Euthyphro

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The beginning of the Euthyphron in the oldest surviving medieval manuscript, the Codex Clarkianus written in 895 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, Clarke 39)

The Euthyphron ( ancient Greek Εὐθύφρων Euthýphrōn ) is an early work by the Greek philosopher Plato , written in dialogue form . The content is a fictional conversation between Plato's teacher Socrates and his emphatically religious fellow citizen Euthyphron, after whom the dialogue is named. The subject is the definition of piety , whose relationship to ethics is examined.

Euthyphron tells Socrates that he is bringing charges against his father for a homicide . He is convinced that the law is on his side and that he is acting piously. Socrates takes this unusual situation as an opportunity to have a philosophical conversation with Euthyphron about piety. Together they try to determine what constitutes piety. In doing so, they come across an essential aspect of the topic, which is formulated here for the first time and is therefore known today in philosophy and theology as the euthyphro dilemma . The question is whether something has to be considered morally correct if it conforms to the will of a god who sets all norms, or whether what is ethically correct is in and of itself correct and is willed by the divinity for this reason . The importance of the question lies in the far-reaching ethical and theological consequences of answering it. However, this is not a problem for the two interlocutors, because they consider it evident that it is not the godliness that causes something to be ethically correct, but the ethical correctness is the cause of the godliness.

It is not possible to define piety satisfactorily and to clarify its relationship to justice . The dialogue leads to an aporia , an apparently hopeless situation. Euthyphron gives up and breaks off the conversation.

Place, time and participants

Socrates (Roman bust, 1st century, Louvre , Paris)

The dialogue takes place in Athens , near the portico of the Archon Basileus courthouse . Only two people are involved, Socrates and Euthyphron.

Apart from two dialogues of Plato, no contemporary sources testify to the existence of Euthyphron. Hence the possibility that Plato invented it is to be expected. This is supported by his meaningful name (“the straight-minded”), which means that he thinks in a straight line and quickly makes connections. However, it is usually assumed in research that this friend of Socrates really lived. In the dialogue with Kratylos , Plato mentions a euthyphron from the Demos Prospalta in Attica , who shares his religious inspirations with enthusiasm. Apparently it is about the same person as in the Euthyphron . Euthyphron was a fortune teller. He may have been a priest, but nowhere is this explicitly stated. According to Plato's account, his fellow citizens viewed him as an outsider and not taken seriously. Apparently he was advocating a traditional religious concept, but in a radical, alien-looking way. This resulted in a certain solidarity with Socrates, who also fell out of line with his unusual demeanor and provocative claims and caused offense.

The time of the dialogue action is the spring of 399 BC. The dating results from the fact that Socrates has already been charged, which then led to his conviction and execution. Euthyphron is probably in the fifth decade of life, Socrates is seventy years old. The homicide that Euthyphron accuses his elderly father of must - if it is historical - no later than 404 BC. BC on the island of Naxos , because the Athenian settlers ( clergy ) living there , to which Euthyphron's father apparently belonged, had to leave Naxos after Athens suffered a heavy defeat in the Battle of Aigospotamoi in 405 .

content

Introductory talk

Socrates went to the courthouse on the charges brought against him by a young man named Meletus. There he meets his friend Euthyphron, who asks him about the reason for his presence. Socrates reports of the impending trial and the accusation that he is corrupting the youth and inventing new gods instead of believing in the old ones. Euthyphron tells of his indictment against his father, which he intends to file or has already filed. The man whose father was responsible for his death was not a relative, but a foreign day laborer who worked in the fields. When he was drunk, he slew a slave in anger. The father then had him tied up and thrown into a pit. While the father obtained legal advice, he did not concern himself with his prisoner. The day laborer fell victim to hunger and the cold before the messenger from Athens arrived with the information. That's why Euthyphron is now accusing his father of a homicide. The term phónos used is usually translated as “murder” or “manslaughter”. According to Greek law at the time, it was either an “unintentional killing not by one's own hand” or a killing through deliberate omission. All of the relatives are outraged by the charges and have taken the father's side. Everyone is of the opinion that it is impious to take one's father to court over such an incident; the strange manslayer had to ascribe his fate to himself. But Euthyphron is in no way deterred by this. He is convinced that he knows better than anyone what is pious and what is indecent. Socrates advises him to consider whether the legal proceedings against his own father might not be impious after all. Euthyphron vehemently denies this possibility, he is completely sure of his cause. Socrates then asks him to teach him about piety.

First attempt at definition

Socrates asks Euthyphron what is pious or godly and what is its opposite, godless or nefarious, both in relation to homicides and in every other respect. The term τὸ ὅσιον ( to hósion ) denotes the pious in the linguistic usage of that time, that is, that which is naturally right or dutiful, which is at the same time what pleases the gods. It relates primarily to actions, less to attitudes; the translation with “piety” is imprecise.

