Dialogic self

The dialogical self is a psychological concept according to which the human self emerges from interaction with others.

development

Hubert Hermans, the founder of dialogical self-theory

The concept of the dialogical self became widely known through the Dutch psychologist Hubert JM Hermans and the dialogical self-theory (DST) developed by him. This draws its concepts from very different sources, including the writings of the psychologists William James (1890) and Lew Wygotski (1934/1972; 1992), the sociologist George Herbert Mead (1934/1968; 1969) and the literary scholar Michail Bachtin (1971; 1981; 1986) etc. More recently, dialogical self-theory has also been made available for psychotherapy (Hermans & DiMaggio 2004), in Germany by the gestalt therapist Frank-Matthias Staemmler (2015).

Central concepts

The two central concepts of dialogical self-theory are dialogicity and plurality, whereby the second arises from the first and is logically subordinate to this. The dialogical form (not only verbal) of interpersonal interaction is fundamentally reflected in the course of socialization in such a way that the self of a person adopts a dialogical format. This is reflected in the fact that people only handle themselves in principle as others deal with them in adulthood such. B. by speaking to themselves (loudly or softly), but also referring to others in their thoughts in various ways, to whom they often turn imaginatively.

Dialogicity

According to Vygotsky, “the crucial mechanism behind higher mental functions is [...] the copying of social interactions; all higher psychic functions are internalized social relationships. [...] Even if we consider mental processes, their essence remains quasi-social. In their own privacy, people maintain the functions of social interaction ”.

What Vygotsky referred to relatively roughly as “copying”, “internalizing” or “interiorizing” in his day is, according to B. Rogoff et al. a. however, it is not a process in the course of which something interpersonal would be completely unmodified, one-to-one, so to speak, transformed into psychic. Rather, it is a process of creative appropriation, which leads to what the child makes his own, finding its own, individual form: “It is [...] about an appropriation of the common activity by the respective individual which reflects the individual's understanding of his or her participation in the joint activity ”.

The common activity consists first of all in a divided attention and has to do with that " intersubjectivity [...] with which the toddlers begin to manifest a common awareness of things in the environment and to engage in systematic interactions [...] with others" . And interactions are also in the foreground when it comes to the question of what is essentially internalized: For the developmental psychological approach represented here, the crucial aspect is that the internalization does not primarily focus on the reference person, their individual characteristics or on the content of the Communication relates. Such processes of identification do exist - later in developmental psychology! - also.

But on the fundamental level it is first about the acquisition of "interaction experiences" of "being for two". It is first about the appropriation of what is common, not that of the other. In this respect, Rogoff speaks of “the appropriation of shared activity as opposed to the process of internalizing an external activity”.

This aspect is essential because it expresses the element of the communal or - as one could also say: - the dialogical, which from the point of view of dialogical self-theory is to be given the highest priority. Leontjew emphasizes that "the process of internalization [...] does not consist in transferring an external activity to an [already existing] internal level of consciousness": it is the process through which this internal level is formed in the first place.

Thus the level of individual psychic processes is endowed with a dialogic quality from the ground up and over the entire lifetime; the self is once and for all provided with a dialogical 'format' - in other words: to develop a self means to make the relationship with others and the exchange with them your own thing and thereby define yourself. A self is appropriated dialogue , so the self is dialogical.

The common precedes the individual; “With you, man becomes I”, as Martin Buber put it; the self arises from the interaction with others, “it does not initially exist at birth, but arises within the social process of experience and activity, that is, in the respective individual as the result of his relationships”. It is therefore a false, individualistic assumption to assume that there is already a 'container' somewhere inside the child, which can then be 'filled' from the 'outside' with prefabricated mental 'contents'. In contrast to such individualistic psychologies, Kenneth Gergen emphasizes : "The word 'I' does not denote the origin of an action, but the achievement of a relationship ".

