Eristic dialectic
Eristic dialectic is the name of a manuscript of the resulting 1830 Schopenhauer in which it as Eristik or Eristic dialectic describes an art teaching in order in a dispute per fas et nefas ( latin to appear for "with legal and illegal means") than that who is right. For this purpose, he gives 38 rhetorical stratagems , which consequently do not serve to establish the truth, but rather the success in a dispute through certain argumentative forms. Classical sophisms also have this purpose . Some of them are also listed by Schopenhauer. He mentions the manuscript in Parerga and Paralipomena in 1851 . There he distances himself from this polemical approach.
overview
The thesis addresses the basic philosophical terms eristics (theory of disputes) and dialectics (art of conversation) , which have been used since ancient times . The discipline that Schopenhauer himself called Eristic Dialectic - he also speaks in the subtitle of the "art of being right" - is a sub-discipline of rhetoric and is also called rabulism . Schopenhauer himself never published the Eristic dialectic; it was only published in the estate volume in 1864 together with other material by Julius Frauenstädt .
The 38 tricks described in the text are rhetorical stratagems that can be used to generate approval from the audience or even from the opponent in a dispute , debate or discussion by making one's own position plausible or undermining the opponent's plausibility. The stratagems should be successful regardless of the truth of the position represented. Schopenhauer thus creates an art of getting others right or keeping it against attacks by others, for which there is no science, but a natural disposition and a natural interest in all people:
“Eristics would therefore be the doctrine of the procedure of human righteousness [...]. The innate vanity, which is particularly irritable with regard to the power of the mind, does not want what we set up first to turn out to be wrong and that of the opponent to be right. "
Eristics, logic and dialectics
In a passage probably planned as an introduction, Schopenhauer goes into the tension between the two terms logic and dialectic , as this influences both pragmatic and the intellectual basis of disputes and arguments. To this end, Schopenhauer first deals with the history of the concept, but then with the difference in meaning.
Schopenhauer states that logic and dialectics were already used as synonyms by the thinkers of classical antiquity, although the eponymous verbs logízesthai ( Greek ; “to think over, to consider, to calculate”) and dialégesthai (Greek for “to talk”) different activities describe.
The synonymous use of logic and dialectic was maintained until Schopenhauer's time. He reports, however, that through Kant's definition of dialectics as the “logic of appearances”, “dialectics” have often been used in a negative sense since the end of the 18th century, for strategies of deception of a “sophistic art of disputation”. The “more innocent” term “logic” is preferred for the old meaning, without any clear differences in content.
Schopenhauer regrets the synonymous use of logic and dialectic that was common in his time. From his point of view, logic includes the close connection between word and reason. It should be defined as “the science of the laws of thought, i. H. of the type of procedure of reason ”. Logic treats an object that can be determined a priori without empirical evidence and arises "from the solitary thinking of a reasonable being". The dialectic, on the other hand, should be understood as "the art of disputing". It deals with “the community of two sensible beings”, whose conversation becomes a “spiritual battle” due to their empirically conditioned (ie “shaped by individual facts of experience”) differences. Dialectics can largely be deduced a posteriori "from the empirical knowledge of the disturbances that pure thinking suffers from the difference in individuality when two rational beings think together" and the "means that individuals use against each other to each his own individual thinking, as pure and to assert objective ".
In order to avoid misunderstandings, Schopenhauer uses the term Eristic Dialectic for arguing techniques or stratagems that do not serve to establish the truth or mutual understanding. He assumes that people are "naturally opinionated" and accordingly describes dialectics as "the doctrine of procedures relating to man's natural opinion".
The meanings of logic and dialectic are now clearly delimited from one another. But this is more a consequence of the redefinition of the dialectic by Schopenhauer's rival Hegel .
The basis of all dialectics
In the basis of all dialectics, Schopenhauer gives fundamental classifications that generally determine the dialectic as a set of rules for the dispute. There are essentially two points of attack through which being right can be fought:
- ad rem (to the point), here the reasons for the opponent's position are attacked and an attempt is made to show that they are wrong.
