Socratic method

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In the history of philosophy and didactic specialist literature, the Socratic method is an approach to discourse that Plato presents in a series of his literary dialogues . In them he lets his teacher Socrates appear as the main speaker and demonstrate the procedure for dealing with individual problems and interlocutors. The fictional dialogues written by Plato and other Socratics, in which Socrates plays an important role, are called Socratic dialogues .

Characteristic elements of the method are the search for a definition that precisely describes and delimits the object of investigation, and the joint review of the suitability of definition proposals, claims and concepts, with the aim of uncovering any discrepancies. From a didactic point of view, the defining characteristic is the endeavor to enable a learner to find out his mistakes himself by asking suitable questions and thus to activate his knowledge potential.

Whether one can even speak of a Socratic method and whether the so-called conduct of the conversation goes back to the historical Socrates or is only one of the peculiarities of the literary figure of Socrates created by Plato is highly controversial in research. According to Plato's account, Socrates called his dialogue practice “midwifery”, which indicates a procedure that follows certain principles.

The question of historical reality

The term Socratic method does not appear in the sources, it comes from modern representations of the history of philosophy. But Plato gives some indications of a special art of discourse on the part of his teacher. One of these can be found in the Apology of Socrates , a literary version of the defense speech that Socrates wrote in 399 BC. Chr. Held as a defendant. There, Socrates asks those present not to be offended by the fact that he is proceeding in his "usual way" in his argumentation. In the dialogue with Theaetetus , Socrates compares his didactic approach with the “midwifery” of his mother, a midwife: just as the midwife helps women with the birth of their children, so he helps the souls with the birth of their insights. An indication that at the latest in the 4th century BC BC thought Socrates to be the author of a certain method, Aristotle provides . He writes in his Metaphysics that there are two achievements that can rightly be ascribed to the historical Socrates: the introductory type of derivation (a type of inductive argumentation) and the general delimitation of determinations (the definition of general concepts).

In Dialogue Politeia , Plato asked Socrates whether an investigation should be carried out “according to the usual method”. Since it is about an investigation from the point of view of the doctrine of ideas , which deals with specifically Platonic ideas, the “Socratic method” cannot be meant.

The question of the relationship between the literarily portrayed “Platonic” (appearing in Plato's dialogues) Socrates and Socrates as a historical personality is one of the most difficult problems in the history of ancient philosophy. A convincing reconstruction of the philosophy of historical Socrates is now considered impossible. It is also unclear whether Aristotle used his own information about the historical Socrates or whether it only owed his knowledge to Plato. The answer to the question of the credibility of the sources depends on whether one regards the “Socratic method” as a characteristic feature of the philosophical investigations of the historical Socrates. Skeptical researchers limit themselves to the observation that Plato, as a writer, ascribes a certain superior type of conversation to his teacher, whom he puts in the best light as a master of dialogue.

The lack of clear source statements about the existence and the exact content of a method introduced and practiced by Socrates has even led to a research opinion that such a method does not exist. Rather, it is a characteristic of Socrates' philosophical endeavors that he had no special tools, no unique and powerful weapons against ignorance. He only had his will to reduce ignorance, unbroken to the last, but not knowledge of certain steps with which this could be methodically achieved. Although he had a special kind of search for definitions, he did not have a theory of definition, and one could not speak of a method in the sense of a relatively systematic, theoretically founded procedure.

The renowned philologist Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1848–1931) spoke out particularly emphatically against the assumption that there was a Socratic method that could be formulated and learned regardless of the personality of Socrates. Socrates was not fascinated with one method, but only with the exemplary manner with which he lived according to his principles: “The Socratic method without Socrates is nothing more than the pedagogy that is used by a soul guide by God's grace, like him clears his throat and how he spits, pulls his alleged method on bottles and then thinks to pour out the water of life. "

Most researchers use expressions such as "Socratic method" or "Socratic reasoning technique", but their views differ on the details. The skeptics who deny the existence of a particular method have not yet prevailed, but they have shown that the conventional ideas about "the Socratic method" are at least problematic. Many questions remain open.

It is also controversial whether the historical Socrates understood and called his dialogue practice “midwifery” ( Maeutics or Maieutics) or whether the comparison with obstetrics was an idea of ​​Plato. Some evidence suggests that the historical Socrates actually compared his assistance in philosophical research with the work of a midwife and summarized his understanding of imparting knowledge in this metaphor.

