Hippias minor

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The conclusion of Hippias minor in a manuscript from the 15th century

The Hippias minor or Hippias II ( Greek  Ἱππίας ἐλάττων Hippías eláttōn , German "the Little Hippias" or "the Little Hippias") is a dialogue of the Greek philosopher Plato . The designation Hippias minor serves to distinguish it from Hippias maior , the "greater" or "great" Hippias, a longer and therefore "greater" dialogue that is attributed to Plato, but whose authenticity is disputed.

It is a fictional, literary conversation. Plato's teacher Socrates discusses with the sophist Hippias von Elis , after whom the dialogue is named. The starting point is a comparison between the mythical heroes Achilles and Odysseus with regard to their dealings with truth and lies. This leads to a fundamental debate about whether it is better to say the untruth of one's own choosing and do something bad, or to act involuntarily. It is not possible to clarify this question; the dialogue ends in perplexity ( aporia ).

Plato lets the dialogue figure Socrates take the provocative view that a cunning liar is more capable and therefore “better” than someone who lacks the ability to deceive others and who is therefore forced to stick to the truth. With this, Plato wants to encourage the reader to think independently about a complex ethical problem. It is about clarifying the criterion on which the ethical ranking is to be made dependent.

In modern research, the unconditional, conventional moral disregard of Socrates' controversy with the controversial issue is assessed partly as a mere thought game, partly interpreted against the background of the Platonic understanding of ethics.

Place, time and people

Socrates (Roman bust, 1st century, Louvre , Paris)

The debate takes place in Athens , probably in a gymnasium . The time is difficult to tell; The period 421–416 is likely to be considered. At that time there was the Peace of Nicias , which interrupted the Peloponnesian War for a few years.

Socrates' interlocutor, Hippias of Elis, was a historical figure. He was one of the sophists, wandering traveling teachers who taught upper-class young people what they considered useful knowledge for a fee. He also acted as an envoy for his hometown of Elis . He stayed in Athens only temporarily. His host Eudikos there is present in Plato's dialogue, but plays only an insignificant secondary role and does not take part in the philosophical discussions. It is not known whether Eudikos actually lived or is a figure invented by Plato.

content

The initial question

Hippias gave an epideixis , a public speech of an instructive kind. Such speeches were mainly about praising or blaming someone or something. In this case the subject was poetry, and particularly Homer's epic . After the audience left, Hippias, Eudicus and Socrates stayed behind. Eudicus asks Socrates to comment on the speech. Socrates wants to ask questions, and Hippias is happy to answer them. The question with which Socrates now begins the dialogue concerns the evaluation of the Homeric heroes. According to an assessment Socrates heard from the father of Eudicos, the Iliad is a nicer epic than the Odyssey , and its precedence is also shown in the hierarchy of the heroes, whose deeds are each glorified: Achilles, the main hero of the Iliad, surpasses Odysseus , the hero of the Odyssey. Socrates wants to know what Hippias thinks of this evaluation. Hippias explains that Homer portrayed Achilles as the finest of the heroes of the Trojan War , and Odysseus as the most adroit or cunning. When asked what is meant by cunning, Hippias specifies that a cunning is to be understood as a lying person. Homer wanted to contrast the straightforward, simple Achilles with the clever, insincere Odysseus. From this Hippias derives the priority of Achilles, who for him is the "best" (áristos) among the heroes. With his relatively unfavorable judgment of Odysseus, the sophist followed a valuation that was already widespread at the time, but which does not correspond to Homer's view.