- ad hominem (to people) or ex concessis , here the consequences of the opponent's thesis or the opponent himself are made implausible or it is shown that the thesis is unacceptable for other reasons, even if its truth or falsity cannot be decided directly .
Two basic strategies of direct and indirect refutation correspond to these two points.
The direct refutation attacks the thesis directly and is intended to show that it is not true, either by showing that the reasons for the assertion are false (based on the syllogistics either by denying a general rule from which the thesis follows nego majorem = "I dispute the major" - or by denying the classification under this rule nego minorem = "I deny the minor") or the reasons are accepted, but denied that the assertion follows from it ( nego consequentiam = "I deny the Conclusion"). The latter case also includes all attacks on the form of inference that the opponent provides to justify his thesis.
The indirect refutation attacks the thesis with its consequences, i. H. shows that the thesis is not acceptable because its consequences contradict known truths or even generally accepted platitudes . In the indirect refutation, Schopenhauer divides into apagogue and instance:
- The apagogue is the conclusion from the falsehood of the opposite: First of all, accept the sentence as true. Then look for any other true sentence that can be related to the first, i.e. the thesis. These two form a new premise and from this in turn draft a conclusion that is apparently wrong - and because that conclusion was wrong, the premise must also have been wrong (see also: Implication ).
- The instance : Show that the general main statement of the thesis is not applicable to any special case, so the thesis would also be exposed as false.
“This is the basic framework, the skeleton of every disputation: so we have its osteology. For this is basically what all disputes are based on: but all of this can really or only seem to happen, with real or spurious reasons; and because it is not easy to make out for sure about this, the debates are so long and persistent. Even when giving instructions, we cannot separate the true and the apparent, because it is never certain beforehand with the contestants themselves: therefore I give the tricks regardless of whether one is objective right or wrong; because one cannot know for certain oneself: and it should only be determined through the dispute. Incidentally, in every disputation or argument in general, one must agree on something from which one wants to judge the question at hand as a principle: Contra negantem principia non est disputandum . [there is no arguing with someone who disputes the opening sentences]. "
The tricks of the Eristic dialectic
Schopenhauer took a number of tricks from Aristotle's Topic. However, according to Schopenhauer, the listing there does not meet the pragmatic requirements for deciding on a dispute or for looking through such stratagems , since it is a correction of possible errors, i.e. a semantic investigation. Accordingly, Schopenhauer considers a dispute between opponents in which claims or theses are made, consequences are apparently drawn and attacks and refutations are attempted. Schopenhauer also names countermeasures that do not correct the logical errors, but rather bring the opponent into need of explanation and convince a possible audience.
The narrative form of the Eristic Dialectic as an adviser could have sprung from an ironic intention of Schopenhauer, so that it is precisely not a question of being right for better or for worse, but of immunizing discussions from the stratagems and aligning them with the truth. An indication of this are the examples through which Schopenhauer exposed certain behavior that was widespread in society at the time as opinionated and damaging to the truth. The closing words of the "last trick [s]" seem to point to this, in which Schopenhauer refers to a "only certain counter rule" from the last chapter of the Topik of Aristotle. There it is recommended not to discuss with the first person who comes across, but only with partners who are known and wise enough to have reason not to bring up anything too absurd. This is the only way to discuss with arguments and not fight for the favor of an audience.
Good discussion opponents are characterized by the fact that they value the truth, like to hear good arguments and do not envy the opponent. You should also be big enough to bear being wrong when the truth is on the other side.
The following is a brief listing of the 38 tricks in the order that Schopenhauer gave them, even if he did not follow any obvious system.
Tricks 1–3
The first three tricks, expansion, homonymy and absolutization, serve to reject premises or assertions. So the opponent tries to carry out a mutatio controversiae (change of the issue) by talking about something other than the assertion that has been made. If this shift is overlooked, an ignoratio elenchi is committed. What the opponent says in reply may be true, but only apparently contradicts the thesis that is being attacked.
As a countermeasure, Schopenhauer advises to directly deny that the falseness of one's own assertion follows from the truth of the opposing conclusion ( negatio consequentiae ).
