Epiphenomenon
An epiphenomenon is an entity that has been causally caused, but has no (significant) causal effect itself. There are two ways of using the term:
- In a weak sense , all states of a system are called epiphenomena that have no significant effect on the system. In this sense z. For example, the smoke from a steam locomotive is an epiphenomenon if it is not considered significant: the smoke has causal effects, but these are considered insignificant in the example of the steam locomotive system.
- In a strong sense , states are epiphenomena if and only if they have no causal effects.
Consciousness as an epiphenomenon
The concept of the epiphenomenon plays a role in the philosophy of mind when consciousness is viewed as an epiphenomenon. The philosophical epiphenomenalism (EP) was already represented by Charles Bonnet and later made popular , in particular by Thomas Henry Huxley . Epiphenomenalism can be viewed as a special form of dualism that avoids the problems of interactionist dualism in the Descartes tradition by denying that these mental experiences are causally effective as a cause for subsequent events.
Descartes assumed a bidirectional interaction between the material on the one hand and the non-physical, mental states on the other. The objection to such a dualistic conception was, among other things, that there is already a sufficient physical cause for every action, and that causation through immaterial entities is therefore superfluous (causal overdetermination).
A general epiphenomenalism was rarely explicitly represented in philosophy. Proponents of the model object that the reason for this is less to be sought in the argumentative superiority of alternative theories of the mind than in the fact that the consequences of the EP run counter to the culturally derived image of man in essential points. However, it has often been claimed that certain properties of consciousness (especially the qualia ) are in fact epiphenomenal.
In addition, some other concepts of the philosophy of mind - such as Donald Davidson's anomalous monism - can be objected to the fact that although they attempt to establish an alternative, coherent concept, these constructs, on closer examination, also amount to epiphenomenalism.
Objections and replies
The following objections have been raised against epiphenomenalism (EP):
- The claim that consciousness phenomena have no causal effects is counterintuitive . In everyday life we take it for granted that, for example, the unpleasant subjective sensation of a painful event can be the cause of someone moaning. Just as loving feelings can induce a person to kiss someone. According to epiphenomenalism, we would be mistaken in that it is the physical events that cause the experience of pain that are the actual cause of the moan, not the uncomfortable mental sensation of the pain. The argument that epiphenomenalism is counterintuitive is fundamentally meaningless in itself, since counterintuitiveness in no way implies falsehood. Examples of this are the blind spot in the field of vision or false memories.
- Furthermore, it is argued against epiphenomenalism that it would be incomprehensible in the EP that we know anything about the existence of our consciousness phenomena or remember them and that we can communicate our individual sensations and feelings even if they are not in ours in any way Behavior ( Lit .: Bieri, 1992). This EP criticism favors an explanatory model of the mind, according to which mental phenomena, such as pain during a visit to the dentist, M1 (see graphic) is the causal cause for the memory of this particular pain M2. It is therefore possible for mental phenomena to be the causal cause of another mental phenomenon (M1 → M2). However - even if one assumes such a causal causation of the mental, although the functioning of causal mental causation cannot be conclusively explained - it is difficult to see why this model should be superior to an explanation by the EP in this respect. In the sense of the EP, the physical event P1 with its mental epiphenomenon M1 occurs in the case of pain during the visit to the dentist. At a later point in time, this physical event P1 is the causal cause for the neural basis of memory P2 with its mental epiphenomenon - the actual memory - M2 ([P1 + M1] → [P2 + M2]).
- If our mental phenomena do not play a causal role, as the EP suggests, the question arises as to why evolution produced these phenomena in the first place. Basically, like the objection of counterintuitiveness, it is not an argument that directly attacks the internal coherence of the EP, but rather one that asks how the EP can be reconciled with other beliefs or theories. Evolution basically filters out characteristics that are disadvantageous in the reproductive competition. A lack of advantage or a disadvantage that is not relevant for reproduction remains unaffected by the selection. In addition, it is quite conceivable that our highly developed brain, which represents a decisive evolutionary advantage, leads to epiphenomenal consciousness as an irrelevant but systemically inevitable side effect (see Spandrel ). This is comparable to the fur of polar bears: The fact that their fur is heavy and the animals are less nimble as a result is an evolutionary disadvantage. However, the high weight is an inevitable systemic consequence of the fact that the polar bear absolutely needs a fur that protects it from the extremely cold environmental conditions.
See also: Mental causation
Epiphenomenon in Political Science
The term epiphenomenon also appears in the political science sub-discipline of international relations . There is a dispute between realists and liberalists about the influence of national and supranational institutions on state action.
Realists refer to institutions as epiphenomena that have no influence on government action. The state always acts only according to aspects of securing and expanding power.
Liberalists, on the other hand, reject this view of institutions as epiphenomena. They assume that international organizations must even be created to solve national-state problems. The effect of international systems consists in precisely this ability. In addition, it is possible to resolve conflicts through supranational systems and to secure peace regardless of power-political aspects.
literature
- Thomas Henry Huxley : On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata, and its History. In: The Fortnightly Review. 16, 95, 1874, ZDB -ID 715786-1 , pp. 555-580, Classical formulation of epiphenomenalism.
- Frank Cameron Jackson : Epiphenomenal Qualia. In: The Philosophical Quarterly. 32, 1982, ISSN 0031-8094 , pp. 127-136 argumentation for epiphenomenalism with the help of qualia.
- Peter Bieri : Trying out Epiphenomenalism. In: Knowledge. 36, 1992, ISSN 0165-0106 , pp. 283-309. Influential modern discussion of epiphenomenalism.
Web links
- William Robinson : Epiphenomenalism. In: Edward N. Zalta (Ed.): Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
- Sven Walter : Epiphenomenalism. In: Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
- Volker Gadenne : Discussion of Epiphenalism (PDF file; 69 kB)
- Sven Walter: Is epiphenomenalism absurd? A fresh look at a position believed dead (PDF file; 156 kB)
swell
- ^ Sven Walter : Epiphenomenalism. In: Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy . Retrieved on February 18, 2013 : " " the soul is a mere spectator of the movements of its body; […] The latter performs of itself all that series of actions which constitutes life; [...] it moves of itself; [...] it is the body alone which reproduces ideas, compares and arranges them; which forms reasonings, imagines and executes plans of all kinds etc. " (Charles Bonnet: Essai de Psychologie , 1755, p. 91) "
- ^ Thomas Henry Huxley: On the hypothesis that animals are automata, and its history. In: Fortnightly Review. 22, 1874, pp. 555-580.
- ^ Donald Davidson: Essays on Actions and Events Oxford. Oxford University Press, 1980, ISBN 0-19-924627-0 .
- ↑ Piccinini, G., Maley, C., Robinson, Z .: Is Consciousness a Spandrel?