The basic discussion

Socrates points out that the question of Homer's judgment must remain open, but for the purpose of the discussion it can first be assumed that Hippias' interpretation is correct. The question then is how the behavior of those who do not adhere to the truth is to be judged. A distinction must be made here between those who are capable of deception and those who lack the necessary intelligence. When asked, Hippias makes it clear that he understands the clever and the liars to be capable people who, thanks to their cunning and prudence, are always able to successfully deceive others as they wish. They have knowledge, relevant expertise, and can be described as “knowledgeable” - the word sophós means “knowledgeable” as well as “clever” and “wise”. On this basis, Socrates asks who is the most capable and the best in a field when it comes to deception: the incompetent or the one who, thanks to his knowledge, can claim what is right or wrong at will. It turns out that the expert is superior not only in presenting the truth, but also in lying. Accordingly, it is wrong to distinguish between sincere people and liars, for in no field can one find a quality which belongs to the sincere as such and which the liars as such lack. Rather, there is only a difference between the capable, who have all options available and who can freely decide, and the incapable, who are honest due to a lack of cunning, since they have no other choice. Thus only competence and not honesty is the criterion for distinguishing between good and bad people.

The application of the basic result to the initial question

Starting from the result of the fundamental discussion, Socrates returns to the comparison between Achilles and Odysseus. Odysseus could only be a master of lies if he knew the truth, i.e. was also capable of truthfulness; Achilles was only righteous when he also had the option of being insincere. Thus both carried truth and lies in them. Accordingly, they were not fundamentally different, but of the same kind. Achilles repeatedly threatened to withdraw from Troy because of a dispute, but made no preparations. His threat wasn't meant seriously, they were empty words. So he too had the ability to use words to fake something, and he used it when necessary. From a self-contradiction which Achilles evaded, but which Odysseus evidently did not notice, it is evident that Achilles did not intend to do what he claimed to be. So both were devious, and from this point of view there is no reason to assume a difference and to think Achilles is better.

Hippias sees it differently. According to his interpretation, Achilles did not act with cunning and evil intent, but contradicted himself, as his attitude wavered. The reason for his self-contradiction was that he changed his position during the argument, because he was dependent on changing moods. So he always remained sincere. Besides, he didn't have a choice; he could not prepare his departure, for under the circumstances he could not abandon the Greek army, even if he contemplated this in anger for a time. But Odysseus always acted with deceitful intent, both when he was telling the truth and when he was lying.

Socrates concludes from this that in this case Odysseus was better than Achilles. In doing so, he starts from the criterion that he has previously established, according to which the more capable, who has more options, is the better. Hippias contradicts this. He finds it paradoxical that someone who lies out of deliberation and with bad intentions or does something evil should be better than someone who says something untrue without intent to deceive or causes mischief for lack of perspective. In doing so, Hippias invokes legislation; Those who willfully act illegally will be punished far more severely than those who do it out of ignorance.

The end in perplexity

Socrates disagrees, but admits he is unsure of this. He does not claim to know that a deliberately wrongdoing perpetrator is better than one who behaves wrongly out of ignorance, but he is only inclined to this view at the moment because the opposite seems inconsistent to him and Hippias could not make his opposing position plausible. Socrates gives a number of examples to justify this, which are intended to illustrate that in general the capable, who as such has various options, is better than the incapable, whose inadequacy sets narrow limits. For example, a good runner who deliberately runs slowly is better than someone who is forced to slow down because he cannot run fast. A wrestler who falls on purpose is better than one who is knocked down. Anyone who deliberately makes jarring sounds is better than someone whose voice is inherently ugly. Everyone would rather limp on purpose than be forced to do so by the condition of their feet. So it is generally with “ justice ” ( dikaiosýnē ) . According to the understanding of the time, this term not only meant a moral virtue in today's sense, but also generally the ability to behave correctly, to do what is appropriate and appropriate. This ability consists in the ability required in each case, which - as Socrates explains - is either a force (dýnamis) or a knowledge or the combination of both. Those who are more capable than others because they are superior to them in terms of their ability to act and expertise are therefore “fairer” and better. He is free to choose between right and wrong, and when he chooses wrong, he does so on purpose. His freedom of choice establishes his superiority in principle. The superior in this sense is inevitably the better. Accordingly, if he consciously does something bad, he is better than someone who behaves in the same way out of ignorance without having thought through his approach.