1st extension
An assertion is made vulnerable by indefinitely expanding its scope. In return, your own claims should be formulated as precisely as possible within clearly defined limits. A detailed list of the status controversiae or puncti controversiae is used to defend against enlargement . H. a counterexample or a list of individual points that represent practically restrictive conditions.
2. Homonymy
The homonyms , so the use of ambiguous terms is used to create a assertion extend to what only the wording has something to do with the matter, and to refute the claim in this case. Homonyma are two terms that are denoted by the same word: "low", "cutting", "high" are homonyma, they can be used to designate sounds, but also the properties of objects. This other meaning can then be clearly refuted, giving the appearance that the assertion made has been refuted.
This trick corresponds to the classic sophisma ex homonymia , i.e. a fallacy from different meanings of a word. However, the obvious fallacy of homonymy will normally hardly deceive anyone.
In more difficult cases, deception is easily possible, especially when the terms denoted by the same phrase are related and merge. Schopenhauer uses the concept of honor as an example: this can be a positive expression of appreciation among equals (such as respect, awarding a medal) or a negative expression that must be met in order to be recognized as equal (cf. the “honor to lose").
See also Quaternio Terminorum .
3. absolutization
To interpret an assertion of the opponent that is only specifically and relatively made in another respect or as if it were meant in every respect, in order to then refute it in this sense.
Tricks 4-6
In Artifices 4-6, an assertion is to be supported by premises from which it follows. They serve to introduce premises without contradiction.
4. Detours
The premises for an assertion are interspersed unsystematically in the conversation so that the opponent agrees with them without being able to suspect the consequence. If this procedure is too transparent, it can also be used for the premises of the premises.
This also can Prosyllogismen (conclusions) are used, is granted to all, unplug the final.
5. Premises ad populum and ex concessis
As a special case of the 4th trick, premises are used that are themselves believed to be false, but which are known to be believed by the opponent or the audience to be true. The latter are premises ad populum , the others are ex concessis because they flow into the argument as a concession to the opponent.
Because a true conclusion can also follow from false premises.
6. Hidden petitio principii
A petitio principii was committed in that the assertion to be proved was already included under the premises. Schopenhauer distinguishes four ways of hiding this approach from the opponent:
- Evaluations can be anticipated by a clever choice of the expression (example: instead of “virginity” say “virtue”, instead of “association representative” “lobbyist”).
- In order to support an assertion, an unsuspicious generalization is confirmed.
- In order to support one claim, another unsubstantiated claim is made so that the two claims are mutually supportive.
- To support a general claim, many special cases are confirmed.
Tricks 7-11
In tricks 7-11 the opponent is to be tricked into admitting something or losing his credibility by means of clever questions. Schopenhauer adopted these tricks from the sophistic refutations . They are advisable if the discussion is rather strict and formal and communication should be particularly clear. So whoever has put forward a thesis and is supposed to prove it, uses the questioning technique to infer the truth of the assertion from the adversary's concessions. This erotematic method, characterized by a question-and-answer game, was already in use in ancient times. It is traced back to Socrates and is therefore also called the Socratic method . These questioning techniques are also used during interrogations .
7. Allow more than necessary
Much is asked at once and in a rambling manner in order to hide what is actually supposed to be allowed. The argumentation that arises from what has already been granted is then quickly put forward. Because those who are slow to understand can not follow exactly and overlook the possible errors or gaps in the evidence .
8. Provoke with questions
The opponent is provoked to anger by harassment and outrageous questions so that he can no longer judge correctly and use his advantage. As a countermeasure, never get annoyed in discussions, just express yourself carefully and draw quick conclusions in silence.
9. Admission of detours
The questions are asked in an order that hides the strategy and evidence of the argument from the opponent. The answers are then used to make their own assertions, regardless of how they turned out and whether or not they are approved (cf. Art. 4 and 5).
10. Admission out of spite
If the opponent deliberately denies questions, the affirmation of which supports one's own assertion, the question must be asked as if the affirmation of the opposite had been achieved, or both are to be put up for election in such a way that the opponent does not notice which sentence should be answered in the affirmative.
