Utilitarianism

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The utilitarianism or utilitarianism (English original title Utilitarianism ) is the name of a text published for the first time in 1861 by the English philosopher John Stuart Mill (1806–1873). Here he explains his variant of utilitarianism and defends it against accusations.

History of origin

The ethical position of utilitarianism had been developed and disseminated since the late 18th century in particular by Jeremy Bentham , but also by his friend and John Stuart's father James Mill . James Mill raised his first son privately and, as a child, systematically sealed him off from his peers to protect him from bad influences. In this way, John Stuart became a versatile intellectual who had dealt with utilitarianism in particular. However, his relationship to his father and also to his philosophy remained psychologically complex. At the age of 14 he spent a year in France with Jeremy Bentham's brother Samuel and was already writing about the utilitarian works of Bentham and his father. After graduating, he wrote several essays in the 1830s that dealt more critically with the variant of utilitarianism advocated by Bentham and his father. After he concentrated more on his theoretical philosophy and economics in the following years, he began to deal more with political philosophy again in the mid-1850s . In 1859 he published the text On Liberty , then in 1861 the text Utilitarianism , first in Frasers Magazine , two years later as a book. The last chapter of the book was originally planned as an independent essay and was only later incorporated into the work. Only minor changes were made by Mill in later editions.

content

The relatively short text is divided into five chapters. First, Mill places his theory in the introduction in an overall context of the moral-philosophical debate in general. In the second chapter he explains his understanding of utilitarianism, in the third and fourth chapters he goes into the question of the ultimate justification of moral-philosophical systems in general and of utilitarianism in particular, and in the last chapter he creates a connection to the concept of justice.

introduction

The question of which the highest good ( summum bonum ), and that the first principle ( first principle is) the moral, exaggerating the philosophy since its origins. Mill claims that Plato already took a utilitarian position on this. Kant , on the other hand, set the general law of reason as the first principle, but "almost grotesquely" failed to derive real moral rules from it. Mill wants to explain and prove the utilitarian theory, whereby a proof is only possible in the sense of deriving a controversial statement from an undisputed statement.

Discussion of utilitarianism

The basic thesis of utilitarianism is the principle of greatest happiness: an action is right precisely when it promotes happiness and wrong when it does the opposite. Happiness means joy and the absence of pain. It was his theory of life ( theory of life ) that apart from pleasure and freedom from pain was not desirable for themselves. Anyone who thinks such a theory is only worthy of pigs is putting himself in a bad light because he claims that people have no better quality sources of joy than pigs. In fact, it is perfectly compatible with utilitarianism that some sources of joy are more valuable than others. Mill offers a test to compare the value of two joys: If a person is able (mentally, physically) to experience two joys and, after experiencing both, gives one clear preference, then that joy is more valuable than the other. So it will always turn out that those joys are preferable that are intellectually more appealing. Since the prerequisite for experiencing such joys is high mental capacities, it is better to be a dissatisfied Socrates than a satisfied fool. It should be noted here that people decide against intellectual pleasure because physical pleasure is closer. These people are then not - or no longer - at the necessary intellectual level to be competent judges .

The realization of happiness as a permanent state is impossible at all. However, utilitarianism is only concerned with a quantitative and qualitative maximum of possible happiness - this is an acceptable goal for everyone. Utilitarianism leads to an increase in education and knowledge and also to an increase, for example, in charity. Only in utilitarianism such goals are not in themselves a good, but a necessary means to increase happiness.

Mill also discusses the accusation that it is too high a requirement to always keep an eye on the benefit to society as a whole in all actions. This is not required in any moral theory and is actually unrealistic. Nevertheless, such actions are also right that are not carried out out of moral motivation, but nevertheless at least do not reduce happiness. According to Mill, the moral judgment of an action should depend on whether the person involved intended to increase or decrease happiness.

In order to do justice to the utilitarian demands, it is right to acquire virtues . This prevents negligence in relation to moral conduct; to that extent it is a morally correct act to acquire virtues. It remains unclear at this point whether Mill is to be regarded as an act utilitarian or a rule utilitarian .

A related reproach for morally excessive demands on the individual is that of practical excessive demands. It is not possible to estimate the consequences of all actions with sufficient accuracy and to weigh them against each other. Mill replies that mankind has had experience with the consequences of human action since the beginning of its existence and can draw from this empirical knowledge. The weighing of all consequences is only the illustrative representation of the utilitarian demand and does not need to be really detailed.

Motivation for utilitarian action

The question of the reason for our obligation to act morally is identical to the question of what motivates us to act. As in all other moral theories, in utilitarianism the acting person is driven by external and internal motives. External motives include the hope of recognition and praise and the fear of punishment from other people or from God. This also includes our natural empathy for others. The internal motivation is a sense of duty. This, according to Mill, is fed by a very complex mixture of experiences and feelings. Nevertheless, there is a natural commonality of all people: All people must have social feelings and understand themselves as part of a community. Since people need to cooperate and act collectively (to gain advantage), they also identify their goals with one another. The formation of the community makes it more and more common to pursue the goals of others and at some point people naturally take each other into consideration. According to Mill, political progress makes it a duty to form a unit with the rest of the people. This is also spread through religion and education.

Proof of the utility principle

A proof of a final goal in the sense of a logical development is not possible, according to Mill. On the contrary:

"The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that people actually see it. [...] In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people actually do desire it. "

- chap. 4, paragraph 3.

