Objection to excessive demands

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As overwork objection refers objections to various ethical theories and principles that criticized theory or principle requires criticized too much, more victims of a call as may reasonably be required, and is therefore not acceptable. The objection is often discussed in connection with consequentialist theories and demands for global duty of assistance, such as those represented by Peter Singer . He was also put forward against many other theories and principles.

history

The objection of excessive demands is considered to be a central objection to consequentialist theories and especially to classical utilitarianism , which demands that the well-being of all those affected by an action be taken into account and to maximize it. It is commonly believed that the objection arose in response to consequentialism. Marcel van Ackeren and Michael Kühler point out, however, that excessive demands were discussed beforehand. Immanuel Kant, for example, criticized the degree of virtue, which the Stoa considered necessary and achievable, as overwhelming. Thereby they would have "stretched the moral faculties of man under the name of a wise man beyond all the limits of his nature and accepted something that contradicts all human knowledge." ( Kant :) In connection with utilitarianism, William Godwin , 1793, was one of the first who thought about excessive demands.

John Stuart Mill dealt with objection to excessive demands in his work The Utilitarianism . The first objection targets people's limited cognitive abilities. It says that it is too much to ask to calculate and weigh all possible consequences for all people in every action. The standard of utilitarianism would be too high for humanity; it would be asking too much that people should always act out of the drive to advance the general interests of society, so Mill points out the objection. Mill replies that by far not every action has to be done for this motive. He calls it a misunderstanding to view the utilitarian mindset as one that would imply that people should base their considerations on a generality as broad as the world or society as a whole. In most cases, Mills believes that it is sufficient to concentrate on the persons directly affected and also to ensure that the rights of other persons are not violated. Mill countered the second objection, which aims at impartiality and says that the constant, unbiased, impartial maximization of utility interferes too much in private decisions, projects and the way of life, that the impartial pursuit of utility maximization is not an obligation, but rather more than that Duty required .

In 1972, Peter Singer rekindled the debate about the excessive demands of consequentialist theories with his essay Famine, Affluence and Morality on the basis of the question of world poverty. Singer developed the thought experiment of a drowning child. He assumed that everyone would affirm an obligation of passers-by to have to save the child if their own victims were comparatively smaller. He concluded:

"If it is in our power to prevent something very bad without sacrificing something of (comparable) moral importance, we should do so, morally."

- Peter Singer : Famine, Affluence and Morality. 1972

The objection of excessive demands has been raised against a large number of other ethical theories and principles to this day, for example virtue ethics , contractualism or Kantian positions . In the past few years, the objection to being overwhelmed has also been discussed on issues of applied ethics such as animal ethics , intergenerational justice and climate change . The idea of ​​an extensive role ethical theories in life and ethical theories in general, influenced by Bernard Williams , was countered with the objection of being overwhelmed and even adopted the position that one can only avoid being overwhelmed by avoiding ethical theories entirely.

definition

Formulations

Moral theories and principles require moral agents to consider, do or not do something. This can lead to conflicts between one's own goals, interests and the well-being of the agent and the moral demands on him. If the addressee would no longer be able to adequately pursue his personal projects and goals by complying with what is morally required, this is the formulation of the objection, then the moral theory or the moral principle demands too much. The personal integrity of the addressee could even be violated. The moral demands exceed a limit of what is reasonable.

Liam Murphy defines the objection to being overwhelmed as follows: The objection to being overwhelmed claims that there is a limit to the extent to which morality, or at least a principle of charity, can legitimately demand victims from agents.

Often the objection is formulated on the basis of costs or general burdens that an obligation would require. McElwee formulates objection to excessive demands like this:

" Demandingness Objection : The claim that the agent is morally obliged to do A should be rejected just because doing A is too costly to the agent, given the moral considerations at stake, to count as morally obligatory."

" Objection of excessive demands : The claim that the agent is morally obliged to do A should be rejected because doing A, taking into account the moral considerations involved, is too burdensome for the agent to consider it morally obligatory"

- McElwee : Demandingness Objections in Ethics. 2016
Example : A moral theory is that Jones, who mountaineering, has a moral obligation to help Alice, who is in mortal danger, even though he can only do it with the loss of one limb. Someone criticizes the theory. He admits that it would be right to help Alice, but also says that Jones is not morally obliged to do so because it would be too much for him to lose a leg or an arm. The critic thus raises the objection of excessive demands.

