Inferential semantics

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Inferential semantics refers to a younger family of theories of meaning that a. discussed in analytical language philosophy , semantics , philosophy of mind , neurophilosophy and applied disciplines.

development

The origin of the concept of inferential semantics is Wittgenstein's view that the meaning of an expression can be traced back to its use. That was u. a. Wilfrid Sellars followed. Important contemporary representatives are for example Ned Block and Robert Brandom . As a representative of inferential semantics, Brandom distinguishes himself from representationalist positions, which he sees realized in Descartes and - in analytical philosophy - in Carnap and Russell, and interprets certain positions in modern philosophy, such as Spinoza and Hegel , as forerunners of inferentialism.

Some philosophers argue that truth-conditional semantics, as proposed by Davidson , are in opposition to inferential semantics. Jerry Fodor coined the expression inferential role semantics as a fighting term in order to attack a theory of meaning that had failed for him because it was non-compositional. Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore also mischievously speak of "New Testament Semantics". You tried to show that all inferential semantics are bound to a semantic holism . Inferential and proof-theoretical semantics have points of contact.

Brandom's normative pragmatics

For Brandom, the meaning of a statement arises from the implicit conclusions and premises to which it entitles or obliges a competent speaker. So the statement 'Today is Wednesday' does not represent a certain objectively given fact. Rather, it is only understandable within the framework of certain socially influenced language rules, according to which, for example, the statement 'Tomorrow is Thursday' is derived as a conclusion. By referring to the rules of language use, Brandom tries to base the inferential semantics on normative language pragmatics .

Semantics of conceptual roles

In contrast to Wittgenstein, in the semantics of conceptual roles (conceptual role semantics, hereinafter CRS ; also inferential or functional role semantics: semantics of inferential or functional roles), it is not the use of language that is the point of reference, but the function and structure of terms in the functional context of human consciousness, insofar as this Context is representable in terms of formal logic. This theory has its origins in ideas by Gilbert Harman and Hartry Field . Other representatives are Ned Block , Paul Horwich , Brian Loar , Colin McGinn , Christopher Peacocke , William Woods , Philip Johnson-Laird . The CRS claims: The meaning of a representation (e.g. in the vehicle of a linguistic expression or a mental state) is identifiable with the role that this representation plays in the conscious life (including perception, thinking and decision-making) of an actor, or it is counterfactual would play. The orientation towards functional roles implies that an expression only has its meaning in the context of a mental structure of relationships. As the talk of "inferences" (logical conclusions) emphasizes, this can be read off in particular from conceptual relations and logical implications.

Proof Theory Semantics

Inferentialist approaches in logic are mostly negotiated under the catchphrase “proof-theoretical semantics”. In this tradition, which began with Gerhard Gentzen's investigations into logical inference , one considers the meaning of the logical operators as defined by two inference rules per operator: The introductory rule specifies the conditions under which a statement may be inferred that contains the operator in question as the main operator; the elimination rule indicates what can be inferred from such a statement. For example, the rules for conjunction in a calculus of natural inference are as follows:

The conjunction “A and B” can be inferred from two statements A and B (rule of the introduction of the conjunction).
Example: From the statements “Skolem was Norwegian” (A) and “Skolem was a logician” (B) it can be concluded: “Skolem was a Norwegian and a logician” (A ∧ B).
Every single conjunct, i.e. both A and B, can be deduced from a conjunction “A and B” (rule of eliminating the conjunctions).
Example: From “Skolem was a Norwegian and a logician” (A ∧ B) it can be concluded: “Skolem was a Norwegian” (A) - and also “Skolem was a logician” (B).

From the point of view of proof-theoretical semantics, such rules are not something secondary, which would have to be justified by a prior definition of the meaning of the operators (e.g. by truth tables ), but they determine the use of the logical symbols and thus (according to Wittgenstein's idea that Meaning equals use) their meaning.

Programmatically formulated Gentzen:

The introductions represent, so to speak, the “definitions” of the characters in question, and the eliminations are ultimately only consequences of what can be expressed as follows: When eliminating a character, the formula in question, the outermost character of which is involved here, may only "To be used as what it means by virtue of the introduction of this mark". […] By specifying these ideas, it should be possible to prove the elimination conclusions on the basis of certain requirements as unambiguous functions of the associated introduction conclusions.