Euthyphron does not seek to find a general, philosophically sound definition of the pious, but rather gives a description of piety that relates specifically to his own behavior. He acts piously whoever pursues every injustice without regard to the person of the wrongdoer, even if he is one of the closest family members. Anyone who does not fulfill this duty is behaving nefariously. For justification, Euthyphron invokes the example of the gods, with which he refers to the mythical overturns in the world of gods. The god Kronos castrated his father Uranus in order to punish him for wrongdoing, and Kronos in turn was tied up by his son Zeus because he devoured his other sons, which he was not entitled to do. Zeus, who is generally recognized as the best and most just god, was not afraid to take action against his father.

By the way, Socrates suggests that he considers the myths of enmities and battles between the gods to be unbelievable, but with this he meets with a lack of understanding. Therefore, he is satisfied with the statement that the proposed definition of piety only concerns a special case. He demands a universal definition that encompasses everything pious. The philosophical search aims at “the pious” par excellence, at that which is common to all manifestations of piety and which gives them the quality of being pious. Only when this is known can the piety or inappropriateness of individual actions be judged. Euthyphron sees that.

Second attempt at definition

Euthyphron makes a new attempt. His second proposed definition is: what is pious is what is dear to the gods. Socrates likes this proposal better than the first. However, there is now a contradiction to Euthyphron's idea of ​​the gods, which adheres to the mythical tradition that reports of quarrels between the gods. If there is indeed discord among them, then, as Socrates points out, they must have different opinions about what is good, just and therefore lovable. What one loves God is hated by the other. Thus the opinion of one god cannot be the measure of piety if another god contradicts it. The definition therefore needs to be changed: Only that which pleases all gods can be considered pious.

But even in this form the definition proves to be inadequate. Socrates asks whether the godly loves what is pious because it is pious, or whether it is pious because they love it. He thinks it is logically necessary that only the first possibility can apply. It is not the fact that something is loved by the gods that makes it pious, but its quality of being pious makes it lovable to the gods. Piety is not brought about by godliness, but vice versa. Hence the statement that the godly loves the pious is not a statement about the nature of the pious, but only about an effect of this being. This does not come any closer to clarifying the question of what piety consists of. Euthyphron sees that. Now he is at a loss.

Third attempt at definition

Since Euthyphron no longer knows what to do, Socrates suggests examining the relationship between piety and justice . Here the question arises whether the statement that everything that is pious is just is true, or also that everything that is just is pious. Euthyphron decides on the assumption that the ranges of the two terms are not congruent, but that the pious is part of the just. So it is important to determine this part.

Euthyphron suggests that piety should be viewed as that part of justice that relates to the “treatment” (therapeía) of the gods - that is, how to deal with them. For Socrates the question arises what is meant by this term here. He points out that treating or caring for the gods must be of a different kind than treating or caring for horses, dogs or cattle, because their aim is not, as is the case with farm animals, that the treated become better. Euthyphron agrees. He now compares what people do in treatment for the gods with what slaves do for their masters. So it is a service to the gods. But this provision also proves to be problematic. Services that people render to other people tend to have a purpose. If you provide a service for someone, for example for a doctor or carpenter, you support him in the creation of his work. You help him to produce something, for example health or a building. However, it is unclear what work the gods produce for which they need the services of men. Euthyphron is unable to name such a work concretely and thus to indicate the meaning of a piety understood as a worship service. Again the attempt to grasp the essence of piety fails.

Fourth attempt at definition

Again Socrates helps his interlocutor with a suggestion. He asks whether piety is the knowledge of sacrifice and prayer. Euthyphron affirms this. Whoever sacrifices gives something to the gods, whoever prays asks them for something. Thus he is pious who knows how to deal with the gods in giving and asking. Whoever asks correctly asks for what he needs, and whoever gives correctly gives what the other needs. Accordingly, as Socrates concluded, piety appears to be the art of doing business with the gods for the benefit of both parties. Euthyphron agrees. He has no problem with this idea, although it implies that the gods need something from humans, so they are not self-sufficient . For Socrates such an image of a god is in reality not acceptable, but in the context of the debate he accepts the idea of ​​a commercial transaction. He now asks the question of the usefulness of trade. It is obvious that people benefit from it, but not that the gods also benefit from it. When asked what human piety brings to the gods, Euthyphron replies that it is what is dear to the gods. This brings the discussion to the point at which it was when the second attempt at definition failed. She moved in circles. The fourth attempt at definition has also failed.

Enough

Socrates would like to start the investigation all over again. He does not want to end the dialogue until he has learned what the essence of piety is. To justify his persistence, he argues that it is beyond doubt that Euthyphron knew about piety and had previously hidden his knowledge. Otherwise he would not have dared to act against his father with such self-assurance, conscious of his own piety.