“It is remarkable how much Mead's sociological position coincides with Vygotsky's developmental position; Vygotsky even spoke explicitly of the ' sociologization ' of all consciousness, ie the recognition of the basic fact that the social dimension of consciousness is temporally and factually primary. The individual dimension of consciousness is derivative and secondary; it is based on the social and is [...] constructed accordingly ”.

This “sociologization” or the dialogical signature of psychological processes is so primary that it does not only become apparent with language development; rather, every linguistic dialogue builds on it: Babies suck in the dialogical format in the figurative, but also in the literal sense, with their mother's milk; the mothers bring their infants when breastfeeding z. B. a basic element of any kind of dialogue that was examined under the concept of "turn-taking" and in which both participants are both active and initiative as well as passive resp. behave reactively - similar to the pattern of question and answer in spoken dialogues.

The studies of the interactions between babies and their caregivers show that dialogic processes do not depend on language, even if they are increasingly associated with verbal communications in the further course of life and can then also take on forms that are predominantly linguistic. But the dialogue begins at birth. (There are arguments worth considering that it begins during pregnancy.) From then on, “thanks to memory [...] we are rarely alone. […] The development presupposes a constant, usually silent dialogue between the […] partners. […] The idea of ​​the community of self and other as a subjective reality is almost omnipresent ”. The phenomenon of "gaze dialogues" and other forms of interaction between small children and their caregivers should also be mentioned here. By Merleau-Ponty called "intercorporeality" is the first chronologically and human also continue basic scene dialogicity: "corporeality [is] a communication with the world, which is older than all thought." “Dialogue” therefore by no means only refers to the exchange that uses linguistic and symbolic means, because this is based on physical communication; it does not replace these in the course of development either, but complements them and thus expands the dialogic abilities of the self in interaction with others - and in dealing with oneself. "To be means to communicate".

plurality

The concept of plurality is based on a fact that is just as important as it may seem trivial at first glance: As a rule, people do not only interact with one other person, but with several people from birth. This usually begins with a toddler not only coming into contact with the mother but also with the father (or other primary caregivers, e.g. siblings, grandparents, etc.). In addition, the circle of caregivers usually expands with increasing age.

As Daniel Stern has shown with his concept of the "Representations of Generalized Interactions (RIGs)", this is significant for the development of the dialogical self in the first months of life (and therefore no longer trivial), as "each of the numerous, diverse relationships between the self and another [...] person has their specific rig. And when different RIGs are activated, the infant again experiences different forms and ways of being together with a self-regulating other ”.

One could also say: Because a respective RIG was created in the interaction with a certain other person, it always also contains the implicit reference to the interaction with this very person. This interaction experience finds its creatively appropriated form in an experience of the self that could be described as the "self-that-I-am-in-dialogue-with-this-person". The self, as it actualizes itself in a given situation, is in this way related to the experience of what it is like to interact with that person. A RIG thus also includes a memory of this person whom Stern calls the “evoked companion”.

This has various consequences. One of these, already indicated above, is that every experience of the self is linked to a more or less implicit memory of another person. A self without a reference to (one or more) others is in principle impossible, even if this reference can of course be more or less conscious and overlaid or processed by later occurring psychological processes and thus become indistinct.

Another consequence lies in the fact that the interactions with different others also contribute to different forms of self-experience. In addition, significantly different interaction experiences with the same caregiver lead to different RIGs and consequently also to different experiences of the “self, that I am in dialogue with this person”. In this way various forms of self-experience are formed. Even if the RIGs are supplemented and modified over time by increasingly complex memory processes, the principle already recognizable in the RIGs continues in the further development.

Buber's above-mentioned sentence, “Man becomes I through you ”, can thus be translated into the following statement: People develop different ways of experiencing themselves in their interactions with different others and in different interactions with the same others. To put it more simply: I am a different self depending on whether I am in a dialogue with Peter or Paula, and I am a different self depending on whether I am in a loving or a controversial dialogue with Paula . George Herbert Mead: “We have many different relationships with different people. [...] There are the most diverse selves that correspond to the most diverse social reactions. [...] A multi-layered personality is normal to a certain extent ”.

