Bloodlust case

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The case of the Federal Court of Justice from 1955, which became known as the blood rush case, is a well-known case study in jurisprudence and deals with the legal consequences of an inability to act that only occurred during the execution of the crime .

facts

The defendant hit K. on the head with a hammer. At first she only acted willfully with regard to bodily harm to Ms. K. Then the defendant feared that K. might file a criminal complaint based on the offense . Thereupon she decided to kill K. by hammering her head and face again. While this decision was being carried out, she fell into a bloodlust , which led to the defendant changing weapons and consequently striking the face and head of K. with a miner's hatchet that happened to be there instead of a hammer. While carrying out the act, she injured K. with a total of 5 out of 30 blows with a hammer and hatchet so that K. died immediately.

The defendant had not taken the blows with the miner's hatchet into her consciousness due to the intoxication of blood .

Condemnation

First instance judgment

The Circuit Court of the District Court of Essen evaluated the hammer and Beilhiebe because of the close spatial and temporal relationship as a fact. This is not opposed by the fact that the defendant initially only acted with intent to cause bodily harm and only later with killing intent. Because the accused did not want to cover up any other act by the (one) act, there is no criminal liability for attempted murder .

The trial court could not determine which 5 of a total of 30 blows with hammer and hatchet were fatal. It therefore assumed in dubio pro reo in favor of the defendants that K. had died not from the hammer blows that the defendant had executed with intent to assault, but only from the ax blows carried out in a state of intoxication. However, the accused could not be punished because of the blows of the ax due to the inability to guilt in the bloodlust for a completed homicide. Thus it remains with a criminal liability for attempted homicide.

Against that judgment which laid prosecutor revision one. She reprimanded the assumption of a unit of action in relation to the hammer and the attachment and thus the non-application of § 211 StGB old version as well as the assumption of an attempted killing.

Second instance judgment

The Supreme Court held, contrary to the opinion of the (first instance) the circuit court, the offense of § 211 II third clause of the Criminal Code (old version) to be applicable. This is in fact unity for dangerous bodily harm which has also been carried out according to § 223a StGB old version

With regard to the assumption of an attempted homicide, which was criticized by the public prosecutor, the BGH considered the merits (and thus ultimately also the success) of the appeal to be possible. He gave the Essen jury to investigate the defendant's idea of ​​the course of the crime. Since the intent must also extend to the causal event [in the figurative sense, the essential course of the crime] , it should be investigated in particular whether the accused was the occurrence of the intoxication and the associated consequences - "[...] warned by her earlier outbursts of anger […] ”- could foresee and at least accepted it with approval . If the investigation shows that this is to be answered in the affirmative, there is a completed (punishable) homicide; if this is denied, it can be assumed that the killing was merely attempted.

Also lies only an attempted homicide occurs when the K. had already died by the "only" covered by the injury intent hammer blows [ Note: in view of the intention to kill shaped by hammer blows would then be an inadequate attempt before ].

Legal meaning

At the time of the decision, according to the statements of the BGH, the basic existence of guilt- excluding affect states was generally recognized in criminal law; albeit partly (again) controversial in psychology. However, according to the statements of the BGH decision, there was disagreement as to whether an exclusion of guilt was only possible in the case of an affect that was not at fault or also in the case of culpable induction of the affect state.

In the blood frenzy case, the BGH expresses its legal opinion with regard to this dispute. According to this, an exclusion of criminal liability in the case of a culpably induced state of affect does not come into consideration if the acts committed by a perpetrator in a state of incapacity to act “represent only an insignificant deviation from the perpetrator's conception of the act” and are covered by intent. The perpetrator would take the entry of Insanity tacitly accepted , let him be therefore be considered guilty of the completed offense, even if the concrete success of the offense occurring only after a made in the state of Insanity action. This legal opinion was confirmed in a later BGH decision.

This also has a certain similarity to the actio libera in causa , since here, too, the perpetrator is not punished for a culpable incapacity.

The solution of the BGH corresponds to the prevailing opinion. However, there are more restrictive minor opinions.

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ see only Wessels / Beulke / Satzger , Criminal Law General Part, 44th Edition, Rn. 258, 411; Frisch , Faithful behavior and attribution of success, Heidelberg 1988, p. 615; Freund in Maiwald-II-Festschrift, pp. 211, 218 fn. 23; sometimes even treated as a separate case group
  2. ^ BGH, judgment of the 4th Criminal Senate v. April 21, 1955, Az .: BGH 4 StR 552/54, BGHSt 7, 325
  3. ^ Walter Gropp: Criminal Law General Part . Springer, 2015, p. 152ff (case study 4.18)
  4. ↑ Source from the BGH decision explained in this article: Leipziger Commentary, 7th edition, § 51 Note 5c, p. 333; Maurach, German Criminal Law, General. Part 1954, p. 380
  5. ↑ Wessels / Beulke / Satzger, Criminal Law General Part, 44th Edition, Munich 2014, Rn. 258 mwN; BeckOK StGB § 20 Rn. 69 with further references and Section 212 Rn. 30 mwN
  6. ^ BGH, judgment of the 2nd criminal senate v. April 30, 2003, Az .: BGH 2 StR 503/02, NStZ 2003, 535
  7. ↑ Strictly in: Munich Commentary on the Criminal Code, 2nd edition 2011, § 20 Rn. 111
  8. ↑ See Kühl in: Lackner / Kühl, StGB, 28th edition 2014, § 20 StGB, marginal no. 16; so also Frisch, factual behavior and attribution of success, p. 615 mwN
  9. ↑ Strictly in: Munich Commentary on the Criminal Code, 2nd edition 2011, § 20 Rn. 111, 113; Freund in Maiwald-II-Festschrift, pp. 211, 218, Berlin 2010