Charmides

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The beginning of Charmides in the oldest surviving medieval manuscript, the Codex Clarkianus written in 895 (Oxford, Bodleian Library , Clarke 39)

The Charmides ( ancient Greek Χαρμίδης Charmídēs ) is an early work by the Greek philosopher Plato , written in dialogue form . The content is a fictional conversation between Plato's teacher Socrates and the youth Charmides , after whom the dialogue is named, and his cousin Kritias .

The two interlocutors of Socrates are historical persons. Charmides was the brother of Plato's mother Periktione ; Critias, as Periktione's cousin, was also largely related to Plato. Both later became well-known politicians of the oligarchical direction.

The dialogue tries to clarify what constitutes prudence (sōphrosýnē) and what its meaning and purpose consists of. The examination does not lead to a positive result; At least a promising approach would appear to suggest a definition according to which prudence is knowledge of one's own and other people's knowledge and ignorance, i.e. requires self-knowledge. This raises the question of whether knowledge that has itself as its object is even possible and what use it may have. Both questions remain open despite all efforts, clarity cannot be gained for the time being. Thus the dialogue ends in an aporia , a situation in which no solution is in sight.

In research there is a controversial discussion about which consequences Plato drew from the negative results of the investigation in Charmides and how he assessed the possibility of self-referential knowledge.

Place, time and participants

The philosophical discussion takes place in Athens , the hometown of the participants. The dialogue is introduced by a framework story in which Socrates appears as the narrator in conversation with a friend. He describes in detail to his friend the course of his conversation with Charmides and Critias, relying only on his memory. This narrative rendering of the main story as a past occurrence, the "narrative" or "dihegematic" form of literary dialogue, enables the author to give the reader additional information about the behavior and changing states of mind of the discussant. This is the advantage of the narrative form over the "dramatic" form, in which the conversation is presented directly in a scenic manner and the reader only experiences the bare wording of what is said. Looking back on the events that he describes to his listener, Socrates frankly responds to his feelings at the time.

According to Socrates, the venue for the discussion was the Palaistra des Taureas, a ring square that served as a popular meeting place for entertainment and sports. It was located in the south of the Acropolis across from the Temple of Persephone . Socrates gives the time of the dialogue action at the beginning: The evening before he “came back from the army in front of Poteidaia ”. He reports on a losing battle that took place shortly before. In older research literature, it was believed that the Battle of Poteidaia took place in the autumn of 432 BC. Chr. Is meant, but according to current research it is certain that it was the battle of Spartolus in May 429 BC. Acts. The historical Socrates took part in the entire campaign, which ran from 432 to May 429 BC. Lasted, participated. Thus Plato leaves the conversation in May 429 BC. Take place.

Bust of Socrates (1st century, Louvre , Paris)

Socrates, Charmides, Kritias and the philosopher Chairephon , a friend and student of Socrates, are involved. Charmides is a teenager (meirákion) , he is around 14 to 17 years old. Kritias is around thirty, Socrates forty. Socrates and Chaerephon are about the same age and have been friends since their youth. As in most of Plato's dialogues, Socrates is the main character. As usual, he is humble and ignorant. Nevertheless, he always steers the conversation in the direction he wants and leads the others to understand the inadequacy of their ideas. At first, Charmides is praised by Critias as being prudent; his behavior then shows his good temperament, but he is not really level-headed in the sense of a demanding understanding of this term. Critias is the guardian of Charmides, whose father has already died. He is far from “prudence” in the sense of moderation, prudence and self-control; he lacks the quality that is the subject of discussion. His aristocratic disposition and his contempt for the simple, working people stand out clearly; He considers commercial activity as a craftsman or trader to be a shame. In the discussion he is not inclined to get to the bottom of problems that arise; when he encounters an objection, he evades the difficulty with a fresh approach. Chairephon only takes the floor at the beginning; he does not take part in the discussion of the philosophical problem.

The plot is divided into two clearly separated parts: In the first phase of the discussion, Charmides is Socrates' partner, in the second, Critias takes on his role.

content

The framework story

As the narrator, Socrates reports that after his return from the campaign in the Palaistra he met many acquaintances, including Critias and Chaerephon. He asked them which of the young people who had grown up since he left three years ago had special mental or physical advantages. Both praised Charmides as the most beautiful, and when Socrates asked about spiritual qualities, Critias pointed out the thoughtful manner of his cousin. Charmides, whose beauty made a strong impression in the homoerotic milieu, was summoned. Socrates was also fascinated by the sight of the youth, but his real goal was the spiritual encounter with Charmides.

The description of this initial situation is followed by Socrates' report on the course of the discussion.

The first phase of the conversation

Charmides asks Socrates about a remedy for his headache. Socrates takes this as an opportunity to explain the concept of holistic medicine to him: You cannot heal the head on your own, but must pay attention to its connection with the rest of the body. Good doctors are aware of the need to treat the body as a whole in order to heal a part. This knowledge of Greek doctors is only a partial truth. Beyond them leads to an insight that he, Socrates, owes to Thracian doctors who invoked the god Zalmoxis . According to their deeper understanding of health, the body must be healed together with the soul, because everything good and bad in it has its origin in the soul. The healing of the soul consists in giving it prudence. Therefore, Charmides should first have his soul examined.

Socrates begins the investigation by asking Charmides whether he is really as levelheaded as Critias has claimed, or whether he is still missing something in this regard. In doing so, he embarrasses Charmides, who neither wants to utter offensive self-praise nor blame himself and contradict Critias. The two decide to investigate the question together.