So Socrates embarrasses the really perplexed Euthyphron. Euthyphron pretends to be in a hurry and therefore to postpone the continuation of the discussion. He takes flight.

In the end - as in other early dialogues of Plato - the self-confidence of Socrates' interlocutor turns out to be unjustified, his attitude as unreflected and unfounded. His concept does not stand up to philosophical scrutiny. The dialogue did not produce a positive result, but led to perplexity (aporia).

Philosophical balance sheet

One result of the discussion, which certainly corresponds to Plato's own conviction, is that what is pious and ethically correct cannot be defined depending on the attitude of the gods. For Plato, as for the two forms of his dialogue, there is no “Euthyphron dilemma”, no conceivable conflict of hierarchy between the ethically required and the divine will. Rather, what is pious and ethically required is an objective reality, a norm that is not constituted by divine will, but has to form the binding guideline for gods as well as for humans.

The central question of what constitutes piety remains open, however, and thus offers the standard for judging the piety or inappropriateness of individual actions. None of the approaches discussed has led to a satisfactory result. As with other dialogues that end aporetically, the question arises whether the result of the described efforts to gain knowledge is only negative or whether there are also indications in the text of a possible solution and of Plato's own view. The latter interpretation is called the “constructivist approach”. Some constructivists consider the third attempt at definition, the definition of piety as a form of justice, to be promising from a Platonic point of view. In contrast to the other definition proposals, this one has not proven to be unsuitable in principle, but has just not succeeded in making it sufficiently precise and plausible. It can therefore be assumed that Plato wants to encourage the reader to think further from this starting point. However, piety, the nature of which is determined independently of godliness, can hardly be defined as a special form of justice, but coincides with it. Whether Plato in the Euthyphron intended to suggest this consequence to the reader is disputed in research.

An important clue is Socrates' remark that Euthyphron was already close to the goal, but then turned around. This refers to the answer to the question of what is the work of the gods which human piety is supposed to contribute to the creation. The idea that it is about a service with which pious people help the gods in creating a work has found the basic approval of Socrates in the dialogue. Thus it corresponds to Plato's own conviction. But Euthyphron was unable to find out which work it was. This crucial question remains unanswered in the Euthyphron , but Plato's view on it is known because he has presented it elsewhere. For him, the work towards which piety aims and which the gods want to produce with the support of pious people is what is good for people. With this he means the goal of the philosophical striving for knowledge and virtue. This does not emerge from the Euthyphron , but appropriate references can be found in Plato's Apology for Socrates . There Plato has Socrates say that he - Socrates - is in the service of the god Apollo , acts according to his instructions and helps him by searching for wisdom and stimulating others to philosophical endeavors. In terms of content and terminology, a connection with the discussion of the third definition in the Euthyphron can be clearly seen in these statements .

Time of origin and historical background

Plato (Roman copy of the Greek Plato portrait of Silanion , Glyptothek Munich )

It is almost unanimously accepted in research that the euthyphron is a genuine work of Plato. For linguistic and content-related reasons it is counted among the early works of the philosopher. Within the group of early dialogues, he seems to belong to the later ones. It was created after the trial of Socrates, which took place in the spring of 399 BC. Took place according to a common research opinion before Plato around 388 BC. BC began his first journey to Sicily, according to a different dating approach around 385.

The historical background is formed by the indictment against Socrates, which accused him of impiety and led to his execution. With the Euthyphron , Plato pursued, as with the Apology of Socrates, the intention of justifying his executed teacher afterwards. To this end, he contrasted the prudent philosophical attitude of Socrates on religious issues with the conventional, prevalent image of gods and piety, which he criticized as superficial and inconsistent. In view of the failure of all efforts to clarify the concept of the pious, a judicial procedure in which lay judges determined by lot have to rule on the piety of a defendant appears to be an absurd process. In the introductory conversation of the Euthyphron , Plato's Socrates also directly criticizes his accuser Meletus, whom he ironically accuses of ignorance. The dialogue is thus to be placed in the context of the polemics between opponents and supporters of Socrates.

The question of whether Euthyphron - if Plato's account is based on a historical event - was even authorized to bring charges against his father is controversial in research. Under the then applicable law, homicides were private affairs; they were not prosecuted by the state, but only when a complaint was made. According to one research opinion, only a precisely defined group of people were entitled to report: relatives of the victim or, if the victim was a slave, his owner. According to this interpretation of the legal situation, Euthyphron's action was inadmissible for formal reasons and therefore obviously hopeless. Accordingly, he complained only to comply with a principle, not to actually bring about a conviction of his father. Other hypotheses are that the right to sue was not limited in such a way or that the day laborer had a slave-like status and therefore Euthyphro, for whose family he had worked, could act as an injured party.

