Feel-as-Information Theory

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The feeling-as-information theory by Norbert Schwarz (1987) represents a psychological framework model for the conceptualization of the role of feelings in the formation of human judgment. It states that under certain conditions people use feelings as the basis for value judgments.

development

The feeling-as-information theory was developed by Norbert Schwarz in the late 1980s. The theory integrates various previous findings from other researchers. Schachter and Singer (1962) showed early on with their research on arousal the importance of attributions , i.e. causal ascriptions in human experience. In their study, the participants inferred from the level of their physical arousal (which was manipulated by the investigators without the knowledge of the participants) about their mental state. It could also be shown that moods increase the accessibility of mood-congruent information in the memory, i.e. information that matches the mood. This means that when a person is making a judgment, information appropriate to the current mood is particularly present.
Wyer and Carlston (1979) integrated both findings and showed that feelings can also be used as information for judgments in the human judgment process, even if they are independent of the judgment object. This is supported by a work by Griffitt and Veitch (1971), which shows that in interpersonal relationships it is sufficient to associate the other with positive feelings in order to increase interpersonal attraction, even if these feelings are coincidental or from another source come. There was therefore reason for Schwarz to assume that Zajonc 's thesis “Preferences need no inferences” should be questioned. Contrary to this statement, the findings presented above speak for a decisive influence of attributions and thus conclusions on the way from feelings to judgments.

Classic experiments

The classic experiments by Schwarz and Clore from 1983 provided further evidence of the importance of emotional states in human judgment. In a first experiment, Schwarz and Clore tried to find out whether the increased accessibility to the current mood of suitable memory contents can explain their influence on the formation of judgments or whether there is actually a judgment process in which the mood is used as information. To do this, they brought the test participants into a positive or negative mood by having them write down either a positive or a negative event from the past. At the same time, it was suggested to the participants that the room in which the experiment took place created a good or depressing mood. The prediction of the authors was as follows: If only the accessibility of mood-congruent information is effective, then the initial mood manipulation should show its effect independently of the information about the room. If the mood is used as information in the judgment process, the participants should first check whether it has anything to do with the judgment to be given. Accordingly, participants who attribute their mood to the effects of the room should not use this information in judgment. Only those participants whose mood could not be explained by the supposed effects of the room should the mood influence the judgment. The predicted effects became apparent (but only for those participants who had initially remembered a sad event). In a second experiment, the effect was examined in a more natural setting: the investigators called people on either sunny or rainy days and asked them about their satisfaction with life. People reported higher life satisfaction on sunny days than on rainy days. This effect disappeared when the investigators asked about the weather at the whereabouts of the participants before the question about life satisfaction, since they then correctly attributed their mood to the weather.

Postulates

The feeling-as-information theory is based on four central postulates:

  1. People use their feelings as information for making judgments. Different types of feelings are the basis of different types of information:
    1. Affective feelings: referred to as emotions when they are directed at a target object, whereas moods are more diffuse, have no clear target object and usually last longer. For example, anger informs us that someone has done us wrong and thus provides more specific information than a generally negative mood.
    2. Cognitive feelings: provide information about your own level of knowledge (e.g. processing fluency , familiarity)
    3. Physical feelings (e.g. pain, physiological arousal)
  2. The influence of feelings in making judgments depends on their perceived informative value.
    1. People assume that their current feelings relate to what is currently the focus of their attention. This is rarely questioned, but it is often incorrect.
    2. In contrast, if a feeling is attributed to a random source (i.e. a person is aware that the feeling has a different cause than the object in focus), its informative value is perceived as lower - for example, this other cause was that in the experiment described above Weather. On the other hand, it is rated higher if there are actual reasons for a different feeling, but the perceived feeling still predominates.
    3. Changes in emotional perception are more informative than stable emotional states.
  3. When feelings are used as information, this use follows the same principles as any other type of information. Feelings are only used as a basis for information if their informational value is not questioned. The stronger the impression that the feelings are relevant to a question, the greater their influence.
    1. Low processing capacity (triggered for example by other simultaneously running information processing processes) and low motivation also lead to a greater influence of this information. In concrete terms, this is the case, for example, when a person is mentally very busy with something else. If, on the other hand, alternative information is available and is also considered, the influence of feelings as information is reduced. As a result, for example, people in areas they are well versed in have less access to the information that gives them their feelings.
    2. Some feelings require more interpretation and provide a broader framework for them than others. Moods accordingly provide more diffuse information about the valence of an object of judgment (ie about how positively or negatively it is viewed) than, for example, emotions. In addition, depending on their own naive theory, people draw different conclusions from the ease with which they experience information. For example, if an event is difficult to remember, there are several possible reasons for it: the event might have been a while ago, or it might not have been important enough to attract much attention.
  4. Like information of any other kind, feelings can also be used as a basis for judgment. The processing path is selected differently depending on the assessment of a situation; for example, in known situations or situations experienced as unproblematic, routines and prior knowledge are more likely to be used.

Moderators

Greifeneder, Bless and Pham (2010) identified five groups of moderators for the process of judging on the basis of feelings:

  1. The salience (ie, the noticeability) of the feeling. If a feeling receives more attention than other feelings or other information, it is used more as a basis for judgment. This would be the case, for example, if a person has a strong dislike for a speaker even though they do not judge the content of the speech negatively.
  2. The representativeness of the feeling for the target object. Representativeness is meant here as the degree to which the feeling is experienced as starting from the target object or reflects central features of the object. In the speaker example, the feeling would be representative if it was triggered by the speaker and appeared to contain information about him.
  3. The relevance of the feeling to the judgment. In contrast to the representativeness, which relates to the target object, this is about the actual judgment, for example the credibility of the speaker.
  4. The evaluative malleability of the judgment. Feelings have a stronger influence, the more malleable the judgment, in the example depending on how changeable the credibility assessment is.
  5. The level of processing intensity. The influence of the feeling towards the speaker would be greater if the judging person is distracted from the speaker and his words, for example by other influences.

See also

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Schachter, S., & Singer, JE (1962). Cognitive, social, and physiological determinants of emotional state. In: Psychological Review. 69, pp. 379-399.
  2. ↑ Isen, AM, Shalker, TE, Clark, MS, & Karp, L. (1978). Affect, accessibility of material in memory, and behavior: A cognitive loop? In: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 36, pp. 1-12.
  3. ↑ Wyer, RS & Carlston, DE (1979). Social cognition, inference, and attribution. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
  4. ↑ Griffitt, W., & Veitch, R. (1971). Hot and crowded: Influences of population density and temperature on interpersonal behavior. In: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 17, pp. 92-98.
  5. ^ Zajonc, RB (1980). Feeling and thinking. Preferences need no inferences. In: American Psychologist . 35, pp. 151-175.
  6. ↑ Schwarz, N., & Clore, GL (1983). Mood, misattribution, and judgments of well-being: Informative and directive functions of affective states. In: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 45, pp. 513-523.
  7. ^ Schwarz, N. (2010). Feelings-as-information theory. To appear in P. Van Lange, A. Kruglanski & ET Higgins (Eds.). Handbook of theories of social psychology. Legend.
  8. ^ Greifeneder, R. & Bless, H. (2007). Relying on accessible content versus accessibility experiences: The case of processing capacity. In: Social Cognition. 25 (6), pp. 853-881.
  9. ^ Greifeneder, R., Bless, H. & Pham, MT (in press). When do people rely on affective and cognitive feelings in judgment? A review. In: Personality and Social Psychology Review. doi : 10.1177 / 1088868310367640 .