Features of the method

The approach of the Platonic Socrates is characterized by two aspects: the epistemological approach and the didactic principle. The epistemology is particularly thematized in the dialogue Theaetetos . The specifically Socratic practice of striving for knowledge is demonstrated in a number of works by Plato: Apology of Socrates , Charmides , Euthydemos , Euthyphron , Gorgias , Hippias maior (authenticity disputed), Hippias minor (authenticity disputed), Ion , Crito , Laches , Lysis , Menon , Politeia (Book I) and Protagoras . The Menon and the Theaetetus are particularly instructive for Socratic didactics .

The search for knowledge

With regard to the procedure for the search for knowledge, three characteristic features of the "Socratic method" can be worked out:

  • the assumption that the starting point of possible philosophical knowledge is a correct definition, that is, a definition that precisely describes the real nature of the object of investigation.
  • the Socratic Elenchos, the refutation of inadequately thought out assertions, especially unsuitable definitions
  • the strategy of checking the consistency of an overall concept represented by a dialogue participant.

The importance of defining

Defining general terms is one of the main concerns of (Platonic) Socrates, with a particular focus on the area of ethics . There he is interested in questions like “What is bravery?” Or “What is piety?”. He considers the definition of the term to be a primary task of the philosopher who turns to a particular topic. He does not mean a definition in the modern sense, i.e. any assignment of an expression to a content, a mere convention for the purpose of understanding and avoiding misunderstandings. Rather, for him the question “What is X?” Aims at an exact determination of what actually constitutes the nature of X. The definition thus expresses a fact that is to be recognized as an objective fact. For every object of investigation there is a single, absolutely correct definition that the philosopher tries to find. If the object of investigation is a property, its definition should include what makes all bearers of this property - and only they - such. For example, bravery should be defined in such a way that the definition expresses exactly what is present in everyone who is brave and what makes them brave. Anyone who has found this definition has grasped the essence of bravery. Not only can he see who is brave and who is not, but he also understands why that is. While one can have an idea of ​​bravery without knowing the definition of that virtue, a philosophical understanding of bravery presupposes knowledge of the definition.

In research, the question of whether the Platonic Socrates assumes a priority of the definition knowledge over other knowledge about the object to be defined in the sense of the statements “Who does not know what F is, cannot know for any x whether x is a case of F is ”and“ Who does not know what F is, cannot know for any property P whether FP has ”. The difficulty arises here that, when searching for the definition of F, Socrates falls back on examples of F, i.e. already assumes that these are actually examples of F. Various proposed solutions are discussed in the research literature.

The elenchos and the verification of consistency

In the Apology , the Platonic Socrates asks about the motives that led his opponents to the judicial indictment against which he is defending himself. He is charged with seducing the youth. He attributes this charge not to the fact that the opponents considered his philosophical convictions to be false and harmful, but to the fact that he made enemies with his way of philosophizing. He thinks that it is not a specific content, but its approach as such that is offensive. Therefore he asks for understanding for his intention to hold on to his "way of speaking" in the current situation; one should only pay attention to the legitimacy of his statements and not blame him for the manner in which he was presented. By “kind” he means his habit of proving inadequately substantiated claims to be unconvincing and thus to expose the claim of the authors of these claims to knowledge or wisdom as unfounded. This rebuttal review of statements is known as the “Socratic Elenchos”. Elenchos (ἔλεγχος élenchos ) is generally understood to mean any refutation regardless of its validity, i.e. with the inclusion of pseudo refutations by false conclusions ; In the Socratic and Platonic context, it specifically refers to “elenkik”, an accountability for the basis of a position with the aim of liberating from false knowledge and approaching the truth. The typical sequence in the dialogs is as follows:

Socrates asks his interlocutor how a certain term is to be defined (“What is X-ness?”). The question is answered. In the second phase, Socrates asks a number of other questions that are relevant in the given context and that will also be answered. The answers of the second phase have the function of premises in the Elenchos ; they are statements that have consequences with regard to the first question. In the third phase, Socrates shows that the answers given in the second phase are incompatible with the answer to the first question. In the fourth phase, the consequence is considered that the first answer cannot be correct if the opinions that led to the answers of the second phase are correct. Thus the position of the interlocutor turns out to be contradictory, his attempt at definition has failed. Then he changes the definition, gives a completely new answer to the first question or has to admit his perplexity.

