Malakand uprising

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Tribal areas of Malakand (dark green) in what is now northern Pakistan.

As Siege of Malakand an armed revolt is Pashtun tribes called against the British colonial forces, which in the summer of 1897 in the region of Malakand , a North-West Frontier Province of British India , occurred in the course of it to the siege of the military post Malakand and the fortress Chakdara came .

The uprising was led by the fakir Saidullah, who led at least 10,000 tribal warriors into the field. Despite the numerical superiority of the enemy, the British colonial troops managed to hold their position until reinforcements arrived from Nowshera .

As a result, there were various military campaigns against the tribes involved in the siege, during which there was again fierce fighting between the British colonial troops and the rebellious tribal warriors.

A prominent contemporary witness was the future British Prime Minister Winston Churchill , who took part in the fighting as a 22-year-old officer (second lieutenant) of the cavalry and initially reported on the siege for two newspapers before he published a non-fiction book based on his observations in 1898.

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Siege of the Malakand military post

Malakand south camp during the siege of Makaland

Night of July 26th to 27th

When a telegram was sent from Fort Chakdara on July 26, 1897 at 9:45 p.m. that a large group of Pashtun tribal warriors were approaching the military camp in Malakand, it became apparent that it was only a matter of time before the attack on the British Positions would come. Shortly afterwards, the first attack on the southern camp of the Malakand military post, located in a basin, took place. To prevent the enemy from entering the camp, the 45th Sikhs under Colonel McRae were dispatched to occupy the Amandara Pass. Although there was fierce fighting there, McRae and his unit managed to hold the position and prevent the enemy from advancing over the pass into the camp.

However, the insurgents entered the basin via another street, which is why there was now fierce fighting in the camp itself. Although it was initially possible for the troops of the 24th Punjab Infantry under Lieutenant Climo to push back the enemy, as more and more snipers opened fire from the mountain slopes, Lieutenant Climo was forced to retreat to an inner line of defense, which finally held could be.

Since the northern camp was also besieged by the Pashtuns, the tribal warriors were able to advance to the southern camp on the road that served as a connection between the two positions. However, this road was also successfully held by British troops.

During the night the ammunition depot, which had already been lost, could be recaptured, but the intensity of the attacks continued to increase. Therefore, reinforcements were finally requested from a nearby fort, which, due to its massive construction, could not be captured by the enemy armed only with rifles. A total of 100 men were sent from the fort to defend the camp.

Due to their great losses, the tribal warriors finally withdrew at 3:30 a.m. But it wasn't until 4:15 a.m. that the snipers finally left the slopes surrounding the camp. A total of five British officers were injured and one killed on the night of July 26-27. Two of the wounded officers later died from their injuries. 21 sepoys were also killed and 31 others injured.

July 27th

Although there were no direct attacks initially on the morning of July 27th, a steady, if not very effective, fire was sustained by the tribal warriors from more distant mountain slopes.

At this time a unit under Major Gibbs was tasked with clearing the valley around the northern camp and clearing it of enemy troops. When he finally met fierce resistance, he was ordered to retreat and returned to the camp.

At that moment the southern camp was attacked again in the center. However, Lieutenant Climo's 24th Punjab Infantry managed to advance and inflict heavy losses on the enemy, despite being heavily attacked by enemy troops.

Despite the dangerous situation in which the camp in Malakand was, it was decided to send a small troop to Fort Chakdara to support the troops there. Thus, a unit consisting of 50 sowars headed by Captain Wright moved towards Chakdara. Since the pass leading to Chakdara was occupied by enemy troops, Wright's unit had to choose an unpaved road, which partly ran through a river. The unit was attacked by the insurgents on this almost impassable route, but finally managed to reach Chakdara.

Although the northern camp had hardly been attacked the night before, despite its tactically unfavorable location, it was decided on July 27 to evacuate the camp and to relocate the troops there to the southern camp in order to achieve a concentration of combat power and unnecessary losses to be avoided in the defense of the unprotected southern camp. During the retreat, the troops evacuated from the northern camp were attacked by enemy fighters, who were now also supported by tribal warriors from the Utman Khel area . Covered by fire from the 24th Punjab Infantry and the Guides Cavalry , the last troops from the northern camp finally reached the south camp at 8:30 a.m.

In the meantime, news of the attack on the garrison in Malakand and the fortress of Chakdara had also reached Nowshera by telegram , from where reinforcements were sent to Malakand at dawn. The Guides Cavalry arrived in Malakand before the infantry, which reached the camp at 7:30 p.m. after a march of 17 and a half hours .

While these reinforcements gradually arrived at the camp, the 24th Punjab Infantry, under the command of Lieutenant Climos, was again attacked in the center of the position. However, the British troops, supported by two batteries of the mountain artillery , managed to carry out a successful bayonet attack, which ultimately drove back the tribal warriors.