Text transmission

A papyrus from the 2nd century, of which two fragments have survived, is the only ancient text evidence. The oldest surviving medieval manuscript was made in 895 in the Byzantine Empire for the scholar Arethas of Caesarea .

reception

Antiquity

In the early 3rd century BC The Epicurean Metrodorus von Lampsakos wrote a pamphlet against the Euthyphron , which has not been preserved. This is the oldest mention of dialogue in ancient literature.

In the tetralogical order of the works of Plato, which apparently in the 1st century BC Was introduced, the euthyphron belongs to the first tetralogy. The historian of philosophy Diogenes Laertios counted him among the “examining” writings and gave “On Piety” as an alternative title. In doing so, he referred to a now-lost script by the Middle Platonist Thrasyllos . Diogenes Laertios mentioned that the Euthyphron was placed at the beginning of the reading plan of their students by some philosophy teachers, so it was considered a suitable introduction to Platonic philosophy from a didactic point of view. In addition, Diogenes Laertios alleged that Socrates dissuaded Euthyphron from accusing the father through the discussion. However, this is an interpretation of the outcome that is not supported by Plato's statements.

The beginning of the Euthyphron in the first edition, the
Aldine printed in Venice in 1513

The Middle Platonist Numenios said that Plato wanted to present his criticism of religion in the Euthyphron , which was only possible in dialogue form; he had to expect that the Athenians would execute him as well as Socrates if he had expressed his conviction directly as such.

In the anonymously handed down late antique "Prolegomena to the Philosophy of Plato" it is stated that the scholars were of the opinion that Plato wrote the Euthyphron as the first of his dialogues.

Middle Ages and Early Modern Times

The beginning of the Euthyphron edition of Henricus Stephanus ( Henri Estienne ) printed in 1578 with a Latin translation. On the left side of the page there are explanatory notes by the translator Jean de Serres (Johannes Serranus).

In the Middle Ages, the euthyphro was unknown to the Latin- speaking scholarly world of the West; it was only rediscovered in the age of Renaissance humanism . The dialogue was translated into Armenian by the 11th century at the latest .

The Byzantine scholar Manuel Chrysoloras († 1415), who emigrated to Italy, owned a manuscript of the Euthyphron . The famous humanist Francesco Filelfo made the first Latin translation before 1436; the second, much worse, which was probably made in 1440/1443, comes from Rinuccio da Castiglione. Both remained unprinted. The third got Marsilio Ficino . He published it in Florence in 1484 in the complete edition of his Latin translations of Plato.

The first edition of the Greek text was published in Venice by Aldo Manuzio in September 1513 as part of the complete edition of Plato's works published by Markos Musuros .

Modern

The influential Plato translator Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834) did not appreciate the Euthyphron ; he saw it as "compared to 'Laches' and 'Charmides' (...) very inferior work". Olof Gigon judged similarly in the 20th century . He said that the theological results of the dialogue were "of astonishing poverty"; Socrates is playing a pedantic game with the key words his partner supplies. The Euthyphron is a "strange and ultimately unsympathetic text" because the essential perspectives are cut off.

Other ancient scholars expressed their appreciation. Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1848–1931) believed that with the Euthyphron , Plato succeeded in liberating the concept of virtue from the burden of piety that was not based on moral duty; this is "not a small positive profit". Michael Erler wrote in 2007 that the course of the conversation showed “a high level of reflection on logical and grammatical questions”. Maximilian Forschner , who published a commentary on the Euthyphron in 2013 , assessed the dialogue as an important and noteworthy work of high literary status in many respects and praised the argumentative structure as concise and stringent; the philosophical points of view are of timeless relevance. Forschner found that in the dialogue the critical rationality of Socratic philosophizing was embedded in personal experiences and hopes as well as dialectically tenable beliefs that were truly religious. However, this interpretation has met with contradictions. The opposite thesis is that it is a question of a non-religious, purely philosophical theology.

The question of whether there is a universally binding ethical standard, by which the divine will is oriented and from which it cannot deviate, was already discussed in the Middle Ages. In modern philosophical and theological discourse, the term “euthyphron dilemma” has become commonplace. It is a bit misleading, however, because there was no dilemma for the ancient Platonists; they took the affirmation of the question for granted. The autonomy of ethics in relation to divine acts of will was indisputable with them. A problem only arose in Christian theology, as difficulties arise when the autonomy of ethics is to be reconciled with theological ideas such as the concept of an absolute omnipotence of God. In addition, there is the consideration that God becomes superfluous for ethics if its validity claim is not derived from his will. Furthermore, the autonomy of ethics can lead to God's actions being judged according to their standards and then possibly appearing as questionable. If ethics are autonomous, God does not set values, but is subject to a value consciousness himself. Therefore, some theologians deny the autonomy of ethics ("Divine Command Theory", DCT). On the other hand, many theists also value the assumption that what is ethically correct is in itself correct and not just on the basis of a command from God.