From a logical point of view, the Elenchos does not necessarily result in the uselessness of the definition initially proposed, but only in its incompatibility with the premises. If, however, the dialogue participants consider the premises to be evident facts, they must conclude that the answer to the definition question asked at the beginning is wrong. In the Socratic dialogue, the premises are not examined with regard to their truthfulness, but only the consequences that result from them for the answer to the initial question are considered. From the point of view of the interlocutors of Socrates, the correctness of the premises is certain and he does not contradict it, but he avoids an explicit determination in this regard. This fact has been interpreted differently in research. According to the "constructivist" interpretation ( Gregory Vlastos ), the Elenchos aims at a positive result: the answer to the initial question should be proven to be right or wrong. Then, however, as Vlastos notes, the investigation suffers from the lack of verification of the truthfulness of the premises. Vlastos thinks that Socrates was able to hold the premises to be true until the contrary was proven, because they were not mere assertions of his interlocutors, but also a part of his own system, the consistency of which no one could refute. According to Hugh Benson's “non-constructivist” interpretation, Socrates neither wants to use the Elenchus to prove the falsity of the answer to the initial question, nor does he compare the plausibility of this answer with that of the premises and make a judgment about it. Rather, he is only concerned with checking the consistency of the overall concept of his interlocutor. If the concept is proven to be inconsistent, it is up to its author to make some kind of amendment. To initiate this step is, in Benson's understanding, the purpose of the Socratic Elenchos.

The Maeutics

The didactic aspect of the approach of the Platonic Socrates is the "midwifery art" (Mäeutik or Maieutik), which he describes in the dialogue Theaetetos . This is the art of conveying knowledge - for example mathematical knowledge - to a conversation partner by not teaching him, but by asking suitable questions to get him to eliminate existing misconceptions and to discover the actual facts himself, the knowledge from the to get your own mind out. Socrates emphasizes that he does not share knowledge with others, but only gives them “obstetrics” when their souls are at the same time pregnant and ready to “give birth” to an insight. The help in searching and finding knowledge, whereby instruction is consistently dispensed with, appears in Plato's presentation as a specifically Socratic alternative to conventional knowledge transfer by passing on and practicing teaching material.

The most important part of the midwifery art of Platonic Socrates, however, according to his presentation, does not consist in the technique of targeting questions, but in his ability to assess which “pregnant” souls are able to produce valuable insights and which can only “give birth” to the unfit. On the basis of this assessment, he selects those whom he “provides obstetrics”.

Modern reception

didactics

In modern didactic usage, the terms "Socratic method" and " Socratic conversation " are linked to the ancient tradition. There one understands general concepts that are based on the fact that a subject - unlike in a teacher lecture - is developed interactively in a dialogue between teaching staff and students through questions and answers ( questioning-developing lessons ).

Behavior therapy

In cognitive behavioral therapy , Socratic dialogue is a conversation technique that aims to question the patient's cognitive distortions and uncover contradictions in his or her thinking. The therapist does not convey his own approaches, but tries to grasp the negative basic assumptions of the patient through "naive" questions until the patient himself discovers inconsistencies in his convictions. As a result, the patient becomes insecure within his cognitive schemas and change becomes possible. Behavioral Socratic dialogue is often indicated for depressive disorders.

literature

  • Rebecca Bensen Cain: The Socratic Method. Plato's Use of Philosophical Drama . Continuum, London 2007, ISBN 978-0-8264-8891-6 .
  • Hugh H. Benson: Socratic Method. In: Donald R. Morrison (Ed.): The Cambridge Companion to Socrates . Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2011, ISBN 978-0-521-54103-9 , pp. 179-200.
  • Gary Alan Scott (Ed.): Does Socrates Have a Method? Rethinking the Elenchus in Plato's Dialogues and Beyond . Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park 2002, ISBN 0-271-02173-X .
  • Harold Tarrant: Socratic Method and Socratic Truth. In: Sara Ahbel-Rappe, Rachana Kamtekar (Ed.): A Companion to Socrates . Blackwell, Malden 2006, ISBN 1-4051-0863-0 , pp. 254-272.
  • Gregory Vlastos: Socratic Studies . Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1994, ISBN 0-521-44735-6 , pp. 1-29.