At 8:00 p.m. the camp was attacked again from all sides. As before, there was heavy fighting in the center of the position. Despite severe setbacks, the insurgents were able to be repulsed again during the night.

A total of 12 sepoys were killed and 29 injured during the fighting that day . There was only one wounded among the British officers.

July 28th

During the day, the tribal warriors retreated to the Khar plain , where tribal warriors from the Buner region joined the uprising. While the British soldiers strengthened the fortifications of the camp, they were again taken under fire by snipers from a great distance. Several horses fell victim to this fire. In the evening the camp was attacked again from all sides, but this time too the insurgents failed to take the camp. A total of two British officers were injured that day, including one seriously. Two sepoys were also killed and 13 injured.

29th of July

On the 29th, most of the tribal forces retreated back into the plains to prepare for a new attack, while the snipers from the mountains kept up a spontaneous fire which, like the day before, killed several horses. The British troops took advantage of this break in the fighting to expand the fortification of the camp. Among other things, some trees were blown up that had provided cover for the enemy in the fight to create a free field of fire. At 4 p.m. Major Stuart Beatson , who commanded the 11th Bengali Lancers, arrived at the camp and delivered the urgently needed supplies of ammunition.

That night, the insurgents attacked with all their might for the last time. At 2 a.m., the fighting reached its peak. The insurgents even managed to break through the parapet of the 24th Punjab Infantry, so that they got into a close combat, in the course of which Lieutenant Costello was again seriously injured. Due to the previous clearing of some trees, the attackers suffered heavy losses. When the Mad Mullah Saidullah was finally injured and another mullah was killed at 2:30 am , the attack collapsed. A total of two British officers were seriously wounded that night. In addition, one sepoy was killed and 17 others injured.

July 30th - August 1st

Finally, on July 30, it was announced that the Governor General had agreed to send a force to support the military post in Malakand and to fight the surrounding insurgent tribes. Brigadier General Sir Bindon Blood was given command of this force .

At 9:30 p.m. the next day, the insurgents launched a last half-hearted attack, in the course of which two men of the British troops were injured.

The next morning, the 38th Dogras and 35th Sikhs belonging to Bindon Blood's troops, who had previously lost 21 men on a forced march due to the overexertion and camped at the foot of the pass in the city of Dargai, reached the camp.

At noon on August 1st, Sir Bindon Blood finally arrived in Malakand in person. The camp was sporadically shot from a great distance over the next few days, but the main armed forces of the tribal warriors now turned to the siege of Chakdara , which effectively ended the siege of the Malakand position.

Casualty numbers

A total of 29 British Forces soldiers were killed and 145 injured during the siege of the Malakand military camp. Among those killed were three British officers and one British NCO and ten British officers were wounded. The majority of the wounded or killed were thus sepoys .

Siege of the fortress of Chakdara

The fortress Chakdara was situated on a hill near the river Swat, over which a suspension bridge led at this point, which should be guarded by the fortress. At the time the uprising broke out, the Chakdaras garrison consisted of 20 sowars from the 11th Bengal Lancers and two companies from the 45th Sikhs. The total strength of the troops stationed in Chakdara, which was commanded by Lieutenant HB Rattray, thus amounted to about 200 men.

July 26th

On July 26th, a sepoy announced that large numbers of Pashtun tribal warriors were about to march on Chakdara. Nevertheless, Lieutenant Rattray rode to Khár to take part in a game of polo there. Just as the game was over, Rattray received word that a large group of Pashtuns were advancing towards the fortress. On the way back to Chakdara, he rode past the Pashtun forces without being noticed. It was only for this reason that he finally managed to reach the fortress in time. Shortly before the connection was broken, Rattray was able to telegraph the military camp in Malakand of the impending attack.

The garrison in Chakdara was warned of an imminent attack by a beacon, which had been lit at 10:15 p.m. on the orders of an allied Khan. The alarm was raised and the troops took up their posts.

The first attack took place shortly afterwards, in which the insurgents suffered heavy losses and finally withdrew. Immediately afterwards a second attack took place elsewhere, which was also successfully repulsed. At 4 a.m. the tribal warriors finally attacked for the third time, but were repulsed again, after which the insurgents retreated into the mountains.

July 27th

On July 27th, Captain Wright finally reached the fortress with his 50-strong troop, who had set out at dawn that day and were constantly pursued and attacked by the insurgents on the way to Chakdara. The tribal warriors who had chased the unit until shortly before arrival were driven away by the Maxim machine gun stationed on the bridge.

The next attack by the insurgents took place at 11:30 a.m. and surrounded the northern and eastern sides of the fort. Although the British troops suffered heavy losses from the gunfire, the tribal warriors maintained their attack for a long time, which made it almost impossible to use the heliograph , which was left unprotected from the enemy fire, and thus to communicate with the camp in Malakand.

