laos, leading to their control of Sầm Nưa and part of Siang Khoary and Phôngsali. In the fall of 1953, the Vietnamese Workers Party (VWP) leadership realized the potential turning point of the war, and asked the Chinese to provide advice in a cable to the CCP Central Commission on 13 August 1953. On 27 and 29 August, the CCP Central Committee sent two telegrams to Luo Guibo and VWP Central Committee, proposing that the Vietnamese should continue to carry out the 'north-western strategy' and should not shift to the delta area. In late October and early November 1953, Chinese military adviser Wei Guoqing together with Viet Mihn commanders worked out the operation plans for 1954 along these lines, which were approved by the VWP Politburo on 3 November, and all of the above formed an important background element for the Diên Biên Phu Campaign.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Jian|first=Chen|title=Mao's China and the Cold War|publisher=Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press|year=2001|pages=157}}</ref>


==References==
==References==

Revision as of 03:34, 10 April 2021

Luo Guibo (Chinese: 罗贵波; Vietnamese: Lã Quý Ba) (1907–1995) was a Chinese diplomat and People's Republic of China politician. He was born in Nankang County, Jiangxi (modern Nankang District, Ganzhou). He joined the Communist Party of China in 1927. During the Second Sino-Japanese War, he was a general officer in the Eighth Route Army. Luo served as director of the Administrative Office of the CCP Military Affairs committee, and in January 1950 was sent to Vietnam as liaison to Ho Chi Minh.[1] He was the first Ambassador of China to North Vietnam (1954–1957).

From October 1957 to October 1970, he was China's Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs.[2] During Hong Kong's 1967 riots, he denounced the British colonial government's "atrocities", "sanguinary oppression" and "collusion with American imperialism against China" in a formal protest presented to the British chargé d'affaires in Beijing.[3]

Luo was governor of Shanxi.[4][5]

The Presence of Luo Guibo and Chinese Advisors in Vietnam

On 1 October 1949, People Republic of China (PRC) was founded under the administration of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) after eight-year-long anti-Japanese war and four-year-long Civil War. Having faced an extremely difficult situation in the fourth year of the French-Indochina War, in December 1949, Hồ Chí Minh dispatched two representatives, Lý Bích Sơn and Nguyễn Đức Thủy, to Beijing with a request for Chinese assistance and for diplomatic recognition for his government.[6] Upon receiving Hồ Chí Minh's request, acting chairman of the Central Committee of the CCP Liu Shaoqi— known in Vietnamese as Lưu Thiếu Kỳ — convened a 24 December meeting of the CCP Politburo to determine the situation in Indochina. Four days later, Liu cabled Hồ Chí Minh on behalf of the CCP Central Committee to specify that the PRC would meet Hồ's request.[7]

First, China agreed to enter into diplomatic relations with the DRV, and that the PRC government would send a team to Vietnam to assess the DRV's needs. In fact, China's assistance based on some complicated considerations. From a geopolitical point of view, it seemed to make sense to Chinese leaders that China could secure its southwestern border, earn Soviet aid and technology, and modernize its armed forces by helping the DRV fight the French forces. Besides, the worldwide expectation and international reputation could be another rationale. Such revolutionary internationalism was widely expected by all Asian Communist parties after the CCP's founding of the People's Republic. Helping Vietnam in this sense could achieve more international reputation for China. The PRC announced its recognition of the DRV on 18 January 1950, followed by the Soviet Union's recognition on 30 January, marking that the DRC's isolation for four years and three months after the establishment of the DRV was over.