Hippias refuses to accept the paradoxical conclusion according to the general sense of right. Socrates countered that it was derived from the common evidence with imperative necessity. Nevertheless, he does not make any claims to the truth for his assertion, but admits that it does not satisfy him either. It has not been possible to resolve the issue. The dialogue ends in aporia, perplexity.

The conversation

In his lecture, which is linked to the dialogue, Hippias did not deal with philosophical questions, but only interpreted poetry. Nonetheless, Socrates immediately steers the conversation towards a philosophical problem and deliberately tries to corner Hippias and to impose a paradoxical conclusion on him, which blatantly contradicts common legal and moral perceptions. This intention is not hidden from Hippias. He accuses the philosopher of habitually looking for the most difficult point on every topic and then taking it out of context and looking at it in isolation. In doing so, he creates confusion like someone who is up to evil.

Hippias remains polite in the argument, but shows the arrogant-looking self-confidence that is typical of the sophists in Plato's dialogues. He sticks to this unwaveringly, although he has little argumentation to offer. Right from the start he proclaims that he has an answer to any question, both here and during his regular appearance as a speaker at the Olympic Games , which he smugly points out on this occasion. He also claims no one has ever outdone him in competition. In the debate he then turns out to be helpless. He willingly follows the argument with which Socrates involved him in a self-contradiction, and then does not try to resolve the contradiction, but instead sticks to his original opinion until the end. Socrates willingly admits that, like his interlocutor, he has no solution. Nevertheless, he manages to expose Hippias, because he himself openly admits his ignorance, while Hippias has embarrassed himself with his exaggerated claim to comprehensive competence.

Initially, Socrates strengthened the pronounced vanity of the sophist by taking up his self-praise with an ironic exuberance. With a story of the boastful appearance of Hippias on the agora , he also adorns the representation of the supposed universal competence of his interlocutor. At the same time, he discreetly distances himself from it by referring to the sophist's self-portrayal. At the end, Socrates expresses his disappointment that even a “wise man” like Hippias could not help him - the “layman”. The impression of the sophist's pathetic failure is reinforced by the contrast with the high expectations he initially aroused. Since Hippias claimed at the beginning that he had never been defeated in a competition, his debate with Socrates also has the character of a competition from his point of view. This ends with his first defeat.

The course of the conversation is also conceived as a practical example of the paradoxical thesis of Socrates. Socrates is the "better one" who deliberately makes a "mistake" and intentionally supports the untruth at times: He encourages an error by apparently approving the immoderate self-praise of Hippias, although in reality he saw through it from the beginning. Hippias made this mistake - his wrong self-assessment - unknowingly, because he had no idea of ​​the limits of his competence. Socrates, on the other hand, gets involved in a calculating way in order to achieve a didactic effect and to lead Hippias to self-knowledge. The course of the conversation shows the superiority of the conscious acceptance of an untruth over the unconscious. Whoever knows the truth can temporarily engage in falsehood in order to bring about a desired effect; those who do not know it are helplessly exposed to their ignorance.

Philosophical balance sheet

Plato (Roman copy of the Greek Plato portrait of Silanion , Glyptothek Munich )

The smaller Hippias thematizes the relationship between honesty and lies, planned and thoughtless action, technical knowledge and ethical superiority. It is about the question of the criterion for “ goodness ” or “excellence” ( aretḗ ), thanks to which someone is superior to others. According to one view, superiority inevitably and directly results from a better insight into the respective circumstances, which is associated with the ability to act. Those who know more and are capable of acting are necessarily superior under all circumstances and “better” than someone who is ignorant or someone who is restricted in their freedom of action, even if their behavior violates moral norms. The good person is not necessarily always sincere, but decides for or against honesty depending on the situation. The ranking of people, their “goodness” or “badness” depends on the degree of freedom with which they can make a deliberate choice between different options. According to the contrary opinion, goodness presupposes, among other things, honesty, and the honest person is never mistaken that he is incapable of doing so. According to this, a sincere person with pure intentions can be better and more praiseworthy than others, even if he is naive in comparison with them and speaks and acts rashly. The moral quality of the intention is more important than the ability to see through the respective situation and to make appropriate decisions.