First of all, Socrates argues that one can expect from a level-headed person that he is aware of his level-headedness and can thus also state what it consists of. Charmides thinks that prudence is expressed in the fact that everything is carried out in an orderly, deliberate, calm manner. On the other hand, Socrates objects that in many areas a quick, agile approach is superior to a slow one, both in physical exercise and in mental activities. But prudence must be something beautiful and something worth striving for under all circumstances; therefore it should not be equated with something that is in some cases worse than its opposite. Charmides sees this and now has to find a new approach. It occurs to him that prudence is a quality that makes people humble. This consideration leads him to his second proposal for a definition: He now equates prudence with “feeling of shame” (aidṓs) - modest restraint. But this attempt also fails. Socrates recalls that agreement has already been reached that prudence is an excellent thing. Accordingly, it is an absolutely good quality that necessarily always makes its wearer good. However, as Socrates explains, this does not apply to the feeling of shame, because there are also situations in which modest restraint is inappropriate and therefore bad. Modesty or modesty, like deliberation, is not a virtue , but turns out to be value-neutral .

Charmides then makes a third attempt with a line he heard from someone. According to the saying, he who “does his own thing” is prudent. Socrates is at first impressed; he expresses the assumption that the saying came from Critias or another "wise man". Critias immediately denies being the author. The reader is indirectly given to understand that Charmides took over the saying from his guardian and that Critias presented the thought to the boy as his own knowledge, although in reality he owed it to Socrates. Critias now wants to cover up this showing off from Socrates. Socrates then turns to the examination of the content, and the initially wise definition of prudence turns out to be problematic. Nobody just does “ his own thing ” in the sense that he is completely self-sufficient , only takes care of his own business and provides himself with everything he needs. Such self-sufficiency and with it the abolition of the social division of labor cannot be the goal of good legislation and state administration. Political prudence cannot consist of that. Therefore Socrates describes the saying as puzzling; Although it makes sense, its author is obviously not simple-minded, but one must first discover the hidden meaning. It is important to understand what is meant by "his own".

The second phase of the conversation

In the meantime, Critias has become impatient and has been able to curb his ambition only with difficulty. After the third unsuccessful attempt by Charmides, he intervenes in the debate, the rest of which takes place between him and Socrates. Critias takes over the defense and explanation of the enigmatic saying. He understands “his own” to be what is valuable and useful. Prudence consists in doing what is good . Socrates, on the other hand, argues that one can do something useful without understanding it. For example, a doctor can cure a patient without understanding the effects of his actions and without knowing beforehand whether the patient will respond to the therapy or not. For Socrates, however, this is not prudence, because the prudent person must be completely clear about his actions and their consequences. Only those who understand are prudent who are clear about their understanding. Critias also considers it a characteristic of prudence that one understands one's own correct action, that is, knows the reason for its correctness. Critias must therefore admit the inadequacy of his definition.

Critias then makes a new attempt: He now equates prudence with self-knowledge (not self-knowledge as an act). He invokes the famous saying “ Know yourself! “(Greek Γνῶθι σεαυτόν Gnṓthi seautón ) at the Temple of Apollo at Delphi . That is God's greeting to the temple goers. It is better than “Be happy!” (Χαῖρε Chaíre ), the usual greeting of the Greeks, because self-knowledge or prudence is more desirable than joy. Socrates replied that if prudence is a knowledge, then it must be a certain knowledge, a knowledge of something, just as medicine is a knowledge of the healthy. Health is the valuable product of medical knowledge, and a house is the valuable product of the architect's expertise. Similarly, Critias must be able to state what her product is for prudence. On the other hand, Critias objects that the comparison is inappropriate, because prudence is not a special, but a comprehensive knowledge. In this it resembles mathematics, which also does not produce a visible product like a craft or an art. Socrates admits this, but is not satisfied with it, because the question of what the object of prudence defined as knowledge or knowledge is remains unanswered. Critias takes up this question and explains that prudence differs fundamentally from all other types of knowledge precisely in that it is not limited to a single object that is different from it. Rather, it relates to all other areas of knowledge as well as to itself. It is knowledge of itself and at the same time all other knowledge. Not only knowledge, but also its opposite, ignorance, is the subject of such knowledge. According to this understanding, the prudent person knows the extent and the limits of his own knowledge and is also able to find out what others actually know and what not.

Socrates explains the difficulties that arise from this determination of prudence. The first question that arises now is whether it is even possible to know, or not know, what one knows and what one does not know. If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, then the question is what is the value of such knowledge. Socrates declares himself ignorant about this; With his considerations he had got into a seemingly hopeless situation. The idea of ​​a knowledge that has itself and its limits as well as foreign knowledge and ignorance as its object seems problematic to him, because he has not found anything in the world to which an analogous object area is assigned; to him nothing seems to be related to itself and at the same time to other things. Perceptions, impulses, acts of will and feelings are always directed towards concrete objects, never towards oneself. For example, fear always relates to something terrifying, not to oneself or to the fear of others. There is also no opinion that relates to other opinions as well as to itself, but has nothing to do with what the other opinions relate to. Socrates uses a number of examples to illustrate the problems that arise in assuming something self-referential. This assumption presupposes that the self-referential itself has the quality of its object. The ear hears tones; to hear itself it would have to have its own tone. Vision perceives colors; to see itself it would have to have its own color. How knowledge could fulfill this requirement of self-referentiality is completely unclear to Socrates. He does not see how one could find out whether something like this occurs anywhere and, if so, in which cases. Critias is also at a loss.

The clarification of the existence of the self-referential must be left aside. This is where the discussion turns to the hypothetical question of what content and usefulness self-referential knowledge in the sense of the proposed definition of prudence can have, if it exists. According to the statements of Socrates, which Critias recognizes as conclusive, prudence does not allow any well-founded judgments about the concrete if it is a knowledge related only to knowledge as such and not to its respective concrete object. With self-referential knowledge, one can only determine that someone has or does not have knowledge, but not what he knows. The respective special knowledge cannot be determined in terms of content in this way. For example, one cannot use prudence to check what a particular doctor is qualified for. This would require the examiner's own medical competence, and this has nothing to do with prudence. This seems to lead to the conclusion that prudence is of no use for living. Apparently it does not help people to feel good and happy. Thus it cannot be shown that prudence, understood as knowledge of knowledge, is a good for humans. The suspicion arises that it is overrated.

