The purpose of man

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The determination of the human being (first edition 1800) is a popular philosophical work by Johann Gottlieb Fichte . It is expressly not aimed at specialist scholars, but "all readers who are able to understand a book at all" (preface p. IV). Fichte would like to lead these readers to self-knowledge by putting themselves in the role of the speaking ego and understanding its train of thought for themselves (preface p. V and VI).

Structure and background

The Context of the Philosophical Debate in the 18th Century

In the second half of the 18th century , by taking up Shaftesbury's philosophy, an attempt was made to answer the double question of the destiny of man and the existence of God solely through rational self- examination . The question quickly became - in closer or further connection with deism - an essential topic of theological and philosophical debate. Based on the many editions and reprints of the publication Contemplation on the Determination of Man by Johann J. Spalding , abbreviated to The Determination of Man from the 7th edition in 1763 , the topic was directly related to Spalding's work by Thomas Abbt and Moses Mendelssohn treated. Her writings were addressed to the educated public as easily understandable treatises. In academic philosophy the question was pursued further by Immanuel Kant . Fichte's book follows this fad, but at the same time marks its end. It is unusual that Fichte literally adopts the title of Spalding's writing for his work and is also clearly based on it in terms of style and structure. "In the meditative characteristic style, in the sequence of stages of insight into the destiny of man, but also in the overall movement of the world of sense to the spirit world and in the final religious orientation Fichte [s] will determine formally as a nachkantianische reworking of Spalding's determination of . ”In terms of content, Fichte's writing takes a completely different approach:" It's about the question of what it means to be a subject. "

Setup, templates, opposing positions

Fichte's writing is divided into three books with the titles "Doubt", "Knowledge" and "Faith". The first and last books are formal monologues based on Spalding's writing in the first person, the second is a dialogue between the self and the spirit . The second book is reminiscent of the Soliloquia of the Church Father Augustine , in which there is a dialogue between an I and reason ( ratio ). In terms of content, Fichte's views can be read as a discussion of Baruch de Spinoza in the first and Immanuel Kant in the second.

The 'Atheism Controversy' 1798/99 and The Determination of Man 1800

The immediately preceding atheism dispute (1798/99) is relevant as the immediate background of the origin of the determination of man :

Fichte had been accused from various quarters on the basis of an essay "On the basis of our belief in a divine world government" of denying God with his philosophy. Fichte defends himself against this accusation in his "Appellation to the audience" (2nd edition 1799). At the beginning Fichte already presents his thoughts on the determination of man in detail and even outlines the three-part outline of the determination of man when he describes his own philosophical system: "It shows against those who exist our entire knowledge from the nature independent of us Wanting to explain things [see 1st book] that there are things for us only insofar as we are conscious of them [see 2nd book, pp. 73-122] and we therefore with our declaration of consciousness about ourselves independently existing things can never arrive [cf. 2nd book, pp. 122-178] It asserts - and this is its essence - that a certain way of thinking is established through the basic character and the original disposition of humanity in general [cf. Book]."

The form of the determination to animate the reader with a figure to identify with certain sentences is also already pre-formed at one point in the 'appellation': "It is often just not quite pushing itself out of the chests of everyone among the business and joys of life ignoble people the sigh: such a life cannot possibly be my true destiny, it must, oh there must still be a completely different condition for me! "

The idea of ​​God is also taken over unbroken: In the determination , the absolute is presented as in the appellation to the public as an implication of Fichte's philosophy. This Absolute can be called God - in the third book the speaking ego even addresses it directly as "God" (pp. 304-312). However, this 'you', as already mentioned in the atheism dispute, is expressly thought of as non-personal: "There are limits to the concept of personality. How could I transfer that to you without them?" (P. 306) Fichte continues the criticism of his objectionable essay of an anthropomorphic conception of God: "This being should [...] have personality [...] but that you have this [the term 'personality'] without limitation and finiteness absolutely neither thinks nor can think can teach you the slightest attention to your construction of this concept. You therefore make this being by the addition of that predicate into something finite, into a being of your own kind, and you did not think God as you wanted, but only multiply yourselves in thinking. "

At the end of the appellation , Fichte finally ponders whether there is a "completely unsuspicious theologian" of atheism whom he can name as "my informant" and supporter of his views - and turns directly to the author of the definition of man: "Would you like to Venerable Father | Spalding, whose destiny of man it was that threw the first germ of higher speculation into my youthful soul, and whose writings all, like the one mentioned, characterize the striving for the supersensible and immortal - you would like in mine Can and want to agree! ". This continuity perceived by Fichte clearly expresses his own human determination .

content

First book. Doubt.