Socrates' provocative reasoning is obviously problematic. By emphasizing his uncertainty and the hypothetical and provisional nature of his position, he admits that too. He himself does not acknowledge the consequence to which his train of thought has led him. With this, Plato makes it clear that no finished solutions are presented here. Rather, the reader should be encouraged to think independently about the problem presented. In particular, the relationship between expert knowledge and ethical competence proves to be in need of clarification. Here there are two opposing concepts: the voluntaristic of Hippias, which takes into account the respective intentions of the agent, and the intellectualistic of Socrates, for whom only the extent of the existing insight establishes the ethical hierarchy. For Hippias, sincerity or insincerity is a fixed character trait, while Socrates assumes an ambivalent disposition that enables both and expresses itself differently depending on the situation. Hippias gets into a self-contradiction that he cannot resolve; Socrates is dissatisfied with his own concept because he realizes its inadequacy. That a cunning criminal should be better than a simple-minded righteous person is a consequence that Socrates does not seriously admit. But also the conventional judgment, defended by Hippias, seems unacceptable to him, according to which someone who is not tempted because of his ignorance and incompetence is better than someone who can choose and opts for something bad.

What is needed is a solution that goes beyond both approaches. This solution, which was not found in the Lesser Hippias , was brought forward by Plato in other works ( Protagoras , Apologie , Menon , Gorgias ) by Socrates. It consists in the principle that everyone strives for what is best for him and therefore nobody does a bad deed when he has recognized its badness. Every wrong decision is ultimately due to ignorance. Real insight includes not only the knowledge of what is useful for a given purpose, but always also the knowledge of the goodness or the badness of the purposes. Correct action inevitably follows from this knowledge (“radical ethical intellectualism”). Therefore, the discerning person can never intentionally commit an injustice. He can seem to act badly, for example by telling the untruth, but this is always justified by a higher-ranking goal and thus not an injustice, but right. In smaller Hippias , this solution is only hinted at: Socrates notes that a person who intentionally commits an injustice, "if there is such," can be none other than the best. The knower who always acts deliberately and deliberately on the basis of his knowledge is inevitably always the good one. Paradoxically, he cannot lose his goodness even if he acts badly. For Plato, however, this paradox, with which the Lesser Hippias ends, is canceled out by his thesis that this case cannot occur. According to the interpretation that is predominantly held in research, Plato denies the possibility that “there is such a thing”: the good who deliberately commits an injustice exists only theoretically. Michael Erler offers a slightly different interpretation . According to her, Plato thinks that these good guys can actually exist, but that his actions only appear bad if they are viewed from a limited perspective. Both interpretations have in common that, according to Plato's teaching, the good can never do something bad if he knows that it is not only apparently bad, but actually bad when all circumstances are considered.

A subject that is often discussed in the research literature is the question of the conclusiveness of Plato's Socrates argument. Most of the time, the evidence is criticized as flawed, but there are also voices to defend it. Some studies emphasize that the philosophical content of the dialogue can only be fully understood against the background of Plato's metaphysics . Some researchers believe that Plato deliberately used fallacies in Lesser Hippias to achieve a didactic goal.

Time of origin and historical background

The Lesser Hippias is one of the early works of Plato. According to the prevailing research opinion today, he was in the period between the execution of Socrates, which took place in the spring of 399 BC. Took place, and Plato's departure for Sicily, around 388 BC. Is dated. Some ancient scholars, however, argue for an earlier origin, while Socrates was still alive. According to their argument, after the execution of Socrates, who was sentenced to death for seducing the youth, it would no longer have been possible for Plato to have his teacher, whom he wanted to defend, take such an offensive view. It is controversial whether Plato's literary activity began before the death of his teacher.