In the next train of thought, it will be examined again what the usefulness of self-referential knowledge might be. Socrates tells of a "dream", of his vision of a society in which prudence prevails. Since everyone there has the knowledge of knowledge, no one can pretend an ability that he does not have. Any such deception would be seen through. Nobody would do anything beyond their competence; only competent action would be possible.

But here the question arises for Socrates whether such a prudent life would also be good and happy. The two interlocutors agree that not every knowledge can lead to a good life. Neither technical knowledge nor a comprehensive knowledge of past, present and future conditions leads to eudaimonia , to a successful life that is associated with well-being or happiness. Rather, as Critias ascertains when asked by Socrates, only one knowledge is necessary: ​​that of the good and the bad. However, this does not make up prudence, but counts to useful knowledge, i.e. to a different category of knowledge. This raises the question, already addressed above, of whether prudence itself also has a use and what its meaning and purpose can consist of. If it is knowledge of knowledge, then - as Critias ascertains - it should be superior to useful knowledge, including knowledge of good and bad, and thereby at least indirectly be useful. However, Kritias does not succeed in naming a concrete benefit of knowing the knowledge. He has to admit that it neither makes people happy nor gives them a tangible advantage like a craft or a technique. So it seems to be useless. Socrates takes stock: Neither has it been possible to find out what is meant by prudence, nor has any use of the hypothetically assumed self-referential knowledge been discovered.

Finally, Socrates turns to Charmides again, who could draw the wrong conclusions from the disappointing outcome of the endeavor for philosophical knowledge. The very unsatisfactory result of the dialogue does not mean that prudence is actually worthless. Rather, the failure is only due to the fact that he, Socrates, does not have the acumen needed to clarify the question. Therefore, Charmides should not be misled. Rather, he should consider himself lucky if he is prudent. Charmides is now confused about prudence because he does not know what it is and whether he owns it or not. However, he does not believe that Socrates is as ignorant as he appears and decides to become his pupil and to learn from him in daily company.

interpretation

The modern discussions revolve - as is often the case with the interpretation of Plato's dialogues - especially around the question of the author's own position. According to the prevailing research opinion, this usually corresponds to the conception of his dialogue figure Socrates. In the present case, however, it is noticeable that assumptions that Plato has represented in other works such as the Apology by Socrates, and which he himself apparently agrees with, are apparently criticized in Charmides and appear as doubtful, problematic or wrong. In Charmides , the position of Socrates is that one cannot judge the competence of others in an area in which one is without expertise. According to the representation in other works of Plato, this is the custom of Socrates: He describes himself as ignorant, but is able to recognize the ignorance of others and to expose it in such a way that it is also recognizable for others.

Different approaches are used in research to explain this apparent or actual contradiction. According to the interpretation of John Stuart Mill is Charmides only a dialectical exercise that are discarded in some theories, but leads to no decision for a particular position. Another hypothesis is that Plato wanted to demonstrate the inadequacy of the Socratic method in resolving such questions. In doing so, he distanced himself from his teacher's approach or at least relativized their performance. He had come to the conclusion that the kind of insight that could be achieved within the framework of a Socratic investigation was unsuitable for solving the central task of philosophy: With it one could not advance to the knowledge that grasps virtue - here prudence which guarantee their possession and make people happy. To solve this problem another, non-Socratic way is necessary, which Plato claims as his own discovery. This interpretation is controversial. Against them it is argued that the criticism of a certain concept of a meta-science in Charmides does not hit the Socratic method of searching for knowledge through critical examination of proposed definitions (Elenchos), but only an unrealistic idea of ​​Critias about the task of a meta-science. Only judgments about technical competence are affected by the criticism, not the tests of ethical knowledge with which Socrates deals. Hugh H. Benson thinks that the argument in Charmides only poses a problem for part of the philosophical activity of the Platonic Socrates in accordance with the apology . The possibility of becoming aware of one's own ignorance and, despite it, of recognizing foreign ignorance, remains intact, and according to the description in Plato's early works, this was the main part of Socrates' life's work. In the Charmides only the possibility of recognizing someone else's competence in one's own ignorance is contested . This calls into question the ability of an ignorant student to judge a teacher's qualifications and to rationally decide whether to join him. Gabriela Roxana Carone does not see any serious danger in the arguments of Charmides for the Socratic project to achieve a limited “human wisdom” as described in the Apology . Charles H. Kahn examines the question of meta-knowledge using the four possible cases: X knows that he has knowledge of F; X knows that he does not have the knowledge of F; X knows that Y has knowledge of F; X knows that Y does not have the knowledge about F. Kahn considers Socrates' argument against the possibility of the last two cases, when X is ignorant, to be convincing. He sees this as a serious objection to the Socratic method of investigation described in the Apology . For Kahn, the solution lies in the assumption that Socrates' ignorance does not actually exist, but is only faked by him for didactic reasons. In reality, Socrates had the knowledge of the topics discussed in each case and thus also the competence to check foreign knowledge claims.

As with the other “aporetic” dialogues - which ended in perplexity - it remains open whether Plato considered the unresolved problems solvable and whether he himself had a solution that he withheld from the readers in order to encourage them to make their own efforts. He could have found a satisfactory solution from his point of view within the framework of his theory of ideas . In particular, the question of whether Plato considered knowledge that has itself as well as knowledge of others as its object to be possible and possibly useful is controversial. It is affirmed by Paul Natorp , Michael Erler and Gerhard Müller , among others, while Joachim Adamietz , Bernd Effe and Oded Balaban , among others, deny it . Ekkehard Martens believes that Plato wanted to reject the sophists' claim to self-referential knowledge, without thereby fundamentally excluding man's self-referential knowledge; he leaves open the possibility of this - for example as part of the self-referential knowledge of God - in Charmides . The aporetic outcome of the dialogue is mere sham vapor.

