Aarau railway accident

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The ascended baggage car F 2087 destroyed the following PLM passenger car AB3 12656 .

When railway accident in Aarau on June 4, 1899 went in Aarau station an express train Zurich - Geneva the Swiss Northeastern Railway (NOB) above the prescribed holding point and joined into two stationary locomotives of the Swiss Central Railway (SCB). The accident left two dead and three seriously injured.

Starting position

The night express train 26 Zurich – Geneva with 27 axles, consisting of eight passenger cars , one baggage car and one mail car , was dispatched in Zurich at 10:47 p.m. with a two-minute delay. The second place behind the baggage car belonged to the Compagnie Paris – Lyon – Méditerranée (PLM) and was a direct through car to Lyon . Its buffers were deeper than those of the other wagons, but the difference in height was still just within the regulations. The train was equipped with Westinghouse double brakes. It was promoted with a leader to Brugg , where the second locomotive was taken. As the regulations of the time allowed, a brake test was not carried out. On the descent in Brugg, the pressure in the main line was just under 5  at , the air pump was in operation all the way to Aarau.

Train 26 was expected in Aarau at 11:57 p.m. The locomotives were changed there. The route Zurich – Baden –Aarau was operated by the Nordostbahn, the continuation to Olten –Bern by the Centralbahn.

Course of the accident

Aarau station concourse with a Centralbahn train. Train 62 drove into the station concourse at 60 km / h.

In Aarau , the express train drove into the station hall at 60 km / h. Only when entering the hall or later did the engine driver turn off the steam and operate the air pressure brake. He passed the stipulated stopping point, reduced the speed to 40 km / h within 15 seconds and hit two Centralbahn locomotives. The two separation machines waited on the through-track at the west end of the station at km 49.541 for the takeover of train 26 in order to transport it to Bern .

The rear end of the F 2087 baggage car, which was lined up behind the A3T 190 locomotive , was lifted off by the collision. The following PLM passenger car AB3 12656 was pushed into the raised baggage car, whereby a second-class and two first-class train compartments of the passenger car were destroyed. There were ten travelers in these three compartments. Two people were killed, three seriously and eight slightly injured. The two locomotives of the Centralbahn were pushed 20 meters away by the collision. The material damage amounted to CHF 25,000 to 30,000.

Determination of the cause of the accident

Investigations of the Northeast Railway

The Nordostbahn immediately started a preliminary investigation. Twelve hours after the accident - the intact part of the train had already been put away - a control engineer found that the rear air shut-off valve of the PLM wagon was closed and the front one was not completely vertical. In its investigations, the NOB came to the conclusion that the braking effect of the Westinghouse compressed air brake had been severely impaired by air loss due to incorrect manipulation when the second locomotive was lined up in Brugg . The engine driver could have given a whistle to the train crew to apply the hand brakes and to use the locomotive's counter-pressure brake and the tender's handbrake . These means of stopping the train were not used or only used at the last moment.

The Nordostbahn made not only the engine driver responsible for the accident, but also the rest of the accompanying personnel. The stoker failed to draw the engine driver's attention to the situation in good time. The train staff did not reduce the speed of the train either by opening the brake taps or using the hand brakes.

Employing experts

Two people were killed in the wrecked PLM car.

The defender of the accused locomotive driver, National Councilor Ludwig Forrer , applied for the involvement of three experts in the proceedings of the Aarau District Court . As an expert, he suggested a machine master of the Gotthard Railway and engineer Schleifer from Berlin. Schleifer developed a compressed air brake that had been introduced on the Saxon State Railways . He was known in specialist circles as a fierce opponent of the Westinghouse brake. The fact that he was suggested as an expert as a competitor to Westinghouse led to criticism. The court felt compelled to appoint the court experts on its own and commissioned R. Weyermann, mechanical engineer of the Jura-Simplon-Bahn and A. Keller, secretary of the technical commissions of the Swiss Railway Association, with the investigations.

Test drives

The two experts decided to simulate the entrance of the crashed train in Aarau by means of test drives with the same composition as train no. The driver's brake valve of the A3T 190 machine in the accident was installed in the locomotive of the test train . In the Biel workshop of the Jura-Simplon Railway, the pressure loss was measured beforehand on a train with the same composition when the main line was no longer fed. With an initial pressure of 5 at, the pressure loss after 20 minutes with the brake line in good condition was 0.6 at and with poor condition 1.9 at. Accordingly, at least 3 at were available for rapid braking of the train in Aarau.

Before the journeys, according to the instructions of the engine driver and the stoker, it was determined where which actions were carried out:

  • 1912 meters before the collision, the engine driver turned off the steam.
  • The air brake was activated 648 meters before the collision.
  • The stoker pulled the handbrake on the tender 545 meters before the collision.
  • 283 meters before the collision, the engine driver released an emergency brake.
  • 227 meters before the collision (beginning of the station hall) the driver activated the steam brake on the locomotive.
  • 174 meters before the collision, the conductor opened the brake line of the last car.