The more the interactions with others take on the character of interaction patterns through repetition and similarity, the more corresponding self-experience becomes recognizable in character. Through the creative processes of appropriation described above and the personal autonomy that increases with the subsequent development as adolescents and adults , the person can then bring their various selves more actively and proactively into emerging interactions and their course in one way or another - be it for their own purposes. or disadvantage - have a say.

The dialogical self is therefore always also a plural self. William James can be seen as a pioneer of this postmodern view; he wrote in his Principles of Psychology 125 years ago : “In fact, a person has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him and have an image of him in their minds. [...] We don't show ourselves to our children like our club-mates, our customers like the workers we hire, our own superiors and employers like our intimate friends. This practically results in a division of man into multiple selves ”.

This “division” is not to be understood in the pathological sense as a split or even as a dissociative identity disorder - otherwise all people would have this disorder. But "no, we are not all multiple", at least if the word "multiple" does not only mean versatility, but "a painful state, an expression of inner turmoil between often incalculable partial identities [...] as a result of severe trauma . […] In the case of people who are not highly dissociative, we should speak of diversity, plurality, creative versatility rather than multiplicity and reserve this technical term for the 'multiple personality' ”.

In other words: "The multiple personality as an abnormal phenomenon seems to be the pathological side of a healthy, functioning, dialogical self". But of course there is also between the many 'voices' that report to 'word' within the framework of a dialogical and plural self, not just relationships of mutual complementarity, support or harmony. Contradictions and inconsistencies are omnipresent and - within individually different limits - quite tolerable, usually to the extent that the various selves or Self-parts (one also speaks of “self-positions”) despite their differences enter into a dialogical exchange with one another, instead of dominating, marginalizing or ignoring one another. People want to be understood, not only by others, but also by themselves.

Metaphorically speaking, one can understand the dialogical self as a kind of " society of mind ", as a 'psychological society' with diverse and different positions, coalitions and contradictions that have to find a mode of coexistence despite all differences and contradictions, without on the one hand in fragments falling apart and on the other hand being subjected to a tendency towards totalitarian leveling. This can be achieved to the extent that all self-positions are granted the same right to exist and have a say in principle, so that they can participate in a psychological discourse that is shaped by the norm of inclusion.

Use in psychotherapy

Therefore, "in therapeutic applications of dialogical psychology, the various voices, often conflicting with one another, are encouraged to express themselves, to be heard and to enter into an open dialogue with one another". It is not primarily a question of establishing unity or consistency or harmony between the various positions; it is primarily about the dialogue itself, because “to be heard is in itself a dialogical relationship. The word wants to be heard, understood and answered in order to answer the answer and so on ad infinitum ”.

In order to be heard and to get an answer, the various voices of the self often need support. Providing this is part of the therapist's job. In doing so, it can orientate itself on discourse ethics such as those designed by Jürgen Habermas (2009) in relation to processes of social communication. Discourse ethics has developed criteria which, with certain specifications, can also be applied to the dialogical psychic processes of the individual. - Corresponding additions have been added to the following quote: "Every [self-position ...] may participate in discourses. […] Every [self-position] may problematize every assertion [other self-positions]. Any [self-position] may introduce any assertion into the discourse. Each [self-position] is allowed to express its attitudes, wishes and needs. […] No [… self-position] may be prevented by […] coercion from exercising [their] […] rights ”.

What turns out to be ethics on an interpersonal level is then presented on an individual level as a criterion for mental health, which psychotherapists can promote in their patients by supporting them in dealing with themselves in the consideration of discourse ethical standards.

In order to sort the 'voices' of updated self-positions, Valsiner divides them into “heterodialogs” on the one hand and into “auto-dialogues” on the other hand: One is in conversation either with others and / or with oneself, in a communication that neither must be acoustically perceptible, nor - in the case of a heterodialog - requires the physical presence of the other (Valsiner calls this a “fictitious heterodialog”).

Whenever people have nothing more urgent to do, they spend a large amount of their time cognitively and emotionally dealing with other people and their relationships with them.