Vasilis Politis points out that in this dialogue Plato's Socrates argues both for and against the possibility and usefulness of self-referential knowledge. There is no contradiction in this, since the argument against reflective knowledge is based on a certain assumption about its object, namely that it consists exclusively of knowledge and ignorance; in the argument in favor of self-referential knowledge, however, there is no commitment to such exclusivity. Therefore only the first approach leads into the aporia, while the second offers the way out. The solution that Plato had in mind was that self-referential knowledge was not only reflexive, but also had other objects as well, which included good and evil. With this, Politis turns against an interpretation advocated by some historians of philosophy, according to which Plato wanted to show that self-referential knowledge is either impossible or, if it is possible, useless and therefore out of the question for the definition of prudence; rather, prudence must be determined as knowledge of good and evil. Politis suspects that Plato's Socrates could not have presented his solution in the dialogue, since he would then have had to show that reflective knowledge has several objects, but is still a unified knowledge and not a combination of two independent types of knowledge. To tackle this difficult task would have gone beyond the scope of the dialogue.

Another topic discussed in the research literature is the end of the dialogue: Charmides emphatically announces that he now absolutely wants to become a pupil of Socrates, even though the latter previously described himself as a poor researcher because of the unsatisfactory outcome of the investigation. Charmides has great hopes for future lessons, and Critias encourages him to do so. Thomas Alexander Szlezák sees here a reference to Plato's “ written criticism ”, his rejection of the written communication of certain particularly demanding philosophical contents. The Charmides had to end without any solution, as Plato did not want to spread writing critical knowledge. This knowledge was reserved for oral communication to qualified students. Therefore, at the end of the dialogue, Plato let Charmides enter into a student relationship with Socrates. The only purpose of the discussion was to test Charmides' qualification for a philosophical training.

Political background

Bust of Plato (Roman copy of the Greek Plato portrait of Silanion , Glyptothek Munich )

It is noticeable that Plato chose two very unpopular figures as the main characters alongside Socrates, Charmides and Critias. At the time the dialogue was drafted, both were completely discredited in the democratically ruled Athens , as their anti-democratic policies had led to a civil war and had ultimately failed catastrophically. They had 404–403 BC. BC, a quarter of a century after the action period of the dialogue, as well-known oligarchic politicians participated in the brief reign of terror of the Thirty and then fell in the fight against the victorious democratic forces. These events shaped her image in the period that followed. The "thirty tyrants" were remembered by posterity as brutal rulers. Chairephon, on the other hand, the fourth, mostly silent figure in Charmides , was a democrat. The importance of the bloody conflict between oligarchs and democrats as the backdrop to the action of dialogue is often emphasized in the research literature. Walter Thomas Schmid points out that the prudence praised in Charmides was especially valued in conservative, aristocratic circles in Athens. In this milieu one admired the undemocratic Spartan state and social order and judged the radically democratic constitution of one's hometown with disdain. The pure popular rule of the present was deprecated as a deviation from the tried and tested state system of an idealized past. Aristocratically-minded members of the Athenian upper class emphasized the importance of prudent state governance. They brought the consequently realized popular rule in connection with intemperance and recklessness, since far-reaching decisions were made by mood-dependent random majorities in the popular assemblies. Chairephon, a staunch supporter of Athenian democracy, is portrayed as impulsive in Charmides , which corresponds to this image. Even in the extremely conservative Spartan society, prudence was very important. The historical Critias distinguished himself especially through his glorification of the Spartan conditions. Under normal conditions, his anti-democratic sentiments precluded a political career in his hometown; only through a coup could he gain creative power.

Generally speaking, prudence was considered a virtue in Athens, but there were also certain reservations about it. It was widely believed that it was secondary to bravery and patriotism and not necessarily one of the qualities of a capable warrior.

The concept of prudence that Critias advocates in Charmides is used in research against the background of political developments from 404–403 BC. Considered. It is interpreted as an aspect of his oligarchical attitude and his striving for power. For Kritias, the “prudent” are an aristocratic elite who, because of their reason, are qualified to rule over the mass of the rash. His interest in the topic of dialogue is primarily based on the fact that it offers him the opportunity to legitimize the oligarchical claim to power. Plato's intention was in particular to work out the difference between the attitude of Socrates and that of Critias and to make the reader aware of the dubiousness of Critias' claim to competence. At the same time, he wanted to reject the accusation that Socrates once influenced Critias and Charmides and was thus complicit in their later fateful work.

The fact that Plato presented the two oligarchs hated in Athens in a lively philosophical conversation with Socrates in a friendly atmosphere and avoided any direct allusion to their later political role is interpreted differently in research. According to one hypothesis, he wanted to signal to the reader that the two had made a relatively decent impression at this early stage and that not all of Kritias' values ​​- especially the conservative ideal of prudence - had been discredited across the board. Possibly it was about defending against accusations that were directed not only against Socrates but also against Plato himself: his family connection with the two oligarchs and his skeptical attitude towards the democratic constitution of Athens suspected him of sympathizing with the oligarchy .