11. Induction from concessions
If certain individual cases of a general sentence have already been admitted, then draw the conclusion yourself on the general assertion in order to avoid reservations and to put opponents and listeners into the belief that they themselves had not concluded otherwise or that the opponent himself had already assumed this conclusion.
Tricks 12–15
The following tricks also aim to induce the adversary to make certain concessions: the first two use affective connotations to reverse the adversary's assertions, while 14 and 15 pretend that evidence has been given.
12. Euphemisms and dysphemisms
For a general term that does not have its own name but has to be described tropical or by a metaphor , this is chosen in such a way that it expresses evaluations that correspond to one's own position (cf. euphemism and dysphemism ). According to Schopenhauer, this trick is used particularly frequently and almost automatically. Skilfully applied, this is a special case of the secret petitio principii (trick 6.1): what you want to prove first, you put in the "designation" in advance. For example, an armed group with political goals can be legitimized or de-legitimized by calling them “freedom fighters” or “revolutionaries”.
13. Lesser evil
The own assertion is presented together with an alternative that follows or could result from the rejection of the assertion. This opposite is so drastically painted that the opponent admits the allegation or loses his credibility. Often in connection with a wrong dilemma .
14. Claim right
After several concessions, an assertion is triumphantly presented as the conclusion from those concessions, even if it does not actually follow from them. Schopenhauer: "If the opponent is shy or stupid, and you have a lot of impudence and a good voice, that can be quite successful". Special case of the fallacia non causae ut causae (deception by assuming the non-reason as the reason).
15. Fake
First, assert a sentence that cannot count on a concession. In order to gain approval, another assertion is made that is true but not immediately understandable. Then it is claimed that the second claim proves the first. If the opponent does not admit the second assertion, it is proven and claims that this also proves the first. If he does admit it, it is also claimed that the first claim is thus proven.
Tricks 16–22
The following tricks are defensive as they undermine claims that the opponent has already made and thus avoid us having to make certain concessions that they want to make. The 20th trick falls out of line.
16. ad populum
On the basis of allegations made by the opponent, an argumentum ad hominem is made, in which it is shown that a current allegation by the opponent or his behavior contradicts an allegation from a source which he has previously acknowledged ( ex concessis , preferably his own Utterances). If the opponent considers these allegations to be true, this evidence convinces himself, but in any case the audience. The opponent must now revoke one of the allegations.
17. Sophistication
If the opponent convincingly refutes an assertion, case distinctions are subsequently introduced or claims that the opponent had confused a homonym. It is advisable to write down the terms used by the opponent quickly from the beginning in order to be able to differentiate them later and pick them up again.
18. Interrupt discussion
If the opponent provides evidence that demonstrably leads to the refutation of his own assertion, he is interrupted before the end by breaking off the discussion or changing the subject ( mutatio controversiae cf. No. 1–3, 29).
19. Introduce arguments in general
If the opponent demands a statement on a specific point of his assertion for which one has no counter-arguments, a general aspect is dealt with instead (cf. also trick 6.2).
20. Obtaining Evidence
If the opponent has admitted the premises of a conclusion, the conclusion is nevertheless drawn itself, with missing premises being tacitly added (an application of the fallacia non causae ut causae ) without giving the opponent the opportunity to comment.
21. Mirror stratagems
If the opponent uses a purely apparent or sophistic argument, the trick is not cleared up, but instead exposed with a counter-argument of the same kind (e.g. ad hominem , ex concessis , ad populum ). This avoids a long debate.
22 argument as petitio spend
If the opponent demands approval of an argument which foreseeably solves the disputed problem in his favor, the argument is rejected with reference to a petitio principii . Since the argument contains theses that are similar in content to the target assertion, opponents and listeners can be convinced that these theses are just as in need of proof.
Tricks 23-26
The devices 23-26 are intended to induce the opponent to refute himself.
23. Provoke exaggeration
By contradiction, the opponent is made to exaggerate the assertion, so that conditions and restrictions of the assertion are removed. In this case, trick 1 applies: The extension of the assertion is refuted and at the same time the refutation of the assertion is asserted. As a countermeasure, the limits of one's own assertion must always be clarified.