As for Chinese assistance requested by Hồ Chí Minh, Liu Shaoqi, with authorization given by Mao while the latter was visiting Moscow, selected Luo Guibo as the liaison representative of the CCP Central Committee. Chosen because his experience as a guerrilla leader gave him the grounding to manage a Chinese advisory mission in Vietnam. Luo's mission as PRC liaison representative to DRV included establishing contact with the Vietnamese Communists, investigating the general situation in Vietnam and reporting his findings to Beijing so that Chinese leaders could make decisions on assisting the Vietnamese Communists.[8] Luo and his team were dispatched on a secret mission to Vietnam on 16 January 1950 and arrived in Vietnam on 26 February 1950.[9] Accompanying Lup on the trip to Vietnam was a staff of eight, including a telegraph operator, secretaries and guards. The initial plan for Luo was to stay in Vietnam for three months, but he stayed for seven years, until 1957. His first assignment was as the head of the Chinese Political Advisory Group (CPAG) in the DRV from 1951 to 1954, and the following three years until 1957 he served as China’s ambassador to the DRV.[10]

The Involvement of Luo Guibo in Vietnamese Affairs

During his first few years in Vietnam, Luo Guibo helped establish the Chinese Military Advisory Group (CMAG) and the Chinese Political Advisory Group (CPAG)). As head of CPAG, Luo led more than one hundred advisors with expertise in finance, banking and grain supply work to advise the DRV on military affairs, finance and the economy, public security, culture and education, united front activities, party consolidation and legal reform.[11] Their work entailed introducing Chinese experiences to the Vietnamese; developing macro-level strategies and policymaking procedures; making recommendations on issues pertaining to rules, regulations, and directives; and helping the Vietnamese carry out orders and implement programmes.[12] By 1952 these advisors had become instrumental in helping Hồ Chí Minh and his government introduce the legal apparatuses and policies to consolidate military and socio-political power.[13][14]

Warfare

China's actual involvement in Vietnam began with the Border Campaign in the fall of 1950. The idea of the campaign first emerged during Hồ's early 1950 visit to Beijing. Both Chinese and Vietnamese communist leaders believe that a victory in such a campaign would enable the Viet Mihn's base areas to directly backed by the PRC. In order to prepare the campaign, form April to September 1950, Beijing delivered to the Viet Minh more than 14000 guns, 1700 machine guns, about 150 pieced of different types of cannon, 2800 tons of grain and large quantity of ammunition, medicine, uniforms and communication equipment. The Border Campaign began on 16 September and ended with a huge Viet Minh victory.[15]

Encouraged by the victory in the Border Campaign, the Viet Minh's military commanders (General Giap in particular), as well as the Chinese advisers, believed that it was the time to lead the war to the Tonkin delta area. From late December to June 1951, the Viet Minh put their emphasis on the delta area, hopping that by conducting a series of victorious offensive campaigns against the French defensive system there, they would create conditions for a total Viet Mihn victory on the Indo-China battlefield. However, the Viet Minh's troops suffered heavily from three offensive campaigns in the delta area and finally decided to give up head-on attacks against fortified French positions by mid-1951.[16]

The Viet Minh's strategy experienced an important change in 1952 because during 1952-53 the French turned to a more defensive strategy in the war against the Viet Minh due to their military effectiveness. The French attitude opened up new possibilities to the Vietnamese.[17] On 16 February 1952, Luo Guibo summarized in a report to the Chinese Central Military Commision that it was necessary for the Viet Minh to focus on liberating Sơn La, Lai Châu, and Nghĩa Lộ, all in north-western Vietnam, in 1952, and prepared for seizing north-western Vietnam and upper Laos in 1953, marking the emphasis of Viet Mihn shifted from the delta area to upper Laos and north-western Vietnam.[18] There are two reasons for targeting this region in particular: First, the French defenses there were considered to be rather weak and the odds for a Viet Mihn victory were good. Second, if the Viet Mihn could secure this area under its control, the chanced of an attack from its rear would be very unlikely. The whole plan for the northwest campaign was followed closely in Beijing, and Luo Guibo's strategies were approved by CCP Central Military Commission before the Vietnamese went into action.[19]