Emergence

It is undisputed that Charmides belongs to a group of early dialogues by Plato that are characteristic of leading to an aporia - a situation that seems hopeless. In older research it was considered one of the first works of the philosopher and was published in the 390s BC. Dated BC, but in more recent times a somewhat later classification has established itself: either towards the end of the first of the three phases, into which Plato's literary work is usually divided, or at the beginning of the second, middle phase. First and foremost, the 380s BC come into consideration. The ideas seem to point to the mature Platonism of the middle creative period of the philosopher. Some statements can only be satisfactorily explained by anticipating statements in later works.

reception

Ancient and Middle Ages

In ancient times, the Charmides received relatively little attention. In the tetralogical order of the works of Plato, which apparently in the 1st century BC It belongs to the fifth tetralogy. The historian of philosophy Diogenes Laertios counted him among the "examining" writings and gave as an alternative title about prudence . In doing so, he referred to a now-lost script by the Middle Platonist Thrasyllos .

The scholar Athenaios , who used to sharply criticize Plato, objected to an alleged contradiction in the representation of Socrates' relationship to Charmides.

Ancient papyri have not been preserved, the handwritten tradition does not begin until the 9th century. The text transmission is based on four text witnesses from the period from the 9th to the 13th century; all other manuscripts are copies that depend on these four. The oldest surviving manuscript was made in 895 in the Byzantine Empire for Arethas of Caesarea . In the west, the Charmides was unknown to the Latin- speaking scholarly world of the Middle Ages.

Early modern age

The beginning of Charmides in the first edition, Venice 1513

In the age of Renaissance humanism was Charmides rediscovered. The humanist Marsilio Ficino translated it into Latin, making it accessible to a broader reading public. He left out an explicitly sexual passage because he did not trust his contemporaries to be able to interpret such passages allegorically as he saw fit . He published the translation in Florence in 1484 in the complete edition of his Latin translations of Plato. Also Poliziano took a Latin translation in attack, which was begun in the 1470s, but apparently remained unfinished; the fragment from his estate was printed in 1498. A third translation comes from the humanist Janus Cornarius ; it was published in 1561 in a complete Latin edition of Plato's works in Basel.

The first edition of the Greek text was published in Venice by Aldo Manuzio in September 1513 as part of the first complete edition of Plato's works in the original language. The editor was Markos Musuros . Two prints followed in Basel in 1534 and 1556.

Modern

Plato's authorship was disputed in the 19th and early 20th centuries, in particular by Eduard Zeller . Today, as in ancient times, it is considered safe. The literary quality is generally rated highly. Michael Erler finds the composition, character drawing and linguistic design admirable, but the content irritating. Ernst Heitsch judges that Plato created a linguistic work of art in which the elegance and serenity of conversation develop against the background of the armed conflicts of the time. Everything is presented with a winning naturalness and the author also keeps an eye on the formal side of his balanced composition.

The philosophical content is assessed in particular from the point of view of its relationship to modern concepts. It is about the problem of reflection and self-confidence. Some researchers interpret the discussion of self-referential knowledge in Charmides as a contribution to the discussion on the problem of consciousness , others deny any connection with the question of consciousness. The proponents of the first interpretation differ from one another with regard to the question of whether Plato approved or rejected the thesis that beings are founded in consciousness.

The philosopher Klaus Oehler found in 1962 that a first-order philosophical problem was formulated in Charmides and then dropped again: the question of whether there is a knowledge of knowledge. This addresses the problem of self-awareness. What comes into view here is “exactly what constitutes the modern understanding of the world: the subjectivity that autonomously establishes itself and the world”. Theodor Ebert turned against this point of view in 1974 . In his view, interpreters who regard Plato's “knowledge of knowledge” as a paraphrase for the essence of self-confidence remain stuck with a historically inadequate horizon of problems. The discussion of Charmides is inadmissibly "brought under the categories of a problem of German idealism ". In 1985 Gerhart Schmidt praised the high intellectual level of the argument, which was amazing. He came to the conclusion that in the dialogue “the basis of the present age” comes into play and that “we ourselves are called for”. The work is an early masterpiece of the author, who here anticipates the principle of subjectivity, which the philosophy of the modern age wrote on its banner. In 1986, Karen Gloy assigned a key position to Charmides , because it was there for the first time in the history of Western philosophy that a comprehensive and multi-layered conception of self-confidence was presented and the various possibilities of interpretation and their difficulties played out. The dialogue forms the starting point for all later theoretical approaches. In 1987, Barbara Zehnpfennig compared Plato's answer to the question of a consistent knowledge and epistemology in Charmides with that of Johann Gottlieb Fichte in his work The Determination of Man , published in 1800 . She found that Fichte's approach was the basis of the modern theory of consciousness, but that Plato's examination of the problem was superior to her, since it anticipated and refuted the “basic structures of the modern philosophy of consciousness represented in Fichte”. Plato shows the untenability of the examined theories of autonomous knowledge. In 2002, Franz von Kutschera paid tribute to a pioneering achievement by Plato who, in Charmides , understood knowledge as a relation and introduced relation as a fundamental logical category. In the dialogue "the very first beginnings of epistemic logic , the logic of the concept of knowledge" can be found. The horizon of the discussions thus extends far beyond the virtue of prudence. For the first time, Plato grasped the concept of relation in such a general way that it encompassed all kinds of relations. Ernst Heitsch stated in 2004 that Plato was the first to recognize that knowledge that is under the alternative of “right or wrong” does not qualify for correct action in the moral and political field, but is value-neutral. This insight emerges from Charmides ; it constitutes one of Plato's most important legacies to posterity.