When the Pashtuns attacked again at 11 p.m., they suffered heavy losses from a 9-pounder gun and a Maxim, but they renewed their attack at 1 a.m.

July 28th

After the rebels had bombarded the fortress over a long distance on July 28, the next attack took place at 5:30 p.m. on the position held by the cavalry. However, only one tribal warrior managed to climb the wall secured with barbed wire and from there to fire three shots from close range at the defenders before he was killed. Thus this attack, which was only ended the next morning, failed.

29th of July

At 3:00 p.m. the next day, the insurgents moved not only ladders but also bundles of hay with them from the Chakdara settlement to the fortress. There they primarily attacked the signal tower of the fortification, whose guard, numbering only a few men, was supported in battle by their comrades firing from the main fortification. However, the number of attackers was so large that they succeeded in setting fire in front of the entrance to the tower with the help of bundles of hay, which did not cause any damage. Although the machine gun crew was temporarily blocked from sight during sunset, the small troops stationed in the tower were still able to hold their own against the attackers, so that they left the scene of the battle at 8:00 p.m. Although the Pashtuns were busy all night recovering the bodies of their fallen combatants, 50 bodies were still sighted the next morning, which is why it was assumed that the attackers' losses must have been enormous.

July 30th - August 2nd

On July 30th, the tribal warriors attacked the fortress at 7:00 p.m., but failed again. The next day the tribal warriors attacked the fortress at 5 p.m. This attack, too, could be repulsed with the help of artillery and Maxim machine guns. But on August 1st the tribal warriors, thanks to their great numerical superiority, succeeded not only in occupying the civil hospital, the walls of which they provided with loopholes, but also in the space between the fortress and the signal tower, so that the guards of the tower were no longer involved Water could be supplied. Thus, the garrison of Chakdara was in a precarious position when the relief force under the command of Brigadier General William Hope Meiklejohn, coming from Malakand, finally arrived in Chakdara on August 2nd, thus ending the siege of the fortress.

Casualty numbers

A total of seven sepoys were killed and 13 injured in the course of the siege . No British officer was wounded or killed during the entire siege. How many fighters fell on the other side has never been officially recorded and is therefore unknown. However, it can be assumed that the insurgents' losses were much higher than those of the British.

Relief of Chakdaras

On August 1, Brigadier General Meiklejohn put together a unit to break the siege and relieve Fort Chakdara. Already at 11 o'clock the Guides Cavalry and the 11th Bengali lancers were dispatched under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, with the order to occupy the Amàndara pass if it was not in the hands of the enemy. However, the troop movement was noticed by the insurgents, which is why they finally attacked the cavalry directly. Since the ground was very furrowed at this point, the tribal warriors now had an advantage, which is why the cavalry, whose flank was now protected by the 24th Punjab Infantry, withdrew again. Two British officers were wounded in the battle, including one seriously. One cavalryman was killed and 13 others injured.

When Sir Bindon Blood finally arrived, Brigadier General Meiklejohn was in the middle of planning a new attempt to send a relief force to Chakdara. Blood relieved Meiklejohn from command of the Malakand military post and placed him in charge of the relief force. Colonel Reid has been given command of the camp. Meiklejohn was instructed to assemble the troops planned for the liberation of Chakdara and to have them camped in the center of the camp. However, there was another attack during the night between 11 a.m. and 12 noon, which forced the troops to be in combat readiness and was only repulsed towards morning. On August 2, Meiklejohn let his troops advance close to the enemy position at dawn and take them in a surprise attack, breaking the ring of siege around the post and clearing the way to Chakdara. While the 11th Bengali lancers pursued the fleeing rebels in the plain, the guides occupied the Amándara Pass and horrified Chakdara. A total of seven sepoys were killed and 26 others wounded during this operation. There were no casualties among the British officers.