From October to December 1952, the Viet Minh's troops successfully conducted the north-west campaign, which resulted in their occupation of Sơn La, Lai Châu, Nghĩa Lộ, and western Yên Bái. From late March to May 1953, the Viet Mihn's troops further conducted the Sầm Nưa Campaign in Upper Laos, leading to their control of Sầm Nưa and part of Siang Khoary and Phôngsali. In the fall of 1953, the Vietnamese Workers Party (VWP) leadership realized the potential turning point of the war, and asked the Chinese to provide advice in a cable to the CCP Central Commission on 13 August 1953. On 27 and 29 August, the CCP Central Committee sent two telegrams to Luo Guibo and VWP Central Committee, proposing that the Vietnamese should continue to carry out the 'north-western strategy' and should not shift to the delta area. In late October and early November 1953, Chinese military adviser Wei Guoqing together with Viet Mihn commanders worked out the operation plans for 1954 along these lines, which were approved by the VWP Politburo on 3 November, and all of the above formed an important background element for the Diên Biên Phu Campaign.[20]

References

  1. ^ Chen Jian, “China and the First Indo-China War, 1950-54,” The China Quarterly No. 133 (Mar. 1993), pp. 85–110. https://www.jstor.org/stable/654240
  2. ^ "Luo Guibo". Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. Chinese Communist Party. Retrieved 19 May 2017.
  3. ^ Carroll, John M (2007). A Concise History of Hong Kong. Hong Kong University Press. p. 153. ISBN 978-962-209-878-7.
  4. ^ 罗贵波：从中共中央联络代表到首任驻越南大使
  5. ^ 中华人民共和国外交部. "中国驻越南历任大使". 中华人民共和国外交部. Retrieved 2012-03-07.
  6. ^ Qiang, Zhai (2000). China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. p. 13.
  7. ^ Vo, Alex-Thai Dinh (2016). "Preliminary Comments on Mobilizing the Masses, 1953". Sojourn (Singapore). vol. 31/no. 3: 985–986. {{cite journal}}: |volume= has extra text (help)
  8. ^ Vo, Alex-Thai Dinh (2016). "Preliminary Comments on Mobilizing the Masses, 1953". Sojourn (Singapore). vol. 31/no. 3: 986. {{cite journal}}: |volume= has extra text (help)
  9. ^ Jian, Chen (2001). Mao's China and the Cold War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. p. 120.
  10. ^ Xiaobing, Li (2020). The Dragon in the Jungle: The Chinese Army in the Vietnam War. New York, NY, Oxford University Press. p. 18.
  11. ^ Olsen, Mari (2006). Soviet–Vietnam Relations and the Role of China 1949–64: Changing Alliances. London: Routledge. p. 23.
  12. ^ Dương Danh Dy (2006). Hồi Ký Cố Vấn Trung Quốc ở Việt Nam [Memoirs of Chinese advisors in Vietnam]. Bourg-la-Reine: Diễn Dàn. p. 16.
  13. ^ Qiang, Zhai (2000). China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. p. 35.
  14. ^ Jian, Chen (2001). Mao's China and the Cold War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. pp. 129, 331.
  15. ^ Jian, Chen (2001). Mao's China and the Cold War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. p. 155.
  16. ^ Jian, Chen (2001). Mao's China and the Cold War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. p. 156.
  17. ^ Olsen, Mari (2006). Soviet–Vietnam Relations and the Role of China 1949–64: Changing Alliances. London: Routledge. p. 24.
  18. ^ Jian, Chen (2001). Mao's China and the Cold War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. p. 156.
  19. ^ Olsen, Mari (2006). Soviet–Vietnam Relations and the Role of China 1949–64: Changing Alliances. London: Routledge. p. 24.
  20. ^ Jian, Chen (2001). Mao's China and the Cold War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. p. 157.
Government offices
Preceded by
Wang Qian
 Governor of Shanxi
1979–1983 		Succeeded by
Unknown Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs
1957–1970 		Unknown
Diplomatic posts
New office Ambassador of China to North Vietnam
1954–1957 		Succeeded by
He Wei
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