The historical background is formed by Plato's engagement with sophistry, which appears here, as in other Platonic dialogues, in a very unfavorable light. His Hippias represents views that were common at the time and approved by the contemporary public, but in such an unreflective manner that he is embarrassed and exposed as a braggart. With this, Plato wants to point out the lack of philosophical competence of the sophists. Possibly the Lesser Hippias is also a reaction of Plato to a now lost work by the philosopher Antisthenes , in which the judgment of Odysseus was also discussed.

reception

Ancient and Middle Ages

The earliest evidence for the reception of the Lesser Hippias is a quote in the metaphysics of Plato's pupil Aristotle . Aristotle took a position on the subject both in Metaphysics and in his Nicomachean Ethics by choosing not the ability to deceive as an evaluation criterion, but rather the decision ( Prohairesis ) for appropriate activity. He rejected the arguments presented in the dialogue, but did not do justice to the line of thought of Plato's Socrates.

The beginning of Hippias minor in the first edition, Venice 1513

In the tetralogical order of the works of Plato, which apparently in the 1st century BC Was introduced, the Lesser Hippias belongs to the seventh tetralogy. The history writer of philosophy, Diogenes Laertios , counted him among the "refuting" writings and gave "About the lie" as an alternative title. In doing so, he referred to a now-lost script by the Middle Platonist Thrasyllos .

Ancient text witnesses have not been preserved. The oldest surviving manuscript of the Dialogue was made in the 10th century in the Byzantine Empire . In the Latin- speaking world of scholars in the West, the Lesser Hippias was unknown in the Middle Ages. The problem discussed in the dialogue was, however , familiar to the late medieval scholars from the metaphysics of Aristotle, with whom they intensively dealt with. Thomas Aquinas dealt with this in his Metaphysics Commentary.

Early modern age

In the west, the Lesser Hippias was rediscovered in the age of Renaissance humanism . The first Latin translation was done by the Italian humanist Marsilio Ficino . He published it in Florence in 1484 in the complete edition of his Plato translations. The first edition of the Greek text appeared in September 1513 in Venice by Aldo Manuzio in the complete edition of Plato's works published by Markos Musuros .

Modern

In the 19th and early 20th centuries, the ethical concept that Socrates represented in Lesser Hippias was perceived as so offensive that some researchers questioned or disputed Plato's authorship. In 1805, the influential Plato translator Friedrich Schleiermacher raised serious reservations about the authenticity of the dialogue in the introduction to the first edition of his translation of Lesser Hippias ; in 1818, in the second edition, he decided even more clearly in favor of the assumption of inauthenticity. Schleiermacher found the exercise of the dialectic strange and awkward. Another hypothesis is that some of the shortcomings in the work may be due to the fact that a design by Plato was worked out by one of his students. In more recent research, doubts about the authenticity of the work have largely disappeared, since Aristotle cites it by name - even if without naming Plato as the author. Occasionally, however, researchers continue to speak up who do not consider the doubts about the authenticity to be completely eliminated.

In the judgment of the philologist Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff , the smaller Hippias is not a masterpiece, but just a "trifle". Nevertheless it is "extremely valuable", since Plato introduces his teacher here "without the interference of morals"; the writing is only satire , but as such it is completely satisfactory. Ernst Heitsch thinks similarly . He regards the dialogue as a mere battle of words, a literary joke; as a playful representation of the art of conversation, however, it is a masterpiece, both in the choice of its “weighty and risky subject matter” and in the conduct of the conversation, in the indirect characterization of the two people and in the ambiguity at the end. Even Alfred Edward Taylor expects a relatively modest goal of the dialogue, finds him but brilliantly executed. Gerhard Müller, on the other hand, who also praises the artful conduct of the conversation, sees the Little Hippias as much more than a game; he thinks that the aporia lets Platonic metaphysics and ethics “shine through”. Michael Erler and Jörg Jantzen are among the philosophy historians who do not regard the Little Hippias as a gimmick, but as a serious expression of Platonic philosophy.