Thinking about social relationships is apparently part of the normal state of the brain; without effort or intent, it continually evaluates and analyzes past, present, or possible future social relationships whenever non-social issues do not take up full attention. (Iacoboni et al. 2004, 1171)

Sometimes a few 'free' seconds that are available to us in the context of other activities are sufficient. In these short or even longer periods of time we enter into an imaginary dialogue with others, which by no means only takes on linguistic forms, but with visual, sometimes also auditory, olfactory and kinesthetic or motor ideas of the others, of their possible reactions and of ours own feelings that arise is accompanied. These imaginary dialogues are used for self-regulation ; According to the development theory described above, they are to be understood as appropriated interpersonal dialogues in which the others previously exercised the function of co-regulation.

Such dialogues are particularly often activated when difficult social situations are processed afterwards or played through in advance, that is, when it comes to some form of problem-solving. But other emotionally significant events such as happy memories or exciting anticipations can lead to fantasy conversations (fictional hetero dialogues) that relate to the others involved. Sometimes these fantasy conversations have a one-sided character in the sense that the person turns to the other in their imagination and only speaks to him (monological form); Sometimes, however, such a fantasy conversation also takes on a reciprocal form, whereby the person also fantasizes possible answers from the other, to which they then in turn respond, etc. (dialogical form). People also have similar conversations with themselves, that is, different self-positions address each other and take positions on each other - be it e.g. B. in a self-critical, sometimes self-tormenting way (“What kind of crap are you doing there again!”), In a self-supporting way (“Just courage, you can do it!”) Or in a way that includes both forms. This form of 'speaking', which is used for self-regulation, is sometimes also called “inner speaking” because it does not have to be linked to acoustically perceptible sounds, but can also be purely mental.

It is noteworthy that as the difficulty of their problems increases, people no longer use only brief comments on their thoughts or actions, but increasingly choose an unabbreviated, explicitly dialogical style in which clearly distinguishable voices take turns (in the sense of the above-mentioned turn- taking) take one or the other position and negotiate with one another. "The dialogic structure shows itself both as an inter-individual differentiating criterion between a good and a bad problem solver and as an intra-individual differentiating criterion between a successful and an unsuccessful processing of a task". It makes sense to take this finding seriously, especially in therapeutic situations, which naturally involve more difficult problems, and to encourage clients to clearly define their updated self-positions and to 'personalize' them, so to speak, that is, how they are looking at different people, giving them names and locating them in different places in the room, e.g. B. by assigning appropriate placeholders such as chairs to them, which they then occupy alternately and let them have their say in the way real people speak to one another. As effective as it is, this procedure requires careful introduction and explanation by the therapist in many cases, since in our culture - despite the findings mentioned - it is unfortunately still considered a sign of psychological peculiarity or even illness, loudly with oneself or speaking to absent others.

If patients can overcome their shyness, however, they often benefit greatly from their explicitly made fantasy or self-talk. Because on the way of the creative appropriation of the dialogues originally conducted with real caregivers and the associated transformations, a number of consolidations, deletions and reductions have usually taken place, which on the one hand have advantages in terms of scarcity and time savings, but on the other hand also have disadvantages. because differentiations and precision can be lost.

For therapeutic purposes, it makes sense to externalize the patient's “inner” speaking so that they become aware of as many relevant aspects of their psychological processes as possible. At the same time, they are brought into the position of conveying these aspects to their therapists in an understandable way, i.e. making them accessible to their understanding and possible influence. Therapists who are trained not only to listen to the content of what their clients say, but also to perceive the tone of their utterances and the accompanying body language , also get extremely valuable impressions of the emotional vibrations that are often initially unnamed the communication of content. This opens up a variety of other possibilities to find therapeutic access to implicit psychological processes.