Editions and translations

Editions with translation

  • Gunther Eigler (Ed.): Plato: Works in eight volumes. Volume 1, 4th edition, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 2005, ISBN 3-534-19095-5 , pp. 287-349 (reprint of the critical edition by Maurice Croiset, 4th edition, Paris 1956, with the German translation by Friedrich Schleiermacher , 2nd, improved edition, Berlin 1818)
  • Ekkehard Martens (ed.): Plato: Charmides . Reclam, Stuttgart 1977, ISBN 978-3-15-009861-5 (uncritical edition with translation)

Translations

  • Otto Apelt : Plato's dialogues Charmides, Lysis, Menexenos . In: Otto Apelt (Ed.): Plato: All dialogues. Volume 3, Meiner, Hamburg 2004, ISBN 3-7873-1156-4 (with introduction and explanations; reprint of the 2nd, revised edition, Leipzig 1922)
  • Ludwig Georgii : Charmides . In: Erich Loewenthal (ed.): Plato: Complete works in three volumes. Volume 1, unchanged reprint of the 8th, revised edition, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 2004, ISBN 3-534-17918-8 , pp. 239-275
  • Rudolf Rufener: Plato: Frühdialoge (= anniversary edition of all works , volume 1). Artemis, Zurich / Munich 1974, ISBN 3-7608-3640-2 , pp. 41–80 (with an introduction by Olof Gigon )

literature

Overview representations

Comments

  • Michael Erler: The meaning of the aporias in the dialogues of Plato. Exercise pieces for guidance in philosophical thinking. De Gruyter, Berlin 1987, ISBN 3-11-010704-X , pp. 170-212
  • Marie-France Hazebroucq: La folie humaine et ses remèdes. Plato: Charmide ou de la modération. Vrin, Paris 1997, ISBN 2-7116-1297-X
  • Ernst Heitsch , Franz von Kutschera: To Plato's Charmides. Franz Steiner, Stuttgart 2000, ISBN 3-515-07786-3
  • Laurence Lampert: How Philosophy Became Socratic. A Study of Plato's Protagoras, Charmides, and Republic. University of Chicago Press, Chicago / London 2010, ISBN 978-0-226-47096-2 , pp. 145-240

Investigations

  • Drew A. Hyland: The Virtue of Philosophy. An Interpretation of Plato's Charmides. Ohio University Press, Athens (Ohio) 1981, ISBN 0-8214-0588-8
  • Gerhard Müller : Plato's philosophical art of dialogue (using the example of Charmides). In: Museum Helveticum 33, 1976, pp. 129–161
  • Walter Thomas Schmid: Plato's Charmides and the Socratic Ideal of Rationality. State University of New York Press, Albany 1998, ISBN 0-7914-3763-9
  • Gerhart Schmidt : Plato's criticism of reason or the double role of Socrates in the Charmides dialogue. Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 1985, ISBN 3-88479-221-0
  • Young-Sik Sue: Self-knowledge in Charmides. Its epistemological and ethical component in connection with the development of Plato's philosophy. Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2006, ISBN 3-8260-3006-0
  • Thomas M. Tuozzo: Plato's Charmides. Positive Elenchus in a “Socratic” Dialogue. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2011, ISBN 978-0-521-19040-4
  • Bernd Witte: The science of good and bad. Interpretations of Plato's 'Charmides'. De Gruyter, Berlin 1970
  • Barbara Zehnpfennig : Reflection and meta-reflection in Plato and Fichte. A structural comparison of the Platonic “Charmides” and Fichte's “Determination of Man” (= Symposion. Vol. 82). Alber, Freiburg / Munich 1987, ISBN 3-495-47619-9