Editions and translations

  • Otto Apelt (translator): Plato: Hippias I / II, Ion . In: Otto Apelt (Ed.): Platon: Complete Dialogues , Vol. 3, Meiner, Hamburg 2004, ISBN 3-7873-1156-4 (translation with introduction and explanations; reprint of the 3rd edition, Leipzig 1935).
  • Gunther Eigler (Ed.): Platon: Works in Eight Volumes , Volume 1, 4th Edition, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 2005, ISBN 3-534-19095-5 , pp. 41-81 (reprint of the critical edition by Maurice Croiset, 9th edition, Paris 1966, with the German translation by Friedrich Schleiermacher, 2nd, improved edition, Berlin 1818).
  • Ludwig Georgii (translator): Hippias the smaller . In: Erich Loewenthal (Ed.): Platon: All works in three volumes , Vol. 1, unchanged reprint of the 8th, revised edition, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 2004, ISBN 3-534-17918-8 , pp. 149–170 .
  • Jan-Markus Pinjuh (translator): Plato's Hippias Minor. Translation and commentary . Narr, Tübingen 2014, ISBN 978-3-8233-6849-6
  • Rudolf Rufener (translator): Plato: Frühdialoge (= anniversary edition of all works , vol. 1). Artemis, Zurich / Munich 1974, ISBN 3-7608-3640-2 , pp. 161-183.
  • Bruno Vancamp (ed.): Plato: Hippias maior, Hippias minor . Franz Steiner, Stuttgart 1996, ISBN 3-515-06877-5 (critical edition).

literature

Overview representations

Investigations and Comments

  • Marcel van Ackeren : Knowledge of the good. Significance and continuity of virtuous knowledge in Plato's dialogues . Grüner, Amsterdam 2003, ISBN 90-6032-368-8 , pp. 54-64.
  • Michael Erler: The meaning of the aporias in the dialogues of Plato. Exercise pieces for guidance in philosophical thinking . De Gruyter, Berlin 1987, ISBN 3-11-010704-X , pp. 121-144.
  • Jörg Jantzen: Plato: Hippias minor or The Wrong True. About the origin of the moral meaning of "good". VCH, Weinheim 1989, ISBN 3-527-17622-5 (commentary).
  • Gerhard Müller: Platonic voluntariness in dialogues Hippias Elatton . In: Gerhard Müller: Platonic Studies . Carl Winter, Heidelberg 1986, ISBN 3-533-03819-X , pp. 34-52.
  • Jan-Markus Pinjuh: Plato's Hippias Minor. Translation and commentary . Narr, Tübingen 2014, ISBN 978-3-8233-6849-6
  • Thomas Alexander Szlezák : Plato and the written form of philosophy. Interpretations of the early and middle dialogues . De Gruyter, Berlin 1985, ISBN 3-11-010272-2 , pp. 79-90.