The objection that a moral theory or duty is overwhelming is particularly significant in the case of positive duties , i.e. duties to provide something for others, to promote their well-being. On the other hand, negative obligations , i.e. obligations not to deny others access to a good or to harm them, are considered less susceptible to the objection. Furthermore, strict impartiality, i.e. the requirement not to value one's own interests and those of people close to them more than those of distant people, is an important reason for excessive demands.

Demarcation

The objection of excessive demands always presupposes a weighing up that results in a disproportion between high moral demands, which are based on altruistic considerations, on the one hand, and the, mostly non-moral, self-interest on the other. This is to be distinguished from objections that are aimed at the moral demands alone: ​​that the moral demanded, the ostensible moral duty, does not exist or is insignificant. And it must be distinguished from objections aimed at the valuation of goods on which the weighing-up is based: that a moral theory or moral duty assigns a wrong value to the moral or extra-moral goods which it requires to be considered, or gives them a wrong ranking.

The principle of ought presupposes ability , which binds a duty to the prerequisite that the person obliged to do justice to it at all, also refers to a limit of moral duty. However, this limit is even more narrowly defined than with the objection of excessive demands.

If someone does more than the moral duty demands, one speaks of supererogatory acts. Instead of a morally required duty to help, one would speak of a praiseworthy act of mercy.

The objection of excessive demands that a moral demand interferes too much in one's own life must be distinguished from the objection that consideration of it exceeds the cognitive abilities or the knowledge that a moral agent can have. So it would be, in the example of classical action utilitarianism, asking too much before making a decision to carry out a hedonistic calculation and to consider all people equally in order to find the alternative that brings the greatest happiness to the greatest number. Weber-Guskar calls this, in connection with the indirect effects of individual actions of global scope, the epistemic excessive demands ; For example, it is impossible to understand the causal chains of every single action, for example when buying a T-shirt.

In addition, a psychological overload is mentioned: According to Scheffler, we only perceive omissions as omissions under special circumstances, as in Singer's example of the child drowning right in front of our eyes, but not among millions of starving children worldwide. Spatial and temporal distance and unmistakable indirect causal relationships make negative effects of our actions appear unreal. The positive effects of aid that require a large number of mediation steps appear similarly unreal. We no longer experience ourselves as agents. In addition, a larger number of people who could also act tempts them not to make a contribution.

Replies

If the interests of the agent and what he morally ought to coincide, it is not demanding and therefore cannot be morally overwhelming. Peter Singer pointed out that in order to maintain the ability to help you have to pursue certain personal interests, including maintaining your own well-being and especially social and family ties. So there are instrumental reasons here that partially reconcile self-interest with moral demands.

Some philosophers take the position that morality is demanding. If you can avert a great evil that threatens another with comparatively few resources of your own, but which nevertheless represent great sacrifices for yourself, then you should do that. Some respond to the objection of being overwhelmed by asking whether the costs for the injured party are not too high, i.e. whether they are not overwhelmed. Ergo, whoever raises the objection to excessive demands must justify the asymmetry between the costs for the agent and the injured party. McElwee suggests a view based on the possibility of blame and praise, which is unique to the agent. In some cases the difference lies in damage caused or allowed and damage suffered.

Moral theories that primarily affirm negative duties and negate positive ones, as is the case with some libertarian currents , are naturally less exposed to the objection of excessive demands.

Some try to counter the problem of impartiality by giving greater weight to their own moral goods and those of people close to them.

Others have tried to weaken ethical theories or to find criteria for limits on how much they can demand: Liam Murphy, for example, suggested the principle of cooperation in order to be able to justify a limit. It is based on the idea of fairness : The less other people adhere to the principles, the more moral principles should not demand of one, so they should be as independent as possible of the extent to which other people adhere to them. You don't have to take responsibility for the failure of others, for example stop doing something to avert a famine, as you would have to do if everyone did their part. However, various authors point to counterexamples in which it is not independent of the behavior of others how much is morally required of us: for example in a concrete emergency in which two people could each save a drowning child without great difficulty. But if one is definitely not ready to do his part, and the other, if he were to save both children, would have significant disadvantages, the latter would still be obliged to save the lives of both children.

