Norton Fitzwarren Railway Accident

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In the Norton Fitzwarren railway accident on the night of November 4, 1940, a train ran over the end of a guard rail after a signal mix-up and derailed . 26 people died.

Starting position

Infrastructure

The railway Reading-Plymouth of the Great Western Railway was - coming from London - to Norton Fitzwarren viergleisig expanded. The outer tracks were used by slower traffic and the inner ones by faster trains, both in the left-hand traffic common in Great Britain . In the exit of the station Norton Fitzwarren which was external to the inner track introduced. From here the line was only two-pronged. This point was secured with a safety switch that led into a 30 meter long dead end that ended without a buffer stop.

The signals were - contrary to the usual practice - not the left of the track, but for the "high-speed tracks" in the middle between the two dedicated tracks, ie, because the distance between the outer tracks and the high-speed tracks to the right was low to here still to place signal masts. The track and vehicles were equipped with the Automatic Train Control (ATC) safety system. This emitted a warning tone when the train approached a distant signal in the position "expect stop". Then the engine driver had to confirm that he had heard the warning or brake. Due to the Second World War , it was darkened and the stations were not illuminated.

First express train

The night train from London to Penzance was on this route with around 900 passengers and a delay of more than an hour. As an express train , it initially used the inner track of the line in a westerly direction. The locomotive of the train was a steam locomotive of the GWR series 6000 ("King Class") with the number 6028, which pulled 13 passenger cars . On the Great Western Railway , the engine driver's seat was on the right side of the machine, while the signals were usually to the left of the track.

The train driver's house had been damaged in a bomb attack shortly before , but he had nevertheless appeared on duty.

Second express train

This express train was followed by another express train, which consisted of a locomotive and five cars , was also on the way from London to Penzance, traveled about 90 km / h and carried newspapers. This should be given priority, also because it did not stop in Taunton. The dispatcher in Taunton therefore let the first train leave his station on the outer track for the slower trains so that the second express train on the long-distance track could overtake it. The driver of the train ahead was not expressly informed of this.

the accident

Simplified representation of the track layout at the accident site

The first train left Taunton station after a stop before the second express train passed through it. The driver of the first train did not notice that he was on the outer instead of the high-speed track. The blackout certainly contributed to the error of the engine driver. He therefore paid attention to the signals on the right - which all indicated "free travel" for the faster moving train - not the ones on the left, which were meant for him. In front of Norton Fitzwarren, the distant signal was set to " Wait for a stop", the main signal was set to "Stop". In this way they covered the introduction of the outer track onto the inner track. The signals from the high-speed track, on the other hand, showed "Drive free". The drive from Taunton to Norton Fitzwarren took about three minutes. Shortly before the accident, the train was traveling at about 70 km / h.

There was no evidence that the ATC was failing. When the warning tone of the ATC sounded when approaching the distant signal indicating “Wait to stop”, the engine driver saw a signal in front of him which - inappropriately - he thought was the one that was valid for him and showed “Drive clear”. He assumed that the security system was malfunctioning and confirmed that he had heard the warning signal. So he drove past the stop signal that was valid for him at 65 km / h.

At the same time the second train passed him. This made him realize his mistake, that he was driving on the outer track, not the inner one. But he couldn't brake in time. The train drove over the safety switch and the end of the track at 3:48 a.m., the locomotive fell down an embankment, overturned and came to rest after 50 meters. The first six wagons of the train derailed, were destroyed or badly damaged and ended up in an adjacent meadow and on all the tracks on the route, which was completely blocked. The overtaking train only avoided being involved in the accident by the derailing train by a fraction of a second.

consequences

26 people were killed in the accident, including the stoker of the steam locomotive , 56 others were seriously injured, 18 slightly injured. The engine driver survived and could be questioned about the accident.

The conductor of the faster newspaper train only heard unusual noises - as it later turned out, stones from the railway ballast had flown through a window of the overtaking train when the derailing train plowed through the ballast.

Local first aid was on site after about half an hour, relief trains from Taunton, Newton Abbot and Swindon arrived one after the other from about 6:00 a.m. At around 8:00 p.m. on the day of the accident, the line could be used again on a single track, after another day all tracks were open again.

The investigation report found that although the engine driver's seat was on the right side of the machine and the signals to the left of the track, his view of the signals was not impaired. The investigation report assumed that the engine driver's failure was the only reason for the accident.

See also

literature

  • Lionel Thomas Caswell Rolt : Red for Danger. The classic history of British railway disasters. Sutton Publishing 1998. ISBN 0-7509-2047-5
  • Ascanio Schneider u. Armin Masé: Disasters on the rails. Railway accidents, their causes and consequences . Zurich 1968, pp. 91–95.

Web links

Coordinates: 51 ° 1 '23.9 "  N , 3 ° 8' 57.1"  W.