Web links

Remarks

  1. ↑ Florence, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, ms. 85.9, fol. 200r.
  2. ↑ Debra Nails: The People of Plato , Indianapolis 2002, p. 313; Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 142.
  3. ↑ See on the historical Hippias Debra Nails: The People of Plato , Indianapolis 2002, pp. 168f .; Michel Narcy: Hippias d'Élis . In: Richard Goulet (ed.): Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques , Volume 3, Paris 2000, pp. 755–758; Slobodan Dušanić: Hippias the Elean: the revolutionary activities and political attitudes of a Sophist . In: Aevum 82, 2008, pp. 41-50.
  4. ↑ See on Eudikos Slobodan Dušanić: Hippias the Elean: the revolutionary activities and political attitudes of a Sophist . In: Aevum 82, 2008, pp. 41-50, here: 44f.
  5. ↑ Plato, Hippias Minor 363a-365c.
  6. ↑ Michael Erler: The sense of the aporias in the dialogues of Plato , Berlin 1987, p. 121f. On Plato's positive assessment of Odysseus, see Fabio Massimo Giuliano: L'Odisseo di Platone. Uno ζήτηµα omerico nell'Ippia minore . In: Graziano Arrighetti (ed.): Ricerche di filologia classica , Vol. 4: Poesia greca , Pisa 1995, pp. 9-57.
  7. ↑ Plato, Hippias Minor 365c-369a.
  8. ↑ Plato, Hippias Minor 369a-371d.
  9. ↑ Plato, Hippias minor 370e – 371e.
  10. ↑ Plato, Hippias minor 371e-372a.
  11. ↑ Plato, Hippias minor 372a-376b.
  12. ↑ Plato, Hippias minor 376b – c.
  13. ↑ Plato, Hippias Minor 369b-c, 373b.
  14. ↑ Plato, Hippias Minor 363c-364a.
  15. ↑ Plato, Hippias minor 364a-b, 368b-e.
  16. ↑ Plato, Hippias Minor 376c.
  17. ↑ Plato, Hippias Minor 364a.
  18. ↑ Michael Erler: The meaning of the aporias in the dialogues of Plato , Berlin 1987, p. 121, note 1.
  19. ↑ Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, pp. 142f .; Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff: Plato. His life and his works , 5th edition, Berlin 1959 (1st edition Berlin 1919), p. 103f.
  20. ↑ Plato, Hippias Minor 376b.
  21. ↑ Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, pp. 144f.
  22. ↑ Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 434f.
  23. ↑ Plato, Hippias Minor 376b.
  24. ↑ This background was already emphasized by Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff: Plato. His life and his works , 5th edition, Berlin 1959 (1st edition Berlin 1919), p. 103. Cf. Marcel van Ackeren: Das Wissen vom Guten , Amsterdam 2003, pp. 59–62; Alfred Edward Taylor: Plato. The man and his work , 5th edition, London 1948, pp. 37f .; Jörg Jantzen: Plato: Hippias minor or The False True , Weinheim 1989, pp. XIII – XV.
  25. ↑ Michael Erler: The sense of the aporias in the dialogues of Plato , Berlin 1987, pp. 135-142. See Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 144.
  26. ↑ See Paul Friedländer : Platon , Vol. 2, 3rd, improved edition, Berlin 1964, pp. 127–129, 131–133.
  27. ↑ For the criticism see William KC Guthrie : A History of Greek Philosophy , Vol. 4, Cambridge 1975, pp. 195f .; John J. Mulhern: Τρóπος and πoλυτροπία in Plato's Hippias Minor . In: Phoenix 22, 1968, pp. 283-288; Charles H. Kahn: Plato and the Socratic dialogue , Cambridge 1996, pp. 115-118; in defense of Roslyn Weiss: Ὁ Ἀγαθός as Ὁ Δυνατός in the Hippias Minor . In: Classical Quarterly 31, 1981, pp. 287-304; Michael Erler: The meaning of the aporias in Plato's dialogues , Berlin 1987, pp. 121–144; Marcel van Ackeren: The knowledge of the good , Amsterdam 2003, pp. 54–64. See Jane S. Zembaty: Socrates' Perplexity In Plato's Hippias Minor . In: John Anton, Anthony Preus (eds.): Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy , Vol. 3: Plato , Albany 1989, pp. 51-69; Werner Boder: The Socratic Irony in the Platonic Early Dialogues , Amsterdam 1973, pp. 91–94. Michael J. O'Brien provides an overview of the older research: The Socratic Paradoxes and the Greek Mind , Chapel Hill 1967, pp. 99f. Note 11.
  28. ↑ Michael Erler: The sense of the aporias in Plato's dialogues , Berlin 1987, pp. 138–144; Gerhard Müller: Platonic Studies , Heidelberg 1986, pp. 34–52; Thomas Alexander Szlezák: Plato and the writing of philosophy , Berlin 1985, pp. 79–90.