literature

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Winston Churchill : The Story of the Malakand Field Force . Dover Publications, 2010, ISBN 978-0-486-47474-8 , pp. 33 .
  2. ↑ Winston Churchill : The Story of the Malakand Field Force . Dover Publications, 2010, ISBN 978-0-486-47474-8 , pp. 36 .
  3. ^ A b Winston Churchill : The Story of the Malakand Field Force . Dover Publications, 2010, ISBN 978-0-486-47474-8 , pp. 39 .
  4. ↑ Winston Churchill : The Story of the Malakand Field Force . Dover Publications, 2010, ISBN 978-0-486-47474-8 , pp. 41 .
  5. ^ A b c Winston Churchill : The Story of the Malakand Field Force . Dover Publications, 2010, ISBN 978-0-486-47474-8 , pp. 43 .
  6. ^ A b c Winston Churchill : The Story of the Malakand Field Force . Dover Publications, 2010, ISBN 978-0-486-47474-8 , pp. 44 .
  7. ^ A b Winston Churchill : The Story of the Malakand Field Force . Dover Publications, 2010, ISBN 978-0-486-47474-8 , pp. 45 .
  8. ^ A b Winston Churchill : The Story of the Malakand Field Force . Dover Publications, 2010, ISBN 978-0-486-47474-8 , pp. 72 .
  9. ^ A b c Winston Churchill : The Story of the Malakand Field Force . Dover Publications, 2010, ISBN 978-0-486-47474-8 , pp. 75 .
  10. ^ A b Winston Churchill : The Story of the Malakand Field Force . Dover Publications, 2010, ISBN 978-0-486-47474-8 , pp. 46 .
  11. ↑ Winston Churchill : The Story of the Malakand Field Force . Dover Publications, 2010, ISBN 978-0-486-47474-8 , pp. 47 .
  12. ↑ Winston Churchill : The Story of the Malakand Field Force . Dover Publications, 2010, ISBN 978-0-486-47474-8 , pp. 48 .
  13. ^ A b c Winston Churchill : The Story of the Malakand Field Force . Dover Publications, 2010, ISBN 978-0-486-47474-8 , pp. 50 .
  14. ↑ Winston Churchill : The Story of the Malakand Field Force . Dover Publications, 2010, ISBN 978-0-486-47474-8 , pp. 51 .
  15. ^ A b Winston Churchill : The Story of the Malakand Field Force . Dover Publications, 2010, ISBN 978-0-486-47474-8 , pp. 52 .
  16. ↑ a b c d Winston Churchill : The Story of the Malakand Field Force . Dover Publications, 2010, ISBN 978-0-486-47474-8 , pp. 53 .
  17. ↑ a b c d e f Winston Churchill : The Story of the Malakand Field Force . Dover Publications, 2010, ISBN 978-0-486-47474-8 , pp. 54 .
  18. ↑ Winston Churchill : The Story of the Malakand Field Force . Dover Publications, 2010, ISBN 978-0-486-47474-8 , pp. 58 .
  19. ↑ Winston Churchill : The Story of the Malakand Field Force . Dover Publications, 2010, ISBN 978-0-486-47474-8 , pp. 60 .
  20. ↑ Winston Churchill : The Story of the Malakand Field Force . Dover Publications, 2010, ISBN 978-0-486-47474-8 , pp. 62 .
  21. ↑ Winston Churchill : The Story of the Malakand Field Force . Dover Publications, 2010, ISBN 978-0-486-47474-8 , pp. 55 .
  22. ↑ Winston Churchill : The Story of the Malakand Field Force . Dover Publications, 2010, ISBN 978-0-486-47474-8 , pp. 55-56 .
  23. ↑ Winston Churchill : The Story of the Malakand Field Force . Dover Publications, 2010, ISBN 978-0-486-47474-8 , pp. 70 .
  24. ^ A b Winston Churchill : The Story of the Malakand Field Force . Dover Publications, 2010, ISBN 978-0-486-47474-8 , pp. 71 .
  25. ^ A b Winston Churchill : The Story of the Malakand Field Force . Dover Publications, 2010, ISBN 978-0-486-47474-8 , pp. 76 .
  26. ^ A b Winston Churchill : The Story of the Malakand Field Force . Dover Publications, 2010, ISBN 978-0-486-47474-8 , pp. 77 .
  27. ↑ Winston Churchill : The Story of the Malakand Field Force . Dover Publications, 2010, ISBN 978-0-486-47474-8 , pp. 79 .
  28. ↑ Winston Churchill : The Story of the Malakand Field Force . Dover Publications, 2010, ISBN 978-0-486-47474-8 , pp. 80 .
  29. ^ A b Winston Churchill : The Story of the Malakand Field Force . Dover Publications, 2010, ISBN 978-0-486-47474-8 , pp. 62 .
  30. ^ A b Winston Churchill : The Story of the Malakand Field Force . Dover Publications, 2010, ISBN 978-0-486-47474-8 , pp. 63 .
  31. ↑ Winston Churchill : The Story of the Malakand Field Force . Dover Publications, 2010, ISBN 978-0-486-47474-8 , pp. 64 .
  32. ↑ Winston Churchill : The Story of the Malakand Field Force . Dover Publications, 2010, ISBN 978-0-486-47474-8 , pp. 64 f .
  33. ↑ Winston Churchill : The Story of the Malakand Field Force . Dover Publications, 2010, ISBN 978-0-486-47474-8 , pp. 65 f .
  34. ↑ Winston Churchill : The Story of the Malakand Field Force . Dover Publications, 2010, ISBN 978-0-486-47474-8 , pp. 67 .
  35. ↑ Winston Churchill : The Story of the Malakand Field Force . Dover Publications, 2010, ISBN 978-0-486-47474-8 , pp. 68 .