The only proof of utilitarianism could therefore be that, after all, all people want their own happiness. In addition to happiness, people now also want virtues, for example. However, according to Mills utilitarianism, this is something worth striving for, since virtues contribute to the common good. Finally, there would be few sources of happiness if things were not also considered worth striving for that contribute to happiness or are closely related to it. Only happiness is really wanted as such.

Utility and justice

Mill sees justice as a feeling or instinct that, like instincts in animals, is in principle fallible. On the other hand, mankind also relies on subjective feelings in other questions on which no evidence is otherwise available. According to Mill, the following aspects are part of our sense of justice:

Mill understands a duty to be everything that can be demanded of people and the non-observance of which is punished - be it by the courts or just by disapproval of fellow men. On the other hand, there are also actions that we would like others to do but could not ask them to do. We call false those acts (or inaction) which we think should be punished. Mill distinguishes between perfect and imperfect duties: those duties are perfect which the other party can demand of the agent. Imperfect duties cannot be demanded from a specific person, they only have to be fulfilled in some specific situation (such as donations ). Justice now applies only to perfect duties.

The feeling of justice, Mill says, has two ingredients: the desire to punish the unjust and the knowledge that someone has been harmed (unjustly). The desire for punishment arises from the impulse for self-defense and empathy. This desire for retribution is not moral in itself, but its use in the social structure, since it serves the collective interest.

For Mill, a right is simply something that, if violated, causes harm to someone, for which the person who caused the harm is to be punished. Rights should be protected by society, as the utility principle is followed.

According to Mill, justice is a name for a class of social benefits that are highly valued in the theory of utilitarianism, since a just society brings great benefits for all. However, he admits that in certain situations it may be better or even advisable to violate the principles of justice - such as stealing in order to save a life. Then, however, there is usually no talk of an unjust act, but of the fact that it is just to act in this individual case.

literature

Text output

  • John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, Oxford 2004.
  • John Stuart Mill, Jeremy Bentham, Utilitarianism and other essays, London 1987.
  • John Stuart Mill, The Complete Text of John Stuart Mill's Utilitarianism, in: Henry West (ed.), Blackwell Guide to Mills Utilitarianism, Oxford 2006, pp. 61-114.
  • John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism / Der Utilitarismus (English / German, translated by Dieter Birnbacher ), Stuttgart 2006.
  • John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (translated and introduced by Manfred Kühn), Hamburg 2009.

Secondary literature

  • John Rawls , History of Political Philosophy, Frankfurt a. M. 2008, Section Mill, pp. 367-457.
  • John Skorupski, John Stuart Mill, London 1991, chapter Utilitarianism, pp. 283-336.
  • Henry West (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Mill's Utilitarianism, Oxford 2006.

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ See Susan Leigh Anderson, Mills Life, in: Henry West (ed.), Blackwell Guide to Mills Utilitarianism, Oxford 2006, pp. 11-25, here p. 13.
  2. ↑ See John Rawls, History of Political Philosophy, Frankfurt 2008, p. 369.
  3. ↑ See Susan Leigh Anderson, Mills Life, in Henry West (ed.), Blackwell Guide to Mills Utilitarianism, pp. 14–14.
  4. ^ Remarks on Bentham's Philosophy (1833), Bentham (1838) and Coleridge (1840).
  5. ↑ See Susan Leigh Anderson, Mills Life, in Henry West (ed.), Blackwell Guide to Mills Utilitarianism, pp. 22–22.
  6. ↑ Dieter Birnbacher, epilogue to Der Utilitarismus, in: John Stuart Mill, Der Utilitarismus, Stuttgart 1976, p. 125
  7. ↑ See chap. 1, para. 2. Mill refers here to the Protagoras dialogue
  8. ↑ See chap. 1, paragraph 4.
  9. ↑ See chap. 1, para. 5.
  10. ↑ See Chapter 2, Paragraph 2.
  11. ↑ See chap. 2, paras. 3–4.
  12. ↑ See chap. 2, para. 5.
  13. ↑ See chap. 2, para. 5.
  14. ↑ See chap. 2, para. 6.
  15. ↑ See chap. 2, paragraph 7.
  16. ↑ See chap. 2, para. 12.
  17. ↑ See chap. 2, para. 17.
  18. ↑ See chap. 2, para. 19.
  19. ↑ See chap. 2, paras. 20–21.
  20. ↑ See also: David Brink, Mill's Moral and Political Philosophy, in: Stanford encyclopedia of Philosophy, Sections 2.7 and 2.8. [1]
  21. ↑ See chap. 2, para. 24.
  22. ↑ See chap. 3, paragraph 1.
  23. ↑ See chap. 3, paragraph 3.
  24. ↑ See chap. 3, paragraph 4.
  25. ↑ See chap. 3, paragraph 10.
  26. ↑ See chap. 4, paragraph 3.
  27. ↑ See chap. 4, paragraph 4.
  28. ↑ See chap. 4, para. 5.
  29. ↑ See chap. 4, paragraph 6.
  30. ↑ See chap. 4, paragraph 8.
  31. ↑ See chap. 5, paragraph 2.
  32. ↑ See chap. 5, paras. 5-10.
  33. ↑ See chap. 5, para. 14.
  34. ↑ See chap. 5, para. 15.
  35. ↑ See chap. 5, para. 18.
  36. ↑ See chap. 5, para. 19.
  37. ↑ See chap. 5, paras. 21-22.
  38. ↑ See chap. 5, para. 24.
  39. ↑ See chap. 5, para. 25.
  40. ↑ See chap. 5, paras. 37-38.