Switzerland during the western campaign

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Bern station, 2nd mobilization of war, soldiers on the open platforms of passenger cars (May 11, 1940)

Before Hitler's campaign in the West in May 1940, neutral Switzerland had to reckon with a march through by both German and French troops. Therefore operational defense preparations were made.

In contrast to the reduit strategy in the Alps that was adopted in July 1940 after the fall of France , General Henri Guisan's concept previously focused on a more extensive defense of the country (see e.g. Limmatstellung ). Before Mussolini entered the war, one saw a violation of neutrality by both Germany and France in the realm of possibility.

Admittedly, at a reception given by former Federal Councilor Edmund Schulthess , Hitler had promised to spare Switzerland in the event of a war: it would serve Germany as flank protection against the French when troops were mobilized, which not least also meant saving troops and resources for Germany itself is useful. Hitler's behavior in the pre-war phase with the breach of numerous promises and contracts made (see e.g. Munich Agreement ), however, offered no reason to believe these assurances. It was therefore - in partial violation of the law of neutrality - based on a secret agreement with the French army command under the code name Plan H , which provided for French assistance in the event of a German invasion.

The German Wehrmacht tried to use troop movements on the Rhine, including pontoon troops with bridge elements, to maintain the appearance that an attack could take place here, with the intention of tying up French troops in the south during their advance in the north.

For Hitler and the Wehrmacht there were numerous advantages to bypassing the Maginot Line north (and not south through Switzerland): bases were to be won to threaten England from close by, and the capital Paris was so on the shorter side Ways reachable. According to RAC Parker, this concept has always and unchallenged in the foreground.

For Guisan, regardless of Plan H, it was important to keep an eye on France: A march through Switzerland for a relief attack in the back of the enemy was quite possible. Mussolini's entry into the war shortly before the end of the German campaign in the west also had a further complicating effect.

See also

literature

  • E. Bonjour: History of Swiss Neutrality. 9 volumes, 1970 ff.
  • Willi Gautschi : General Henri Guisan. 1989.
  • Jürg Fink : Switzerland from the perspective of the Third Reich. 1985.
  • Fischer Weltgeschichte / RAC Parker: Europe 1918–1945. 1985.
  • Stephen P. Halbrook: Target Switzerland: Swiss Armed Neutrality in World War II . 1998 (Paperback: Da Capo Press 2008, ISBN 978-0306813252 ).

Individual evidence

  1. Bruno Müller: Magden in the Second World War , on the website of the municipality of Magden, accessed on March 20, 2018.