Research has divided opinions about the conclusiveness of Socrates' objections to the rejected proposed definitions. Peter Geach considers Socrates' view, according to which piety cannot be traced back to godliness, to be correct, but does not find the argument in the dialogue to be valid. Among other things, he is fundamentally against the assumption that one cannot have any knowledge about something that cannot be defined. He describes this as "Socratic fallacy" (Socratic fallacy). His criticism of the considerations of Plato's Socrates, first published in 1966, provoked different reactions. Some researchers have tried different approaches to refute Geach or to prove individual objections to the proposed definitions as plausible.

Another topic of research discussions is whether or to what extent the euthyphron already contains a preliminary stage of Plato's doctrine of ideas presented in later dialogues or suggests a possible solution using this doctrine.

Editions and translations

  • William SM Nicoll (Ed.): Euthyphron . In: Elizabeth A. Duke et al. (Ed.): Platonis opera , Volume 1, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1995, ISBN 0-19-814569-1 , pp. 1–25 (authoritative critical edition)
  • Winfried Czapiewski (translator): Plato on the death of Socrates. Four writings of Plato on the person and death of Socrates: Euthyphron, Apology, Crito, Phaedo. Laufen, Oberhausen 2018, ISBN 978-3-87468-378-4
  • Gunther Eigler (Ed.): Platon: Works in Eight Volumes , Volume 1, 4th Edition, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 2005, ISBN 3-534-19095-5 , pp. 351-397 (reprint of the critical edition by Maurice Croiset, 9th edition, Paris 1966, with the German translation by Friedrich Schleiermacher, 2nd, improved edition, Berlin 1818)
  • Maximilian Forschner (translator): Plato: Euthyphron (= Plato: Works , edited by Ernst Heitsch et al., Volume I 1). Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2013, ISBN 978-3-525-30400-6
  • Otto Leggewie (Ed.): Plato: Euthyphron . Reclam, Stuttgart 2007, ISBN 978-3-15-009897-4 (Greek text without critical apparatus, plus German translation)
  • Reinhold Merkelbach (Ed.): Plato's Euthyphron . Saur, Munich / Leipzig 2003, ISBN 3-598-73012-8 (Greek text without critical apparatus, next to it a German translation)
  • Klaus Reich (Ed.): Plato: Euthyphron . Meiner, Hamburg 1968 (Greek text without critical apparatus, next to it a German translation)
  • Rudolf Rufener (translator): Plato: Die Werke des Aufstiegs (= anniversary edition of all works , vol. 2). Artemis, Zurich / Munich 1974, ISBN 3-7608-3640-2 , pp. 185–210 (with an introduction by Olof Gigon)
  • Friedrich Schleiermacher (translator): Euthyphron . In: Erich Loewenthal (Ed.): Platon: Complete Works in Three Volumes , Vol. 1, unchanged reprint of the 8th, revised edition, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 2004, ISBN 3-534-17918-8 , pp. 277-299 (only translation)
  • Gustav Schneider (translator), Benno von Hagen (ed.): Plato's dialogues Laches and Euthyphron . In: Otto Apelt (Hrsg.): Platon: Complete Dialogues , Vol. 1, Meiner, Hamburg 2004, ISBN 3-7873-1156-4 (translation with explanations; for Euthyphron : reprint of the 2nd, revised edition, Leipzig 1922)

Humanistic translation (Latin)

  • Stefano Martinelli Tempesta (Ed.): Platonis Euthyphron Francisco Philelfo interprete, Lysis Petro Candido Decembrio interprete . Società Internazionale per lo Studio del Medioevo Latino, Florence 2009, ISBN 978-88-8450-357-2 , pp. 1–104 (critical edition)

literature

Overview representations

Introductions

Investigations and Comments

  • Jacques A. Bailly: Plato's Euthyphro & Clitophon. Commentary with Introduction, Glossary and Vocabulary . Focus Publishing, Newburyport (MA) 2003, ISBN 1-58510-059-5 , pp. 15-109 (intended commentary for students and a wider audience)
  • Chris Emlyn-Jones: Plato: Euthyphro. Text, with Introduction, Commentary and Vocabulary . 2nd, amended edition, Bristol Classical Press, London 2001, ISBN 1-85399-132-5 (intended commentary for students and a wider audience)
  • Maximilian Forschner: Plato: Euthyphron. Translation and commentary (= Plato: Works , edited by Ernst Heitsch et al., Volume I 1). Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2013, ISBN 978-3-525-30400-6
  • Ernst Heitsch: Piety helps. Comments on the euthyphro . In: Marcel van Ackeren (Ed.): Understanding Plato . Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 2004, ISBN 3-534-17442-9 , pp. 11-21
  • Ian Walker: Plato's Euthyphro. Introduction and Notes . Scholars Press, Chico 1984, ISBN 0-89130-571-8 (intended commentary for students and a wider audience)