Ernst Tugendhat , among others, takes the view that those in need have rights vis-à-vis the community, not individuals. It is not the potentially overwhelmed individual but national and international institutions that are primarily responsible.

Ethical theories

Consequentialism and utilitarianism

Insofar as utilitarian theories demand that the well-being of others be given the same importance as one's own well-being and the well-being of a loved one, i.e. to be completely impartial, and insofar as they demand to promote benefit as well as avoid harm, they can completely dominate their own projects and their own lives . In the view of some, for example Bernard Williams , this is too demanding and a reason to reject consequentialism. Frequently consquentialists counter the objection, following Mill's strategy (see above), that one can develop patterns of decision-making and that it is more efficient to devote oneself to the good of small groups rather than the general good of the public. On the other hand, there are growing opportunities to influence the lives of strangers around the world, often with comparatively little effort.

Some utilitarians argue that we actually have a moral obligation to change our lives and do much more to promote the common good. Not doing so is therefore morally wrong. The objection of excessive demands is in vain because it treats the costs of the morally obligated and those of the needy differently, but with this it no longer assumes the prerequisites of action-consequentialism, it is no longer an independent objection. Others weaken the demands that one should act in such a way that the well-being of all is promoted as much as possible, but it is not always morally wrong not to do so. Some admit an agent-relative point of view, which allows one to attach more value to oneself and loved ones than to distant strangers. Satisfying or progressive consequentialism also weaken the demands - you just have to do enough or we should continually strive to do more.

Further theories and ethical principles

Thomas Nagel objected against contractualist ethical theories that every possible principle of care to which all individuals would have to agree would, in view of the current state of the world with their property rights, be expected of either the rich or the needy, depending on their point of view, too much and therefore rejected.

Objections to excessive demands were also discussed for Kant's ethics and virtue ethics , as well as for Nozick's interpretation of Locke's Proviso that appropriation is only justified if the existence of private property in general ( weak provision ) or the transfer of a good into private property through this appropriation ( strong provision ) nobody is worse off.

Applied ethics

World poverty

The objection to being overwhelmed has often been discussed in connection with positive duties of being charitable and reducing the suffering and poverty in the world as much as possible. Peter Singer's classic essay from 1972 was a frequent starting point. Given that there are many extremely poor people and much suffering in the world, an unlimited duty to help would mean that there would be no room for one's own life outside of this duty. Because each contribution, which is relatively small for the wealthy, is suitable for creating a much greater benefit for the very poor than it could if the comparatively wealthy person used it for himself. As a consequence, you should only stop when there is nobody left who is poorer than you and whom you could still help with a transfer.

In this context, in view of the limited possibilities of the individual, reference to structural problems that cannot be solved as an individual and institutional solutions play a decisive role. In the non-ideal world, in which adequately functioning institutions do not exist, both in the states of the needy and in those of the wealthy, there is still an individual responsibility to work towards the creation of such institutions and to make individual contributions. There is then again the risk of being overwhelmed.

Weber-Guskar points out that in the course of the globalized flow of goods, negative obligations have also become more important, it is not only the failure to provide aid that the wealthy can be accused of, because of the interrelationships the wealthy even carry out with some of their everyday actions of the poor.

With Liam Murphy's principle of cooperation , attempts have often been made to establish a limit. Sonderholm criticized the principle of cooperation and referred to the “cheap rescue”: Even if others do not do their part, one is still obliged to save lives if this is possible with comparatively few resources - for wealthy people.

Richard Miller proposed a principle of compassion designed to limit moral demands for charity. According to this principle, one only has to act benevolently to the extent that one can continue to fulfill one's other obligations and at the same time do not run the significant risk of significantly worsening one's life. You may occasionally pursue your own “goals worth striving for”, interests that enrich your own life and that you can pursue well. Sonderholm considers Miller's principle to be far too little demanding. Because it does not consider desirable goals from a normative point of view, every subjectively worthwhile goal, even extremely expensive luxury interests and pure consumption of validity , would be justified.