In the first book, “Doubt”, Fichte wants to show the consequences of a Spinozite philosophy understood as naturalistic or metaphysical determinism (perhaps it is already a first reflexion on Schelling's natural philosophy ): When man is entirely determined from the outside and only himself can perceive as being moved by external forces, then something as central as one's own love - "my holiest" (p. 66) - becomes an illusion; because free will does not exist: "The object of my deepest affection is a chimera, a palpable detected gross misrepresentation shop is mine and is an alien to me quite unknown force" (p. 65). The alternative of subordinating this unwanted knowledge to love is no less problematic (p. 69). In view of two paths that are not to be recommended, the ego remains helpless at first.

Second book. Knowledge.

In the second book, "Knowledge", Fichte tries to introduce the reader to the fundamentals of Kant's transcendental philosophy and then to show him its aporias. In addition, he gives the ego, who is faced with a bad alternative through Spinozism, a counterpart that promises to free him from this situation: the spirit (p. 72). To get rid of all horror images, only the decision to use one's own mind is necessary, he promises. In his acclamation "Ermanne dich" (p. 74) the famous translation of Sapere aude by Kant is clearly heard : "Have the courage to use your own understanding!" In dialogue, the spirit leads the ego into the basics of Kant's epistemology a. But then the postulate of a thing in itself is proven to be erroneous (pp. 148–161). The ego and its perceptions thus dissolve into a meaningless change without any real reference; thinking becomes a dream of a dream. The bitter realization of the ego is: "There is [...] no lasting, neither outside of me nor in me, but only an incessant change. [...] Images are: they are the only thing that is there , [...] Pictures without anything depicted in them, without meaning or purpose. I myself am one of these pictures; yes, I am not that myself, but only a confused picture of the pictures. " (P. 172 and 173) When the ego accuses the spirit of having deceived it, the latter only replies that it was already fully aware before the ego, "how all reality would be completely destroyed by those principles and transformed into a dream [ ...] I wanted | to free you from your false knowledge, but in no way wanted to teach you the true one. " (Pp. 175 and 176) After this second course of knowledge, both a primacy of the external world in the sense of Spinoza and a primacy of subjective consciousness in the sense of Kant are proven as epistemological errors. Therefore, in the third book, Fichte now turns to the solution of the epistemological problem.

Third book. Faith.

In the third book, "Faith", the "I" finally comes to the insight that self-determined action is decisive for consciousness: "Not just knowing, but acting according to your knowledge is your determination: so it sounds aloud in the innermost part of my soul [...] There is a drive in me to absolutely independent self-activity [...] it is inseparably united with the consciousness of myself. [...] Who am I? Subject and object in one, the omnipresent consciousness and consciousness, looking and looking, thinking and thought at the same time ”(pp. 182-185). “All my thinking must relate to what I do […]” (p. 202).

The spirit of nature

But Fichte demands something “beyond the mere idea that is there, and was, and will be, even if the idea were not” (3/1). The inner voice tells him that the human being is essentially a supersensible being and that this corresponds to the spirit of nature: “The nature in which [he] has to act, [be] not a strange one, regardless of [himself] A creature brought up, into which [he] could never penetrate. It [was] formed by its own laws of thought, and [must] agree with them; it [must] be transparent and recognizable everywhere, and penetrable to its core. It expresses nothing everywhere but relationships and relationships of one himself to [himself], and as certain as he [could] hope to know myself, so certain [he may] promise himself, it to explore ”(3/3). This happens in the four parts (I-IV) of the 3rd book:

Connection to the eternal will

In Part IV, Fichte summarizes the results of his considerations. In his model he places man in a transcendent, supersensible, eternal context and presupposes a “law of a spiritual world” under which the “will of all finite beings stands” (3 / IV / 1). He sees the sensual, finite world as “the result of the eternal will in us” (3 / IV / 2). The world, however, needs finite reason and this part of creation entrusted to man by God is the root of his knowledge. His “mind” and his “thoughts, if only they are true and good” (3 / IV / 2) are the connection to the eternal will, because it is not separate from it: “Your voice resounds in me, mine resounds in you again ”. (3 / IV / 2). In the minds of the people he continues to develop this world and intervenes in it and "continually lets other states arise from our states" (3 / IV / 2). And this voice calls on people to “duty”. In this the author sees his “determination in the series of rational beings” (3 / IV / 2) for the fulfillment of the “ordinance of the spiritual world plan” (3 / IV / 3). The eternal spirit would like to realize itself with him, through people: “Through all”, “a great, free, moral community should be brought forth” (3 / IV / 3).