Web links

Editions and translations

literature

Remarks

  1. See on the types of representation Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, pp. 71–75.
  2. For the location see Bernd Witte: The science of good and bad. Interpretations of Plato's 'Charmides' , Berlin 1970, p. 40 f.
  3. ^ Plato, Charmides 153a.
  4. Christopher Planeaux: Socrates, Alcibiades, and Plato's Τὰ Ποτειδεατικά. Does the Charmides have an Historical Setting? In: Mnemosyne 52, 1999, pp. 72-77; Debra Nails: The People of Plato , Indianapolis 2002, pp. 311 f .; Laurence Lampert: How Philosophy Became Socratic , Chicago 2010, pp. 237-240.
  5. Plato, Charmides 154b.
  6. ^ Plato, Charmides 163b – c.
  7. On the character of the individual dialogue characters and on the historical characters Kritias and Charmides, see Walter Thomas Schmid: Plato's Charmides and the Socratic Ideal of Rationality , Albany 1998, pp. 10-14; Thomas M. Tuozzo: Plato's Charmides , Cambridge 2011, pp. 52-90; Young-Sik Sue: Self-knowledge in Charmides , Würzburg 2006, pp. 27–44; Debra Nails: The People of Plato , Indianapolis 2002, pp. 90-94, 108-113; Voula Tsouna: Socrates' Attack on Intellectualism in the Charmides . In: Mark L. McPherran (ed.): Wisdom, Ignorance and Virtue (= Apeiron 30/4), Edmonton 1997, pp. 63-78, here: 63-72; Gerasimos Santas : Socrates at Work on Virtue and Knowledge in Plato's Charmides . In: Edward N. Lee et al. (Ed.): Exegesis and Argument , Assen 1973, pp. 105-132, here: 105-108.
  8. ^ Plato, Charmides 153a-155b. See the commentary by Laurence Lampert: How Philosophy Became Socratic , Chicago 2010, pp. 147-162.
  9. Plato, Charmides 155e-157c. See Laurence Lampert's comment: How Philosophy Became Socratic , Chicago 2010, pp. 162-169. For Thracian medicine and Zalmoxis, see the relevant articles in Thomas M. Robinson, Luc Brisson (eds.): Plato: Euthydemus, Lysis, Charmides , Sankt Augustin 2000, pp. 278-295 and Zoe Petre: “Zalmoxis, roi et dieu ". Autour du Charmide . In: Dacia 51, 2007, pp. 47-72; Francis P. Coolidge: The Relation of Philosophy to Σωφροσύνη: Zalmoxian Medicine in Plato's Charmides . In: Ancient Philosophy 13, 1993, pp. 23-36. See Mark L. McPherran: Socrates and Zalmoxis on Drugs, Charms, and Purification . In: Apeiron 37, 2004, pp. 11-33.
  10. Plato, Charmides 157c-158e. See Laurence Lampert: How Philosophy Became Socratic , Chicago 2010, p. 169 f.
  11. Plato, Charmides 158e-161b. See Laurence Lampert: How Philosophy Became Socratic , Chicago 2010, pp. 170-173; Michael Erler: The sense of the aporias in Plato's dialogues , Berlin 1987, pp. 171–177.
  12. ^ Gerhard Müller: Plato's philosophical art of dialogue (using the example of Charmides) . In: Museum Helveticum 33, 1976, pp. 129–161, here: 131.
  13. ^ Plato, Charmides 161b-162b. See Laurence Lampert: How Philosophy Became Socratic , Chicago 2010, pp. 173-178; Michael Erler: The sense of the aporias in the dialogues of Plato , Berlin 1987, pp. 177-181.
  14. See Theodor Ebert: Opinion and Knowledge in Plato's Philosophy , Berlin 1974, pp. 55–57.
  15. ^ Plato, Charmides 162c-164d. See Laurence Lampert: How Philosophy Became Socratic , Chicago 2010, pp. 178-185; Michael Erler: The sense of the aporias in Plato's dialogues , Berlin 1987, pp. 181–186.
  16. See Theodor Ebert: Opinion and knowledge in Plato's philosophy , Berlin 1974, p. 58.
  17. Plato, Charmides 164d-167a. See Aryeh Kosman: Virtues of Thought , Cambridge (Massachusetts) 2014, pp. 227-235; Laurence Lampert: How Philosophy Became Socratic , Chicago 2010, pp. 185-203; Michael Erler: The sense of the aporias in the dialogues of Plato , Berlin 1987, pp. 186-189.
  18. Plato, Charmides 167a – 169d. See Laurence Lampert: How Philosophy Became Socratic , Chicago 2010, pp. 203-208; Michael Erler: The sense of the aporias in Plato's dialogues , Berlin 1987, pp. 190–197.
  19. Plato, Charmides 169E-172c. See Laurence Lampert: How Philosophy Became Socratic , Chicago 2010, pp. 208-215; Michael Erler: The sense of the aporias in the dialogues of Plato , Berlin 1987, pp. 197-200.
  20. Plato, Charmides 172c-173d. See Laurence Lampert: How Philosophy Became Socratic , Chicago 2010, pp. 215-218; Michael Erler: The sense of the aporias in the dialogues of Plato , Berlin 1987, pp. 200-202.
  21. Plato, Charmides 173d-175d. See Hans-Georg Gadamer : Practical Knowledge . In: Gadamer: Gesammelte Werke , Vol. 5, Tübingen 1985, pp. 230–248, here: 235 f .; Laurence Lampert: How Philosophy Became Socratic , Chicago 2010, pp. 218-230; Michael Erler: The sense of the aporias in the dialogues of Plato , Berlin 1987, pp. 201-210.
  22. Plato, Charmides 175d-176d. See Laurence Lampert: How Philosophy Became Socratic , Chicago 2010, pp. 230-234; Michael Erler: The sense of the aporias in Plato's dialogues , Berlin 1987, pp. 210–212.
  23. ^ Charles H. Kahn: Plato and the Socratic Dialogue , Cambridge 1996, p. 197 f.
  24. ^ John Stuart Mill: Notes on Some of the More Popular Dialogues of Plato . In: Collected Works of John Stuart Mill , Vol. 11, Toronto 1978 (first publication), pp. 37-238, here: 186.
  25. Louis-André Dorion: Charmide . In: Richard Goulet (Ed.): Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques , Vol. 5, Part 1, Paris 2012, pp. 723–732, here: 730 f .; Young-Sik Sue: Self-knowledge in Charmides , Würzburg 2006, pp. 17–19; Richard McKim: Socratic Self-Knowledge and "Knowledge of Knowledge" in Plato's Charmides . In: Transactions of the American Philological Association 115, 1985, pp. 59-77.
  26. ^ Hugh H. Benson: A Note on Socratic Self-Knowledge in the Charmides . In: Ancient Philosophy 23, 2003, pp. 31–47, here: 33–40, 46.
  27. Gabriela Roxana Carone: Socrates' Human Wisdom and Sophrosune in Charmides 164c ff. In: Ancient Philosophy 18, 1998, pp. 267–286, here: 267 f., 285 f.
  28. ^ Charles H. Kahn: Plato and the Socratic Dialogue , Cambridge 1996, pp. 197-203.