Climate change

The objection of excessive demands was discussed in connection with the question of how far individual obligations go to avoid greenhouse gas emissions and to work towards political, collective action for climate protection .

In contrast to positive obligations arising from the principle of charity, there are negative obligations in avoiding greenhouse gas emissions. Dangerous climate change , to which individuals contribute, causes damage up to and including human rights violations and the premature death of many. Almost all moral theories affirm a negative duty not to cause harm. However, many everyday activities, some of which can hardly be avoided, currently cause greenhouse gas emissions either directly, such as motorized traffic, or indirectly, such as material consumption. How far do the duties of avoiding your own emissions go? Is it too much to ask at some point?

Schwenkenbecher indicates a difference between subsistence and luxury emissions. Emissions that go beyond subsistence requirements could be avoided, often with little effort and expense. She also points out that this, at regional or national level, would even be accompanied by other positive side effects, such as lower health risks from air pollution.

Another proposed limit is the long-term capacity of the earth system (other than the atmosphere and oceans) to absorb CO 2 . This sustainable level - given the current world population and the two-degree target - is below 1–2 t per person per year in the long term. It is the basis for load sharing processes such as contraction and convergence . (In the meantime, however, due to rising emissions worldwide and the accumulation of CO 2 in the atmosphere, negative emissions are probably already necessary temporarily , i.e. the removal of greenhouse gases from the earth's atmosphere.)

Fruh and Hedahl call, in addition to a sustainable amount of emissions per capita, yet climate compensation as another practical approach: by climate protection projects elsewhere funded, can compensate for its own emissions. In net terms, your own actions do not lead to higher greenhouse gas concentrations in long-term effective compensation projects. Fruh and Hedahl fear that this solution could also be too demanding for poor people, while rich people could still afford an emission-intensive lifestyle. They also question whether compensation measures really do justice to the principle of not actively harming other people through one's own actions.

Fruh and Hedahl therefore also propose to distinguish between duties of traditional justice and duties of systemic justice : Traditional rights and duties between persons are prima facie duties , they exist immediately and must, if they do not harm an objectively at least equivalent good, without Consideration of the obligated party's private projects are fulfilled. Duties of systemic justice exist when the damage is a side effect of uncoordinated, aggregated actions by many. According to the proposal, such obligations would not arise in individual cases if they make projects that are central to the identity of the agent impossible. For example, the air travel of a Mecca pilgrim who cannot afford climate compensation may be morally permitted because of its central role in his life and the systemic nature of the potential injustice.

For the state level, Hohl and Roser suspect that emissions could be reduced - even beyond the fair amount - without excessive demands, i.e. that states could and should also step in for failures of others in accordance with the principle of cooperation.

In view of the lack of climate protection efforts at the institutional level, the question arises whether Murphy's principle of cooperation is applicable to individuals and whether their duty to reduce emissions is limited to the fair amount that would result if all states fulfilled their duties. Schwenkenbecher denies this, the principle is not applicable to different types of moral agents, individuals, organizations and states. However, it becomes all the easier for individuals to reduce their emissions as there are collective efforts to do so. Schwenkenbecher sees, depending on the possibilities of the individual, additional duties to contribute to such collective action.

Elizabeth Cripps believes that polluters must reduce their emissions until - in the sense of a non-harm principle - further avoidance would cause them as much damage as the emissions would do others. A lower limit here is “morally significant” burdens, which she defines very narrowly: The impairment, even temporarily, of central life and social functions, namely life, health, physical integrity, the abandonment of family membership and close social relationships.

See also

  • Effective altruism , a movement, optimal use of individual resources and time to promote the common good

literature

  • Brian McElwee: Demandingness Objections in Ethics . In: The Philosophical Quarterly . March 15, 2016, doi : 10.1093 / pq / pqw020 .
  • Marcel van Ackeren , Michael Kühler: Ethics on Edge? Moral Demandingness and 'Ought Implies Can' . In: Preprints and Working Papers of the Center for Advanced Study in Bioethics . No. 74 . Münster 2015 ( uni-muenster.de [PDF]).
  • Timothy Chappell (Ed.): The Problem of Moral Demandingness. New Philosophical Essays . Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2009, ISBN 978-0-230-21940-3 .

