Argumentum ad hominem

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

An argumentum ad hominem ( Latin for example "evidence [leading] [related] to the person") is understood as a sham argument ( Red Herring ) in which the position or thesis of an opponent is challenged by attacking his personal circumstances or characteristics. This is mostly done with the intention, as with an argumentum ad populum , to discredit the position and its representative in an audience or in public opinion and to avoid real discussion. In rhetoric , an argumentum ad hominem can be consciously used as a polemical and, under certain circumstances, rabulistic strategy.

Scheme

The opponent claims that p .
The opponent is inconsistent / stupid / incompetent / untruthful / selfish.
Therefore: p is to be rejected.

Historical outline

While in older literature the argumentum ad hominem was regarded as a prime example of a polemical argument and a logical fallacy , according to more recent interpretations this is not unreservedly appropriate in every case, but only if a logical error is committed, which is called genetic fallacy in the English-language literature referred to as. The genetic fallacy but one of the already by Aristotle described sophistry .

Since the 20th century, the argumentum ad hominem has increasingly been the subject of systematic consideration, which can be traced back to the treatment in Charles Leonard Hamblin's Fallacies . Hamblin thus started the discourse on so-called informal logic . In Fallacies , Hamblin cites a passage from John Locke's treatise An Essay concerning Humane Understanding (1690) as the source of the expression argumentum ad hominem . However, Locke stated at the time that this expression did not come from himself, which also left the question of the origin of the term unanswered. Hamblin argues that the ad-hominem concept actually came from Aristotle.

In retrospective consideration, Maurice Finocchiaro demonstrated that the argumentum ad hominem was an important tool in Galileo Galileo's dialogues and that Locke was influenced by them. According to Douglas Walton , Galileo and Locke had very similar ideas about this argument; so they both stated that the main thing to do is to compromise your opponent.

Hamblin's hypothesis was confirmed by Nuchelmans, who distinguishes two distinct ad-hominem patterns that have been presented repeatedly since Aristotle's first description. Arthur Schopenhauer made a comparable subdivision in his work on Eristic dialectics . There the compromising of the counterpart is mentioned on the one hand, and the personal attack on the other hand with the aim of inciting the opponent to break off the dispute. Schopenhauer only wants to designate the first variant as argumentum ad hominem , while he proposed the expression argumentum ad personam for the second .

With Ad Hominem Arguments, Douglas Walton finally presented a standard work that precisely defines the term and names clearly distinguishable subtypes.

Walton subtypes

Walton divides the argumentum ad hominem into five subtypes with the note that these are largely accepted by the scientists: "five types or subcategories of ad hominem argument recur as being recognized as central most frequently - the abusive, the circumstantial, the bias, the tu quoque (or "you too"), and the poisoning the well ". These are discussed in more detail below.

Direct ad hominem

As abusive ad hominem ( abusive ad hominem ) that reasoning can be called, immediately attacked when a person to all their claims rejected. This line of reasoning has the pattern: " X is a bad person, so one shouldn't believe him".

Despite the wider acceptance of the term abusive ad hominem , Walton recommends that it be used only for clearly abusive and inconclusive cases where the person is being wrongly attacked. The word abusive not only suggests the violation of the person, but also that the argument is unjustified. Since, according to Walton, there are certainly cases in which an ad hominem is entirely justified and which are not based on a logical error, he suggests the name Direct Ethotic . The direct emphasizes the direct attack, the ethotic the “ethos” of the counterpart, specifically the nature of certain personality traits.

Walton distinguishes the following five subtypes of Direct (Ethotic) Ad Hominem :

  • from Veracity (lack of truthfulness)
  • from Prudence (lack of common sense or caution)
  • from perception (lack of insight / ignorance)
  • from Cognitive Skills (lack of cognitive skills)
  • from morals (lack of moral principles).

All subtypes have in common that they present a specific aspect of the opponent's personality as inadequate for the production of a valid argument, assertion or opinion.

Performative ad hominem

In the past, the performative ad hominem ( circumstantial ad hominem ) was interpreted so broadly that it was difficult to distinguish between it and the abusive ad hominem . Walton defines this subtype as follows: "the circumstantial type of ad hominem argument requires some kind of practical inconsistency between what an arguer says and some propositions expressed directly or indirectly by that arguer's personal circumstances."

It is not the argumentative ability that is attacked here, but rather the opponent's authorization to judge a certain point. In particular, a performative contradiction between behavior and assertion is sought. An example of this would be if a mother smokes herself but tells her child not to smoke because it is very unhealthy. The child replies: “Obviously it is not so unhealthy because you smoke yourself too!” The child's statement addresses the contradiction between the mother's statement and her action. The mother's assertion does not necessarily have to be untrue or the argumentation must be regarded as inconclusive just because there is an inconsistency between the rule she advocates and her own behavior.

Bias

The bias ad hominem ( bias ad hominem ) questions a person's impartiality about the point of contention. The assertion of the opponent is traced back to selfish motives and he is denied an interest in a truthful, wise or public good decision.

Well poisoning

Walton suggests that poisoning the well should be viewed as an aggravation of the bias ad hominem, in which the bias of the speaker is considered to be assured and he is assumed to have an interest that clearly runs counter to that of the audience and is viewed by them as morally contemptible becomes.

Suitable framing can be used to create a reference that gives a certain statement a clearly negative connotation. Even if these allegations may be far-fetched, the following applies: Semper aliquid haeret (“something always gets stuck ”), which lays the foundation for an abusive ad hominem .

See also: Well poisoning , Red Herring

Tu quoque

This type of reasoning is often used to return the attacking argument to the sender. In doing so, his justification to bring forward the argument is not challenged (as in the performative ad hominem ); instead, the opponent's assertion is used as an opportunity to rebuke him directly and thus to silence it regardless of the specific issue. Example: “Don't tell me to quit smoking, you smoke like a chimney yourself!”. Walton leaves open whether this pattern can be classified under the umbrella term ad hominem .

Argumentum ad personam

In his work on eristic dialectics , the philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer describes argumentum ad personam as a pseudo-argument that, like the argumentum ad hominem, is aimed at the person of the opponent, but no longer contains any reference to the actual issue and only attacks factually irrelevant personal characteristics. In contrast to the argumentum ad hominem, it does not need a logical structure and in the extreme case consists of a simple insult . Schopenhauer cites it as a last resort in a dispute:

"If you notice that the opponent is superior and you will be wronged, you become personal, insulting, rude."

This approach is popular because it can be used by anyone. In contrast, the ability to a factual discussion and to admit one's own injustice is not given to everyone, and he notes:

"It follows that there is hardly one in a hundred who is worth arguing with."

Schopenhauer emphasizes that a dialectical victory, i.e. the objective refutation of a position, embitters an opponent far more than a mere insult and recommends this approach as a counter-strategy.

literature

See also

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Hamblin 1970, p. 161.
  2. ↑ Finocchiaro 1980, p. 131 f.
  3. ↑ a b Walton 1998, p. 2.
  4. ↑ Nuchelmans 1993
  5. ↑ Walton 1998, p. 283.
  6. ↑ Walton 1998, p. 215.
  7. ↑ Walton 1998, p. 6.
  8. ↑ See Walton 1998, pp. 11-14.
  9. ↑ See Walton 1998, p. 15.
  10. ↑ Opposite Latin ad rem = "to the matter"
  11. ↑ Arthur Schopenhauer: The art of being right . tredition, Hamburg 2011, ISBN 978-3-8424-1385-6 , pp. 95–96 ( full text / preview in Google Book Search).