Web links

Remarks

  1. For the building, its location and its significance, see Alexander Tulin: Dike Phonou. The Right of Prosecution and Attic Homicide Procedure , Stuttgart 1996, p. 65 and note 158; Tulin partially corrects the remarks by Richard J. Klonoski: The Portico of the Archon Basileus: On the Significance of the Setting of Plato's Euthyphro . In: The Classical Journal 81, 1985-1986, pp. 130-137.
  2. Maximilian Forschner: Plato: Euthyphron. Translation and commentary , Göttingen 2013, p. 46.
  3. ^ See for example Louis-André Dorion: Plato: Lachès, Euthyphron. Traduction inédite, introduction et notes , Paris 1997, p. 179. Maximilian Forschner, however, expresses doubts: Plato: Euthyphron. Translation and commentary , Göttingen 2013, p. 46.
  4. ^ Plato, Euthyphron 3b – c, 3e.
  5. ^ See on Euthyphron's religious stance Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 129; Louis-André Dorion: Plato: Lachès, Euthyphron. Traduction inédite, introduction et notes , Paris 1997, pp. 180-185; William D. Furley : The Figure of Euthyphro in Plato's Dialogue . In: Phronesis 30, 1985, pp. 201-208.
  6. Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 128; Debra Nails: The People of Plato , Indianapolis 2002, pp. 152 f., 321; Louis-André Dorion: Plato: Lachès, Euthyphron. Traduction inédite, introduction et notes , Paris 1997, p. 187 f .; Maximilian Forschner: Plato: Euthyphron. Translation and commentary , Göttingen 2013, p. 41 f.
  7. Debra Nails believes that the indictment has already been filed at the time of the dialogue: The People of Plato , Indianapolis 2002, p. 153. Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 131 f. See Alexander Tulin: Dike Phonou. The Right of Prosecution and Attic Homicide Procedure , Stuttgart 1996, p. 71 f. and note 175.
  8. For the legal situation, see Ernst Heitsch: Platon und die Anfang seine Dialektischen Philosophierens , Göttingen 2004, p. 152 f .; Maximilian Forschner: Plato: Euthyphron. Translation and commentary , Göttingen 2013, p. 62.
  9. ^ Plato, Euthyphro 2a-5c.
  10. See on the term Maximilian Forschner: Plato: Euthyphron. Translation and Commentary , Göttingen 2013, p. 34 and notes 5 and 6 as well as the literature cited there.
  11. ^ Plato, Euthyphron 5c-6a. See Maximilian Forschner: Plato: Euthyphron. Translation and Commentary , Göttingen 2013, pp. 80–97.
  12. ^ Plato, Euthyphron 6a – e. See Maximilian Forschner: Plato: Euthyphron. Translation and Commentary , Göttingen 2013, pp. 97–113.
  13. ^ Plato, Euthyphron 6e – 9e. See Maximilian Forschner: Plato: Euthyphron. Translation and Commentary , Göttingen 2013, pp. 114–129.
  14. ^ Plato, Euthyphron 10a.
  15. ^ Plato, Euthyphron 9e – 11d. See Maximilian Forschner: Plato: Euthyphron. Translation and Commentary , Göttingen 2013, pp. 129–144.
  16. ^ Plato, Euthyphro 11e – 12e. See Maximilian Forschner: Plato: Euthyphron. Translation and Commentary , Göttingen 2013, pp. 143–150.
  17. Plato, Euthyphron 12e – 14b. See Maximilian Forschner: Plato: Euthyphron. Translation and Commentary , Göttingen 2013, pp. 151–160.
  18. ^ Plato, Euthyphro 14c-15c. See Maximilian Forschner: Plato: Euthyphron. Translation and Commentary , Göttingen 2013, pp. 160–171.
  19. ^ Plato, Euthyphron 15c – e.
  20. A proponent of this approach ("constructive interpretation") is, for example, Laszlo Versényi: Holiness and Justice , Lanham 1982, pp. 11-20.
  21. ^ Louis-André Dorion: Euthyphron . In: Richard Goulet (ed.): Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques , Volume 5, Part 1, Paris 2012, pp. 661–669, here: 667; Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 130 f .; William KC Guthrie : A History of Greek Philosophy , Vol. 4, Cambridge 1975, pp. 122-124; Dan Solcan: La piété chez Platon , Paris 2009, pp. 84–90; Thomas C. Brickhouse, Nicholas D. Smith: Socrates on Trial , Oxford 1989, pp. 91-95; Mark L. McPherran: Socratic Piety In The Euthyphro . In: Journal of the History of Philosophy 23, 1985, pp. 283-309, here: 283 f.