Web links

  • Category Demandingness of Consequentialism on philpapers.org
  • Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Consequentialism . In: Edward N. Zalta (Ed.): The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Winter 2015 Edition, Chapter 6: Consequences for Whom? Limiting the Demands of Morality.

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Julia Driver: The History of Utilitarianism. In: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 Edition). Edward N. Zalta, accessed March 11, 2016 .
  2. ↑ Marcel van Ackeren, Michael Kühler: Ethics on Edge? 2015, p. 4 .
  3. ^ AA V, Critique of Practical Reason: 127.2-4
  4. ^ Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Consequentialism. In: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta, 2015, accessed July 8, 2016 ( 4. Which Consequences? Actual vs. Expected Consequentialisms ).
  5. ↑ John Stuart Mill: Utilitarianism . 1886, Chapter 2: What Utilitarianism Is. ( Html [accessed July 8, 2016]): "They say it is exacting too much to require that people shall always act from the inducement of promoting the general interests of society."
  6. ^ Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Consequentialism. In: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta, 2015, accessed July 8, 2016 ( 6. Consequences for Whom? Limiting the Demands of Morality ).
  7. ^ Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence and Morality . In: Philosophy & Public Affairs . tape 1 , no. 3 , 1972 ( uoregon.edu [PDF; accessed September 25, 2016]). German translation: Hunger, Prosperity and Morality . In: Barbara Bleisch and Peter Schaber (eds.): Weltarmut und Ethik . Mentis, Paderborn 2007.
  8. ↑ Marcel van Ackeren, Michael Kühler: Ethics on Edge? 2015, p. 5 .
  9. ^ Liam Murphy The Demands of Beneficence. In: Philosophy and Public Affairs. 1993, page 268. According to: Sonderholm World poverty, positive duties, and the overdemandingness objection. 2013
  10. ^ A b c Brian McElwee: Demandingness Objections in Ethics . In: The Philosophical Quarterly . March 15, 2016, doi : 10.1093 / pq / pqw020 .
  11. ↑ a b c d Jorn Sonderholm: World poverty, positive duties, and the overdemandingness objection . In: Politics, Philosophy & Economics . tape 12 , no. 3 , 2013, doi : 10.1177 / 1470594X12447779 .
  12. ↑ a b c d e Barbara Bleisch : Duties at a distance: World poverty and individual responsibility . De Gruyter, Berlin 2010, ISBN 978-3-11-022825-0 , Chapter 6.1 Common duties as institutional duties and 6.2 The scope of individual responsibility .
  13. ↑ a b c Troy Jollimore: Impartiality. In: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta, 2014, accessed July 12, 2016 (Spring 2014 edition).
  14. ^ Jacob Caton: Resource Bounded Agents. In: Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved August 26, 2016 (more about the ethical significance of cognitive limitations).
  15. ↑ Weber-Guskar does not consider this to be necessary for an attribution of responsibility, one has to take on shared responsibility for the structures in which the actions take effect and whose overall effects can be better overlooked. Eva Weber-Guskar: How much do I need to know in order to act globally? Responsibility for world poverty and the problem of epistemic excessive demands . In: Journal for Practical Philosophy . tape 2 , no. 2 , 2015, p. 13-48 .
  16. ^ Scheffler Individual Responsibility in a Global Age. According to: Eva Weber-Guskar: How much do I need to know in order to be able to act globally? Responsibility for world poverty and the problem of epistemic excessive demands . In: Journal for Practical Philosophy . tape 2 , no. 2 , 2015, p. 13-48 . ; see also spectator effect
  17. ^ A b Elizabeth Ashford and Tim Mulgan:  Contractualism. In: Edward N. Zalta (Ed.): Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy . Chapter 8: What does contractualism demand?