literature

• M. Adams: Losing one's voice: Dialogical psychology of the unspeakable . In: Theory & Psychology 2010 20/3, pp. 342-361.
• R. Alexy: A Theory of Practical Discourse. In: W. Oelmüller (Ed.): Justification of standards, enforcement of standards. Schöningh, Paderborn 1978, pp. 22-58.
• MM Bakhtin: Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics. Hanser, Munich 1971.
• MM Bakhtin: The dialogic imagination: Four essays. University of Texas Press, Austin 1981.
• MM Bakhtin: Problems of Dostoevsky's poetics. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1984.
• MM Bakhtin: Speech genres and other late essays. Edited by C. Emerson and M. Holquist. University of Texas Press, Austin 1986.
• V. Bise: Problem solving in dialogue with oneself - Dialogic structures in inner speaking when solving problems: An exploratory study using the method of thinking aloud. Tectum, Marburg 2008.
• Martin Buber: Me and you. Schocken, Berlin 1936.
• U. Castiello, C. Becchio, S. Zoia, C. Nelini, L. Sartori, L. Blason, G. D'Ottavio, M. Bulgheroni and V. Gallese: Wired to be social: The ontogeny of human interaction . In: PLoS ONE 2010 5/10, e13199.
• Kenneth J. Gergen: Relational being: Beyond self and community. Oxford University Press, New York 2009.
• E. Goffman: Speech ways - forms of communication in social situations. UVK, Constance 2005.
• Jürgen Habermas: Discourse Ethics. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 2009.
• Hubert JM Hermans: The dialogical self as a society of mind. In: Theory & Psychology 2002 12/2, pp. 147-160.
• Hubert JM Hermans and G. DiMaggio (eds.): The dialogical self in psychotherapy. Brunner-Routledge, New York 2004.
• Hubert JM Hermans and T. Gieser (Eds.): Handbook of dialogical self theory. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2012.
• Hubert JM Hermans and A. Hermans-Konopka: Dialogical self theory: Positioning and counter-positioning in a globalizing Society. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK 2010.
• M. Huber (Hrsg.): Be many - a manual - complex trauma and dissociative identity - understand, change, treat. Junfermann, Paderborn 2011.
• William James: The principles of psychology (in two volumes). Holt, New York 1890.
• K. Kaye and AJ Wells: Mothers' jiggling and the burst-pause pattern in neonatal feeding. Infant Behavior and Development 3. 1980, pp. 29-46.
• AN Leontjev: The problem of activity in psychology. In: JVwert (Ed.): The concept of activity in Soviet psychology. Sharpe, New York 1981, pp. 37-71.
• George Herbert Mead: Spirit, Identity and Society from the Perspective of Social Behaviorism. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1934/1968.
• George Herbert Mead: Philosophy of Sociality - Essays on the anthropology of knowledge. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1969.
• M. Merleau-Ponty: Phenomenology of Perception. de Gruyter, Berlin 1966.
• J. Peichl: Hypno-analytical part work - Ego-State-Therapy with inner self-parts. Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 2012.
• HG Petzold : Integrative Therapy in the Lifespan - On the developmental psychology and memory theory foundation of active and body-centered interventions in the case of 'early damage' and 'negative chains of events' in unhappy life careers. In: HG Petzold (ed.): Psychotherapy and baby research. Vol. II: The power of loving looks - infant observations revolutionize psychotherapy. Junfermann, Paderborn 1995, pp. 325-490.
• P. Rochat: Me and mine in early development . In: T. Fuchs, HC Sattel and P. Henningsen (Eds.): The embodied self: Dimensions, coherence and disorders. Schattauer, Stuttgart 2010, pp. 175-181.
• B. Rogoff: Apprenticeship in thinking: Cognitive development in social context. Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford 1990.
• F.-M. Staemmler: The Secret of the Other - Empathy in Psychotherapy: How therapists and clients understand each other. Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 2009a.
• F.-M. Staemmler: The dialogical self - postmodern image of man and psychotherapeutic practice. Schattauer, Stuttgart 2015.
• Daniel N. Stern : The Infant's Life Experience . With a new introduction by the author. 10th edition. Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 2010, ISBN 978-3-608-94687-1 (English: The interpersonal world of the infant . Translated by Wolfgang Krege).
• Daniel N. Stern: Forms of Vitality. Exploring dynamic experience in psychotherapy, developmental psychology, and the arts . Brandes & Apsel, Frankfurt, M. 2011, ISBN 978-3-86099-692-8 ( brandes-apsel-verlag.de [PDF; 699 kB ; accessed on December 15, 2017] English: Forms of vitality. Exploring Dynamic Experience in Psychology, the Arts, Psychotherapy, and Development . Translated by Elisabeth Vorspohl, first edition: Oxford University Press , 2010).
• E. Tenzer: Talk to yourself! In: Psychologie heute 38/9. 2011, pp. 26-30.
• H. Trüb: Healing from the encounter. Consideration of dialogic psychotherapy. Extended new edition, edited and with an introduction by Milan Sreckovic. Bergisch Gladbach 2015.
• J. Valsiner: Forms of dialogical relations and semiotic autoregulation within the self. In: Theory & Psychology 12/2. 2002, pp. 251-265.
• LS Vygotsky: Consciousness as a problem in the psychology of behavior. In: Soviet Psychology 17/4. 1979, pp. 3-35.
• LS Vygotsky: The genesis of higher mental functions. In: JVwert (Ed.): The concept of activity in Soviet psychology. Sharpe, New York 1981, pp. 144-188.
• LS Vygotsky: History of the higher mental functions. LIT, Münster and Hamburg 1992.
• LS Vygotsky [Vygotsky]: Thinking and speaking. S. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main 1934/1972.