  22. For a discussion of Plato's understanding of the relationship between piety and justice see Scott Warren Calef: Piety and the Unity of Virtue in Euthyphro 11 E - 14 C . In: Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 13, 1995, pp. 1–26; Mark McPherran: Socratic Piety: In Response to Scott Calef . In: Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 13, 1995, pp. 27–35; Scott Warren Calef: Further Reflections on Socratic Piety: A Reply to Mark McPherran . In: Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 13, 1995, pp. 37–43; Christopher CW Taylor: The End of the Euthyphro . In: Phronesis 27, 1982, pp. 109-118, here: 114-118; William S. Cobb: The Religious and the Just in Plato's Euthyphro . In: Ancient Philosophy 5, 1985, pp. 41-46. On Plato's virtue terminology, see Paul Shorey : What Plato said , Chicago 1934, p. 79 f.
  23. ^ Plato, Euthyphron 14c.
  24. ^ Plato, Apology 23b, 30a. See Louis-André Dorion: Euthyphron . In: Richard Goulet (Ed.): Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques , Volume 5, Part 1, Paris 2012, pp. 661–669, here: 667 f .; Ernst Heitsch: Piety helps. Comments on the euthyphro . In: Marcel van Ackeren (Ed.): Understanding Platon , Darmstadt 2004, pp. 11–21; Dan Solcan: La piété chez Platon , Paris 2009, p. 244; Michael Erler: The sense of the aporias in the dialogues of Plato , Berlin 1987, p. 163-165; Thomas Alexander Szlezák : Plato and the writing of philosophy , Berlin 1985, pp. 107–116; Christopher CW Taylor: The End of the Euthyphro . In: Phronesis 27, 1982, pp. 109-118, here: 113 f .; Gregory Vlastos : Socrates. Ironist and Moral Philosopher , Cambridge 1991, pp. 174-176. Reginald E. Allen has a different opinion: Plato's 'Euthyphro' and the Earlier Theory of Forms , London 1970, pp. 6-9; he thinks that the dialogue does not suggest a way out of the aporia.
  25. Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 128; Alexander Tulin: Plato's Euthyphro , Dissertation New York 1990, p. 23 f .; Maximilian Forschner: Plato: Euthyphron. Translation and commentary , Göttingen 2013, p. 33.
  26. Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 128 f .; Maximilian Forschner: Plato: Euthyphron. Translation and Commentary , Göttingen 2013, p. 39; Louis-André Dorion: Euthyphron . In: Richard Goulet (Ed.): Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques , Volume 5, Part 1, Paris 2012, pp. 661–669, here: 661.
  27. See background Dan Solcan: La piété chez Platon , Paris 2009, pp. 24–37.
  28. Maximilian Forschner: Plato: Euthyphron. Translation and Commentary , Göttingen 2013, pp. 62–67; Louis-André Dorion: Plato: Lachès, Euthyphron. Traduction inédite, introduction et notes , Paris 1997, pp. 202–208; Spiro Panagiotou: Plato's Euthyphro and the Attic Code on Homicide . In: Hermes 102, 1974, pp. 419-437; Ian Kidd: The Case of Homicide in Plato's Euthyphro . In: Elizabeth M. Craik (Ed.): 'Owls to Athens' , Oxford 1990, pp. 213-221; Alexander Tulin: Dike Phonou. The Right of Prosecution and Attic Homicide Procedure , Stuttgart 1996, pp. 77-100.
  29. ^ Corpus dei Papiri Filosofici Greci e Latini (CPF) , Part 1, Vol. 1 ***, Firenze 1999, pp. 64-66.
  30. Oxford, Bodleian Library , Clarke 39 (= "Codex B" of the Plato textual tradition). For the text transmission, see Stefano Martinelli Tempesta (ed.): Platonis Euthyphron Francisco Philelfo interprete, Lysis Petro Candido Decembrio interprete , Florence 2009, pp. 11–37.
  31. See Dirk Obbink (ed.): Philodemus: On Piety , Part 1, Oxford 1996, pp. 377-389; Alexander Tulin: Plato's Euthyphro , Dissertation New York 1990, p. 24 f.
  32. Diogenes Laertios 3.57 f.
  33. Diogenes Laertios 3.62.
  34. Diogenes Laertios 2.29.
  35. Alexander Tulin: Dike Phonou. The Right of Prosecution and Attic Homicide Procedure , Stuttgart 1996, pp. 73-77.
  36. Numenios, fragment 23, ed. by Édouard des Places : Numénius: Fragments , Paris 1973, p. 61 f.
  37. "Prolegomena to Plato's Philosophy" 25, ed. von Leendert G. Westerink: Prolégomènes à la philosophie de Platon , Paris 1990, p. 38 f.