  18. ^ A b c Fiona Woollard: Dimensions of Demandingness . In: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society . 2016, doi : 10.1093 / arisoc / aow003 .
  19. ↑ Tim Mulgan: The Demands of Consequentialism . Clarendon Press, 2005, ISBN 978-0-19-928697-3 , chapter 1.1.7. Libertarianism.
  20. ↑ see also communitarianism
  21. ↑ Ernst Tugendhat lectures on ethics. Frankfurt a. M. 1994, p. 335.
  22. ↑ Katja Vogt: Moral Excessive Demands and Theory of Justice . In: Journal for Philosophical Research . tape 56 , no. 3 , 2002, p. 346-364 , JSTOR : 20485096 .
  23. ^ Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Consequentialism. In: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta, 2015, accessed July 12, 2016 (Winter 2015 Edition, Chapter 6. Consequences for Whom? Limiting the Demands of Morality).
  24. ↑ Marcel van Ackeren , Martin Sticker: Kant and Moral Demandingness . In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice . tape 18 , no. 1 , February 2015, doi : 10.1007 / s10677-014-9510-3 ( online as working paper [PDF]).
  25. ↑ Christine Swanton: Virtue Ethics and the Problem of Demandingness . In: Timothy Chappell (Ed.): The Problem of Moral Demandingness. New Philosophical Essays . 2009.
  26. ↑ Josh Milburn: The demandingness of Nozick's 'Lockean' proviso . In: European Journal of Political Theory . 2014, doi : 10.1177 / 1474885114562978 .
  27. ^ Liam Murphy The Demands of Beneficence. In: Philosophy & Public Affairs. 1993.
  28. ^ Richard Miller Beneficence, Duty and Distance. 2004. According to: Sonderholm World poverty, positive duties, and the overdemandingness objection. 2013.
  29. ^ Brian Berkey: Climate Change, Moral Intuitions, and Moral Demandingness . In: Philosophy and Public Issues . tape 4 , no. 2 , 2014.
  30. ↑ So, among many, Henry Shue Human rights, climate change, and the trillionth ton. 2011.
  31. ↑ Estimates based on the average emissions of an American in his life come to the result that, cumulatively, he shortens at least another person's life by several months, see Simone Rocca and Des Gasper: Is An Individual's Impact on Health Harm via Climate Change Ethically Negligible? Paper presented to CERES conference on The Right to a Sustainable Future, June 30, Utrecht University. 2014 ( PDF ). They may possibly even cost, cumulatively, one or two human lives, see John Nolt: How Harmful Are the Average American's Greenhouse Gas Emissions? In: Ethics, Policy & Environment . tape 14 , no. 1 , 2011, doi : 10.1080 / 21550085.2011.561584 .
  32. ↑ See also Henry Shue Subsistence emissions and luxury emissions. 1993.
  33. ↑ Stephen Mark Gardiner : Ethics and Global Climate Change . In: Ethics . tape 114 , no. 3 , 2004, doi : 10.1086 / 382247 .
  34. ↑ Pete Smith et al. a .: Biophysical and economic limits to negative CO2 emissions . In: Nature Climate Change . 2016, doi : 10.1038 / nclimate2870 .
  35. ↑ a b Kyle Fruh and Marcus Hedahl: Coping with Climate Change: What Justice Demands of Surfers, Mormons, and the Rest of us . In: Ethics, Policy & Environment . tape 16 , no. 3 , 2013, doi : 10.1080 / 21550085.2013.843378 .
  36. ↑ Sabine Hohl and Dominic Roser: Stepping in for the Polluters? Climate Justice under Partial Compliance . In: Analysis & Criticism . tape 33 , no. 2 , 2011.
  37. ^ Anne Schwenkenbecher: Is there an obligation to reduce one's individual carbon footprint? In: Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy . tape 17 , no. 2 , 2014, sections The overly-demanding view and Individual mitigation and collective action , pp. 179-183 , doi : 10.1080 / 13698230.2012.692984 .
  38. ↑ Elizabeth Cripps: Climate Change and the Moral Agent: Individual Duties in an Interdependent World . Oxford University Press, 2013, ISBN 978-0-19-966565-5 , (V) The Limits of Demandingness.