The test drives showed that the two air shut-off cocks on the PLM wagon were open, the Westinghouse air brake worked throughout the train and the air brake also worked flawlessly with 3 at main line pressure.

Cause of the collision

The immediate cause of the collision was that the engine driver exerted the pulling force for too long. Because of the delayed braking of the Nordostbahn train No. 26, the collision could no longer be prevented.

The collision would not have happened:

  • if the two separation machines of the SCB had waited on a siding and not on the exit track towards Olten .
  • if the stoker had made the engine driver aware of the delayed steam shutdown.
  • if the train crew had opened a brake valve in good time.
  • if the leaders of the SCB had reacted to the stop signals of the station assistant and drove away with their releasing machines.

The lower buffer height of the PLM trolley made it easier for the baggage trolley to climb up and the PLM trolley to be smashed. The impact speed of the express train would have been lower with a driving wheel brake on locomotive No. 190, with better maintained car brakes and with a speed limit at the entrance to Aarau station.

consequences

After the accident, the separation machines were no longer waiting on the through track in Aarau.

On March 30, 1901, the Aarau District Court sentenced the engine driver of train No. 26 to a total of eight weeks ' imprisonment . The Aargau High Court , to which the defense and the public prosecutor appealed , upheld the judgment of the first instance on January 25, 1902 and increased the prison sentence by a week. The convicted engine driver submitted a pardon to the Federal Assembly . The Federal Council requested that the request be rejected.

literature

  • The opinion of the court experts on the railway accident at Aarau station on June 4, 1899 . In: Schweizerische Bauzeitung (SBZ)
    Part I. (PDF 2.8 MB) In: Volume 36, Issue December     23 , 1900, pp. 221–224 , accessed on April 15, 2015 . Part II. (PDF 1.8 MB) In: Volume 36, Issue 24 December 15, 1900, pp. 234-237 , accessed on April 15, 2015 . Part III (conclusion). (PDF 1.4 MB) In: Volume 36, issue December 25th, 22nd 1900, pp. 245–247 , accessed on April 15, 2015 .

References and comments

  1. ↑ a b About the railway accident in Aarau. (PDF 1.2 MB) In: Schweizerische Bauzeitung (SBZ), Volume 33, Issue June 24, 17, 1899, pp. 225–226 , accessed on April 15, 2015 .
  2. ↑ a b c Railway accident in Aarau. (PDF 0.6 MB) In: Schweizerische Bauzeitung (SBZ), Volume 33, Issue June 23 , 1899, p. 213 , accessed on April 15, 2015 .
  3. ↑ a b SBZ Volume 36, Issue 24, Pages 234–236
  4. ↑ SBZ Volume 36, Issue 23, Page 224
  5. ↑ The property border was not in Aarau station, but to the west in Wöschnau on the Solothurn-Aarau canton border.
  6. ↑ a b c Report of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly on the pardon request of Heinrich Metzger, who was convicted of negligent railroad endangerment, former locomotive driver of the Swiss Northeast Railway, in Seebach near Zurich. (PDF 0.4 MB) In: Swiss Federal Gazette. June 21, 1902, pp. 885-893 , accessed October 20, 2013 .
  7. ↑ a b The higher court ruling on the railway accident at Aarau station on June 4, 1899. (PDF 3.7 MB) In: Schweizerische Bauzeitung (SBZ), Volume 39, Issue April 15 , 1902, pp. 162–165 , accessed on April 15, 2015 .
  8. ↑ a b Railway accident in Aarau. (PDF 1.0 MB) In: Schweizerische Bauzeitung (SBZ), Volume 34, Issue July 1 , 1899, p. 11 , accessed on April 15, 2015 .
  9. ^ Railway accident in Aarau. (PDF 0.5 MB) In: Schweizerische Bauzeitung (SBZ), Volume 34, Issue 12. September 23, 1899, p. 116 , accessed on April 15, 2015 .
  10. ↑ Railway operational safety (train brakes, signaling). In: Meyers Konversationslexikon. 1885-1892, p. 238, accessed April 15, 2015
  11. ↑ SBZ Volume 36, Issue 23, Page 222
  12. ^ Railway accident in Aarau. (PDF 0.6 MB) In: Schweizerische Bauzeitung (SBZ), Volume 33, Issue 16 October 21, 1899, p. 158 , accessed on April 15, 2015 .
  13. ↑ The travel time of train No. 26 from Brugg to Aarau was 19 minutes.
  14. ↑ This measure was ineffective because, because the rapid braking had already been triggered, the air pressure brake was already active with the greatest possible braking force.
  15. ↑ The regulations require the train crew to stand on the platforms of the wagons when entering a train station and observe the entrance.
  16. ↑ As already mentioned, the locomotives were changed in Aarau anyway.