24. Refuted by consequences
False conclusions are drawn from the opponent's assertion that contradict his opinion and that of the public, or even contradict himself or accepted truths. The refutation of these consequences is considered an indirect refutation of the assertion ( Reductio ad absurdum ). By applying the fallacia non causae ut causae (as in the 20th trick), a reduction can be faked through false conclusions from the opponent's assertions.
25. Refutation by counterexample
A general assertion is refuted by a single counterexample ( exemplum in contrarium ) and its negation is thus proven. If the opponent uses this apagonic evidence procedure, the following defenses must be checked:
- Is the counterexample true or real? And does that fit the assertion (or does it apply to fictitious ones)?
- Is the counterexample actually an example to the claim in question?
- Does the counterexample really contradict the claim?
26. Retorsion
An argument or a supporting assertion that the opponent wants to use for his point of view is used for a counter-argument ( retorsion ). In Schopenhauer's example, the opponent recommends that a child be judged less strictly because it is still a child. The argument is reversed: Because it is about a child, we should be stricter so that they learn the moral rules and also blame them for doing things that are bad in adults but are ugly.
Tricks 27-29
Tactical devices that do not so much concern individual allegations but the course of a dispute.
27. Expand provocation
Arguments and allegations that visibly provoke the opponent will be pursued further and expanded. On the one hand, the provocation (8th trick) is repeated; a violent reaction can also be seen as a signal that one has touched a point in which the opponent sees his argument as threatened.
28. Argumentum ad auditores
If there is an audience that is less well informed than the opponents and lacks arguments ad rem and ad hominem , invalid counter-arguments can be used as long as they can be plausible to the audience. If the opponent wants to demonstrate the invalidity, he must first instruct the public, which does not readily accept the instruction.
An invalid objection, the invalidity of which can only be seen by the expert but not by the listener, will thus defeat the factual argument in their eyes. The procedure is particularly effective if the objection makes the opponent's allegation ridiculous.
29. Diversion
If the opponent has started a target-oriented argument against which nothing else helps, a diversionary maneuver is carried out in which the opponent is attacked from a new, unexpected side. Either another aspect of the topic is carefully brought to the fore or an ad hominem brazen against an assertion ex concessis . Schopenhauer considers this stratagem to be widespread and therefore sees it as part of the human natural talent for dispute resolution.
Tricks 30–34
30. Appeal to authorities
Instead of factual reasons, experts put forward positions that the opponent does not dare to question because of their authority ( argumentum ad verecundiam ). For this it is irrelevant whether the assertion of authority was made in a different context, must remain incomprehensible to the opponent or was merely invented, as long as the opponent considers himself less competent than the authority and does not know his way around well enough recognize a fictional or reinterpreted quote as such. The expert can also be represented in certain contexts by public opinion, popular errors and prejudices; as long as the opponent does not have the means to solve them, he will shy away from contradicting them.
31. Express lack of understanding, claim incomprehensibility
Against the arguments of the opponent it is argued that one cannot see their truth because one does not understand it. This gives the audience the impression, who consider the contestant to be an authority, that it is nonsensical. It is therefore a special case of appealing to an authority (namely one's own, trick 30) and an argumentum ad auditores . To this end, Schopenhauer recommends the following counter-strategist (as an application of trick 21): If the opponent expresses incomprehension for an assertion, the excuse is that it should be easy for the opponent to understand the assertion, so that his incomprehension only arises based on the unclear presentation.
32. Refutation by recursion
The opponent's claim is rejected and declared implausible by referring to their relationship to an already rejected claim.
33. Deny applicability
According to the maxim “That may be correct in theory, but it is wrong in practice”, the reasons for an assertion are recognized, but their consequences are rejected with reference to non-specifiable additional conditions in practice.
34. Encircle
Evasive behavior on the part of the opponent is answered with questions and requests for allegations on related issues. This makes it clear where the opponent has problems with his own arguments.
Tricks 35-38
The tricks 35–38 are used directly to end a dispute.
35. Argumentum ab utili
Instead of objective reasons, appeals are made to the motives and interests of the opponent and the listener. It must be made plausible that what the opponent claims is contrary to his own interests in order to induce him to revoke them.
