Single line (Soviet Union)

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The principle of single-line ( Russian "единоначалие" / Jedinonatschalije or in English transcription edinonachalie , as a one-man line or one-man line translated) was a guiding principle in the Soviet Union and its satellite states , which was applied in the state economy and the military. The principle of individual leadership was first formulated by Lenin , who derived it from the principles of " democratic centralism ". According to this, every management task should only be entrusted to a person with full decision-making authority - but also with personal responsibility in the event of failure. In the case of management tasks that could only sensibly be carried out by experts, contradictions arose between the principle of individual management by specialists on the one hand and the political control that the state and party leadership considered necessary on the other. The changing position of the political commissars in relation to the commanders in the Red Army is exemplary for dealing with this contradiction .

Single line in the Soviet Union

Political history

Lenin argued in March 1919 at the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of Russia (Bolsheviks) against the collective principle in the management of army units. Lenin also spoke out in favor of individual leadership in industry: “Heavy industry, the basis of socialism […], demands absolute and strict unity of will. This can only be achieved if thousands subordinate their will to the will of the individual. ”In the later ideological debate during and after Stalin's time, Soviet authors repeatedly referred to these statements by Lenin.

Single line in the military

The Red Army was formed in January 1918, with the revolutionary Red Guards transferred to the army. The armed forces were under the direction of the People's Commissar for Military Leon Trotsky . Shortly after the establishment of the Red Army, Trotsky, with the support of Lenin and important members of the Politburo , abolished the election of commanders taken over by the Red Guards and introduced a hierarchy of officers . Because of the lack of trained officers, especially in higher command functions, generals and officers of the tsarist army were also recruited. In order to combat their feared political unreliability, the Soviet leadership provided every commander from battalion level up with a Polit-Commissar (Politruk) who could revoke the commander's orders if they violated the principles of the CPSU. The civil war against the White Guards lasted until 1921/22.

In 1924 Mikhail Frunze was appointed People's Commissar for the Army and Navy; as the successor to Trotsky, who has meanwhile been pushed into the opposition. Immediately after taking office, Frunze began a military reform, the main aim of which was to professionalize the Red Army. In peace, the Red Army should be a mixed cadre / militia army that could grow up in the event of mobilization. The individual line had been decided in principle in 1924. In March 1925, Frunze issued definitive service regulations for the introduction of individual management. In December 1925 - two months after Frunze's death - the XIV Party Congress of the CPSU ratified this directive.

During the again escalating Cold War in the early 1980s, in the course of the stationing of Soviet medium-range missiles, which had a strategic character due to their high mobility, range and accuracy, there were doubts on the west about the reliability of the Soviet military who had control over these weapons. In response, the leadership of the Soviet Union repeatedly stressed its full control over the missile forces . On September 8, 1983, an article appeared in the official army newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda , in which the principle of individual leadership was defended. Western observers interpreted this as an indication of the army leadership not to return to the principle of shared responsibility - and thus political officers with the power to intervene in the chain of command - despite the current disputes over nuclear armament.

Individual leadership in business

The Shakhty Trial of 1928 is regarded as a turning point in the economic history of the Soviet Union, away from the New Economic Policy and towards Stalinist centralization. In view of the unfulfilled targets, the party leadership propagated the concept of individual leadership from 1929 onwards. Lack of discipline and unclear responsibility were seen as the cause of failure. In view of the unclear power position of the managers in collectivized companies vis-à-vis the party, the trade unions and individual workers, some managers also used these structures as an excuse for their own failure. The tactic of shifting responsibility was called "без началие" (without guidance), the conscious disguise of the decision-makers behind an amorphous collective as "oбезличка" (facelessness).

In September 1929, the Central Committee of the Communist All-Union Party (later CPSU) decided to introduce or strengthen the principle of individual leadership in industrial companies. However, this was not associated with the despotic power of the individual manager - on the contrary, individual leadership also meant to a large extent individual responsibility of the manager towards the party.

Single line outside the Soviet Union

In the economy of the GDR , the principle of single management was officially introduced in the spring of 1948, when their large companies were formally transferred to public ownership.

literature

General history of the single line

Individual leadership in business

  • Hiroaki Kuromiya: Edinonachalie and the Soviet Industrial Manager, 1928-1937 . In: Soviet Studies , Vol. 36, No. 2 (April 1984), pp. 185-204, doi : 10.1080 / 09668138408411523 .

Single line in the military

Individual evidence

  1. ^ John Ellis: Armed components of revolution . In: Michael Elliott-Bateman (Ed.): Revolt to Revolution: Studies in the 19th and 20th Century European Experience . Manchester University Press, Manchester 1974, p. 141.
  2. ^ VI Lenin: Collected Works in 45 Volumes , Volume 27. Moscow 1960-1970, pp. 268f.
  3. ^ Roger R. Reese: Red Army Professionalism and the Communist Party, 1918-1941 . In: The Journal of Military History . Vol. 66, No. 1 (January 2002), pp. 85-86.
  4. ↑ Pointless and dangerous, dangerous for everyone . In: Der Spiegel No. 39/1983 of September 26, 1983.
  5. ^ Matthew J. Payne: Stalin's Railroad: Turksib and the Building of Socialism . University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh 2001, ISBN 0-8229-4166-X , pp. 258f. ( Chapter "The New Industrial Order and Edinonachalie" in the Google book search)
  6. ↑ Hiroaki Kuromiya: Edinonachalie and the Soviet industrial manager, 1928-1937 . In: Soviet Studies , Vol. 36, No. 2 (April 1984), p. 185.
  7. ↑ FS: single line . In: Dieter Dowe, Karlheinz Kuba, Manfred Wilke (Hrsg.): FDGB-Lexikon. Function, structure, cadre and development of a mass organization of the SED (1945-1990) . Research Association SED-State, Berlin 2009, ISBN 978-3-86872-240-6 .