Individual evidence

1. ↑ Hubert JM Hermans and T. Gieser (eds.): Handbook of dialogical self theory. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2012.
2. ↑ Hubert JM Hermans and A. Hermans-Konopka: Dialogical self theory: Positioning and counter-positioning in a globalizing Society. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK 2010.
3. ^ William James: The principles of psychology (in two volumes). Holt, New York 1890.
4. ↑ LS Vygotsky [Vygotskij]: Thinking and speaking. S. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main 1934/1972.
5. ^ LS Vygotsky: History of the higher mental functions. LIT, Münster and Hamburg 1992.
6. ↑ George Herbert Mead: Spirit, Identity and Society from the View of Social Behaviorism. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1934/1968.
7. ↑ George Herbert Mead: Philosophy of Sociality - Essays on Cognitive Anthropology. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1969.
8. ↑ MM Bakhtin: Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics. Hanser, Munich 1971.
9. ↑ MM Bakhtin: The dialogic imagination: Four essays. University of Texas Press, Austin 1981.
10. ↑ MM Bakhtin: Speech genres and other late essays. Edited by C. Emerson and M. Holquist. University of Texas Press, Austin 1986.
11. ↑ Hubert JM Hermans and G. DiMaggio (eds.): The dialogical self in psychotherapy. Brunner-Routledge, New York 2004.
12. ↑ LS Vygotsky: The genesis of higher mental functions. In: JVwert (Ed.): The concept of activity in Soviet psychology. Sharpe, New York 1981, p. 164.
13. ^ B. Rogoff: Apprenticeship in thinking: Cognitive development in social context. Oxford University Press, New York & Oxford 1990, p. 195.
14. ^ P. Rochat: Me and mine in early development. In: T. Fuchs, HC Sattel & P. ​​Henningsen (Eds.): The embodied self: Dimensions, coherence and disorders. Schattauer, Stuttgart 2010, p. 177.
15. ↑ DN Stern: Forms of Vitality - The exploration of dynamic experience in psychotherapy, developmental psychology and the arts. Brandes & Apsel, Frankfurt am Main 2011, p. 184.
16. ↑ M. Merleau-Ponty: Phenomenology of Perception. de Gruyter, Berlin 1966, p. 406.
17. ^ B. Rogoff: Apprenticeship in thinking: Cognitive development in social context. Oxford University Press, New York & Oxford 1990, p. 195.
18. ↑ AN Leont'ev: The Problem of activity in psychology . In: JVwert (Ed.): The concept of activity in Soviet psychology. Sharpe, New York 1981, p. 57.
19. ↑ Martin Buber: Me and you. Schocken, Berlin 1936, p. 36.
20. ↑ George Herbert Mead: Spirit, Identity and Society from the View of Social Behaviorism. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1934/1968, p. 177.
21. ↑ Kenneth J. Gergen: Relational being: Beyond self and community. Oxford University Press, New York 2009, p. 133.
22. ^ LS Vygotsky: Consciousness as a problem in the psychology of behavior. In: Soviet Psychology 17/4. 1979, p. 31.
23. ↑ K. Kaye and AJ Wells: Mothers' jiggling and the burst-pause pattern in neonatal feeding. Infant Behavior and Development 3. 1980, pp. 29-46.