  29. ^ Edward Halper: Is Knowledge of Knowledge Possible ?: Charmides 167a-169d. In: Thomas M. Robinson, Luc Brisson (eds.): Plato: Euthydemus, Lysis, Charmides , Sankt Augustin 2000, pp. 309-316.
  30. ^ Paul Natorp: Plato's theory of ideas , 3rd edition, Darmstadt 1961, pp. 25-29; Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 107; Michael Erler: The meaning of the aporias in Plato's dialogues , Berlin 1987, pp. 190–197; Gerhard Müller: Plato's philosophical art of dialogue (using the example of Charmides) . In: Museum Helveticum 33, 1976, pp. 129–161, here: 159–161. See Mary Margaret McCabe: Looking Inside Charmides' Cloak: Seeing Others and Oneself in Plato's Charmides . In: Dominic Scott (Ed.): Maieusis , Oxford 2007, pp. 1–19, here: 16–18; Alan Pichanick: Two Rival Conceptions of Sôphrosunê . In: Polis 22, 2005, pp. 249-264.
  31. Joachim Adamietz: To explain the main part of Plato's Charmides (164a – 175d) . In: Hermes 97, 1969, pp. 37-57; Bernd Effe: Plato's 'Charmides' and the 'Alkibiades' of Aeschines from Sphettos . In: Hermes 99, 1971, pp. 198-208; Oded Balaban: Le rejet de la connaissance de la connaissance, la thèse centrale du Charmide de Platon. In: Revue Philosophique de Louvain 106, 2008, pp. 663-693.
  32. Ekkehard Martens: The self-referential knowledge in Plato's “Charmides” , Munich 1973, pp. 84–91.
  33. Vasilis Politis: The Place of Aporia in Plato's Charmides . In: Phronesis 53, 2008, pp. 1–34, here: 4 f., 32–34. Cf. Theodor Ebert: Opinion and Knowledge in Plato's Philosophy , Berlin 1974, p. 75.
  34. Plato, Charmides 175e – 176d.
  35. ^ Thomas Alexander Szlezák: Plato and the writing of philosophy. Interpretations of the early and middle dialogues , Berlin 1985, pp. 127–150.
  36. Walter Thomas Schmid: Plato's Charmides and the Socratic Ideal of Rationality , Albany 1998, pp. 3–5, 12.
  37. ^ Walter Thomas Schmid: Plato's Charmides and the Socratic Ideal of Rationality , Albany 1998, p. 5 f.
  38. ^ Michael Eisenstadt: Critias' Definitions of σωφροσύνη in Plato's Charmides . In: Hermes 136, 2008, pp. 492–495.
  39. ↑ On this political background see Noburu Notomi: Critias and the Origin of Plato's Political Philosophy . In: Thomas M. Robinson, Luc Brisson (eds.): Plato: Euthydemus, Lysis, Charmides , Sankt Augustin 2000, pp. 237–250; Noburu Notomi: Ethical Examination in context. The Criticism of Critias in Plato's Charmides . In: Maurizio Migliori et al. (Ed.): Plato Ethicus. Philosophy is Life , Sankt Augustin 2004, pp. 245-254; Walter Thomas Schmid: Plato's Charmides and the Socratic Ideal of Rationality , Albany 1998, pp. 10-14. See Voula Tsouna: Socrates' Attack on Intellectualism in the Charmides . In: Mark L. McPherran (ed.): Wisdom, Ignorance and Virtue (= Apeiron 30/4), Edmonton 1997, pp. 63-78, here: 63 f.
  40. See on this aspect Gabriel Danzig: Plato's Charmides as a Political Act: Apologetics and the Promotion of Ideology . In: Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 53, 2013, pp. 486-519. See Thomas M. Tuozzo: Plato's Charmides , Cambridge 2011, pp. 53-90.
  41. Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 104; Gerhard Müller: Plato's philosophical art of dialogue (using the example of Charmides) . In: Museum Helveticum 33, 1976, pp. 129–161, here: 160 f .; Holger Thesleff : Platonic Patterns , Las Vegas 2009, p. 298; Gerhart Schmidt: Plato's Critique of Reason or the Double Role of Socrates in Dialogue Charmides , Würzburg 1985, p. 9; Bernd Witte: The science of good and bad. Interpretations of Plato's 'Charmides' , Berlin 1970, pp. 42–46.
  42. Diogenes Laertios 3: 57-59.
  43. Athenaios 5,187e – f.
  44. See on the text transmission David J. Murphy: The Manuscripts of Plato's Charmides . In: Mnemosyne 43, 1990, pp. 316-340.
  45. Oxford, Bodleian Library , Clarke 39 (= "Codex B" of the Plato textual tradition).
  46. James Hankins: Plato in the Italian Renaissance , 3rd edition, Leiden 1994, pp. 313, 452 f.
  47. See Ficino's translation by David J. Murphy: The Basis of the Text of Plato's Charmides . In: Mnemosyne 55, 2002, pp. 131–158, here: 150–153.
  48. ^ David J. Murphy, The Basis of the Text of Plato's Charmides . In: Mnemosyne 55, 2002, pp. 131–158, here: 153 f .; James Hankins: Plato in the Italian Renaissance , 3rd edition, Leiden 1994, pp. 449-453.
  49. ^ David J. Murphy, The Basis of the Text of Plato's Charmides . In: Mnemosyne 55, 2002, pp. 131–158, here: 154 f.
  50. See also Hans Herter : Self-knowledge of Sophrosyne . In: Hans Herter: Kleine Schriften , Munich 1975, pp. 305–315, here: p. 315 and note 49.
  51. Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 106.
  52. Ernst Heitsch: Plato and the beginnings of his dialectical philosophizing , Göttingen 2004, p. 93.
  53. See the research report by Ekkehard Martens: The self-referential knowledge in Plato's “Charmides” , Munich 1973, pp. 11-16.
  54. Klaus Oehler: The doctrine of noetic and dianoetic thinking in Plato and Aristoteles , Munich 1962, p. 108 f.
  55. ^ Theodor Ebert: Opinion and knowledge in Plato's philosophy , Berlin 1974, pp. 59–61.
  56. Gerhart Schmidt: Plato's Critique of Reason or the Double Role of Socrates in Dialog Charmides , Würzburg 1985, pp. 7, 9.
  57. Karen Gloy: Plato's theory of ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτῆς in Charmides as a forerunner of modern self-confidence theories . In: Kant-Studien 77, 1986, pp. 137–164, here: 139.
  58. Barbara Zehnpfennig: Reflection and metareflection in Plato and Fichte , Freiburg / Munich 1987, p. 13 f.
  59. ^ Franz von Kutschera: Plato's Philosophy , Vol. 1, Paderborn 2002, pp. 169, 180.
  60. Ernst Heitsch: Plato and the beginnings of his dialectical philosophizing , Göttingen 2004, p. 110.
This article was added to the list of excellent articles on May 19, 2015 in this version .