  29. ↑ Rosamond Kent Sprague: Plato's Use of Fallacy , London 1962, pp. 65-79; Ernst Heitsch: Knowledge and Lifestyle , Stuttgart 1994, pp. 20–34; Charles H. Kahn: Plato and the Socratic dialogue , Cambridge 1996, pp. 116-120.
  30. ↑ Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 142; William KC Guthrie: A History of Greek Philosophy , Vol. 4, Cambridge 1975, pp. 191f. Plead for emergence during Socrates' lifetime u. a. Paul Friedländer: Platon , Vol. 2, 3rd, improved edition, Berlin 1964, p. 134; Ernst Heitsch: Was Socrates still able to read Plato's dialogues? In: Gymnasium 110, 2003, pp. 109–119; Ernst Heitsch: Plato and the beginnings of his dialectical philosophizing , Göttingen 2004, pp. 15–19, 25–34.
  31. ^ Andreas Patzer : Antisthenes der Sokratiker , Heidelberg 1970, pp. 174–176; Charles H. Kahn: Plato and the Socratic dialogue , Cambridge 1996, pp. 121-124; Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 145; Michael Erler: The meaning of the aporias in the dialogues of Plato , Berlin 1987, p. 122f. Note 11. Fabio Massimo Giuliano argues against the hypothesis of a connection between the two works: L'Odisseo di Platone. Uno ζήτηµα omerico nell'Ippia minore . In: Graziano Arrighetti (ed.): Ricerche di filologia classica , Vol. 4: Poesia greca , Pisa 1995, pp. 9-57, here: 43-50.
  32. ↑ Aristotle, Metaphysics 1025a.
  33. ↑ Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1127b.
  34. ↑ See also John Phillips: A study of Plato's "Hippias Minor" , New York 1987 (dissertation), pp. 13-20 and Michael Erler: Der Sinn der Aporien in Plato's dialogues , Berlin 1987, p. 132, notes 38 and the literature mentioned there.
  35. ↑ Diogenes Laertios 3: 57-60.
  36. ↑ On the text transmission, see Bruno Vancamp (ed.): Platon: Hippias maior, Hippias minor , Stuttgart 1996, pp. 10–48 (on the oldest manuscript, pp. 14f.).
  37. ↑ Michael Erler: The meaning of the aporias in Plato's dialogues , Berlin 1987, p. 132, note 38.
  38. ↑ See on this edition Bruno Vancamp (Ed.): Plato: Hippias maior, Hippias minor , Stuttgart 1996, p. 50f.
  39. ↑ See on this edition Bruno Vancamp (Ed.): Plato: Hippias maior, Hippias minor , Stuttgart 1996, p. 49f.
  40. ^ John Phillips: A study of Plato's "Hippias Minor" , New York 1987 (dissertation), pp. 10-12; Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 142; William KC Guthrie: A History of Greek Philosophy , Vol. 4, Cambridge 1975, p. 191.
  41. ^ Friedrich Schleiermacher: Hippias, the smaller conversation of this name. Introduction . In: Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher: About the philosophy of Plato , ed. by Peter M. Steiner, Hamburg 1996, pp. 162-167, here: 165-167.
  42. ↑ This is what Olof Gigon suspects : Introduction . In: Platon: Frühdialoge (= anniversary edition of all works , vol. 1), Zurich / Munich 1974, p. V – CV, here: LXIX.
  43. ↑ John R. Pottenger: The Sage and the Sophist: A Commentary on Plato's Lesser Hippias . In: Interpretation 23, 1995/1996, pp. 41-60, here: 41f.
  44. ↑ Gerard R. Ledger: Recounting Plato , Oxford 1989, pp. 158-160; Holger Thesleff : Platonic Patterns , Las Vegas 2009, p. 367. Thesleff is considering the possibility that a student of Plato wrote the dialogue.
  45. ^ Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff: Platon. His life and his works , 5th edition, Berlin 1959 (1st edition Berlin 1919), p. 104.
  46. ↑ Ernst Heitsch: Plato and the beginnings of his dialectical philosophizing , Göttingen 2004, pp. 15f., 18, 33.
  47. ^ Alfred Edward Taylor: Plato. The man and his work , 5th edition, London 1948, p. 35.
  48. ^ Gerhard Müller: Platonische Studien , Heidelberg 1986, pp. 34, 43, 49.
  49. ↑ Michael Erler: The sense of the aporias in Plato's dialogues , Berlin 1987, p. 144; Jörg Jantzen: Plato: Hippias minor or Der Falsche Wahre , Weinheim 1989, p. 112.
This version was added to the list of articles worth reading on January 23, 2014 .