The incomprehensible

At the end of his investigation, however, Fichte admits that he cannot understand the consequences of this will and thus the determination of the human being in the system: “What I should become and what I will be, everything is beyond my thinking” (3 / IV / 5 ). “What I understand becomes finite through my mere comprehension; and this can never be transformed into infinity even through infinite heightening and exaltation ”(3 / IV / 2). It is also impossible to trace world-historical developments based on "cowardice, wickedness and mutual distrust of people" (3 / IV / 3), and thus the "plan that extends over the whole" (3 / IV / 5.), which could not be similar to the human, to understand. Because "Nature, and natural success in the fates and effects of free beings, becomes an empty, meaningless word towards you" (3 / IV / 3).

The role of evil in nature

"[S] even that in the world that we call evil, the result of the abuse of freedom, [be] only through him" (3 / IV / 3). Here Fichte takes up the often discussed question of the "rule of evil" in the world. Good intentions often lead to disaster, and vice versa, unjust conditions lead to resistance and an improvement in the situation. He explains this with the ambivalence of nature: "The virtuous [is] a noble, the vicious a ignoble and reprehensible nature, but necessarily arising from the context of the universe" (1 / IV / 7). Fichte believes in a painful healing, in the course of which "cowardice and slavery [are] exterminated, and despair awakens lost courage" (3 / IV / 3). “Then the two opposing vices will have destroyed one another, and the most noble thing in all human conditions, lasting freedom, will have emerged from them” (3 / IV / 3): “Nature leads man through want to diligence, through evils the general disorder to a legal constitution, through the tribulations of their incessant wars to final eternal peace ”(3 / IV / 3). The result of the investigation is that people can only take responsibility for themselves. It is his duty to improve himself, to train his mind, “to represent all of humanity in all its fullness, but not for the sake of humanity itself; this in itself [is] not of the lowest value, but in turn in order to present in humanity the virtue, which alone has value in itself, in its highest perfection ”(3 / IV / 5). The best way to describe this provision is “artless simplicity, when it recognizes this life for an examination and educational institution, for a school for eternity; when she sees your destinies in all destinies [...], which should lead to good; when she firmly believes that those who love their duty and know you must serve all things for the best ”(3 / IV / 3). The hope of progress in development leads to a relaxed attitude towards life: “There is only one thing I want to know: what to do, and I always know that infallibly. I know nothing about everything else […] and I refrain from thinking […] No event in the world can set me in motion through joy, none through sadness […] because I know that I cannot interpret a single one , can still see its connection with what is important to me ”(3 / IV / 6). From this insight Fichte derives an attitude of calm “in all events in the world” (3 / IV / 3).

Human freedom

From human freedom, however, it follows that "there are also" free beings destined for reason and morality, who fight against reason and use their forces to promote unreason and vice "(3 / IV / 6). Fichte partially relieves these people. A "love of evil [...] which alone [s] could provoke a righteous anger" lies "not in human nature" (3 / IV / 6). For them there is no bad or good at all, "only something pleasant or unpleasant". She would be "not under her own authority, but under the force of nature [...] within [her], which seeks the former [the pleasant] with all its might and the latter [the unpleasant] flees" (3 / IV / 6) . Many people could "not act in the least [...] differently than they act". In this, however, lies “their guilt and their disgrace, that they are what they are and that instead of being free and something for themselves, they surrender to the flow of blind nature”. Because they only acted really freely when they opposed the “blind and willless nature” 3 / IV / 6). From these insights it never occurs to Fichte “to want to rule the world instead of himself” (3 / IV / 5). He is only the "tool [] of the purpose of reason" (3 / IV / 6). Therefore, in his actions as well, man must honor his own responsibility and "freedom of other beings besides [him] in his actions" (3 / IV / 5), in that he only wants to "directly affect their convictions and their will [], as far as the order of society and its own consent permit; but by no means without their conviction and without their will to their strengths and circumstances ”(3 / IV / 5), because“ they do on their own responsibility what they do, what I cannot or may not change, and the eternal will will direct everything to the best "(3 / IV / 5).