36. Simulated argument
If the opponent is used to not understanding everything immediately, he will be overwhelmed with a simulated argument made up of meaningless, but complicated-sounding phrases. Schopenhauer mentions Goethe's maxim: "Usually people believe, if they only hear words, that something must also be thought of." If the opponent is afraid of appearing incomprehensible, he does not contradict and the dispute is won.
37. Refute claim with evidence
If the opponent is right about the matter, but chooses bad evidence, then you refute the evidence and pass it off as a refutation of the matter. An argument ad hominem is declared to be an argument ad rem .
Schopenhauer advises using this trick as early as possible, because if the opponent cannot provide better evidence for his assertion, it is deemed to be refuted.
38. Ad personam
The ad personam argument is a way out when the opponent seems to be winning. The subject of the dispute is deviated from and the person of the opponent is verbally attacked. In contrast to an Argumentum ad hominem , in which the allegations about this object are used instead of the object of the allegations, here the opponent himself is insulted in order to force him to give in. Schopenhauer warns, however: “The problem here, however, is which measures are available to the opponent here. Because if he wants to pay back with the same coin, it quickly turns into a fight, a duel or an insulting process. "
Countermeasures: Schopenhauer advises you to stay calm and insist on factual arguments. Nevertheless, he admits that it is not enough to remain polite oneself, since even a refutation ad rem is often understood as an offense of vanity and thus leads to an ad personam of the opponent. The only countermeasure is to show yourself unaffected and make it clear that the offense is not the subject of the dispute.
“The only sure counter-rule is therefore that which Aristotle already gives in the last chapter of the Topica: not to dispute the best with the first; but only with those that you know and of whom you know that they have understanding enough not to come up with absurdities and be ashamed of them; and in order to disput with reasons and not with judgments of power, and to listen to reasons and to respond to them, and finally that they value the truth, like to hear good reasons, also from the mouth of the opponent, and have equity enough to endure it to be able to be wrong when the truth is on the other side. It follows that there is hardly one in a hundred who is worth arguing with. "
See also
Text output
- Arthur Schopenhauer (author), Julius Frauenstädt (ed.): From Arthur Schopenhauer's handwritten estate. Treatises, notes, aphorisimes and fragments . Leipzig 1864. ( Google book page preview )
- Eristic Dialectic or The Art of Being Right. 1830/31.
- Edition Arthur Hübscher (1966); Haffmans Verlag, Zurich 1983. ISBN 3-251-00016-0
- Franco Volpi (Ed.): The Art of Being Right: Presented in Thirty-Eight Artifacts. Insel Verl., Frankfurt a. M. 1995. (Insel Taschenbuch. 1658.) ISBN 3-458-33358-4
Web links
Individual evidence
- ^ Arthur Schopenhauer (author), Julius Frauenstädt (ed.): From Arthur Schopenhauer's handwritten estate. Treatises, notes, aphorisimes and fragments . Leipzig 1864. ( Google book page preview ) The text appears under the title Eristik on pages 3–43 and is divided into three parts: an untitled introduction, the text Basis of all dialectics , the Schopenhauer in the Parerga and Paralipomena Vol. 2, § 26 editorially processed and the tricks. Frauenstädt has added Schopenhauer's text on the value of logic and on the rarity of the power of judgment as an appendix. In the Parerga , however, Schopenhauer distances himself from the intention of an eristic dialectic in the form of contrivances or from the polemical intention of the manuscript obtained from it.
- ^ Arthur Schopenhauer (author), Julius Frauenstädt (ed.): From Arthur Schopenhauer's handwritten estate. Leipzig 1864, p. 5.
- ↑ Schopenhauer gives the following conceptual history: According to Diogenes Laertius, the term “dialectic” was first used by Plato . Phaedrus , who lived around the turn of the ages, understands it to mean the regular use of reason and being trained in it. Aristotle uses ta dialéktika in the same sense; but he is said to have first used logiké with the same meaning. Cicero and Quintilian used Dialectica and Logica with the same common meaning.
- ↑ a b Quotations are adapted to today's expressions and spelling