  38. For the Armenian translation see Elizabeth A. Duke et al. (Ed.): Platonis opera , Volume 1, Oxford 1995, p. XII; Frederick C. Conybeare: On the Ancient Armenian Version of Plato . In: The American Journal of Philology 12, 1891, pp. 193-210.
  39. For the dating see Stefano Martinelli Tempesta (ed.): Platonis Euthyphron Francisco Philelfo interprete, Lysis Petro Candido Decembrio interprete , Florenz 2009, p. 6 f.
  40. James Hankins: Plato in the Italian Renaissance , 3rd edition, Leiden 1994, pp. 87 f., 401-403.
  41. ^ Friedrich Schleiermacher: Euthyphron. Introduction . In: Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher: About the philosophy of Plato , ed. by Peter M. Steiner, Hamburg 1996, pp. 124–128, here: 124.
  42. Olof Gigon: Plato's Euthyphron . In: Fritz Meier (Ed.): Westöstliche Abhandlungen , Wiesbaden 1954, pp. 6–38, here: 12 f.
  43. Olof Gigon: Introduction . In: Plato: Die Werke des Aufstiegs (= anniversary edition of all works , vol. 2), Zurich / Munich 1974, pp. 5–182, here: 17.
  44. ^ Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff: Platon. His life and works , 5th edition, Berlin 1959 (1st edition Berlin 1919), p. 157.
  45. Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 130.
  46. Maximilian Forschner: Plato: Euthyphron. Translation and commentary , Göttingen 2013, p. 9 f.
  47. Maximilian Forschner: Plato: Euthyphron. Translation and commentary , Göttingen 2013, p. 190.
  48. Hannes Kerber: Review by Maximilian Forschner: Plato: Euthyphron. In: Philosophisches Jahrbuch 122, 2015, pp. 249–251.
  49. See on the dilemma Necip Fikri Alican: Rethinking Plato , Amsterdam 2012, pp. 231–241.
  50. ^ Peter T. Geach: Plato's Euthyphro. An Analysis and Commentary . In: The Monist 50, 1966, pp. 369-382.
  51. An overview of the discussion is provided by Rachana Kamtekar: Introduction . In: Rachana Kamtekar (ed.): Plato's Euthyphro, Apology, and Crito , Lanham 2005, pp. IX – XIX, here: XI – XIII. This volume also contains a reprint of the work by Peter T. Geach, first published in 1966: Plato's Euthyphro: An Analysis and Commentary (pp. 23–34) and a study by Marc Cohen: Socrates on the Definition of Piety: Euthyphro 10A – 11B ( Pp. 35–48; first published in 1971). David Wolfsdorf provides a summary of the research history of the second attempt at definition and new approaches: Euthyphro 10a2–11b1: A Study in Platonic Metaphysics and its Reception Since 1960 . In: Apeiron 38, 2005, pp. 1-71. On the quality of Socrates' arguments, see Andrew E. Benjamin: A Missed Encounter: Plato's Socrates and Geach's Euthyphro . In: Grazer philosophische Studien 29, 1987, pp. 145–170; Necip Fikri Alican: Rethinking Plato , Amsterdam 2012, pp. 223-225; Louis-André Dorion: Plato: Lachès, Euthyphron. Traduction inédite, introduction et notes , Paris 1997, pp. 323–334; Laszlo Versényi: Holiness and Justice , Lanham 1982, pp. 70-84; Alexander Tulin: Plato's Euthyphro , Dissertation New York 1990, pp. 128-133, 160-163, 189-236; Thomas D. Paxson: Plato's Euthyphro 10 a to 11 b . In: Phronesis 17, 1972, pp. 171-190; Robert G. Hoerber: Plato's Euthyphro . In: Phronesis 3, 1958, pp. 95-107, here: 102-104; John H. Brown: The Logic of the Euthyphro 10A-11B . In: The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 14 No. 54, 1964, pp. 1-14; John C. Hall: Plato: Euthyphro 10a1-11a10. In: The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 18 No. 70, 1968, pp. 1-11.
  52. Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 130 f .; Reginald E. Allen: Plato's 'Euthyphro' and the Earlier Theory of Forms , London 1970, pp. 67-159; Jean-Yves Chateau: Philosophy et religion. Plato: Euthyphron , Paris 2005, pp. 270-279; Louis-André Dorion: Plato: Lachès, Euthyphron. Traduction inédite, introduction et notes , Paris 1997, pp. 208-213; Andrew E. Benjamin: A Missed Encounter: Plato's Socrates and Geach's Euthyphro . In: Grazer philosophische Studien 29, 1987, pp. 145–170, here: 164–170; Maximilian Forschner: Plato: Euthyphron. Translation and commentary , Göttingen 2013, p. 36 f.
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