The immortality of the spirit

From his own individual spirituality, which could not coincide with the material end, Fichte concludes that the spirit is immortal. The universe bears the “stamp of the spirit; constant progress towards the more perfect in a straight line that goes into infinity ”(3 / IV / 6). "All death in nature [be] birth [...] There [be] no killing principle in nature, for nature [be] absolutely pure life": "Even my natural life, even this mere representation of the inner invisible life the view of the finite, it cannot destroy, because otherwise it would have to be able to destroy itself; she who is only there for me and for my sake and is not when I am not. Precisely because it kills me, it has to revive me; it can only be my higher life, developing in it, before which my present one disappears; and what the mortal calls death is the visible appearance of a second revival ”(3 / IV / 6). The world is only the “curtain” by which an “infinitely more perfect” is covered, and the “germ” from which it is to develop (3 / IV / 6).

analysis

Similar to René Descartes in his Meditationes , Fichte finds refuge from doubt in knowledge ( cogitatio ) . But he does not want to stop at this knowledge because it completely determines man as a natural being (cf. the dogmatism of Spinoza ) and is only able to satisfy the mind, while the heart's demand for freedom and responsibility remains unfulfilled. The individual can only acquire this freedom through self-knowledge (cf. Kant's Sapere aude , the Socratic philosophy). The I can only find true knowledge in itself, because there is no "thing outside of me". Everything that surrounds me is just the product of my imagination. Nature has no purpose in itself, but is only there for me, that is to say through it I can reach my true destination.

literature

swell

  • Volume 2, pp. 165-319 of the complete edition of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences. Edited by Reinhard Lauth, Erich Fuchs and Hans Gliwitzky, Stuttgart - Bad Cannstatt 1962 ff. ISBN 3-7728-0138-2 .
  • Volume 1, pp. 219–376 of the works in 2 volumes. Edited by Wilhelm G. Jacobs, Peter L. Oesterreich , Frankfurt a. M. 1997. ISBN 3-618-63073-5
  • The purpose of man. Based on the edition by Fritz Medicus, revised by Horst D. Brandt. With an introduction by Hansjürgen Verweyen , Hamburg 2000. ISBN 3-7873-1449-0 .
  • The purpose of man. Edited by Theodor Ballauff and Ignaz Klein, Philipp Reclam jun. Stuttgart 1997. ISBN 3-15-001201-5 .

Secondary literature

  • Harald Münster: Fichte meets Darwin, Luhmann and Derrida. "The determination of the human being" in differential theory reconstruction and in the context of the "Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo" ; Amsterdam, New York: Rodopi 2011 (Spruce Study Supplementa, Volume 28). ISBN 978-90-420-3434-1
  • Bernhard Pansch: Fichte's "Determination of Man" and Schleiermacher's "Monologues" . Vetterli, Buxtehude 1885 ( digitized version )
  • Peter L. Austria & Hartmut Traub: The whole spruce. The popular, scientific and metaphilosophical opening up of the world. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 2006. ISBN 3-17-018749-X . P. 267-
  • Laura Anna Macor: The Destiny of Man (1748–1800). A conceptual story. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 2013 (FMDA II, 25). ISBN 978-3-7728-2615-3