24. ↑ U. Castiello, C. Becchio, S. Zoia, C. Nelini, L. Sartori, L. Blason, G. D'Ottavio, M. Bulgheroni and V. Gallese: Wired to be social: The ontogeny of human interaction . In: PLoS ONE 2010 5/10, e13199.cast.
25. ↑ Daniel N. Stern: The life experience of the infant. Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 1992, p. 171 f.
26. ↑ HG Petzold: Integrative Therapy in the Lifespan - For the developmental psychology and memory theory foundation of active and body-centered interventions in 'early damage' and 'negative chains of events' in unhappy life careers. In: HG Petzold (ed.): Psychotherapy and baby research. Vol. II: The power of loving looks - infant observations revolutionize psychotherapy. Junfermann, Paderborn 1995, pp. 325-490.
27. ↑ M. Merleau-Ponty: Phenomenology of Perception. de Gruyter, Berlin 1966, p. 296.
28. ↑ MM Bakhtin: Problems of Dostoevsky's poetics. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1984, p. 287.
29. ↑ Daniel N. Stern: The life experience of the infant. Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 1992, p. 161.
30. ↑ George Herbert Mead: Spirit, Identity and Society from the View of Social Behaviorism. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1934/1968, p. 184 f.
31. ^ William James: The principles of psychology (in two volumes). Holt, New York 1890, p. 294.
32. ↑ M. Huber (Ed.): Many be - a manual - complex trauma and dissociative identity - understand, change, treat. Junfermann, Paderborn 2011, p. 15.
33. ↑ J. Peichl: Hypno-analytical part work - Ego-State-Therapy with inner self-parts. Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 2012, p. 28.
34. ↑ Hubert JM Hermans and G. DiMaggio (eds.): The dialogical self in psychotherapy. Brunner-Routledge, New York 2004, p. 3.
35. ↑ See F.-M. Staemmler: The Secret of the Other - Empathy in Psychotherapy: How therapists and clients understand each other. Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 2009.
36. ↑ See Hubert JM Hermans: The dialogical self as a society of mind. In: Theory & Psychology 2002 12/2, pp. 147-160.
37. ^ M. Adams: Losing one's voice: Dialogical psychology of the unspeakable . In: Theory & Psychology 2010 20/3, p. 343.
38. ↑ MM Bakhtin: Speech genres and other late essays. Edited by C. Emerson and M. Holquist. University of Texas Press, Austin 1986, p. 127.
39. ↑ R. Alexy: A theory of practical discourse. In: W. Oelmüller (Ed.): Justification of standards, enforcement of standards. Schöningh, Paderborn 1978, p. 40 f.
40. ^ J. Valsiner: Forms of dialogical relations and semiotic autoregulation within the self. In: Theory & Psychology 12/2. 2002, pp. 251-265.
41. ↑ V. Bise: Problem solving in dialogue with oneself - Dialogical structures in inner speaking when solving problems: An exploratory study based on the method of thinking aloud. Tectum, Marburg 2008, p. 218.
42. ↑ Cf. E. Goffman: Rede-Weisen - forms of communication in social situations. UVK, Konstanz 2005, p. 154.
43. ↑ Cf. E. Tenzer: Talk to you! In: Psychologie heute 38/9. 2011, pp. 26-30.