This means that the elimination rules must be justified on the basis of the introduction rules. From this programmatic remark by Gentzen, Dag Prawitz, as the central theoretician of proof-theoretical semantics, worked with Michael Dummett to create an entire meaning- theoretical program. Prawitz formulated a semantics of proofs based on the notion of the semantic priority of introductory rules. This idea was worked out by Michael Dummett at about the same time as the philosophical conception of a verificationist theory of meaning, which was based on assertibility conditions as the central semantic definition.

Individual evidence

  1. ^ R. Brandom: Making it Explicit , p. 97 f.
  2. ^ Dorit Bar-On, Claire Horisk, William G. Lycan: Deflationism, meaning and truth-conditions , in: Philosophical Studies 101/1 (2000), pp. 1–28. In addition to a postscript (pp. 344–352) also in: B. Armor-Garb / JC Beall (eds.): Deflationary Truth , Open Court Press, Chicago and La Salle 2005, pp. 321–343.
  3. ^ R. Brandom: Making it Explicit , HUP: Cambridge, Mass. 1998, p. 93 ff.
  4. ↑ After Block, lc
  5. ^ Closely based on Ned Block : Art. Semantics, Conceptual Role , in: The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  6. ^ Gentzen: Investigations on logical reasoning , p. 189.
  7. ^ Prawitz: On the idea of ​​a general proof theory
  8. ^ Dummett: The Logical Basis of Metaphysics

literature

  • Ned Block: Holism, Hyper-Analyticity and Hyper-Compositionality , in: Philosophical Issues 3 (1993), 37-72
  • Paul Boghossian : Does an Inferential Role Semantics Rest upon a Mistake? , in: Philosophical Issues 3 (1993), 73-88.
  • Paul Boghossian: Inferential role semantics and the analytic / synthetic distinction , in: Philosophical Studies 73 / 2-3 (1994), 109-122.
  • Michael Dummett: The Logical Basis of Metaphysics , Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press 1993, ISBN 0-674-53785-8 .
  • N. Francez / R. Dyckhoff: Proof-Theoretic Semantics for a Natural Language Fragment , Linguistics and Philosophy 33 (2010), 447-477.
  • Jerry Fodor / Ernest Lepore: Why Meaning (Probably) Isn't Conceptual Role , in: Mind & Language 6/4 (1991), 328-343.
  • Jerry Fodor / Ernest Lepore: The compositionality papers , Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002, ISBN 0199252165 .
  • Gerhard Gentzen: Investigations into logical reasoning , Mathematische Zeitschrift 39 (1934–1935)
Reprinted in: Karel Berka , Lothar Kreiser (eds.): Logic texts . Annotated selection on the history of modern logic , Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 4th edition 1986.
Online version of the University of Göttingen: Part 1 and Part 2
  • Jaroslav Peregrin: Pragmatization of Semantics , in: K. Turner (ed.): The Semantics / Pragmatics Interface from Different Points of View , Elsevier, Amsterdam 1999, 419–442. ISBN 9780080430805 . Online version (PDF; 145 kB)
  • Dag Prawitz: Meaning Approached via Proofs , Synthèse 148 (2006), 507-524.
  • Dag Prawitz: On the idea of ​​a general proof theory , Synthèse 27 (1974), 63-77.
  • William J. Rapaport: Holism, Conceptual-Role Semantics, and Syntactic Semantics , in: Minds and Machines 12/1 (2002), 3-59.
  • Peter Schroeder-Heister : Semantics, proof-theoretical , in: Jürgen Mittelstraß (Hrsg.): Encyclopedia Philosophy and Philosophy of Science. 2nd Edition. Volume 7: Re - Te. Stuttgart, Metzler 2018, ISBN 978-3-476-02106-9 , pp. 341 - 343 (see bibliography).
  • Peter Schroeder-Heister : Validity Concepts in Proof-Theoretic Semantics , Synthèse 148 (2006), 525-571.
  • Ted A. Warfield: On a syntactic argument against conceptual role semantics , in: Analysis 53/4 (1993), 298-304.

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