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ 'The Determination of Man' is quoted with the page numbers of the original edition from 1800: https://archive.org/stream/bub_gb_vF8AAAAAMAAJ#page/n11/mode/2up , accessed on April 13, 2020
  2. ↑ Cf. Norbert Hinske (ed.): The determination of man. Hamburg 1999 (= Enlightenment, Volume 11, Edition 1. Comprehensive presentation by Laura Anna Macor: The determination of people (1748–1800). A conceptual history.) Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 2013 (FMDA II, 25). ISBN 978-3-7728-2615-3
  3. ↑ Cf. Günter Zöller, The determination of the determination of people in Mendelssohn and Kant. In: Volker Gerhard, Rolf Peter Horstmann, Ralph Schumacher (eds.): Kant and the Berlin Enlightenment. Files of the IX. International Kant Congress. Vol. 4. Berlin 2001, ISBN 978-3-11-016979-9 . Reinhard Brandt: The determination of people in Kant. Hamburg 2007. ISBN 9783787318445
  4. ↑ See § 41. For the last time the determination of the human being (1800), in: Laura Anna Macor: The determination of the human being (1748–1800). A conceptual story. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 2013 (FMDA II, 25). ISBN 978-3-7728-2615-3 p 317ff.
  5. ↑ Günter Zöller, The determination of the determination of humans in Mendelssohn and Kant. In: Volker Gerhard, Rolf Peter Horstmann, Ralph Schumacher (eds.): Kant and the Berlin Enlightenment. Files of the IX. International Kant Congress. Vol. 4. Berlin 2001. ISBN 978-3-11-016979-9 . P. 482
  6. ^ Gunnar Hindrichs, The standpoint of natural thinking. Fichte's determination of man in dealing with Jacobi's "unphilosophy", In: Birgit Sandkaulen (ed.), System und Systemkritik. Contributions to a basic problem of classical German philosophy. Critical Yearbook of Philosophy, Volume 11. Königshausen & Neumann: Würzburg 2006, pp. 109–129. ISBN 978-3-8260-3381-0 p. 111
  7. ↑ In detail on the atheism dispute: Harald Münster: Fichte meets Darwin, Luhmann and Derrida. "The determination of the human being" in differential theory reconstruction and in the context of the "Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo"; Amsterdam, New York: Rodopi 2011 (Spruce Study Supplementa, Volume 28). ISBN 978-90-420-3434-1 . P. 12ff. See Peter L. Oesterreich & Hartmut Traub: The whole spruce. The popular, scientific and metaphilosophical opening up of the world. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 2006. ISBN 3-17-018749-X . P. 267 m. Note 34
  8. ↑ Philosophical Journal of a Society of Teutscher Scholars, ed. by Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer, Vol. VIII, First Issue, Jena and Leipzig 1798, pp. 1–20. http://anthroposophie.byu.edu/mystik/grund.pdf accessed on April 13, 2020
  9. ↑ Appellation to the audience, in: Werner Röhr (ed.): Appellation to the audience. Documents on the atheism dispute over Fichte, Forberg, Niethammer. Jena 1798/99. Leipzig 1987. ISBN 3-379-00074-4 . P. 93.
  10. ↑ Ibid. P. 93f.
  11. ↑ On the reason for our belief in a divine world government, in: Werner Röhr (ed.): Appellation to the audience. Documents on the atheism dispute over Fichte, Forberg, Niethammer. Jena 1798/99. Leipzig 1987. ISBN 3-379-00074-4 . P. 20.
  12. ↑ Appellation to the audience, in: Werner Röhr (ed.): Appellation to the audience. Documents on the atheism dispute over Fichte, Forberg, Niethammer. Jena 1798/99. Leipzig 1987. ISBN 3-379-00074-4 . P. 119.
  13. ↑ Appellation to the audience, in: Werner Röhr (ed.): Appellation to the audience. Documents on the atheism dispute over Fichte, Forberg, Niethammer. Jena 1798/99. Leipzig 1987. ISBN 3-379-00074-4 . P. 119.
  14. ↑ Appellation to the audience, in: Werner Röhr (ed.): Appellation to the audience. Documents on the atheism dispute over Fichte, Forberg, Niethammer. Jena 1798/99. Leipzig 1987. ISBN 3-379-00074-4 . P. 119 and 120.
  15. ↑ See Albrecht Beutel, Enlightenment Higher Order? The determination of religion in Schleiermacher (1799) and Spalding (1797), in: Albrecht Beutel: Reflektierte Religion. Contributions to the history of Protestantism. Tübingen 2007, pp. 266-290. ISBN 978-3-16-149219-8 . P. 272 ​​m. Note 46.
  16. ↑ See Peter L. Austria & Hartmut Traub: The whole spruce. The popular, scientific and metaphilosophical opening up of the world. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 2006. ISBN 3-17-018749-X . P. 270f.
  17. ↑ See Peter L. Austria & Hartmut Traub: The whole spruce. The popular, scientific and metaphilosophical opening up of the world. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 2006. ISBN 3-17-018749-X . P. 271 m. Note 38
  18. ↑ Core sentence: "I am an utterance, determined by the universe, of a natural force determined by itself.", P. 243, volume 1, works in 2 volumes (see above).
  19. ↑ "Dare to become truly wise. (...) I [sc. The spirit] will not bring you any new revelations. What I can teach you, you have known for a long time, and you should only remember it now.", P 254, volume 1, works in 2 volumes (see above).
  20. ↑ p. 294, volume 1, works in 2 volumes (see above).
  21. ↑ "Let my world be - the object and sphere of my duties, and absolutely nothing else." S. 316, volume 1, works in 2 volumes (see above)

Web link