Remarks

  1. ^ Plato, Apology of Sokrates 27b.
  2. ↑ Plato, Theaetetus 148e-151d.
  3. ↑ Aristotle, Metaphysics 1078b27–29.
  4. ↑ Plato, Politeia X 596a.
  5. ↑ Louis-André Dorion provides an overview of the history of research: The Rise and Fall of the Socratic Problem. In: Donald R. Morrison (ed.): The Cambridge Companion to Socrates , Cambridge 2011, pp. 1–23. See also Debra Nails: Agora, Academy, and the Conduct of Philosophy , Dordrecht 1995, pp. 8–31.
  6. ↑ On the source problem, see Hugh H. Benson: Socratic Method. In: Donald R. Morrison (ed.): The Cambridge Companion to Socrates , Cambridge 2011, pp. 179–200, here: p. 179 note 2; Louis-André Dorion: The Rise and Fall of the Socratic Problem. In: Donald R. Morrison (ed.): The Cambridge Companion to Socrates , Cambridge 2011, pp. 1–23, here: 16f.
  7. ^ Thomas C. Brickhouse, Nicholas D. Smith, The Socratic Elenchos? In: Gary Alan Scott (Ed.): Does Socrates Have a Method? , University Park 2002, pp. 145-157, here: 147, 154-157; David Wolfsdorf: Socrates' Pursuit of Definitions. In: Phronesis 48, 2003, pp. 271-312, here: 298, 301f., 304f.
  8. ^ Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff: Platon. His life and works , 5th edition, Berlin 1959 (1st edition Berlin 1919), p. 81.
  9. ↑ Bruno Vancamp advocates historicity: L'historicité de la maïeutique socratique: réflexions critiques. In: L'Antiquité Classique 61, 1992, pp. 111-118 and Julius Tomin: Socratic Midwifery. In: The Classical Quarterly 37, 1987, pp. 97-102. Disagree Richard Robinson : Plato's Earlier Dialectic , 2nd edition. Oxford 1953, pp. 83f., Kenneth Dover : Socrates in the Clouds. In: Gregory Vlastos (ed.): The Philosophy of Socrates , Garden City (NY) 1971, pp. 50-77, here: 61f. and Myles F. Burnyeat: Socratic Midwifery, Platonic Inspiration. In: Hugh H. Benson (Ed.): Essays on the Philosophy of Socrates , New York 1992, pp. 53-65. Cf. Thomas Alexander Szlezák : Plato and the writing of philosophy , part 2: The image of the dialectician in Plato's late dialogues , Berlin 2004, pp. 91–127, especially pp. 91–98.
  10. ↑ In the English-language literature the question is usually “What is F?” And a property to be defined is called “F-ness”.
  11. ^ Hugh H. Benson: Socratic Method. In: Donald R. Morrison (ed.): The Cambridge Companion to Socrates , Cambridge 2011, pp. 179–200, here: 193–198.
  12. ↑ For an overview see David Wolfsdorf: Socrates' Pursuit of Definitions. In: Phronesis 48, 2003, pp. 271-312, here: 308-310.
  13. ^ Plato, Apology of Socrates 17c – 18a.
  14. ↑ Michael Erler : Elenchos. In: Christian Schäfer (Ed.): Platon-Lexikon , Darmstadt 2007, p. 107 f .; Bernhard Waldenfels : Elenchus, Elenkenik. In: Historical Dictionary of Philosophy , Volume 2, Basel 1972, Sp. 442 f.
  15. ^ Hugh H. Benson: Socratic Method. In: Donald R. Morrison (ed.): The Cambridge Companion to Socrates , Cambridge 2011, pp. 179–200, here: 184.
  16. ^ Gregory Vlastos: Socratic Studies. Cambridge 1994, pp. 1-29. See David Wolfsdorf: Socrates' Pursuit of Definitions. In: Phronesis 48, 2003, pp. 271-312, here: 274, 280-293.
  17. ^ Hugh H. Benson: Socratic Method. In: Donald R. Morrison (Ed.): The Cambridge Companion to Socrates , Cambridge 2011, pp. 179–200, here: 185–193.
  18. ↑ Plato, Theaitetos 148e-150d; Michael Erler: The meaning of the aporias in Plato's dialogues , Berlin 1987, pp. 60–70; Michael Erler: Maieutik. In: Christian Schäfer (Ed.): Platon-Lexikon , Darmstadt 2007, p. 193 f.
  19. ↑ Plato, Theaetetus 150a-151b.
  20. ^ Gary Alan Scott: Introduction. In: Gary Alan Scott (Ed.): Does Socrates Have a Method? , University Park 2002, pp. 1–16, here: 1.
  21. ↑ Christa Koentges: Socratic dialogue. In: Markus Antonius Wirtz (Ed.): Dorsch - Lexikon der Psychologie , 18th, revised edition, Bern 2017, p. 1566.